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Universidade Autónoma de Lisboa

e-ISSN: 1647-7251

VOL15, N.º 2, TD1

Thematic Dossier – Brazil-China relations:

The rise of modern International Order

December 2024

354

BRAZIL-CHINA RELATIONS SINCE 2003: CONVERGENCES AND DIVERGENCES

ANDRÉ LUIZ REIS DA SILVA

reisdasilva@hotmail.com

Associated professor at Federal University of Rio Grande do Sul (Brazil). Ph.D. in Political Science

and CNPq researcher. https://orcid.org/0000-0003-2593-1189.

JULI ARUSIEWICZ BERTA

juli.berta@ufrgs.br

International Relations student at Federal University of Rio Grande do Sul (Brazil) and researcher

assistant which a FAPERGS scholarship. https://orcid.org/0009-0008-2013-7449.

MAIARA DE ALMEIDA CARDOZO NUNES

maiaranunes663@gmail.com

International Relations student at Federal University of Rio Grande do Sul (Brazil) and researcher

assistant which a CNPq scholarship. https://orcid.org/0009-0009-2279-3930.

Abstract

This article aims to analyze the relations between Brazil and China since 2003 to identify

major lines of continuity and changes. The specific objectives are to map the main lines of

Brazilian Foreign Policy, the perspective on the importance of China in bilateral relations and

the main differences and challenges presented. The central argument is that changes in

Brazilian Foreign Policy, especially with how Brazil perceives its position in the world and its

relationship with major powers, have conditioned relations with China since 2003, causing

fluctuations in the political relationship despite their growing economic interaction. The

methodology is based on bibliographic analysis and the examination of Brazilian public

diplomatic documents.

Keywords

Brazil-China Relations, Brazilian Foreign Policy, Lula, Dilma, Bolsonaro.

Resumo

Este artigo tem como objetivo geral analisar as relações Brasil-China desde 2003,

identificando as grandes linhas de continuidade e de mudança. Como objetivos específicos

mapear as grandes linhas da política externa brasileira, a visão sobre a importância da China

nas relações bilaterais e as principais oscilações e desafios apresentados. A metodologia de

análise está assentada em análise bibliográfica e de documentos públicos diplomáticos

brasileiros. O argumento central é de que as alterações na política externa brasileira, em

especial como o Brasil percebe sua posição no mundo e na relação com as grandes potências,

condicionaram as relações com a China desde 2003, provocando oscilações no relacionamento

político, a despeito de sua crescente interação econômica.

Palavras-chave

Relações Brasil-China, Política Externa Brasileira, Lula, Dilma, Bolsonaro.

JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations

e-ISSN: 1647-7251

VOL 15 N.º 2, TD 1

Thematic Dossier

Brazil-China relations: The rise of modern International Order

December 2024, pp. 354-367

Brazil-China Relations Since 2003: Convergences And Divergences

André Luiz Reis da Silva, Maiara de Almeida Cardozo

355

How to cite this article

Silva, André Luiz Reis da & Nunes, Maiara de Almeida Cardozo (2024). Brazil-China Relations Since

2003: Convergences And Divergences. Janus.net, e-journal of international relations. VOL 15 N.º

2, TD1 – Temathic Dossier – “Brazil - China Relations: The Rise Of Modern International Order”.

December 2024, pp. 354-367. https://doi.org/10.26619/1647-7251.DT0324.17.

Article received on 1 June 2024 and accepted for publication on 30 September 2024.

JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations

e-ISSN: 1647-7251

VOL 15 N.º 2, TD 1

Thematic Dossier

Brazil-China relations: The rise of modern International Order

December 2024, pp. 354-367

Brazil-China Relations Since 2003: Convergences And Divergences

André Luiz Reis da Silva, Maiara de Almeida Cardozo

356

BRAZIL-CHINA RELATIONS SINCE 2003:

CONVERGENCES AND DIVERGENCES

ANDRÉ LUIZ REIS DA SILVA

JULI ARUSIEWICZ BERTA

MAIARA DE ALMEIDA CARDOZO NUNES

Introduction

The international system is facing a complex and transformative power transition,

becoming more multipolar, in which the United States, as the hegemonic leader,

considers China its main rival. China’s rise, observed in recent decades, characterized by

the shift in its growth model and rapid economic and technological development, has

challenged the U.S. position in the global order, increasing tension between the two

countries (Ross, 2020). However, the economies of China and the U.S are strongly linked

and interdependent (Li & Bernal-Meza, 2021). According to Ross (2020) the power

transition stimulates competition between Beijing and Washington but doesn't stop them

from cooperating. However, this requires pragmatic leadership. Nonetheless, China has

been expanding its economic and diplomatic ties, becoming one of the main economic

partners for many countries.

