

BEYOND IRON ORE: REFRAMING THE BRAZIL-CHINA PARTNERSHIP AS A MULTIFACETED ENGAGEMENT

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Abstract

This paper examines the evolving multifaceted engagement between China and Brazil, focusing on the catalytic role of the iron ore trade in shaping their strategic partnership. Driven by China's growing demand for iron ore and its strategic need to diversify supply chains, the relationship has evolved beyond economic interests into a broader strategic alliance. This alliance encompasses increased economic integration, characterized by trade, infrastructure projects, and technology transfer, as well as shared ideological alignment within multilateral institutions like BRICS and the G20. This paper argues that the China-Brazil partnership, fueled by their mutual reliance on iron ore, exemplifies how resource-driven partnerships can evolve into strategic alliances with significant implications for global politics and economics. The alliance signifies a shift in global power dynamics, with emerging powers like Brazil playing an increasingly important role in shaping the future of international relations.

Keywords

Iron ore, China-Brazil relations, resource-driven, multilateral institutions, global power dynamics.

Resumo

Este artigo examina a evolução do envolvimento multifacetado entre a China e o Brasil, concentrando-se no papel catalisador do comércio de minério de ferro na definição da sua parceria estratégica. Impulsionada pela crescente procura de minério de ferro por parte da China e pela sua necessidade estratégica de diversificar as cadeias de abastecimento, a relação evoluiu para além dos interesses económicos, para uma aliança estratégica mais ampla. Esta aliança abrange uma maior integração económica, caracterizada pelo comércio, projectos de infra-estruturas e transferência de tecnologia, bem como um alinhamento ideológico partilhado dentro de instituições multilaterais como os BRICS e o G20. Este artigo argumenta que a parceria China-Brasil, alimentada pela sua dependência mútua do minério de ferro, exemplifica como as parcerias orientadas para os recursos podem evoluir para alianças estratégicas com implicações significativas para a política e a economia globais. A aliança significa uma mudança na dinâmica do poder global, com potências emergentes como



o Brasil desempenhando um papel cada vez mais importante na definição do futuro das relações internacionais.

Palavras-chave

Minério de ferro, relações China-Brasil, instituições multilaterais orientadas por recursos, dinâmica de poder global.

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Introduction

The Brazil-China relationship, once hailed as a "perfect match" due to their complementary economic strengths, has faced significant challenges in recent years (Freitas, 2014). This "perfect match" envisioned a mutually beneficial partnership, with China's burgeoning demand for raw materials aligning with Brazil's abundant resources. This initial optimism was tempered by a downturn in 2014, however, that was characterized by economic contractions and declining levels of engagement. Beyond a few large corporations, most Brazilian companies struggled to penetrate the Chinese market, leaving Brazil with a trade deficit. Despite these challenges, a new window of opportunity emerged in the 2020s. China's shift away from Australia, driven by geopolitical tensions and economic statecraft, created a demand for alternative sources of raw materials, particularly iron ore. Brazil, with its vast reserves, emerged as a key alternative, offering China a chance to diversify its supply chain and reduce its dependence on Australia. This shift has the potential to reshape the Brazil-China partnership, opening avenues for deeper economic integration and strategic cooperation.

While iron ore remains a crucial commodity in this evolving relationship, it is only one aspect of a multifaceted engagement. This paper explores recent shifts in Brazil-China relations and proposes a new framework for analyzing their complex relationship, looking at geopolitical, technological, strategic, multilateral, economic, and political dimensions. This framework will be illustrated through the lens of the rising importance of Brazil's iron ore supply to China, demonstrating how this single commodity can serve as a case study for understanding the potential for a deeper and more strategic partnership between the two nations. Realizing the full potential of this partnership, however, would require addressing the economic disparities, geopolitical tensions, and technological collaboration needs. This paper will explore how both countries can navigate these challenges and build a more resilient and mutually beneficial relationship in the face of a changing global landscape.



