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Universidade Autónoma de Lisboa
e-ISSN: 1647-7251
VOL15, N.º 2, TD1
Thematic Dossier – Brazil-China relations:
The rise of modern International Order
December 2024
309
THE ZONE OF PEACE AND COOPERATION OF THE SOUTH ATLANTIC: A
CONTRIBUTION TO MARITIME SECURITY IN THE GULF OF GUINEA
ANTÓNIO GONÇALVES ALEXANDRE
amgalexandre527@hotmail.com
Captain in the Portuguese Navy (in reserve). He took part in several international exercises and
naval operations, mainly in the Baltic, Mediterranean and Adriatic Seas and in the Indian Ocean.
He has a Ph.D. in International Relations from NOVA University of Lisbon and an Advanced
Studies Degree in Geopolitics from the Autonomous University of Lisbon. He has developed and
published research in recent years, mainly focused on the general theme of the oceans, from the
specific perspective of maritime security and the geopolitics of maritime spaces. He is an auditor
of the Portuguese National Defence Course, an integrated researcher at the Portuguese Institute
of International Relations (IPRI-NOVA) and an associated researcher at the Centre for Research
and Development of the Military University Institute. He regularly collaborates with NOVA
University Lisbon (Portugal), the National Defence Institute, the Atlantic Centre and the Military
University Institute. https://orcid.org/0000-0002-2697-1951.
Abstract
The Zone of Peace and Cooperation of the South Atlantic (ZOPACAS) was established in 1986
by the countries on the east coast of South America and the west coast of Africa to promote
regional cooperation and the maintenance of peace and security in the region. The Gulf of
Guinea (GoG) is a part of Brazil’s strategic neighbourhood, but the threats that have plagued
it in this century, particularly piracy and armed robbery at sea, jeopardise freedom of
navigation and international trade in the region. The irregular activity of ZOPACAS since its
inception has not allowed it to develop specific measures to combat insecurity in the GoG.
However, there has been a shift in Brazil’s foreign policy since January 2023 as the country
seeks to increase its influence on the international arena, and particularly with countries in
the Global South. In this sense, ZOPACAS appears to be an opportunity for Brazil to take on
a growing role in the GoG. It is understood that the academic importance of this article is
centred on the evolution of ZOPACAS since its launch and its potential to become an important
regional organisation in the pursuit of maritime security in the GoG region. In these
circumstances, this study aimed at analysing ZOPACAS as an initiative capable of positively
influencing maritime security in the GoG region, using an interpretivist epistemological
framework, inductive reasoning and a qualitative research strategy, with a case study as the
research design. For that purpose, it was defined the following research question: how can
the ZOPACAS contribute to improve maritime security in the region of the GoG? The findings
show that ZOPACAS has indeed the potential to play an important role in combating the main
maritime threats in the GoG.
Keywords
ZOPACAS, GoG region, Maritime security, East coast of South America, West coast of Africa.
Resumo
O lançamento da Zona de Paz e Cooperação do Atlântico Sul (ZOPACAS), em 1986, teve como
propósito promover a cooperação regional e garantir a manutenção da paz e da segurança
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e-ISSN: 1647-7251
VOL 15 N.º 2, TD 1
Thematic Dossier
Brazil-China relations: The rise of modern International Order
December 2024, pp. 309-328
The Zone of Peace and Cooperation of The South Atlantic: A Contribution to Maritime
Security in The Gulf of Guinea
António Gonçalves Alexandre
310
dos países da costa oriental da América do Sul e da costa ocidental de África. O Golfo da Guiné
(GdG) faz parte do “entorno estratégico” do Brasil, mas tem sido fustigado ao longo deste
século por ameaças diversas, em particular a pirataria e o assalto armado no mar, que podem
colocar em causa a liberdade de navegação e o comércio internacional naquela região. O
funcionamento intermitente da ZOPACAS ao longo dos anos não permitiu o desenvolvimento
concreto de medidas para combater a insegurança sentida no GdG. Todavia, tem-se assistido
a uma mudança na política externa brasileira desde janeiro de 2023, procurando alcançar
maior relevância internacional, em particular junto de países do Sul Global. Neste sentido, a
ZOPACAS surge como uma oportunidade para o Brasil reassumir protagonismo crescente no
GdG. Entende-se que a importância académica deste artigo se centra na evolução da
ZOPACAS desde o seu lançamento e no seu potencial para se tornar uma organização regional
importante na prossecução da segurança marítima na região do GdG. Nestas circunstâncias,
este estudo teve como objetivo analisar a ZOPACAS como uma iniciativa capaz de influenciar
positivamente a segurança marítima na região do GdG, utilizando um quadro epistemológico
interpretativista, um raciocínio indutivo e uma estratégia de investigação qualitativa, tendo
como desenho de investigação um estudo de caso. Para o efeito, foi definida a seguinte
questão de investigação: como pode a ZOPACAS contribuir para melhorar a segurança
marítima na região do GdG? Os resultados mostram que a ZOPACAS tem, de facto, potencial
para desempenhar um papel importante no combate às principais ameaças marítimas no GdG.
Palavras-chave
ZOPACAS, Golfo da Guiné, Segurança marítima, Costa oriental da América do Sul, Costa
ocidental de África.
