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VOL15, N.º 2, TD1
Thematic Dossier – Brazil-China relations:
The rise of modern International Order
December 2024
175
A BRAZILIAN STATUS DILEMMA IN THE UKRAINE WAR?
BETWEEN BEING A ‘DO-GOOD’ STATE AND A BRICS MEMBER
LUIS GOUVEIA JUNIOR
luisgouveia@ces.uc.pt
Ph.D. candidate at the University of Coimbra - Centre for Social Studies (Portugal). He holds a
Master's in Latin American Studies from the University of Oxford. His research focuses mainly on
Peace and Security Studies and the Global South, especially Latin America and BRICS.
Abstract
Brazil’s position concerning the war in Ukraine has been the target of harsh criticism. Once it
did not impose sanctions, due to its close its political ties with Russia, some perceive that
Brazil has prioritized its alliances to the detriment of establishing peace conditions in the
region. However, the Brazilian president, Lula da Silva, has recurrently affirmed that he strives
to promote peace in Ukraine. His discourses exemplify Brazil’s strategy of being a ‘do-good’
state, to gain international status. Applying the ‘social identity theory’ and analyzing official
discourses and mass media posts, this study concluded that Brazil attempted to gain status
by utilizing a ‘creativity’ strategy. This strategy vowed to portray Brazil as a peace promoter.
However, this strategy failed because of Brazil’s proximity to Russia. Paradoxically, this
proximity to Russia also happens due to status-seeking. As a forum where Brazil has close
contacts with China and other powers, the BRICS works as a fundamental space for Brazil to
acquire international recognition. Therefore, I propose that Brazil has faced a status dilemma:
capitalize its image within the BRICS or maintain a ‘do-good’ state image.
Keywords
Brazil, international status, Ukraine War, BRICS, Social Identity Theory.
Resumo
A posição do Brasil em relação à guerra na Ucrânia tem sido alvo de duras críticas. Na verdade,
pelo facto de não ter imposto sanções e devido aos seus estreitos laços políticos com a Rússia,
alguns percebem que o Brasil priorizou suas alianças em detrimento de estabelecer condições
de paz na região. No entanto, o presidente brasileiro, Lula da Silva, tem afirmado
repetidamente que se esforça para promover a paz na Ucrânia. Os seus discursos
exemplificam a estratégia do Brasil de ser um Estado que faz o bem, para capitalizar o seu
estatuto internacional. Aplicando a “teoria da identidade social” e analisando os discursos
oficiais e as publicações nos meios de comunicação de massa, este estudo concluiu que o
Brasil tentou capitalizar o seu estatuto internacional utilizando uma estratégia de
“criatividade”. Essa estratégia prometia retratar o Brasil como um promotor da paz. Contudo,
esta estratégia falhou devido à proximidade do Brasil com a Rússia. Paradoxalmente, esta
proximidade com a Rússia também acontece devido à necessidade de capitalizar o seu
estatuto internacional. Sendo um fórum onde o Brasil mantém contatos estreitos com a China
e outras potências, o BRICS funciona como um espaço fundamental para o Brasil adquirir
reconhecimento internacional. Assim, este texto sugere que o Brasil esteja a enfrentar um
dilema de estatuto: capitalizar sua imagem dentro dos BRICS ou manter uma imagem de
Estado “que faz o bem”.
JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations
e-ISSN: 1647-7251
VOL 15 N.º 2, TD 1
Thematic Dossier
Brazil-China relations: The rise of modern International Order
December 2024, pp. 175-189
A Brazilian Status Dilemma in the Ukraine War? Between Being a ‘Do-Good’ State and a
Brics Member
Luís Gouveia Junior
176
Palavras-chave
Brasil, Estatuto Internacional, Guerra Ucrânia, BRICS, Teoria da Identidade Social.
How to cite this article
Junior, Luis Gouveia (2024). A Brazilian Status Dilemma in the Ukraine War? Between Being a ‘Do-
Good’ State and a Brics Member. Janus.net, e-journal of international relations. VOL 15 N.º 2, TD1
– Temathic Dossier – “Brazil - China Relations: The Rise Of Modern International Order”. December
2024, pp. 175-189. https://doi.org/10.26619/1647-7251.DT0324.8.