China emerges as an alternative to the current world order, challenging the division of

States into core, semi-peripheral, and peripheral categories proposed by Wallerstein

(2004), as well as the maintenance of the global status quo (Li, 2020). As a rising power,

the Asian country seeks to promote multipolarity and reform international agreements to

include the interests of developing countries. It is evident, therefore, that China's rise

and the relative decline of the United States represent a shift in the global balance of

power (Can & Chan, 2020).

In the early 21st century, Brazil emerged as a significant player on the international

system, recognized as important by other powers. Brazil's place in the world is in constant

redefinition. Whether designated as an emerging power, a middle power, or a regional

power, the country's size does not allow it to play a minor role. It is within this context

of systemic transformations that one of Brazil's central challenges lies: navigate these

global changes while aiming for autonomy and internal development (Silva, 2023). To

achieve this, Brazil has pursued strategic partnerships, South-South cooperation,

JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations

e-ISSN: 1647-7251

VOL 15 N.º 2, TD 1

Thematic Dossier

Brazil-China relations: The rise of modern International Order

December 2024, pp. 354-367

Brazil-China Relations Since 2003: Convergences And Divergences

André Luiz Reis da Silva, Maiara de Almeida Cardozo

357

regional integration, and a multilateral approach (Silva, 2023). In this context, relations

with China have been fundamental for Brazil's development.

In 1974, Brazil and China established political-diplomatic relations due to the

convergence of their interests and agendas. In this context, the subsequent years were

marked by the establishment of a "Strategic Partnership'' between the two countries in

1993 and the creation of the China-Brazil High-Level Coordination and Cooperation

Commission (COSBAN) in 2004. These relations had deepened to such an extent that in

2009 the Asian country became Brazil's main trading partner and the primary contributor

to the surplus in Brazil's trade balance (Brasil, 2024). Meanwhile, the international

scenario was characterized by China's economic rise and the weakening of the United

States as a global power. Concurrently, a multipolar system is increasingly emerging,

with the persistence of old and the rise of new powers, both in the Global North and the

Global South.

This article has the main objective to analyze the relations between Brazil and China

since 2003, identifying the continuity and changes up to the present day. The specific

objectives are to map the main lines of Brazilian Foreign Policy, the view on the

importance of China in bilateral relations and the main fluctuations and challenges

presented. The methodology is based on bibliographic analysis and the examination of

Brazilian diplomatic documents. The theoretical basis is in the interpretation that foreign

policy is a public policy, influenced by internal and external factors, and conditioned by

the country's capacities and constraints within the international system, as well as its

internal power bloc, political leadership, and worldview (Silva, 2004; Silva, 2023). The

central hypothesis is that changes in Brazilian Foreign Policy, particularly in how Brazil

perceives its global position and its relationships with major powers, affect the speed and

intensity of relations with China, despite the growing economic interaction.

Since the first Lula administration, which began in 2003, Brazil has increased its proximity

to China both diplomatically and economically. Brazil and China have maintained a deep

connection since the beginning of their relations, celebrating 50 years in 2024 (MRE,

2024). Therefore, it is important to understand how Brazil-China relations developed

from 2003 to 2010, the changes from 2011 to 2022, and the perspectives of Brazilian

governments on China, including the current view, cooperation, and the limitations posed

by internal and international policies.

The expansion of Brazil-China Relations since the turn of the millennium

The first Lula’s government operated on a new base of Brazilian Foreign Policy, aiming

to overcome the limitations of the 1990s and adapting Brazil to the transition in the

international system. This approach focused on deepening regional integration in South

America, reviving Brazil's multilateral tradition with a critical approach on international

asymmetries and seeking strategic partnerships with similar countries worldwide (Cervo

and Bueno, 2011; Silva, 2015). Additionally, coalition groups with variable geometry,

such as IBSA, the G20 in the WTO, and BRICS, were formed. These new coalitions

expanded the power of the participating countries, not only through an increased veto

JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations

e-ISSN: 1647-7251

VOL 15 N.º 2, TD 1

Thematic Dossier

Brazil-China relations: The rise of modern International Order

December 2024, pp. 354-367

Brazil-China Relations Since 2003: Convergences And Divergences

André Luiz Reis da Silva, Maiara de Almeida Cardozo

358

capacity (collective obstruction) against dominant-country initiatives and proposing

proactive solutions to global challenges (Silva, 2015).