How to cite this article
Alexandre, António Gonçalves (2024). The Zone of Peace and Cooperation of The South Atlantic:
A Contribution to Maritime Security in The Gulf of Guinea. Janus.net, e-journal of international
relations. VOL 15 N.º 2, TD1 – Temathic Dossier – “Brazil - China Relations: The Rise Of Modern
International Order”. December 2024, pp. 309-328. https://doi.org/10.26619/1647-
7251.DT0324.15.
Article received on 4 July 2024 and accepted for publication on 14 September 2024.
JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations
e-ISSN: 1647-7251
VOL 15 N.º 2, TD 1
Thematic Dossier
Brazil-China relations: The rise of modern International Order
December 2024, pp. 309-328
The Zone of Peace and Cooperation of The South Atlantic: A Contribution to Maritime
Security in The Gulf of Guinea
António Gonçalves Alexandre
311
THE ZONE OF PEACE AND COOPERATION OF THE SOUTH
ATLANTIC: A CONTRIBUTION TO MARITIME SECURITY IN THE
GULF OF GUINEA
ANTÓNIO GONÇALVES ALEXANDRE
1. Introduction
On 27 October 1986, on Brazil’s initiative – with the support of Argentina –, the United
Nations General Assembly (UNGA) approved resolution 41/11, which established
ZOPACAS with the goal of strengthening international peace and security (Governo do
Brasil, 2023a). In this resolution, the General Assembly called upon all South Atlantic
states
1
to promote regional cooperation for social and economic development, the
protection of the environment, the conservation of living resources and the peace and
security of the whole region (UNGA, 1986). ZOPACAS has 24 member countries from
South America and West Africa
2
. Since then, and until 2023, it has held eight meetings
between national officials from the signatory countries. However, only three of those
meetings took place in the 21st century – in 2007, 2013 and 2023 (figure 1).
Figure 1 – Ministerial Meetings of Zopacas Member Countries
1988
1990
1994
1996
1998
2007
2013
2023
Rio de
Janeiro
Abuja
Brasília
Sommerset
West
Buenos
Aires
Luanda
Montevideu
Mindelo
Source: Adapted from (Marinha do Brasil, 2023a)
Nevertheless, ZOPACAS has been addressed in Brazil’s defence framework documents.
It is set out in Brazil’s National Defence Policy issued in 2020 that one of the pillars of
1
The waters between Africa and South America (United Nations General Assembly, 1986, p. 21).
2
South Africa, Angola, Argentina, Benin, Brazil, Cape Verde, Cameroon, Congo, Côte d’Ivoire, Gabon,
Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Equatorial Guinea, Liberia, Namibia, Nigeria, Democratic
Republic of Congo, São Tomé and Príncipe, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Togo and Uruguay (Governo do Brasil,
2023a).
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The Zone of Peace and Cooperation of The South Atlantic: A Contribution to Maritime
Security in The Gulf of Guinea
António Gonçalves Alexandre
312
the national defence concept should be “to maintain the South Atlantic as a zone of peace
and cooperation” (Governo do Brasil, 2020, p. 21). The Strategy also states that:
Strengthening the Zone of Peace and Cooperation of the South Atlantic – Zopacas will
help affirm Brazil as a relevant regional actor, increasing its influence over its strategic
environment and reducing the possibility of military interference by extra-regional
powers in the South Atlantic (Governo do Brasil, 2020, p. 33).
ZOPACAS’ irregular calendar of activities, especially during the 21st century, coincided
with the surge of the two most relevant maritime security threats in the GoG
3
: piracy
and armed robbery at sea against ships. According to the United Nations Convention on
the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) and the International Maritime Organization (IMO)
4
, the
main difference between these threats is where the act is perpetrated. Figure 2 shows
the areas – territorial sea, high seas and exclusive economic zone – where these crimes
are carried out.
Figure 2 – Areas Where Acts of Piracy and Armed Robbery at Sea Occur
Source: Adapted from (UNCLOS, 1982) and (IMO, 2009)
Armed robbery at sea against ships occurs in the sovereign territory of states, that is, in
internal waters, in the territorial sea (up to 12 nautical miles) or in the archipelagic waters
of an archipelagic state; piracy occurs on the high seas (beyond 200 nautical miles), but
3
The GoG includes the region’s 17 coastal countries, from Senegal in the north to Angola in the south,
and the two island states of Cape Verde and São Tomé and Príncipe (Council of the European Union,
2014).
4
Specialised United Nations agency that deals exclusively with maritime issues.
* 1NM = 1852 meters
DISTANCE TO THE TERRITORIAL SEA BASELINE IN NAUTICAL MILES (NM)*
12 NM
200 NM
HIGH SEAS
TERRITORIAL SEA BASELINE
TERRITORIAL SEA
EXCLUSIVE ECONOMIC ZONE
PIRACY
ARMED ROBBERY
AT SEA
SOVEREIGN
TERRITORY
SOVEREIGN RIGHTS TO THE WATER
COLUMN AND CONTINENTAL SHELF
WATER COLUMN BEYOND NATIONAL JURISDICTION
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The Zone of Peace and Cooperation of The South Atlantic: A Contribution to Maritime
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this area can be extended to include the exclusive economic zones of coastal states (in
practice, it concerns incidents that occur beyond 12 nautical miles).