Article received on 1 July 2024 and accepted for publication on 26 September 2024.
JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations
e-ISSN: 1647-7251
VOL 15 N.º 2, TD 1
Thematic Dossier
Brazil-China relations: The rise of modern International Order
December 2024, pp. 175-189
A Brazilian Status Dilemma in the Ukraine War? Between Being a ‘Do-Good’ State and a
Brics Member
Luís Gouveia Junior
177
A BRAZILIAN STATUS DILEMMA IN THE UKRAINE WAR?
BETWEEN BEING A ‘DO-GOOD’ STATE AND A BRICS MEMBER
1
LUIS GOUVEIA JUNIOR
1 - Introduction
Since the election of Lula da Silva, the Brazilian president has attempted to lead a
potential mediation for an agreement to end the War in Ukraine. His positions were,
however, considerably criticized by some political forces, especially in Western media.
For some, his positions, sometimes criticizing Russia and other times criticizing the West,
demonstrated a lack of proper position in favor of peace. Applying the “Social Identity
Theory” (SIT), this piece argues that Lula da Silva’s position was an attempt to gain
international status for Brazil. More specifically, Lula da Silva endeavored to apply
strategies that some authors call “creativity” (Larson & Shevchenko, 2010; Ward, 2017)
to gain status.
Although status has gained rampant attention in IR, most studies still focus on the Great
Powers (Larson & Shevchenko, 2010, 2014a). A recent trend in the literature has
consolidated new efforts to widen the analysis to emerging, middle, or small powers
(Wohlforth et al., 2018; Chagas-Bastos & Franzone, 2019; Bilgic & Pilcher, 2023). This
literature has demonstrated how examining emerging and minor powers can shed light
on dynamics usually unnoticed in studies on the Great Powers’ status. One example of it
concerns incentives for conflicts. Studies on major powers usually refer to how status-
seeking fosters conflicts (Larson & Shevchenko, 2010; Forsberg, 2014; Tsygankov,
2014). However, when authors look at middle or emerging powers, non-conflictual
dynamics emerge (Larson & Shevchenko, 2014b; Neumann & de Carvalho, 2015;
Wohlforth et al., 2018). These states usually utilize creativity to gain status, trying to
find a ‘niche,’ something distinctive about themselves (Larson & Shevchenko, 2010). One
possibility is to become a ‘good state’ (Neumann & de Carvalho, 2015) or a ‘do-good
state’ (Wohlforth et al., 2018). For instance, states such as Norway managed to construct
an image of a humanitarian, peace settler state to gain status.
Brazil historically utilizes this image of a ‘good’ state to gain status (Neumann & De
Carvalho, 2015; De Carvalho et al., 2020). Nevertheless, his approach faced a
1
Acknowledgment: This research has received financial support from Fundação para a Ciência e Tecnologia
(Portugal).
JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations
e-ISSN: 1647-7251
VOL 15 N.º 2, TD 1
Thematic Dossier
Brazil-China relations: The rise of modern International Order
December 2024, pp. 175-189
A Brazilian Status Dilemma in the Ukraine War? Between Being a ‘Do-Good’ State and a
Brics Member
Luís Gouveia Junior
178
fundamental problem in the Ukraine case, because Brazil’s participation in BRICS is also
a fundamental step of the country’s foreign policy. More so, it offers a space for direct
contact with China, Brazil’s most important commercial partner. Consequently, the South
American country cannot neglect such a forum. With closer connections with Russia
because of this organization, the ties with the aggressor in Ukraine hindered the Brazilian
strategy to act as a “do-good” state. This became evident, for instance, when the
Ukrainian president, Volodymyr Zelensky, affirmed that Brazil and China prefer to
maintain their alliances with Russia rather than establish peace in Ukraine (Poder360,
2024). Additionally, Lula da Silva’s declarations even provided more argument to this
position as some perceived his views as reproducing Wladimir Putin’s discourses (Wright,
2023). Hence, I argue that Brazil has achieved a status dilemma. While ties with Russia
within BRICS represent a crucial factor for Brazilian status, it also hampers the success
of the Brazilian status strategy concerning the Ukraine War.