Literature Review

The turn of the century saw China and Brazil, both aspiring regional powers, seeking closer collaboration. Niu (2010), a Chinese research fellow at the Shanghai Institute for International Studies, examined the impact of the Lula era on the evolving bilateral strategic partnership. He recognized that the conversations and exchanges between the two countries were becoming more substantive, covering a broader spectrum of topics, and wielding a greater impact on the global stage. Niu advised both countries to layer more regional and global components into their bilateral agenda, to enhance ties in terms of economic cooperation and social interaction.

Cardoso (2012) echoed Niu's observation, highlighting the rise of trading volume and the establishment of high-level bilateral institutions, particularly in their collaboration within various multilateral institutions and mechanisms. Cardoso focused his research on relevant domestic actors and the strategic meanings behind this partnership. He found that both countries were eager to cooperate and seize this window of opportunity. The establishment of the BRICS marked the starting point of this collaboration, aiming to influence the world order and global governance. However, ten years later, the question remains: what has this partnership achieved?

Armony & Velasquez (2016) recognized that a complex matrix of interactions, encompassing developmental, political, cultural, and "soft power" dimensions, was behind the rapid growth of China-Brazil economic relations. While acknowledging a clear "honeymoon" sentiment among Brazilians towards China, they cautioned that the benefits Brazil received might not be long term, due to unpredictable circumstances. This warning proved prescient as bitterness began to rise as Brazilian companies faced difficulties penetrating the Chinese market and the potential threat of China's aggressive strategy in potentially taking over physical control of Brazil's (and other Latin American countries') natural resources (Rocha and Bielschowsky, 2018).

Despite these difficulties and hazards, Brazilians remain eager to seek closer collaboration with China, particularly in terms of investments to diversify its manufacturing economy (Hiratuka, 2020). As China has established itself as Brazil's main supplier of manufactured products, Brazilian elites have raised concerns about the concentration of Brazilian exports in a few products, the potential hidden environmental costs, and the impact of the influx of Chinese products on the domestic market. Brazil urgently needs to upgrade its manufacturing capacity and diversify its economic growth. Chinese companies, like BYD, may be able to provide the technological guidance and assistance that Brazil seeks. Hiratuka emphasizes that the presence of these Chinese companies requires appropriate coordination from Brazilian policymakers.

Iron Ore's Role

Scholars have observed that despite shifts in Brazilian political leadership, the relationship between Brazil and China grew stronger and more multifaceted from 1995 to 2020, regardless of whether the Brazilian government was left-leaning or right-leaning. Vazquez (2022) observed that Brazil's trade with China and its trade with the United States moved in tandem, demonstrating a shared pattern of growth and evolution



over the course of the study. The transformation of Brazil-China relations over a quarter of a century, according to Vazquez, is evident in three key areas: the strengthening of diplomatic ties through an expanded network, the significant growth of trade and investment, and the convergence of their positions on global governance issues. He argued that Brazil's relationship with China should not be viewed solely through the lens of political ideology. Under President Jair Bolsonaro, Vazquez points out, the relationship has become more pragmatic, adapting to shared interests rather than ideological clashes, without necessarily being dependent on or excluding Brazil's ties with the US.

The growing importance of iron ore is a crucial aspect of the Brazil-China partnership that requires further analysis. Iron ore is a vital ingredient for making steel, a massive industry that builds everything from bridges to buildings. The demand for steel has grown quickly, so iron ore production has been booming since the year 2000. Australia and Brazil are the biggest suppliers of iron ore, and China is the biggest buyer. The iron ore industry is working to improve its technology to make it more efficient, environmentally friendly, and cost-effective. These advancements include the adoption of automated mining systems, advanced processing techniques, and sustainable mining practices. This research aims to bridge the gap in existing scholarship by examining the increasing importance of iron ore trade in the context of the broader Brazil-China relationship, analyzing its implications for both countries, and exploring the potential for a more multifaceted and strategic engagement.