However, one of Brazil’s priorities must be to maintain the security of a large maritime
space with the geo-economical and geo-strategic importance of the GoG, especially
because it is a part of Brazil’s strategic environment
5
, which matches the ZOPCAS region,
as it can be seen in the figure 3.
Figure 3 – Zopacas Region
Source: Paulo Gonçalves (2024) (Rights granted by Francisco Leandro in written)
This is the motivation behind Brazil’s efforts to revitalise ZOPACAS since President Lula
da Silva was inaugurated on 1 January 2023. On 17 and 18 April 2023, after ten years
during which the initiative was essentially ignored, ZOPACAS held its 8th ministerial
meeting in Cape Verde, in Mindelo. The meeting was attended by sixteen of the 24
member states. In his opening speech, the Prime Minister of Cape Verde Ulisses Correia
5
This strategic environment consists of the priority areas of interest for Brazil: the South Atlantic and the
countries of the west coast of Africa (Marinha do Brasil, 2023b).
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The Zone of Peace and Cooperation of The South Atlantic: A Contribution to Maritime
Security in The Gulf of Guinea
António Gonçalves Alexandre
314
e Silva highlighted the need to “strengthen our commitment to fight transnational
organised crime – drug trafficking, human trafficking, piracy – illegal fishing, terrorism
and cybercrime. This is vital for countries’ economic development, social peace and
stability” (Governo de Cabo Verde, 2023). During the meeting, the Brazilian Foreign
Minister said that “the time has come to unleash the potential of ZOPACAS” and proposed
“three main lines of action [...]: cooperation, institutionalisation and engagement”
(Governo do Brasil, 2023c).
The Action Plan of Mindelo (2023d) established at the ministerial meeting listed several
actions that should be taken to address some of the main maritime security threats in
the South Atlantic: “[...] deterring, preventing and combating IUU fishing [...]” (2023d,
p. 7); and “[...] strengthening cooperation in the prevention and repression of piracy and
armed robbery [at sea] against ships [...]” (2023d, p. 12).
Therefore, given the recent changes to Brazil’s foreign policy, which intends to be more
proactive in the international arena, it is relevant to analyse ZOPACAS’ short-term
potential to become a relevant initiative capable of implementing concrete lines of action
that contribute to increase maritime security in the GoG.
The following research question was defined to guide the investigation: how can the Zone
of Peace and Cooperation of the South Atlantic contribute to improve maritime security
in the region of the GoG?
This study used an interpretivist epistemological framework, inductive reasoning and a
qualitative research strategy, with a case study as the research design. With regards to
the temporal, geographical and content delimitations, the study covers the period from
2013-2023 (during which the two most recent ministerial meetings of ZOPACAS member
countries took place), focuses on the GoG region, and analyses how ZOPACAS can
contribute to the maritime security of that region.
The chapter is divided into three subchapters, an introduction and a conclusion section:
the first subchapter discusses the most relevant frameworks for analysing maritime
security; the second addresses the securitisation of piracy in the GoG and the role that
ZOPACAS could play in the process; the third analyses the security practices that have
been implemented in the GoG and identifies how ZOPACAS could contribute to further
develop them. The findings show that ZOPACAS could play a relevant role in maintaining
maritime security in the GoG.
2. Analysis
2.1 Maritime security: frameworks of analysis
2.1.1 The concept of maritime security
This subchapter addresses maritime security and describes the most common
frameworks for analysing this concept – the semiotic approach, securitisation theory,
security practice theory and the good order at sea approach. However, in this study, only
the securitisation and security practice theories will be used to analyse the research
question.
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Maritime security is a relatively recent term
6
– it emerged and was added to the
conceptual edifice of international relations at the end of the 20th century – but it quickly
became widespread, making it a complex, perhaps ambiguous, disputed and even
somewhat contentious concept which can be interpreted through different approaches.
One approach which has been adopted by several theorists who have dedicated
themselves to its study
7
links maritime security to threats in the maritime domain – such
as maritime disputes between states, maritime terrorism, piracy, trafficking of drugs,
arms, people and illicit goods, illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing, environmental
crimes, and maritime accidents and disasters. Their main argument, according to Bueger
(2015), is that “maritime security should be defined as the absence of these threats” (p.
159). However, this approach has been criticised as insufficient, because “it does neither
prioritize issues, nor provides clues of how these issues are interlinked, nor outlines of
how these threats can be addressed”. It also creates enduring puzzles over which threats
should be included” (p. 159). Bueger (2015) also refers to a different conceptualisation,
which he calls ‘positive’, and which projects a desired “end state”, “in contrast to the
‘negative’ definition of maritime security”. Some proponents of this view see maritime
security as a “good” or “stable” order at sea
8
(p. 159).
Given the lack of international consensus on the concept of maritime security, which is
reflected in the fact that it can have a multitude of meanings and is often motivated by
political interests and different interpretations of the law, Bueger identified three
frameworks of analysis that he used to explain the similarities and differences of the
various approaches to this concept:
(1) ‘semiotics’ which intends to map different meanings by exploring the
relations between maritime security and other concepts, (2) the
‘securitization’ framework which provides the means to understand how
different threats are included in maritime security, and (3) security practice
theory which aims at understanding what actions are undertaken in the
name of maritime security (Bueger, 2015, p. 160).
