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Universidade Autónoma de Lisboa
e-ISSN: 1647-7251
VOL15, N.º 2, TD1
Thematic Dossier – Brazil-China relations:
The rise of modern International Order
December 2024
122
UNDERSTANDING CHINA’S STANCE IN SINO-BRAZILIAN RELATIONS: THE
CHINA MODE
XUHENG WANG
carol_wxh@foxmail.com
Ph.D. Candidate in International Politics and Conflict Resolution in the School of Economics
(FEUC) at the University of Coimbra and the Centre for Social Studies (Portugal). She holds a
Master’s degree from the School of Economics (FEUC), University of Coimbra, Portugal and a
Bachelor’s degree from the School of Business, Macao Polytechnic Institute, China. Currently, she
is working on the research on the role of Macao in Sino-Portuguese-speaking countries relations,
based on paradiplomacy in China. Since November 2023, she has also worked in the project
AspirE, "Decision making of aspiring (re)migrants to/within the EU: The case of labour market-
leading migrations from Asia", on the scope of HORIZON-CL2-2022-TRANSFORMATIONS-01 in
the local team of the University Institute of Lisbon. https://orcid.org/0000-0002-0186-7445.
CARMEN AMADO MENDES
carmen.mendes@cccm.gov.pt
President of the Macau Scientific and Cultural Centre in Lisbon (Portugal). She is an Associate
Professor with tenure in International Relations, accredited at the School of Economics of the
University of Coimbra, where she established the course “China and the Portuguese-speaking
Countries in World Trade.” She is the former head of the International Relations department and
coordinator of the School of Economics International Office at the same university. She holds a
Ph.D. degree from the School of Oriental and African Studies - University of London, a Master’s
degree from the Institute of Higher European Studies - University of Strasbourg, and a Bachelor’s
degree from the Institute of Social and Political Sciences - University of Lisbon. She was a Post-
doctorate scholar at the Institute of Political Studies of the Portuguese Catholic University of
Lisbon, and visiting professor at the University of Macau, the University of Salamanca, and the
University of Lyon. She was a board member of the European Association for Chinese Studies,
and the organizer of the 2014 EACS conference in Coimbra, and president of the International
Relations Section and member of the board of the Portuguese Political Science Association.
Principal Investigator at the University of Coimbra on a research project on the role of Macau in
China s relations with the Portuguese-speaking countries, funded by the Portuguese national
funding agency for Science, Research and Technology; and on the project on South– South
Cooperation for the Europe China Research and Advice Network, supported by the European
External Action Service. Auditor of the Portuguese National Defense Institute. Co-founder of the
consulting company ChinaLink, and of the Observatory for China in Portugal. Author of China and
the Macau Negotiations, 1986–1999 (HKUP) and China’s New Silk Road: An Emerging World
Order (Routledge), as well as other publications available for consultation at:
www.uc.pt/feuc/carmen. https://orcid.org/0000-0003-1376-5048.
Abstract
During the Covid-19 pandemic, Sino-Brazilian relations were affected by the election in
January 2019 of Jair Bolsonaro as President of Brazil. Various voices were raised on the topic
of Sino-Brazilian relations, with some people believing that the attitude towards China that
Bolsonaro held damaged Sino-Brazilian relations to a noticeable degree. However, several
studies also suggested that the election of Jair Bolsonaro did not have any negative impact
on Sino-Brazilian relations, in the form of actual results. In the post-epidemic era, with the
new Brazilian President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva taking office, Brazil and China’s strategic
JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations
e-ISSN: 1647-7251
VOL 15 N.º 2, TD 1
Thematic Dossier
Brazil-China relations: The rise of modern International Order
December 2024, pp. 122-144
Understanding China’s Stance in Sino-Brazilian Relations: The China Mode
Xuheng Wang, Carmen Amado Mendes
123
partnership seems to have been strengthened. Lula not only expressed his friendly attitude
towards China after taking office, but also paid a state visit to China from April 12 to 15, 2023.
China and Brazil subsequently signed the Joint Statement between the People’s Republic of
China and the Federative Republic of Brazil on Deepening the Comprehensive Strategic
Partnership. China and Brazil not only continue to cooperate in trade, but have also expanded
cooperation in aerospace, electronic technology and other fields. Using Guanxi theory as its
theoretical framework, this paper studies China's attitude and policies towards Brazil during
Covid-19 and after the epidemic, from a Chinese perspective. It analyses the different
attitudes and policy orientations of Brazilian leaders towards China, as well as China's
responses to ensure the maintenance of Sino-Brazilian relations, discussing the various
actions taken.