Such debate contributes to the existing literature, focusing on the under-studied role of
peaceful behaviors in shaping status (Wohlforth et al., 2018; De Carvalho et al., 2020).
Moreover, it offers promising conclusions for the literature on emerging powers. Hence,
the following three sections will discuss status. First, I will provide a more exhaustive
overview of my theoretical approach. Second, I will discuss the literature on Brazilian
status-seeking. Then, I will analyze the Brazilian strategies in Ukraine and evaluate their
results.
2 - Status-seeking
According to Renshon (2017: 5), the importance of status in international politics is so
evident that it is consensual among different epistemologies and theories in international
relations. Status might arguably contribute to a state’s security, influence on others, and
economic prosperity (Renshon, 2017: 3). For Duque (2018: 2), the absence of an
international authority increases the importance of status since it influences “who gets
what, when, and how.” Surprisingly, despite some definitional nuances, status tends to
be defined in similar terms by different authors. It is usually connected with “filling a
place in a social hierarchy.” (Wohlforth et al., 2018: 528). Moreover, to achieve a
particular status, other states must recognize a state’s status (Dafoe et al., 2014).
A common approach to status in International Relations usually arises from Social
Identity Theory (SIT), which asserts that “social groups strive to achieve a positively
distinctive identity” (Larson & Shevchenko, 2010: 66). SIT proposes three approaches
usually used by states to gain status: 1- mobility, 2- competition, and 3- creativity. I
must mention that there are some divergences concerning this division. While Larson
and Shevchenko (2010) consider the three strategies simultaneously, Ward says this
perspective is inaccurate. For him, SIT makes a clear distinction between individual
strategy (mobility) and group strategy (competition and creativity) (Ward, 2017). Thus,
Ward affirms that the approach proposed by Larson and Shevchenko is problematic
because it confuses different levels of analysis and blurs the distinction between mobility
and competitiveness. Nonetheless, this debate is irrelevant to this piece, because my
JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations
e-ISSN: 1647-7251
VOL 15 N.º 2, TD 1
Thematic Dossier
Brazil-China relations: The rise of modern International Order
December 2024, pp. 175-189
A Brazilian Status Dilemma in the Ukraine War? Between Being a ‘Do-Good’ State and a
Brics Member
Luís Gouveia Junior
179
further analysis will focus on creativity, which both agree can be applied to the group
level.
Presenting an overview of these three strategies, “mobility” arguably refers to conforming
to existing norms, aspiring to obtain a higher place in a hierarchy (Larson & Shevchenko,
2010)
2
. It presupposes a space and acceptance of newcomers in such hierarchies (Larson
& Shevchenko, 2010).
Meanwhile, “competition” refers to a strategy followed by a state where it competes with
others, in specific domains, aiming to gain status (Larson & Shevchenko, 2010). This can
occur, for instance, through technological competition. In this case, obtaining new
technologies can represent a positive characterization of a country, achieving a higher
ranking in the social hierarchy.
The other strategy is “creativity”, which does not aim “to achieve a higher rank for the
in-group along a consensually valued dimension of comparison, but to reinterpret the
comparative situation in a way that mitigates the in-group’s experience of low status”
(Ward, 2017: 823). According to Larson & Shevchenko (2010), creativity can occur by:
1- changing a negative meaning of status to become a positive one; and, 2- creating a
new dimension in which the state can emerge as superior. Different creative strategies
contribute to improve a state’s status, such as participating in elite clubs (Larson &
Shevchenko, 2010). When mobility is not desirable, due to an avoidance of reproducing
existing rules, and competition is not an option, due to power discrepancies, creativity is
the most promising strategy, especially for emerging states (Larson & Shevchenko,
2014b).
Considering these three potential strategies, most literature strives to comprehend how
status-seeking fuels conflict among states (Larson & Shevchenko, 2010, 2014a; Dafoe
et al., 2014; Forsberg, 2014). Many turn to Russia and its conflictual relationship with
the West (Larson & Shevchenko, 2014a; Tsygankov, 2014; Forsberg, 2014). Others
affirm that accommodating China and Russia's status concerns could be fundamental to
guarantee their peaceful participation in the international order (Larson & Shevchenko,
2010). Status, or social recognition, allegedly causes conflicts because it is an
uncontrollable human desire (Dafoe et al., 2014).