2.1.1.1 The semiotic approach
One of the frameworks of analysis proposed by Bueger (2015) is the semiotic approach,
which focuses on the relationships between concepts. This approach is based on the idea
that the meaning of a term can be discovered by exploring how it relates to other terms.
That is, concepts take on relational meaning through their similarities and differences.
6
According to Germond (2015), “Before the end of the Cold War it was rarely used and primarily in reference
to sea control over maritime areas in the context of the superpower confrontation, that is to say in a
naval context” (p. 138).
7
Such as Klein (2011), who believes that maritime security includes the protection of a territory’s
infrastructure, economy, environment and society from illegal acts that occur at sea, or Feldt et al. (2013),
for whom maritime security is “the combination of preventive and responsive measures to protect the
maritime domain against threats and intentional unlawful acts” (p. 2).
8
Including Till (2009), who argues that “The importance of this ‘good order’, and the corresponding threats
of disorder, are such that navies around the world are focusing much more on their role in helping to
preserve it” (p. 286), and Kraska and Pedrozo (2013), who see maritime security as “a stable order of
the oceans subject to the rule of law at sea” (p. 1).
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To explore the concept of maritime security, Bueger (2015) created a matrix with four
concepts – seapower
9
, marine safety, resilience and blue economy –, each pointing to a
different dimension of maritime security (national security, the marine environment,
human security and economic development). The semiotic approach implies that, to
understand the meaning that the different actors ascribe to maritime security, one must
analyse the relationships between the four concepts.
2.1.1.2 The securitisation approach
The second framework of analysis is securitisation, a theory proposed by Buzan et al.
(1998), who defined it as “the move that takes politics beyond the established rules of
the game and frames the issue either as a special kind of politics or as above politics” (p.
23). In a spectrum that represents the degree to which the state is involved in resolving
public issues, the issues at one end of the spectrum are non-politicised, that is, they are
not a part of public debate, and the state does not make decisions about them (it simply
does not deal with them). Issues can also be politicised, which means that the
government analyses them, makes decisions about them and allocates resources to
address them. At the other end of the spectrum are securitised issues, that is, issues
that are presented as existential threats which require emergency measures and justify
actions outside the normal bounds of political procedure (Buzan et al., 1998).
2.1.1.3 The security practice theory approach
The third framework of analysis focuses on the concrete actions of the actors involved in
maritime security. That is, what type of activities are involved when actors say they are
producing maritime security? Bueger (2015) called it an “understanding of security
politics in which practice, understood as organised patterns of doing and sayings, is the
central unit of analysis” (p. 162). This approach is similar to the securitisation approach
inasmuch as it deals with the implementation of measures that can result from the
securitisation of issues that have been deemed existential. There is a broad range of
practices involved in maritime security, more specifically in what has become known as
maritime situational awareness
10
. Security practices include a wide range of tasks that
are carried out at sea, such as maritime patrolling, area interdictions, searches of vessels
9
In the words of Mahan (1890), who coined this concept in the 19th century, “The history of Sea Power is
largely, though by no means solely, a narrative of contests between nations, of mutual rivalries, of
violence frequently culminating in war” (p. 1). However, the concept has evolved significantly during the
20th century. Till (1984) listed the sources and elements of a state’s sea power. The sources are: its
maritime community; its resources; its style of government; and its geography. The elements are:
merchant shipping; logistical bases, and; the military instrument (p. 13). In 2009, Till introduced a new
approach to the concept, in which seapower (now a single word) was something that maritime powers
possessed and that should be seen as both an input and an output. The input included navies, coastguards
and the shipbuilding and ship repair industries. The output referred to the ability to influence the
behaviour of others through their actions at sea (or from the sea) (p. 21).
10
The term is based on the fact that knowing exactly what activities are taking place at sea is vital for
maritime security. It involves a broad range of surveillance and information-sharing capabilities, including
intelligence-gathering systems – such as the Automatic Identification System – to monitor ship
movements and active surveillance through naval patrolling, aerial reconnaissance, satellite imagery and
coastal radar systems (Bueger & Edmunds, 2017, p. 1303).
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The Zone of Peace and Cooperation of The South Atlantic: A Contribution to Maritime
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António Gonçalves Alexandre
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when there are strong suspicions of illicit practices, naval exercises and law enforcement
activities at sea – such as arrests, the transfer of suspects, prosecution, trials and
convictions. Finally, this includes coordination activities at different levels (Bueger,
2015).
2.1.1.4 The good order at sea approach
The last framework of analysis focuses on good order at sea as a requirement for the
maritime security of a given area. According to Vreÿ (2010) “The approach of good order
at sea highlights the importance and utility of safe and secure access to what the oceans
offer countries and the global community at large” (p. 122). For Till (2009), good order
at sea consists of a series of attributes – which include the good order that must exist on
land and the sea as a source of resources, as a means of transport and as an area of
domination – as well as a broad range of threats. And the sea has such relevance that
the responsibilities of the authorities and security organisations must include its
protection.
2.2 The securitisation of piracy in the Gulf of Guinea
This subchapter analyses the ongoing process to securitise piracy in the GoG – the most
relevant threat to maritime security in those waters in the 21st century – and explores
the role that ZOPACAS may play in this process.