Research Methodology

This research aims to answer the question: How has the increasing importance of iron ore trade shaped the evolving relationship between Brazil and China? Contextual analysis is particularly relevant to this research because it allows for a comprehensive understanding of the complex interplay of historical, political, economic, and social factors shaping the Brazil-China relationship, especially in the context of iron ore trade. The research draws on a variety of data sources, including: 1) academic journal articles, which provide in-depth analysis of Brazil-China relations, including the role of iron ore trade; 2) news reports, which offer insights into current events and the evolving dynamics of the Brazil-China relationship; and 3) think-tank reports, which provide expert analysis and policy recommendations on various aspects of Brazil-China relations, including trade and investment.

The data collected from these sources is analyzed through a process of thematic analysis, identifying key themes and patterns in the literature related to the Brazil-China relationship and iron ore trade. Thematic analysis will focus on identifying key themes such as the evolution of trade patterns, the impact of geopolitical shifts on iron ore trade, the role of technological advancements in the iron ore industry, and the broader implications of the Brazil-China partnership for regional and global stability. This analysis will involve coding the data, identifying patterns and relationships between themes, and drawing conclusions based on the emerging insights.

While this research draws on a diverse range of sources, it is important to acknowledge that the study is limited by the availability of publicly accessible data, particularly



regarding government documents and internal company reports. Future research could benefit from conducting interviews with key stakeholders in the Brazilian and Chinese iron ore industries to gain deeper insights into the dynamics of their relationship.

Geopolitical Analysis of China-Brazil Relations: Economic Ties, Political Ideology, and Commodities

Bilateral relations between Brazil and the People's Republic of China are relatively recent. In 1974, Brazil formally recognized the People's Republic of China. The Deng Xiaoping era was crucial for Brazil as Deng Xiaoping's government incorporated Brazil into Chinese plans. This culminated in 1984 with the first visit of a Brazilian president to China. In the last three decades, the relationship between China and Brazil has evolved significantly, spanning economic, political, and strategic dimensions. This analysis delves into the multifaceted nature of their ties, exploring the dynamics of economic integration, ideological alignment, and the significance of commodities in shaping their relationship.

What drew the attention of President João Figueiredo to China was the economic situation. The 1980s is known as the lost decade for Brazil, where the Brazilian economy was in decline. By contrast, China had already experienced significant economic growth, with a 15.2% increase in 1984 (World Bank, n.d.). João Figueiredo's visit to China was more symbolic, as he presented only a speech emphasizing a "convergence band" between China and Brazil. President Figueiredo's speech highlighted that while China and Brazil were extremely different countries in several factors, both sought international clout in a similar manner. Neither Brazil nor China wanted to be aligned with superpowers like the United States or the Soviet Union. Both countries prioritized development and believed that internal stability was crucial for achieving it. This meant refraining from interfering in the affairs of other countries (Horta, 2016). Although President Figueiredo returned to Brazil without reaching any formal agreement with China, he managed to demonstrate to China the mutual necessity for the two countries to draw closer together to achieve joint international integration as sovereign nations. This shared focus on economic development would eventually lead to a significant increase in trade between the two countries, particularly in commodities like iron ore, which would become a key driver of their relationship in the years to come. This early focus on economic cooperation and non-alignment would lay the groundwork for a more multifaceted relationship in the decades to come, with iron ore trade emerging as a crucial factor shaping the dynamics of their engagement.

China-Brazil Technological and Strategic Partnership

In 1988, another Brazilian president traveled to China. President Sarney visited the People's Republic of China, and during this visit, Brazil and China signed an agreement called the China-Brazil Earth Resources Satellite (CBERS). This marked a significant moment as both countries ventured into space satellite technology. The project is a collaborative effort utilizing technology from both nations. The primary goal of CBERS is to track the Earth's crust, mapping natural resources, monitoring deforestation, and



tracking sea currents. This early technological collaboration would later pave the way for joint ventures in the mining sector, including the development of more efficient and sustainable iron ore extraction technologies.