However, these studies focus mainly on major powers (Neumann & De Carvalho, 2015).
When opening the investigation boundaries to smaller states, other relevant dimensions
emerge. For instance, Latin American scholars identified the necessity of formulating new
concepts connected to status, such as international insertion (Chagas-Bastos & Franzoni,
2019). According to this perspective, being accepted, or inserted, by those at the higher
hierarchical stances preludes acquiring status (Chagas-Bastos & Franzoni, 2019). Looking
at middle powers also overcomes the recurrent connection between status and conflict.
Wohlforth et al. (2018) argue that small and middle powers can have other strategic
choices to gain status, including being a peace defender or avoiding conflict. As
mentioned above, Norway utilizes the image of a “do-good” state to gain status
2
As mentioned above, Ward (2017) affirms that Larson & Shevchenko misinterpreted SIT and mobility
should not be included in IR analyses.
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A Brazilian Status Dilemma in the Ukraine War? Between Being a ‘Do-Good’ State and a
Brics Member
Luís Gouveia Junior
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(Wohlforth et al., 2018). The same arguably happens with Brazil, whose participation in
peacekeeping operations, and humanitarian actions, attempted to gain the status of
‘doing good’ (De Carvalho et al., 2020). Such attempts, however, have been barely
effective (Beaumont & Roren, 2020: 45).
3 - The Global South; Brazil; and Status
A rising interest in identity formation in the Global South has emerged. Nevertheless, as
Chagas-Bastos & Franzoni (2019) allure, the literature on status still misses explanatory
capacity regarding how states from the Global South act to gain status. Some talk about
how the colonial past creates an identity of post-colonial anxiety in those countries (Bilgic
& Pilcher, 2022). The shared history of being explored also fosters cooperation in some
areas, including the non-aligned movement (Vieira, 2016). The colonized past also
severely influences how these states seek to gain status (Bilgic & Pilcher, 2022). As some
have identified, in recent decades, Global South emerging Powers have increased their
actions to gain status (Dal & Dipama, 2019). Brazil, the object of this analysis, is far from
being an exception.
De Carvalho et al. (2020) affirms that in the Brazilian case, there is an attempt to gain
status by emulating the Great Powers' actions (e.g., participating in peacekeeping) and
challenging existing governance channels. However, there are some disagreements
about the country’s status objectives. Some argue that Brazil strives to be between a
Great Power and a Global South state (De Carvalho, 2020). Meanwhile, others perceive
Brazil as aspiring to become a Great Power (Larson & Shevchenko, 2014b; Stolte, 2015).
Independently of its final aim, Brazil has utilized a few strategies to gain recognition for
its emergence. Its participation in regional and international blocs, such as Mercosur,
BRICS, and IBSA, is one meaningful example of the Brazilian strategy to get space in
multilateral forums (Chagas-Bastos & Franzoni, 2019; Stuenkel, 2019). Furthermore, its
presence in Africa during Lula da Silva's first two mandates was arguably an attempt to
get a major power status (Stolte, 2015).
BRICS is significant since it is a group with annual meetings in which Brazil has direct
access to other major powers like China, Russia, and India. The recent BRICS expansion
to BRICS+, with the entrance of Iran, Egypt, Ethiopia, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab
Emirates, propelled this group’s geopolitical and economic importance even more. The
emergence of BRICS has direct linkages with creating the IBSA Dialogue Forum formed
by India, Brazil, and South Africa (Stuenkel, 2015, 2019; Brosig, 2019). One illustrative
anecdote of IBSA creation is that the three Global South leaders joined cooperative
efforts after participating in a G7 meeting, in which the three only observed without
participating in the crucial discussions (Stuenkel, 2015, 2019). The Brazilian president at
that time, Lula da Silva, queried about the sense of the three being there only ‘to eat the
dessert’, once they wanted the ‘main course, the dessert and then coffee’ (Lula da Silva
in Stuenkel, 2019:16). Thus, creating IBSA arose for a concise discontentment of the
status given to Brazil, India, and South Africa by the G7 members. These countries could
not join an elite club, so they created their own club.