2.2.1 Securitisation theory
The discussion that took place after the Cold War regarding the content and priorities of
security and defence policies led to the recognition that there was a need to analyse the
process by which threats were constructed and issues were added to the security agenda
(Bueger, 2015). During this period, new frameworks of analysis emerged in the field of
security studies, which had, until then, focused almost exclusively on the military
instrument and on states. Buzan et al. (1998) – the main proponents of the Copenhagen
School
11
–, created a new framework to analyse the character of security dynamics across
five different sectors: military, political, economic, environmental and societal. This
framework rejected the traditional approach, in which security was only applicable to one
of those sectors, and argued that security was a particular type of politics applicable to
a wide range of issues. Furthermore, it provided a constructivist operational method of
distinguishing the process of securitisation from politicisation to understand who could
securitise what and under what conditions (Buzan et al., 1998).
11
Mcsweeney (1996) described the publication of Barry Buzan’s book People, States and Fears in 1983 as
marking the beginning of a new field of security studies. Not long after, in 1985, the establishment of the
Centre for Peace and Conflict Research in Copenhagen triggered a period of intense exploration of the
problem of security, and several works on the subject were published that were sufficiently interrelated
to be dubbed “the ‘Copenhagen school’ of security studies” (Mcsweeney, 1996, p. 81). The work produced
by the Copenhagen School put innovative concepts and ideas into practice, including that of
“securitisation” (Huysmans, 1998, p. 480).
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Thus, the first step is to define what makes an event a security issue in international
relations. Buzan et al. (1998, p. 21) argue that “The answer to what makes something
an international security issue can be found in the traditional military-political
understanding of security. In this context, security is about survival”. And that happens
“when an issue is presented as posing an existential threat to a designated referent
object”. Therefore, “The special nature of security threats justifies the use of
extraordinary measures to handle them” (p. 21). As for what distinguishes securitisation
from politicisation, these theorists assert that “Securitization can [...] be seen as a more
extreme version of politicization” (in the latter, the issue is part of public policy and
requires a decision by the government and the allocation of resources (p. 23). But the
fact that politicisation and securitisation are related does not imply that securitisation is
always carried out by the state, as it can be done through other forums. According to
Buzan et al. (1998, p. 24), “other social entities [may] raise an issue to the level of
general consideration or even to the status of sanctioned urgency among themselves”.
That is, when a securitising agent (which may or may not be the state) describes a threat
as existential, removing the issue from the sphere of normal politics, we are dealing with
a case of securitisation. Therefore, the most salient feature of securitisation is “a specific
rhetorical structure (survival, priority of action “because if the problem is not dealt with
now it will be too late, and we will not exist to remedy our failure”)” (Buzan et al., 1998,
p. 26). The key concepts of this theory are “the securitising actor” (who frames an issue
as a threat through a securitising move), “the referent subject” (the entity posing the
threat), “the referent object” (the entity being threatened), “the audience” (who must
agree to confer an intersubjective status to the threat), “the context and the adoption of
distinctive policies” (which may or may not be exceptional) (Balzacq et al., 2016, p. 495).
2.2.2 The process of securitising piracy in the GoG
The United Nations Security Council (UNSC) has always asserted that piracy (and armed
robbery at sea against ships) was a regional issue that should dealt with by coastal states
and by the African regional organisations of the GoG. This would require an integrated
response by states which involved the creation of laws and regulations to criminalise
piracy and armed robbery at sea against ships; and the development of a regional
framework for combating these threats, including information-sharing and coordination
mechanisms in the region (UNSC, 2011). The following year, the UNSC reiterated that
the GoG states had the primary responsibility to combat piracy and armed robbery at
sea against ships in the region (UNSC, 2012).
On the other hand, both threats have been on the IMO’s agenda since the 1980s. The
IMO currently has 88 international non-governmental organisations with consultative
member status, including major international maritime transport and trade associations
and organisations
12
(IMO, 2019). It would be only natural that these important entities
would influence the policies adopted by the IMO. However, almost all the resolutions
issued by this organisation during the 21st century have either served to implement
12
Such as the Baltic and International Maritime Council, the International Association of Dry Cargo Shipowners
or the International Association of Independent Tanker Owners, among many other organisations.
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December 2024, pp. 309-328
The Zone of Peace and Cooperation of The South Atlantic: A Contribution to Maritime
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general codes of conduct or were only approved for the Horn of Africa region. Therefore,
the IMO’s contribution to the securitising of piracy in the GoG has fallen short of
expectations, especially when compared to its decisive role in securitising piracy in the
Horn of Africa.
On the other hand, the International Maritime Bureau (IMB)
13
has been an important
securitising agent in combating the threat of piracy in the GoG by highlighting the attacks
that occur in those spaces and publishing reports on how the phenomenon is evolving.
Thus, it can be inferred that political decision makers do not see the problem of piracy
and armed robbery at sea against ships in the GoG as an existential threat, and as such
have not felt the need to implement any emergency measures, including the use of the
military in operations to contain these threats.