In 1992, Brazil received two Chinese statesmen. The first was Jiang Zemin, who succeeded Deng Xiaoping as the leader of China, marking the first visit of a Chinese head of state to Brazil. Later that year, Chinese Prime Minister Zhu Rongji also visited Brazil. During Zhu Rongji's visit, Brazil and China established a strategic partnership, meaning a bilateral agreement signifying mutual importance in each other's foreign policy objectives. This partnership would lay the foundation for a more integrated economic relationship, with the iron ore trade being pivotal in strengthening their economic and strategic ties. Over time, this relationship evolved from a strategic partnership to a global strategic partnership, denoting even greater significance between the two nations (Jenkins, 2012, p.21).

Brazil-China Trade Partnership

In the 1990s, Brazil witnessed a large trade surplus with China. Brazil imported inexpensive manufactured products, known as low-value-added manufactured products, from China during this period. Meanwhile, Brazil exported raw materials and commodities such as iron ore and soybeans to China (Bull, 2011, p.231). From 1998 to 2004, Brazil experienced a significant surge in commodity trade due to China's increasing demand, solidifying its position as a global player in the exports of soybeans, oil, and iron ore (Barbosa & Mendes, 2006, p.2).

In 2004, President Lula made his first visit to China. During the same year, Embraer, the Brazilian multinational aerospace corporation (Aulakh, 2006, p.93) established a presence in China. Additionally, the Brazil-China Business Forum was inaugurated. This business forum, along with the earlier technological collaborations, facilitated the development of joint ventures in the mining sector, contributing to the growth of iron ore exports. The purpose of this business forum was to facilitate business and contracts between Brazilian and Chinese companies, reducing the necessity for government intermediation. While the government continued to participate in negotiations, companies gained greater autonomy in forming agreements and conducting business. Since then, Brazil has made larger investments in China, and China has become one of the largest investors in Brazil, within various sectors. Brazil has primarily sold raw materials to China, while China has sold manufactured products to Brazil; this relationship is similar to the interactions between an underdeveloped and a developed country (Powell, 2017, p.416). While Brazil benefits from increased demand for its raw materials, China gains access to essential resources for its industrial development, creating a mutually beneficial relationship. Nevertheless, Brazil began encouraging China to produce goods in Brazil, so as to train Brazilian labor and help foster Brazil's development.

In 2013, trade with China was worth \$83 billion, covering a wide range of products. Brazil continued to export iron ore, soybeans, and now oil to China (Government of Brazil, 2022). Between 2006 and 2016, total trade with China increased from \$20 billion to \$68



billion (Wei, et al., 2019, p.1). From 2020 to 2021, Brazil's iron ore exports reached a total of 357.7 million tons (OEC, 2024). In 2024, Brazil's iron ore exports alone reached \$2.41B, representing a growth of China (\$669M) in total exports representing (\$9.77B) on Brazil's export to China, its biggest trade partner, according with trade data from The Observatory of Economic Complexity (OEC, 2024). The continued growth of iron ore exports suggests a strong foundation for further economic integration, but addressing the trade imbalance and fostering technological collaboration will be crucial for maximizing the potential of this partnership.

Multilateralism

China places significant emphasis on multilateralism over bilateral agreements, a stance that extends to various international negotiations. This approach is particularly highlighted in the perspectives of both China and Brazil, as they argue that multilateral frameworks carry greater significance compared to exclusive agreements such as those within the G7, where they are not present. Consequently, both China and Brazil prioritize engagements within the G20, recognizing it as a more inclusive and impactful platform for global discussions and agreements. This shared commitment to multilateralism has also influenced their approach to iron ore trade, as they seek to create a more equitable and sustainable global framework for resource management.