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e-ISSN: 1647-7251
VOL 15 N.º 2, TD 1
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December 2024, pp. 175-189
A Brazilian Status Dilemma in the Ukraine War? Between Being a ‘Do-Good’ State and a
Brics Member
Luís Gouveia Junior
181
While IBSA has a diminutive global impact, BRICS is paramount for these countries to
gain status (Stuenkel, 2019: 43). To Brazil, constant and direct contact with China
represented an opportunity to advance its economic and political interests. Notably,
China is Brazil's most significant commercial partner, and Brazil is one of the few states
with a positive trade balance with China (Bermúdez, 2024). BRICS is usually described
as crucial to such commercial development (Stuenkel, 2019). Not surprisingly, some
authors have argued that BRICS members have refused to take measurements against
Russia (Junior & Branco, 2022; Sjoli, 2023). Brazil avoids breaking up with a partner in
BRICS, since the forum represents an opportunity to advance its own interests.
Nevertheless, in a quantitative comparison of BRICS member's status recognition, Brazil
appears to underperform the most, considering its potential (Beaumont & Roren, 2020).
Beaumont and Roren (2020) also identify this lack of status as a recurrent characteristic
of Latin American countries. Regardless of not fulfilling its potentiality, in his first two
terms as Brazilian president (2003-2010), Lula da Silva was responsible for an expressive
effort to improve the Brazilian international position (Chagas-Bastos & Franzoni, 2019).
Beyond joining new international forums, Brazil bolstered its participation in
peacekeeping operations, evidenced by its leading role in MINUSTAH, hosted the 2016
Olympics and the 2014 FIFA men’s World Cup, and ignited its claims for a permanent
seat in the Security Council (De Carvalho, 2020; De Carvalho et al., 2020).
Notwithstanding, some have argued that since the 2010s, Brazil has stopped pursuing
actions to reinforce its status as a regional power (Nolte & Schenoni, 2024).
In the literature about Brazilian status-seeking, a recurrent tendency is the perspective
of Brazil attempting to gain status through an image of a ‘good state’, respectful of
international law and a contributor to peacekeeping (Chagas-Bastos & Franzone, 2019;
De Carvalho et al., 2020). The idea of “good power” proposed by Neumann and De
Carvalho (2015) highlights those states that utilize their “moral authority” to gain status.
Larson and Shevchenko (2014b) consider the Brazilian strategies as examples of
creativity. The ‘good state’ strategy might represent another creative pathway to gain
status. In the next section, we will apply this perspective to analyze Brazilian behaviors
concerning the Ukraine War.
4 - Lula da Silva and the War in Ukraine
In this section, I will analyze speeches and statements issued by the Brazilian
government since January 2023, when Lula da Silva reassumed the presidency. As
mentioned in the introduction, the Brazilian president's position concerning the Ukraine
War was considerably questioned, especially by Western media. Indeed, as studies
identified, Brazil has not opposed Russia since the (February 2022) invasion of Ukraine,
following a BRICS pattern of criticizing while maintaining political and economic relations
with Putin’s regime (Júnior & Branco, 2022; Sjoli, 2023).
The Brazilian position, however, can be better explained as a creative attempt to gain
status. After becoming president, Lula da Silva claimed to cease the hostilities in Ukraine
(gov.br, 2023a, 2023b). Such claims arose with a discourse of “Brazil is back” (gov.br,
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Thematic Dossier
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December 2024, pp. 175-189
A Brazilian Status Dilemma in the Ukraine War? Between Being a ‘Do-Good’ State and a
Brics Member
Luís Gouveia Junior
182
2023a, 2023b). The Brazilian president recurrently referred to the years of Bolsonaro’s
presidency as lost years in Brazilian international participation (gov.br, 2023a). The
Worker’s Party leader perceived that his country had lost status, which he vowed to
regain.
As mentioned above, one aspect usually associated with status is the participation in
‘elite groups’ (Larson & Shevchenko, 2010). In the case of Ukraine, Lula da Silva
proposed a few times the creation of a new elite club. In his words: “When there was the
2008 economic crisis, quickly, we created the G20 attempting to save the economy. Now,
it is important to create another G20 to end the war and to establish peace” (gov.br,
2023c, author’s translation
3
).