During Lula's first two governments (2003-2010), relations with China were primarily

guided by the principles of cooperation and mutual interests across various sectors

including science, technology, agriculture, education, culture, trade, industry,

infrastructure, development and multilateral affairs. During this period, Brazil tried to

align itself with China aiming for mutual development through a “Strategic Partnership”

(Silva & Frutuoso, 2011). Simultaneously, China was opening up to foreign investment

and expanding its economic presence with a bilateral and multilateral commercial

diplomacy in a quest to translate economic power into political gains (Dittmer, 2010).

With the end of the first two Lula governments, Brazil entered a new phase both

domestically and in its foreign policy. During Dilma Rousseff's presidency (2011-2016),

Brazil maintained a foreign policy similar to Lula's but faced internal crises, economic

deterioration and a political support loss aggravated by the 2008 global financial crisis.

Brazil's position in the international system remained largely unchanged. However,

domestically, the country experienced economic decline, inflation, and recession. The

government of Dilma Rousseff was marked by protests and a loss of support from

business and political sectors, culminating in her impeachment in 2016 (Silva, 2021).

From 2010 to 2014, Brazil and China strengthened their relations as China expanded its

global influence. Brazil's foreign policy focused on South-South cooperation,

universalism, and enhancing its regional leadership. Consequently, both governments

approved the Joint Action Plan (2010-2014), which aimed to promote equal cooperation,

bilateral discussions on mutual interests to deepen relations with a focus on coordination,

strategic vision, and exchange between the countries (MRE, 2010a; MRE, 2010b). This

joint plan underscored the shared interests of both parties in forming a strategic

partnership for the development of each country and their relations domestically and

internationally (Leite, 2013). The strategic partnership has been upgraded to

“comprehensive strategic partnership” in 2012 and a Global Strategic Dialogue between

Ministers of Foreign Affairs along Ten-Year Cooperation Plan was established (2012-

2021).

With Dilma’s impeachment, Vice President Michel Temer assumed the presidency of Brazil

from 2016 to 2019. During Temer's government, Brazil-China relations were not as close

as in the two previous administrations (De Sousa, Abrão & Porto, 2023). The focus was

primarily on internal crises, particularly economic challenges. The relationship with China

continued based on economic interests, especially in agribusiness, as the Temer

government has interests in economic benefits from the bilateral relationship with China

(Moreira, 2020).

In this context of internal crisis and reorientation of Brazilian Foreign Policy, Jair

Bolsonaro assumed the presidency from 2019 to 2022, proposing a shift that included

distancing Brazil from China, now seen as a threat to Brazil and the West. However, as

we will see next, this orientation was moderated by various factors. In 2023, Lula

returned to the presidency, aiming to reclaim Brazil's lost ground in international

relations. Under the slogan "Brazil is back," Lula's government adopted a foreign policy

focused on defending multilateralism and multipolarity, reestablishing South-South

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e-ISSN: 1647-7251

VOL 15 N.º 2, TD 1

Thematic Dossier

Brazil-China relations: The rise of modern International Order

December 2024, pp. 354-367

Brazil-China Relations Since 2003: Convergences And Divergences

André Luiz Reis da Silva, Maiara de Almeida Cardozo

359

cooperation, and enhancing regional articulation in South America. In this context, it also

meant revitalizing political-diplomatic cooperation within the BRICS group and expanding

partnership with China (Silva, 2023).

Over the past 20 years, Brazil and the world have undergone various changes, especially

in their relations with China, which have also adapted to the interests and objectives of

the different Brazilian governments. From 2000 to 2010, the most recurrent themes in

bilateral cooperation between China and Brazil were multipolarity, infrastructure, trade,

science and technology, global governance, and cooperation in business, trade, and

investments (MRE, 2004). With the transition to Dilma Rousseff's presidency, national

interests shifted towards a series of internal conflicts spreading across the country (Silva,

2021). Additionally, cooperation with China continued to focus on multipolarity,

international governance, science and technology, energy, mining, investments,

infrastructure, and cultural exchanges between the countries and their national subunits

(MRE, 2014).