Moreover, Brazil's relationship with China extends beyond general diplomatic ties to encompass collaboration on specific issues. This collaboration is evident in Brazil's participation within groups such as BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa) and BASIC (Brazil, South Africa, India, China), where they work closely with China on shared objectives and policies. While they share a commitment to multilateralism, navigating the complexities of these groups and balancing their national interests can pose challenges to their collaboration. These partnerships within larger multilateral frameworks underscore the strategic importance that China and Brazil attribute to fostering broader international cooperation and consensus-building (Sauvant, 2006 p.373).

Robust Economic Ties

China and Brazil have forged a robust economic partnership over the past 30 years, marked by increasing trade volumes, investment flows, and collaborative ventures. At the heart of this relationship lies the exchange of commodities, with Brazil emerging as a key supplier of raw materials to fuel China's rapid industrialization and economic growth. Iron ore, in particular, has been a cornerstone of Sino-Brazilian trade. China's insatiable demand for iron ore, driven by its booming steel industry, has thrust Brazil into the spotlight as one of its main suppliers.

Historically, Australia dominated 60% of the iron ore market (Rodrigues & Lengyel, 2023, p.44), but Brazil's rise as a major exporter of iron ore and other commodities has significantly altered China's supply chain dynamics. Commodities beyond iron ore span a diverse range of products, including soybeans, oil, and agricultural products. This broad



commercial relationship has fostered mutual interdependence with China, which is unlikely to diminish in the future. Brazil is poised to remain a major international player due to its abundant natural resources and robust agricultural production, which enable it to offer bulk volumes at competitive prices that are difficult for other countries to match. However, this reliance on commodity trade also presents certain vulnerabilities, such as price fluctuations and the potential for market disruptions. Technological collaboration in areas like mining and resource management can help to mitigate these risks and foster a more sustainable and balanced economic partnership.

In recent years, bilateral trade between China and Brazil has soared to unprecedented levels, reflecting the deepening integration of their economies. Strategic initiatives such as the China-Brazil High-Level Coordination and Cooperation Mechanism have facilitated dialogue and cooperation across various sectors, laying the groundwork for sustained economic collaboration (Chinese Embassy, 2024). The importance of raw materials in shaping China-Brazil relations cannot be overstated, especially in the context of the iron ore trade. Brazil's emergence as a major supplier of iron ore to China has not only transformed the global commodities market but also catalyzed closer economic integration between the two countries.

Diplomatic Engagement, Ideological Alignment and Commodities Trade

The political dimension of China-Brazil relations was initially characterized by a mutual technological and economic partnership within the context of developing countries, which later evolved towards elite interests and ideological alignment. This alignment is supported by shared principles of multilateralism, global cooperation, and the distancing from old alliances and partnerships from the Cold War period. Historically, both China and Brazil have advocated for principles of non-interference and respect for national sovereignty in international affairs. This shared commitment to sovereignty and non-alignment has served as a cornerstone of their diplomatic relations, fostering trust and cooperation on global issues ranging from climate change to international peacekeeping. Furthermore, China and Brazil have actively sought to strengthen ties within the framework of multilateral institutions such as BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa) and the G20. As founding members of the BRICS bloc, China and Brazil have collaborated closely on initiatives aimed at promoting economic development, improving global governance, and reforming international financial institutions.

China's diplomatic overtures toward Brazil also reflect its broader strategy of cultivating strategic partnerships with emerging powers in the Global South. By engaging with Brazil on issues of mutual interest, such as infrastructure development, energy cooperation, and technology transfer, China seeks to consolidate its influence and leverage in Latin America and beyond. From a Brazilian perspective, engagement with China offers significant economic benefits and opportunities for technological exchange and training. Brazil's alignment with the BRICS framework exemplifies its commitment to deepening cooperation and connectivity with Asia, Africa, and Europe, thereby enhancing its global competitiveness and strategic relevance.