In May 2023, after a meeting in London with the British Prime Minister, Lula da Silva
said: “I believe in constructing a mechanism that can establish the possibility of making
that the world returns to having peace” (gov.br, 2023b, author’s translation
4
). He then
added that he has talked about the War in Ukraine at the G20 and at the G7 and in
bilateral meetings with the Indian, Indonesian, and Chinese leaders (gov.br, 2023b). His
main proposal was the creation of a ‘Peace Group’ to deal with the war (gov.br, 2023c).
This demonstrates a robust attempt to reinforce the Brazilian position as a peace
defender. Historically, Brazil has tried to gain status through a peaceful image (De
Carvalho, 2020; De Carvalho et al., 2020).
Still, in 2023, Lula da Silva also defended the creation of a G20 of peace when meeting
the Spanish Prime Minister, Pedro Sanchez. This declaration is meaningful because he
connects this new ‘elite club’ with the failure of the existing Security Council (gov.br,
2023a). The Brazilian claims for a permanent seat in the Security Council also emerges
as an attempt to gain status (De Carvalho et al., 2020). The declarations by the Brazilian
president also indicate that the country’s behavior concerning Ukraine sought to solidify
the country’s position to achieve this objective. Lula da Silva’s speech at the 2023 G7
meeting in Hiroshima also includes a sharp criticism of the Security Council (Da Silva,
2023). Furthermore, this speech attests to how he proposes Brazilian peaceful behavior
as a matter of national identity. He said:
Brazil has lived in peace with its neighbors for over 150 years. We made
Latin America a region without nuclear weapons. We are also proud to have
built, together with our African neighbors, a zone of peace and nuclear
non-proliferation in the South Atlantic (Da Silva, 2023:1, author’s
translation)
5
.
3
Original Text: “Quando houve a crise econômica de 2008, rapidamente, nós criamos o G20 para tentar
salvar a economia. Agora é importante criar um outro G20 para acabar com a guerra e estabelecer a
paz.”
4
Original Text: acredito na construção de um mecanismo que possa estabelecer a possibilidade da gente
fazer com que o mundo volte a ter paz.
5
Original Text: “O Brasil vive em paz com seus vizinhos há mais de 150 anos. Fizemos da América Latina
uma região sem armas nucleares. Também nos orgulhamos de ter construído, junto com vizinhos
africanos, uma zona de paz e não proliferação nuclear no Atlântico Sul.”
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A Brazilian Status Dilemma in the Ukraine War? Between Being a ‘Do-Good’ State and a
Brics Member
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Such statement is an attempt to gain international status. SIT proposes that states seek
status because human beings want to feel proud of participating in a group (Larson &
Shevchenko, 2010). According to the Brazilian president, peace with its neighbors for
over 150 years is a reason for national pride. However, as the literature indicates, status
also requires recognition. Speaking in these terms in a G7 meeting indicates an attempt
to obtain recognition of Brazilian peaceful conduct.
Comparison is another essential feature of status-seeking (Larson & Shevchenko, 2010).
In Lula da Silva’s 2023 G7 speech, he compares the peaceful Brazil abovementioned with
the bellicose attitude of some Security Council permanent members, who “continue the
long-term tradition of waging wars non-authorized by the council.” (Da Silva, 2023,
author’s translation)
6
Such narrative indicates an approach similar to some
characteristics of a creativity strategy to gain status in some authors’ perspectives
(Larson & Shevchenko, 2010, 2014b; Ward, 2017). Lula da Silva tries to create new
status measurements, such as a non-nuclear state as a positive feature and a new ‘elite
club,’ the ‘Peace Club,’ to gain recognition. This strategy encapsulates what some authors
call a ‘good state’ or a ‘do-good state’ strategy (Neumann & de Carvalho, 2015; Wohlforth
et al., 2018).