2.2.3 The role of ZOPACAS
As shown in the previous subchapters, various securitising agents have endeavoured to
securitise piracy in the GoG during the 21st century. What is still lacking is a discourse
that clearly presents piracy in the region as an existential threat to important referent
objects, including international shipping, freedom of navigation, the safety of the crews
of merchant ships travelling through the region and all those who use the sea lawfully,
especially fishers. According to Buzan et al. (1998):
A discourse that takes the form of presenting something as an existential
threat to a referent object does not by itself create securitization—this is a
securitizing move, but the issue is securitized only if and when the audience
accepts it as such (p. 25).
In this sense, audiences have not been receptive to the arguments presented by
securitising actors. Furthermore, ZOPACAS is not even included in the range of actors
that have made the most significant efforts to present the problem of piracy in the GoG
in the 21st century as more important than other issues, and as such should be given
absolute priority. First, because in the first 23 years of this century there were only three
ministerial meetings of its member states, which is itself an indication of their lack of
commitment to the goals of this multinational partnership. On the other hand, the fact
that piracy in the GoG poses a threat to the maritime security of the entire region was
not addressed in all meetings. In fact, in the sixth ministerial summit of ZOPACAS
member states – the first in the 21st century –, maritime security issues in the South
Atlantic were barely mentioned, and the final declaration and action plan focused on the
need to revitalise the organisation and called for a reform of the UNSC to “give more
representation to developing countries” (Caldas, 2013, p. 14). Paragraph 108 of the
declaration of the 7th ministerial meeting (UNGA, 2013) held in January 2013 in
13
A specialised division of the International Chamber of Commerce established in 1981 to act as a focal
point in the fight against all types of maritime crime. One of the IMB's main areas of activity is the
repression of piracy.
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Montevideo, Uruguay, states that the ZOPACAS signatory states: “Express concern at the
threat that piracy and armed robbery at sea in the Gulf of Guinea pose to the international
navigation, maritime security and economic development of States in the region, and
recognize the leadership role that the States in the Zone should play in this regard and
the need for a regional coordination of efforts to counter activities of piracy and armed
robbery at sea” (p. 15).
On the other hand, paragraph 110 of the declaration (2013) reads: “Urge international
partners to assist States and organizations in the region to enhance their capabilities to
counter piracy and armed robbery at sea in the Gulf of Guinea, including their capacity
to conduct regional patrols, to establish and maintain joint coordination centres and joint
information-sharing centres, and in the effective implementation of the regional strategy,
once adopted, as mandated in United Nations Security Council resolutions 2018 (2011)
and 2039 (2012)” (p. 15).
However, after this, there was another long period without ministerial meetings, and it
was only in 2021 that a new effort to revitalise the multinational partnership was
spearheaded by Brazil at the United Nations (Governo do Brasil, 2023a). As a result of
this initiative, the United Nations General Assembly issued resolution A/RES/75/312 on
5 August 2021, which highlighted the role of ZOPACAS as a forum of interaction,
coordination and cooperation between its members and encouraged them to hold
ministerial meetings every two years, as well as to create a follow-up mechanism (UNGA,
2021). At the 8th ministerial meeting held in Mindelo, Cape Verde, in April 2023, the
member states “reaffirmed [their] determination [...] to prevent and eliminate piracy, in
particular [...] in the states located on the coast of the Gulf of Guinea, in compliance with
international law” (Governo do Brasil, 2023b, p. 9). The action plan outlined at the
Mindelo ministerial meeting includes a critical task related to maritime security
cooperation, which consists of “strengthening cooperation efforts to prevent and repress
piracy, armed robbery against ships and illegal maritime activities and to protect critical
[maritime] infrastructure” (Governo do Brasil, 2023d, p. 12).
This shows that, for several years during this century, ZOPACAS played a limited role in
the process of securitising piracy in the GoG region. However, the visible efforts to
revitalise the organisation (led by Brazil) since 2021 – which led the organisation to hold
its eighth ministerial meeting in Mindelo in 2023 – and Brazil’s offer to host the ninth
meeting means that the organisation could be more committed to address the maritime
security issues in the GoG and to contribute to the securitisation of piracy in that region.
2.3 Security practices in the Gulf of Guinea
This subchapter addresses the most relevant (maritime) security practices that have
been implemented in the GoG in the 21st century, and explores ZOPACAS’ role as a
maritime security community with the capacity to become a key agent in containing the
threat of piracy in the region.
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2.3.1 Security practice theory
Security practice theory definitely entered the international relations lexicon after the
Cold War, as the most advanced theories about practice as a concept were developed in
the early 1990s with the introduction of constructivist ideas. In general terms, this theory
is based on the idea that an actor (in international relations) observes the practices of
other actors regarding a particular social phenomenon, speaks and reflects (about them)
and is able to participate in them. The aim is not only to provide an abstract explanation
of social phenomena, but to understand how the world works through these practices
(Bueger & Gadinger, 2014).
In addition, after the Cold War, Booth (1994) asserted that “Security is concerned with
how people live” (p. 19). For Booth, both theory and practice were politically relevant.
He argued that security studies could benefit from a variety of approaches, as long as
the focus was on people and the problems they faced on a daily basis. In essence, in
Booth’s words, “thinking about thinking is important, but so is thinking about doing”
(Booth, 1994, p. 19).