Under Michel Temer's government, internal issues, especially economic ones, were

predominant (Moreira, 2020). The relationship with China continued to be based on

cooperation, international governance, multipolarity, investments, and free trade (MRE,

2017). During Bolsonaro's administration, relations with China were turbulent (Santoro,

2020), but they remained focused on trade, investments, agriculture, energy, science,

technology, and commercial flows (MRE, 2019). Under Lula’s new government, Brazil

seeks to increase its role in the international system and strengthen ties with developing

countries. Therefore, there is a renewed effort to enhance relations with China, aiming

for cooperation in social development, technology, multilateralism, trade, environment,

transportation, science, and technology (MRE, 2023).

Brazil-China Relations in the Bolsonaro Government (2019-2022)

In 2019, with Bolsonaro as president and Ernesto Araújo as Minister of Foreign Affairs,

there was a shift in Brazilian Foreign Policy, with significant internal and international

implications. From a bilateral perspective, the new foreign policy matrix prioritized closer

ties with developed countries and distanced itself from developing countries, selecting

ideologically aligned partnerships with the conservative right. There was also a

rapprochement with Trump's United States (2017-2021), seen as a "defender of Western

values." South-South cooperation was viewed with suspicion, while Brazil distanced itself

from the Middle East and Africa and adopted a strong anti-China rhetoric (Silva, 2023).

This transformation in Brazilian Foreign Policy was also heavily influenced by the then

Minister Ernesto Araújo's view that the West was experiencing a loss of its own identity

and that only Donald Trump was capable of saving the West. Thus, the role of Brazil's

foreign policy agenda, as a Western country, would be to fight against "globalism" and

support the recovery of the West through alliances with Western nations, especially the

United States, and the reaffirmation of the Judeo-Christian identity (Araújo, 2017). This

perception led to the country becoming increasingly isolated on the international stage

(Magalhães, 2022).

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e-ISSN: 1647-7251

VOL 15 N.º 2, TD 1

Thematic Dossier

Brazil-China relations: The rise of modern International Order

December 2024, pp. 354-367

Brazil-China Relations Since 2003: Convergences And Divergences

André Luiz Reis da Silva, Maiara de Almeida Cardozo

360

Regarding the relationship with China, even before his victory in the 2018 election,

Bolsonaro faced strong criticism from the Chinese government for visiting Taiwan and for

stating that China "does not buy in Brazil, it buys Brazil" (Marra et. al., 2021). The first

years of his administration were characterized by a hostile stance (Bones, Pennaforte &

Auler, 2023). When Eduardo Bolsonaro, then a Federal Deputy, made a statement on the

social network X, formerly Twitter, blaming China for the emergence of the Covid-19

pandemic, he received a note from the Chinese Embassy in Brasília repudiating his words.

Additionally, statements by the then Minister of Education, Abraham Weintraub, caused

friction in Sino-Brazilian relations by suggesting that the pandemic was a strategy for

Chinese global domination. These declarations caused strains in diplomatic relations

between China and Brazil, hindering Brazil's access to vaccine supplies and mechanical

ventilators, for example (Magalhães, 2022).

Another issue that was a point of contention during Bolsonaro's government concerned

the debate over Brazil's adoption of 5G technology standards. The Clean Network

initiative, from Donald Trump's administration, received support from the Bolsonaro

government at the end of 2020, ruling out the possibility of a partnership between Brazil

and the Chinese company Huawei. At the time, Eduardo Bolsonaro stated that the alliance

with the US would enable "secure 5G without Chinese espionage" (Schreiber, 2020).

However, in 2021, after Trump left the White House, Brazil ceased to impose restrictions

on the Chinese company regarding 5G.

Despite these recurring tensions in relations between Beijing and Brasília, a movement

contrary to President Bolsonaro's position was also present during his government. This

movement, primarily linked to economic sectors such as industry and agribusiness,

recognized the need to maintain relations with China through a more pragmatic

approach. Pressure from these sectors enabled a more moderate treatment of China by

the government. For example, in June 2019, Vice President Hamilton Mourão visited the

Asian country, resulting in the reactivation of COSBAN. In November of the same year,

Chinese President Xi Jinping was received by Bolsonaro during the BRICS summit, with

the statement that "China is increasingly becoming a part of Brazil's future" (Mazui,

Barbiéri & Rodrigues; 2019).

Concerning economic and trade relations, starting with the so-called "Trade War"

between China and the United States in 2018, Sino-Brazilian trade relations grew

considerably, increasing the degree of interdependence between the two countries. These

relations were consolidated through the sale of Brazilian primary products to the Chinese

market and the purchase of manufactured goods from China by Brazil. Furthermore, the

Asian country is the main destination for Brazilian exports and the primary source of its

imports, also being the main contributor to Brazil's trade surplus (Bones, Pennaforte &

Auler, 2023).