5 - The Brazilian dilemma: when status-seeking strategies overlap
The Brazilian strategy concerning the Ukraine War failed in its central claims. After less
than one year of making the War in Ukraine a pivotal matter in its foreign policy strategy,
Lula da Silva lost much of his appeal to this matter. The eruption of the Israeli invasion
of Gaza and the turbulence in its neighborhood with Venezuela and Guiana forced Brazil
to minimize its rhetoric about Ukraine. Domestic dynamics also forced Lula da Silva to
decrease his official international visits to other states (Moreno, 2023). Furthermore,
Western media mainly perceived the Brazilian posture negatively, creating some
diplomatic embarrassment to Lula da Silva. In this section, we will discuss why this
strategy fails.
As mentioned, Brazil’s participation in the BRICS is vital for the country to gain status
(Larson & Shevchenko, 2014b; Chagas-Bastos & Franzone, 2019; De Carvalho et al.,
2020; Stuenkel, 2019). Russia is one of the leading states in BRICS, and some argue
that Wladimir Putin used this group to overcome isolationism since the 2014 Crimea
invasion (Stuenkel, 2019). Some studies identify that Brazil did not effectively act in
dissonance with Russia’s interests (Júnior & Branco, 2022; Sjoli, 2023). As expected,
Brazil maintains its agenda closer to BRICS, including Russia, in Lula da Silva’s third
mandate.
A meaningful event in this regard was Sergey Lavrov's trip to Brazil in April 2023. The
official page of the Brazilian Ministry of External Relations refers to the visit: “Beyond the
historical ties of friendship and cooperation between Brazil and Russia, the countries
maintain expressive commercial relations. Russia is the main supplier of fertilizers to
6
Original Text: “continuam a longa tradição de fazerem guerras não autorizadas pelo Conselho”.
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A Brazilian Status Dilemma in the Ukraine War? Between Being a ‘Do-Good’ State and a
Brics Member
Luís Gouveia Junior
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Brazil.”
7
(Ministério das Relações Exteriores, 2023: 1, author’s translation). Lavrov even
affirmed in Brasília that Russia was “grateful to our Brazilian friends for their clear
understanding of the genesis of the situation.” (Paraguassu & Boadle, 2023:1). Western
platforms recurrently mentioned this visit to suggest that Brazil was getting farther away
from its traditional non-alignment and closer to Russia (Harris & Pooler, 2023).
After the International Criminal Court (ICC) issued a prison mandate to Putin, some
questioned whether he could participate in the G20 meeting in Brazil in 2024. Lula da
Silva affirmed that, as long as he was the Brazilian president, Putin would not be arrested
in Brazil, despite the country being an ICC signatory (Reuters, 2023). This kind of
statement becomes even more meaningful, considering that Putin did not participate in
the BRICS 2023 summit in South Africa (Aljazeera, 2023a). Although the official reason
was a ‘mutual agreement,’ some affirm that he did not participate in the summit because
of the ICC mandate (Aljazeera, 2023a). Thus, the Brazilian president’s statement
becomes even more problematic.
Beyond Lavrov’s visit and Putin’s discourse, Lula da Silva’s assertions that the US and
the EU were fueling the war in Ukraine created significant criticism by Western powers.
The US spokesperson, John Kirby, even said that “Brazil is parroting Russian and Chinese
propaganda without at all looking at the facts,” affirming that Lula’s comments were
“simply misguided” (Wright, 2023: 1). According to an anonymous ambassador’s
interview to Reuters, this criticism also resonated within the European Union (Paraguassu
& Boadle, 2023). The EU spokesman, Peter Stano, rejected the Brazilian affirmations
(Paraguassu & Boadle, 2023). In a direct answer to Lula’s declarations, Stano enforced
that Russia was the only aggressor responsible for the conflict (Poder360, 2023).
The criticisms also surged when Lula da Silva visited Portugal for the commemorations
of the Portuguese Revolution. Ukrainian refugees protested against the Brazilian
president and his proximity to Russia (Aljazeera, 2023b). Referring to Lula da Silva, the
leader of the Portuguese Liberal Party said that having a friend of Putin in the Parliament
was outrageous (Lusa, 2023). The major oppositional party, PSD (currently in power),
also asked the government to issue a statement demarcating Portugal´s policy from Lula
da Silva’s affirmations (Lusa, 2023). Moreover, Chega, the Portuguese far-right party
currently the third major force in the Portuguese Parliament, called for protests against
Lula's presence in Portugal (Amato, 2023).