Therefore, security practice theory – now applied to the maritime domain – aims to
understand “What kind of activities are conducted when actors say that they are doing
maritime security” (Bueger, 2015, p. 162). This theory is also related to the framework
of analysis discussed in the previous chapter – securitisation –, as some of the
(emergency) measures that were implemented may stem from the process of securitising
a specific threat to a given referent object in a concrete space. According to Bueger and
Stockbruegger (2013, p. 102): “A successful securitization is organized by three
elements: an issue which is accepted as threat, a collective whose survival is threatened
by the issue, and a script for action followed by the actors of the collective or those
representing it”.
Considering the emphasis that is usually given to the representation of threats and the
use of language, the theory has focused on understanding the processes by which issues
are framed and accepted as threats and on the identity of the communities that are built
when something is presented as a threat – both of which are related to the first two
elements listed by Bueger and Stockbruegger. As a result, there is less (academic)
interest in analysing issues related to the activities that actors engage in when following
the scripts involved in successful securitisation processes (which constitute the third
element presented by Bueger and Stockbruegger). However, these authors argue that
the gap is being filled by academics who follow “practice theory”. This approach “takes
patterns of actions (practice) as the basic unit of analysis and sees questions of threat
construction and identity formation (representation) as a secondary aspect of practice”
(Bueger & Stockbruegger, 2013, p. 103). Briefly, securitisation deals with how security
“is constructed” and security practice theory examines how security “is practised”
(Krause & Williams, 2007, p. 137).
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2.3.2 Security practices implemented in the GoG
Several actors have implemented maritime security practices in the GoG in this century.
The role of the European Union (EU) – perhaps one of the most relevant regional
organisations involved in this process in the region – has been particularly important. It
has launched several programmes to develop the legislation, promote information
sharing, provide training and support capability building. Some of the most relevant are
the Critical Maritime Routes Monitoring, Support and Evaluation Mechanism, which
provides information, monitoring, policy analysis and expert recommendations for
projects covered by this general programme; the Gulf of Guinea Inter-Regional Network,
which supports the creation and development of the regional information-sharing
network known as the Yaoundé Architecture
14
; the Support to West Africa Integrated
Maritime Security, which aims to support the implementation of the Integrated Maritime
Strategy of The Economic Community of West African States and improve law
enforcement in GoG; the Support Programme to the Maritime Security Strategy in Central
Africa, which aims to strengthen the institutional, legal and operational framework for
cross-border maritime cooperation in Central Africa; the Improved Regional Fisheries
Governance in Western Africa, which aims to enhance the regional contribution to the
sustainable use and management of fisheries resources; and the West and Central Africa
Port Security, which aims to improve port security in West and Central African countries
(European External Action Service [EEAS], 2021). Other important programmes include
the Coordinated Maritime Presences project implemented in January 2021, which aims
to strengthen the coordination of the EU’s activities in the GoG, and specifically to
improve maritime situational awareness
15
and cooperation at sea through the naval
capabilities of EU member states in the region (EEAS, 2024).
On the other hand, several programmes to support maritime capability building have
been implemented and are ongoing in the GoG, involving multilateral exercises and
information sharing. Obangame Express
16
, an annual naval aviation exercise sponsored
by the US Africa Command, is one of the most important. It is designed to improve
regional cooperation in support of the Yaoundé Code of Conduct and provide maritime
domain awareness, information sharing between the maritime operations centres in the
GoG and maritime interdiction, as well as increase capabilities to counter crimes at sea
in order to strengthen safety and security in the GoG (Defense Visual Information
Distribution Service, 2024). Grand African NEMO is another large-scale exercise
conducted by the French navy since 2018 in the waters of the GoG. The fourth edition
took place in 2022 and its aim was to share knowledge and improve the operational skills
of participants in the fight against illegal fishing, piracy, maritime pollution, illegal
14
Intra-regional commitment to combat maritime crime in the GoG region signed by the Economic
Community of West African States, the Economic Community of Central African States and the Gulf of
Guinea Commission during the Yaoundé Summit of Heads of State in June 2013 (European External Action
Service, 2021).
15
Which consists of the fusion of data required to produce a robust depiction of maritime areas and provide
relevant intelligence to identify trends in threats, as well as areas of concern for all those who use the
sea lawfully (Alexandre, 2022).
16
The largest multinational maritime exercise in West and Central Africa (United States Africa Command,
2023). The 12th edition was held in 2023 and 19 of the 29 participating nations were also members of
ZOPACAS.
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trafficking and rescue at sea. About forty naval units and five aircraft were used in Grand
African NEMO 2022 (Naval News, 2022). Seventeen of the 19 GoG countries and Brazil
as a guest nation (a total of 18 ZOPACAS member countries) participated in the exercise.
In October 2023, the French Navy organised Grand African NEMO 2023, under the
auspices of the Yaoundé Architecture. Eighteen GoG nations and 10 partner nations
participated in the exercise, which covered a vast area of the ocean from Senegal to
Angola (Ministère des Armées, 2023). Once again, a significant number of ZOPACAS
member states were present at this edition.