Around 30 years ago, when Brazil began to take its first steps towards China, the country saw a gradual shift in its policies, moving away from a strategic alignment that had fought alongside the Allied powers in the Second World War and continued throughout the Cold War, following the lead of the United States of America and its anti-communist stance. Throughout the military administration in Brazil, the government adopted a stringent and openly anti-socialist and anti-communist position.

At the end of the military period and with the beginning of democratization in Brazil in 1988, the country gradually began to implement social policies and change its outlook towards communist and socialist regimes. This shift is evident in the eight-year presidency of Fernando Henrique Cardoso, who was identified as a social democrat, followed by the extensive rule of the Workers' Party (PT), with Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva and Dilma Rousseff being elected and re-elected over three consecutive terms. Subsequently, Brazil experienced a period of conservatism under Jair Bolsonaro for four years (Piza, 2023, p.41) followed by a return to left-wing governance with the re-election of Lula and the Workers' Party.

The partnership between the Workers Party (Piza, 2023, p. 45), led by the iconic figure Lula, and China has evolved into a strategic alliance characterized by deepening trade relations, robust diplomatic engagements, and shared socialist ideologies. One of the pillars of the Workers' Party and China alliance was the significant expansion of bilateral trade during Lula's presidency (2003-2010). This trade expansion, fueled by the growing demand for iron ore from China, solidified Brazil's position as a key supplier of raw materials and strengthened the economic foundations of their partnership. Brazil, under the PT's leadership, leveraged its abundant natural resources to become a key supplier of commodities such as soybeans, iron ore, and oil to China. In return, Brazil imported manufactured goods and technology from China, fostering a mutually beneficial economic relationship. This trade expansion not only boosted economic growth but also enhanced Brazil's strategic position in the global market (Green & Leuhrmann, 2018, p.345).

To achieve this trade expansion, PT-led administrations actively pursued diplomatic initiatives to strengthen ties with China. High-level visits, diplomatic dialogues, and cooperation agreements were hallmarks of this engagement, signaling a commitment to deepening political and strategic understanding. Brazil, under PT's influence, aligned itself with China on various international issues, supporting China's initiatives in forums like the United Nations. This diplomatic synergy reinforced mutual trust and laid the foundation for broader collaboration.

The alliance between PT, Lula, and China is not merely transactional but also ideological. While they share a commitment to multilateralism, navigating these differences and finding common ground on complex issues will be crucial for sustaining their ideological convergence. Both parties share socialist ideologies, albeit with contextual differences, leading to a convergence of interests on social welfare, poverty alleviation, and sustainable development. This shared vision extends to global governance, where PT and China advocate for a multipolar world order that accommodates diverse voices and promotes equitable development. Their cooperation transcends traditional power dynamics, challenging hegemonic structures and fostering a more inclusive international system. The strategic alliance between PT, Lula, and China carries significant implications



for global politics and cooperation. It represents a model of South-South cooperation based on mutual respect, shared values, and strategic alignment. This alliance not only strengthens Brazil-China relations but also contributes to shaping a more balanced and multipolar global order. The return of the PT to power in Brazil suggests a continuation of this strategic alliance, but navigating global challenges and balancing their national interests will be crucial for maintaining the momentum of their partnership. As PT and China continue to collaborate on economic, diplomatic, and ideological fronts, their partnership serves as a testament to the potential of cooperation among emerging powers to drive positive change on the world stage.

The China-Australia Relations and the Rise of Brazil on Iron Ore Supply

Over the past four years, China has purchased billions of tons of iron ore. With Australia being its largest supplier of iron ore, it was presumed that relations between the two countries remained in an almost permanent state of goodwill. However, trade relations between China and Australia began to experience strong turbulence in the last decade due to China's significant interference in international politics in Southeast Asia, directly impacting Australia's internal policies. Recognizing China as a growing international and regional threat in Southeast Asia and the Asia-Pacific, Australia has visibly and gradually shifted away from China while aligning itself with security partnerships to counter China's long-standing maritime expansion in the region. These security partnerships are reflected in initiatives such as the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (QUAD) and the Australia-United Kingdom-United States (AUKUS) coalition.