According to the Secretariat of Foreign Trade (2024), Brazil's exports to China were

US$67.8 billion in 2020 and US$89.4 billion in 2022. As for Brazil's trade surplus with

China, it amounted to US$27.3 billion in 2019 and US$40.2 billion in 2021 (Brazil, 2024).

In contrast, Brazil had a trade deficit with the United States of US$5.1 billion in 2019 and

US$8.3 billion in 2021 (AMCHAM, 2022). Despite the political and diplomatic strain in

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e-ISSN: 1647-7251

VOL 15 N.º 2, TD 1

Thematic Dossier

Brazil-China relations: The rise of modern International Order

December 2024, pp. 354-367

Brazil-China Relations Since 2003: Convergences And Divergences

André Luiz Reis da Silva, Maiara de Almeida Cardozo

361

Sino-Brazilian relations during Bolsonaro's administration, trade between China and

Brazil reached record levels.

These indices demonstrate that Chinese pragmatism has prevailed, meaning Beijing has

chosen to prioritize its economic and trade interests. It also shows China's importance as

a consumer market, as well as Brazil's consequent dependence on the Asian country,

which is greater than Brazil's dependence on the United States (Kalout & Martins da

Costa, 2022). However, despite this strong interdependence between the two countries,

China is seeking to diversify its food suppliers, such as soybeans, by purchasing more

from countries like Uruguay, Argentina, and Canada, which could reduce long-term

dependency on Brazil (Marra; et al., 2021).

In 2020, the U.S. was the second-largest source of foreign direct investment in Brazil,

following the Netherlands (Brasil, 2021). In relation to Chinese investments in Brazil,

their volume increased significantly from 2010 onwards, especially in the energy and

manufacturing sectors. If Chinese direct investments in Brazil continue at the same pace

in the coming years, this dependency relationship could be reversed (Kalout & Martins

da Costa, 2022).

Brasil-China relations in the Third Lula’s Government (2023-)

The proposal for the new Lula’s government is to operate in a similar manner of

international relations from his two previous governments. However, contextual changes

and the learning of the last decade require adaptations to Brazilian Foreign Policy. The

first year of government allows us to evaluate the priorities in Brazilian Foreign Policy

which are the recovery of international credibility, the environmental agenda, the

strengthening of BRICS, regional cooperation, South-South cooperation and the

reinforcement of multilateralism (Silva, 2023).

Over the last two decades, Brazil and the international system passed through a lot of

changes. With that it is necessary to comprehend how the internal and external influences

affected Brazil and vice versa. For Putnam (2010), a country's internal and external

politics are interconnected. The author highlights the existence of a two-level game: at

the domestic level, actors pursue their interests and seek ways to adapt favorable policies

to those interests. At an international level, national governments maximize their

capabilities to satisfy pressures from domestic groups while minimizing the consequences

of external actions (Putnam, 2010).

Having this in mind, the two-level game, Lula’s new government aims to restore Brazil’s

international credibility in addition to maintaining a certain balance in the country’s

foreign policy. Lula returned to government with a Foreign Policy deeply affected by

various diplomatic crises caused by his predecessor and the country’s internal challenges

that Brazil is facing. In addition to that, the international landscape is turbulent, marked

by the Russia-Ukraine, Israel-Palestine conflicts, the post-Covid-19 pandemic and

environmental crises. Thus, under Lula’s new government, Brazil is seeking to build a

multipolar order, with less inequality and the ability to support the Global South, a

different view from Bolsonaro’s administration, which prioritized Christian values and an

anti-globalist agenda (Júnior, 2023).

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e-ISSN: 1647-7251

VOL 15 N.º 2, TD 1

Thematic Dossier

Brazil-China relations: The rise of modern International Order

December 2024, pp. 354-367

Brazil-China Relations Since 2003: Convergences And Divergences

André Luiz Reis da Silva, Maiara de Almeida Cardozo

362

Lula’s new government is in a difficult position, but re-establishing ties with China can be

an opportunity for Brazil’s government to build a more inclusive international order with

active participation of emerging countries. There is also a return of concepts from Lula’s

first terms, such as prioritizing development and poverty reduction, strengthening South-

South relations, focusing on coalitions like the BRICS, promoting economic growth with

income distribution, multilateralism, and the reform of organizations like the UN (De

Almeida, 2023). Therefore, relations with China are seen as an opportunity to achieve

these objectives. Thus, with China’s support, Lula’s government seeks to revive bilateral

opportunities for internal and global development goals, projecting Brazilian interests and

its international protagonism (Lopes, Almeida & De Souza, 2023).