2.3.3 ZOPACAS’ efforts to improve security practices in the GoG
As shown above, ZOPACAS has been mostly absent from the initiatives to strengthen
security in those areas of the ocean developed by various actors – both from the GoG
region and others. Most African states that are members of the organisation (such as
Brazil) have been involved in different maritime security practices over the last years,
both autonomously and integrated in partnerships, showing that these states are greatly
concerned about security in the GoG. However, they have not done so through the
organisation to which they belong – ZOPACAS –, which was set up to maintain the
security of the entire South Atlantic (which includes the GoG).
This suggests that ZOPACAS member states are convinced that they will be better
equipped to respond to the maritime security challenges posed by threats such as piracy
and armed robbery at sea against ships if they do so outside the organisation. This has
been largely due to the irregular manner in which ZOPACAS has been operating.
To identify what role ZOPACAS could actually play in terms of implementing maritime
security practices in the GoG region, two decisive factors should be considered: the
collective identity of its member states – which is linked to their colonial legacy; and a
common ideal – the maintenance of peace in the vast maritime space (the South Atlantic)
that unites them. However, this project will require an unequivocal leader. And, in this
regard, Brazil – which spearheaded the creation of ZOPACAS – is a key player for the
very survival of the organisation. Therefore, ZOPACAS must be revitalised, as Brazil will
obtain (other) important benefits from it, such as the opportunity to affirm itself as a
relevant regional actor and to increase its influence in a maritime space where extra-
regional actors are increasingly present – China being the most recent (Edwards, 2021).
The boost that President Lula da Silva has sought to lend the organisation during his
current term of office reflects Brazil’s renewed interest in revitalising ZOPACAS, and could
even change the status quo by making it the main forum of cooperation in the field of
security between the South American countries and West African coastal countries.
However, other member states such as South Africa and Argentina (which are fellow G20
members and have well-equipped armed forces) or Nigeria and Angola (African regional
powers with large oil and natural gas reserves) and Uruguay (which makes a significant
contribution to United Nations peacekeeping operations) also play a relevant role
(Edwards, 2021). Some of the maritime security practices that ZOPACAS could
implement in the near future in the GoG region will not be possible without the support
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of these states. Those practices include the commitment of military naval capabilities to
surveillance missions in the waters of the GoG and the collection, fusion and sharing of
maritime information, and supporting the law enforcement agencies of the coastal states
of the GoG in building their maritime capabilities.
Conclusion
After years during which it was practically absent from Brazil’s foreign policy, ZOPACAS
has been given a much higher priority since early 2023 – influenced by President Lula da
Silva –, and is poised to become a key initiative in strengthening Brazil’s foreign policy
by making the country a key actor in South Atlantic geopolitics.
The security of an area of the ocean can be studied using different frameworks of analysis
that approach it from different perspectives: from semiotics (in which the meaning of a
concept can be derived by exploring its relationships with other concepts) to good order
at sea (which focuses on the importance of the sea as a source of resources, a means of
transport and an area of domination), securitisation theories (in which threats to the
security of a referent object are presented as existential and require exceptional
measures by decision makers) and security practice theory (which focuses on the specific
activities of the actors involved in the maritime security of a region).
This article examined ZOPACAS’ role in increasing maritime security in the GoG using
two of the analysis frameworks presented above: the securitisation of the threats in that
region of the South Atlantic (piracy in particular); and the security practices that have
been implemented there.
During most of the 21st century, ZOPACAS has not played an active role in the
securitisation of piracy in the GoG. However, it could be considerably more involved in
the short term, not only because the process to securitise piracy in the GoG is far from
consolidated, but also due to Brazil’s ongoing efforts to revitalise the organisation. But
for this to happen, ZOPACAS must adopt a discourse that presents piracy as an existential
threat to all those who use the GoG waters lawfully, as this will allow it to contribute to
a securitising movement that brings the issue to the audiences that must accept it for it
to become securitised.
Brazil also plays an instrumental role in the security practices that ZOPACAS could
implement in the GoG, as most of the organisation’s African member states, with a few
exceptions (such as Nigeria and South Africa), generally lack naval capabilities to deploy
in maritime security operations to combat the threats in the GoG. This means that not
only must Brazil be able to deploy naval capabilities in the GoG more often (and over
longer periods), it must persuade its African partners (especially Nigeria and South
Africa) to create a multinational task force capable of addressing the security challenges
in the region through maritime surveillance missions and the collection, fusion and
sharing of relevant operational information and by supporting the law enforcement
agencies of African coastal states in building their maritime capabilities.
The study’s research question has thus been answered: ZOPACAS can play a relevant
role in improving maritime security in the GoG by contributing to the securitisation of the
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most important threat in those waters (piracy) and by adopting concrete security
practices to address the challenges currently facing the region.
In terms of limitations to this research, some difficulty was identified in accessing
information from certain ZOPACAS member states, particularly African states, in order
to better understand their future commitment to the organisation.
Due to the fact that in this article only the securitisation and security practice theories
were used to analyse the research question, it seems appropriate to propose approaching
this issue using different frameworks of analysis, namely the building of good order at
sea in the Gulf of Guinea region.
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VOL 15 N.º 2, TD 1
Thematic Dossier
Brazil-China relations: The rise of modern International Order
December 2024, pp. 309-328
The Zone of Peace and Cooperation of The South Atlantic: A Contribution to Maritime
Security in The Gulf of Guinea
António Gonçalves Alexandre
328
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