China saw Australia as no longer a reliable partner for its strategic raw material needs, especially as Australia entered into security alliances with China's geopolitical rivals. For its part, the Chinese Communist Party has redirected its efforts to other sources of ore and raw materials to mitigate the impact of Australia's strategic pivot. Brazil's proactive engagement with China, coupled with its abundant iron ore reserves and competitive pricing, has positioned it as a key alternative to Australia. This Chinese maneuver demonstrates a concerted effort towards a common goal, not only between China and Brazil countries operating under the logic of South-South cooperation but also between two parties with similar political ideologies, once again reinforcing their global strategic partnership. Brazil, a steadfast economic partner and reliable diplomatic friend of China for decades, has steadily deepened its diplomatic engagement with China, resulting in increased trade. China has become Brazil's largest export partner over the years.

When it comes to iron ore, Brazil ranks only behind Australia as a supplier to China for its steel production. Therefore, as China considers diversifying its sources of raw material extraction, it primarily looks at smaller countries in Africa. However, in terms of iron ore, Brazil is likely to remain China's top priority as the main supplier for the foreseeable future. However, maintaining this position will require addressing environmental concerns related to mining and navigating potential competition from other emerging iron ore producers. The growing interdependence between Brazil and China in the iron ore sector suggests a promising future for their partnership, with potential for further collaboration in areas like resource management and technological development.



Conclusion

The multifaceted relationship between China and Brazil, spanning economic, political, and strategic domains, has undergone significant transformations in recent decades, culminating in a mutual global strategic partnership. Rooted in the quest for natural resources and driven by geopolitical imperatives, this partnership has evolved into a strategic alliance with far-reaching implications for global geopolitics. At the core of China-Brazil relations is the trade in raw materials, especially iron ore, which serves as the backbone of China's industrial complex, infrastructure development, and military efforts. China's strategic imperative to secure diversified sources of raw materials has led to an increasing dependence on Brazil, positioning it as a key partner in China's quest for resource security and strategic dominance.

Brazil's abundance of natural resources, coupled with its strategic diplomatic position, makes it an attractive proposition for resource negotiations with China. As China seeks to mitigate its dependence on traditional suppliers such as Australia and explore alternative sources, Brazil is emerging as a key player in shaping the global raw materials market and facilitating China's economic expansion. Economic ties between China and Brazil have flourished in recent years, with bilateral trade volumes reaching unprecedented levels. Brazil's emergence as a strategic trading partner for China underscores the deepening economic integration between the two nations, driven by mutual interests in raw materials, technology transfer, and infrastructure development.

BRICS, alongside other summit forums involving key states, serves as a convergence point to enhance economic cooperation and connectivity between China and Brazil, opening up new avenues for trade and investment. Leveraging Brazil's strategic position in South America, its diplomatic prowess, and vast resource base, China aims to consolidate its economic influence and expand global reach through infrastructure projects and trade routes. The political alignment between China and Brazil is characterized by shared interests and principles of multilateralism, sovereignty, and non-interference. Both nations actively collaborate within multilateral institutions such as BRICS, G20, and other international summits to advocate for a more equitable global order and reform international financial systems. China's diplomatic overtures towards Brazil reflect its broader strategy of cultivating strategic partnerships with emerging powers in the Global South. By engaging with Brazil on mutual interests such as infrastructure development and technology transfer, China seeks to enhance its geopolitical influence and shape the future trajectory of international relations.

As both countries continue to navigate the complexities of global politics and economics, their partnership is poised to shape the future of international relations, particularly in the context of resource security and global governance. The China-Brazil relationship, fueled by their mutual reliance on iron ore, serves as a compelling example of how resource-driven partnerships can evolve into strategic alliances with far-reaching implications for global politics and economics.



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