With these new opportunities, Lula performed a State visit to China in 2023. During the

meeting, issues regarding bilateral cooperations, regional and international topics of

common interest were discussed. Both countries signed a series of agreements of

understanding in areas such as poverty and hunger reduction, food security, science,

technology, innovation, space cooperation, communication, investments, finances, digital

economy, trade facilitation and media. In terms of economy, both parties discussed the

diversification and facilitation of trade and the increase in agricultural exchange and the

resilience of production chains. The parties committed to create conditions for facilitating

more competitive and high value products to be included in bilateral trade. Both countries

agreed to encourage their companies to invest in each other, especially in areas such as

infrastructure, energy, logistics, agriculture, industry and high technology (MRE,2023).

In the matter of political factors, Sino-Brazilian relations are marked by cooperation,

mutual benefit, understanding and mutual interest in the progress of developing

countries.

Therefore, it is evident that China is utilizing a Chinese model for cooperation with the

Global South which is characterized by eight guiding principles formulated by Zhou Enlai

in 1964. These principles are: (i) Equality and mutual benefit; (ii) Unconditionality; (iii)

Relief of the burden on beneficiary countries; (iv) Self-sufficiency and independent

economic development; (v) Promotion of efficient projects with less investment; (vi)

Better quality equipment; (vii) Transfer of techniques to beneficiary countries; (viii)

Chinese experts without special privileges. Thus, China leads the development of the

Global South through trade, investment, and external assistance (Vadell, Lo Brutto, Leite

& Crivelli, 2020).

However, in Sino-Brazilian relations, it is notable that trade exchanges are characterized

by Brazil's role as a producer and exporter of natural resources, while China, in turn, acts

as an exporter of manufactured goods and capital (Cunha, Lélis, Silva & De Lima, 2012).

By investing in infrastructure and financing, China has built strong connections

worldwide, allowing the Asian country to produce higher value-added products and

creating a great interdependence and collaboration with developing countries. The debate

about the nature of economic relations with China in Brazil occurs due to the growth of

exportations in sectors with lower added value such as agriculture. On the other hand,

the advantages of these trade relations are associated with the possibilities of investment

and increased diversification of negotiations with major development centers (Rodrigues,

2022).

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December 2024, pp. 354-367

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André Luiz Reis da Silva, Maiara de Almeida Cardozo

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Given the current international scenario, the re-establishment ties with China after the

Bolsonaro government and the new Lula government could be an opportunity to promote

a new Brazilian international insertion, as well as to bring incentives for an internal

reindustrialization plan, thus rescuing principles of Foreign Policy Brazilian as those of

balance and diversification (Lopes, Almeida & De Souza, 2023). The new Lula

government aims to rearticulate political and diplomatic relations, improve bilateral

relations, especially economic ones, and rebuild strategic cooperation on global issues.

In this way, the relationship with China aims to boost industrialization, technological

advancement, and greater international insertion for Brazil during Lula's new

government.

Final Considerations

During Lula's first two governments, relations with China were based on cooperation and

mutual interests in areas such as science, agriculture, culture, education, trade, industry,

infrastructure, development, and multilateralism. The Dilma government maintained

these characteristics. As a result, Lula's first government and Dilma's government

brought Brazil closer to China and the Global South. This rapprochement was strategic

as it aimed to satisfy the development interests, partnerships, strengthening of

multipolarity, and South-South cooperation of both Brazil and China.

During Michel Temer's government, the pursuit of cooperation in Sino-Brazilian relations

was maintained, primarily in the economic and trade spheres. On the other hand, Jair

Bolsonaro's government was marked by a break with Brazilian diplomatic tradition,

specifically the history of pragmatism, the pursuit of multilateralism, and autonomy. The

automatic alignment with the USA and the anti-China rhetoric weakened the strategic

partnership between Brazil and China, as well as isolated Brazil internationally.

In summary, during the analyzed period, economic interaction between Brazil and China

grew, while political relations fluctuated. The administrations of Lula, Dilma, Temer, and

Bolsonaro maintained economic interaction with China. Their differences lie in the

strategic and political closeness from 2003 to 2016, followed by political distancing during

Bolsonaro's government, and a new re-establishment starting in 2023. The new Lula

government seeks to restore Brazil's international projection, as well as rebuild global

strategic cooperation. In this context, China is a potential ally for Brazilian development

and a partner for Brazil in various international agendas.

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