The Ukrainian president, Volodymyr Zelensky, fueled the critics, affirming that Brazil was
misinterpreting the war and who was the real aggressor (Gazeta do Povo, 2023). For
Zelensky, Lula da Silva reproduced Putin’s ideas about the war, which does not contribute
to peace (Duarte, 2023). The Ukrainian president even sarcastically affirmed that he was
happy that Lula da Silva criticized him (CNN Brasil, 2023). As mentioned, the Ukrainian
president has recently argued that Brazil and China prioritize their alliance with Russia;
rather than establishing peace in Ukraine (Poder360, 2024). Considering that the
7
Original Text: Além dos laços históricos de amizade e cooperação entre Brasil e Rússia, os países mantêm
expressivo relacionamento comercial. A Rússia é o principal fornecedor de fertilizantes para o Brasil.
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185
Europeans, and the North Americans, share a considerably positive perspective on
Zelensky, such statements negatively impact Lula da Silva’s image in the West.
The analysis of news reports and feature articles from Western media suggests that the
‘good guy’ image can hardly stand if you ‘walk with’ a ‘bad guy.’ Lavrov’s visit to Brazil
hardened Europeans' acceptance of Brazil's position. As demonstrated in the previous
section, Brazil attempted to gain status with the war in Ukraine. This strategy, however,
failed. The peace group never materialized, and Lula da Silva was never invited to
mediate peace talks. This does not mean that Brazil has not gotten the world’s attention
because it substantiated Lula da Silva’s discourse of “Brazil is back”, hence achieving
greater success. However, considering precisely the ‘creative’ strategy concerning the
Ukraine War, the polemic positions of Brazil hardly improved the country’s status.
6 – Conclusion
This paper proposes that the Brazilian posture regarding the War in Ukraine can be
qualified as a (failed) attempt to gain status. Although the literature on status focuses
mainly on how it fosters conflicts, this analysis demonstrates that seizing conflicts can
also be utilized when a state seeks status. As the Brazilian president’s declarations attest,
it attempted a few creative strategies, including creating a new elite club (G20 for peace)
and claiming the necessity of bringing non-nuclear states to the Security Council. This
conclusion contributes to the literature proposing that Brazil attempted to be a ‘do-good’
state (De Carvalho et al., 2020). Nonetheless, the failure of Lula da Silva’s strategy of
using creativity in the Ukrainian case demonstrates that there are other dynamics that
have still not been identified by these authors.
Lula da Silva failed for different reasons. The perspective among the status gatekeepers
was so polarized that the Brazilian ‘pro-peace perspective’ appeared as an acceptance of
Russia’s behavior. Thus, Western states barely acknowledged Brazil’s status in resolving
the Ukraine War. Moreover, Lavrov's presence in Brasília increased Western suspicion of
Brazil’s position regarding Ukraine. It indicated a vital conclusion for the literature on
‘good states’ or ‘do-good states’: it is difficult to maintain the image of a ‘good state’
while, simultaneously, being a friend of a state perceived by status gatekeepers as a ‘bad
state.’
In the Brazilian case, it faced a status dilemma. On the one hand, its participation in
BRICS with Russia constitutes a fundamental part of its status-seeking. One must always
bear in mind that China's presence in BRICS represents a unique opportunity for Brazil
to advance its economic and political interests with that rising Asian superpower.
However, it also strengthens Brazil’s proximity to Russia, which hinders the country’s
approach to gaining status as a ‘do-good’ state with its position in the Ukraine War. As
Zelensky criticizes, it seems to other states that Brazil prioritizes its alliance with ‘the
aggressor.’
More importantly, this conclusion demonstrates the necessity of a deeper analysis of
emerging powers' status-seeking. It is necessary to go beyond focusing on how status
creates conflicts and try to comprehend how peaceful behaviors can be a tool to gain or
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186
lose status. The dynamics identified in this study contribute to this comprehension,
proposing that a ‘do-good’ strategy requires a few steps to be successful, including the
political assessment of that state’s partnerships. The Brazilian status dilemma is a case
study that might be reproduced by other Global South states. Further study is needed to
comprehend how Global South states utilize peace to improve their international status.
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