Keywords
Sino-Brazilian relation, Guanxi Theory, Bolsonaro, Lula.
Resumo
Durante a pandemia de Covid-19, as relações sino-brasileiras foram afetadas pela eleição, em
janeiro de 2019, de Jair Bolsonaro como Presidente do Brasil. Várias vozes se levantaram
sobre o tema das relações sino-brasileiras, com algumas pessoas acreditando que a atitude
de Bolsonaro em relação à China prejudicou as relações sino-brasileiras em um grau notável.
No entanto, vários estudos também sugeriram que a eleição de Jair Bolsonaro não teve
qualquer impacto negativo nas relações sino-brasileiras, na forma de resultados reais. Na era
pós-epidemia, com a posse do novo presidente brasileiro, Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, a parceria
estratégica do Brasil e da China parece ter sido fortalecida. Lula não apenas expressou sua
atitude amigável para com a China após assumir o cargo, mas também fez uma visita de
Estado à China de 12 a 15 de abril de 2023. A China e o Brasil assinaram posteriormente a
Declaração Conjunta entre a República Popular da China e a República Federativa do Brasil
em Aprofundamento da Parceria Estratégica Abrangente. A China e o Brasil não só continuam
a cooperar no comércio, mas também expandiram a cooperação nos setores aeroespacial,
tecnologia eletrónica e outros campos. Utilizando a teoria de Guanxi como referencial teórico,
este artigo estuda a atitude e as políticas da China em relação ao Brasil durante a Covid-19 e
após a epidemia, a partir de uma perspectiva chinesa. Analisa também as diferentes atitudes
e orientações políticas dos líderes brasileiros em relação à China, bem como as respostas da
China para garantir a manutenção das relações sino-brasileiras, discutindo as diversas ações
tomadas.
Palavras-chave
Relações sino-brasileiras, Teoria de Guanxi, Bolsonaro, Lula.
How to cite this article
Wang, Xuheng & Mendes, Carmen Amado (2024). Understanding China’s Stance in Sino-Brazilian
Relations: The China Mode. Janus.net, e-journal of international relations. VOL 15 N.º 2, TD1 –
Temathic Dossier – “Brazil - China Relations: The Rise Of Modern International Order”. December
2024, pp. 122-144. https://doi.org/10.26619/1647-7251.DT0324.6.
Article received on 3 January 2024 and accepted for publication on 30 August 2024.
JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations
e-ISSN: 1647-7251
VOL 15 N.º 2, TD 1
Thematic Dossier
Brazil-China relations: The rise of modern International Order
December 2024, pp. 122-144
Understanding China’s Stance in Sino-Brazilian Relations: The China Mode
Xuheng Wang, Carmen Amado Mendes
124
UNDERSTANDING CHINA’S STANCE IN SINO-BRAZILIAN
RELATIONS: THE CHINA MODE
XUHENG WANG
CARMEN AMADO MENDES
Introduction
The year 2024 marks the 50th anniversary of the establishment of diplomatic relations
between China and Brazil, and after half a century of exchanges, the Sino-Brazilian
relationship continues to develop. But this relationship has not always been problem-
free, and this is related to the different governing strategies and attitudes of Brazilian
leaders towards China. Looking back at former Brazilian President Bolsonaro’s electoral
campaign and the Covid-19 epidemic period, we can find that Sino-Brazilian relations
fluctuated then. Particularly when national leaders make negative remarks, tensions will
arise in official discourse between two countries. Under the dual influence of the epidemic
and official discourse, cooperation between China and Brazil in various fields at the official
level was hindered to a noticeable extent.
After being re-elected as President of Brazil in 2023, Lula continued his former friendly
attitude towards China. He visited China in 2023 and signed a series of agreements in
various fields with China. He emphasized China and strategic partnership (China, 2023b).
China has been Brazil's largest trading partner and export destination for fourteen
consecutive years. Brazil is China’s largest trading partner and largest direct investment
destination in Latin America (Bian, Zhuodan; Chen, Weihua; Xie, Zhao & Zhou, Yongshui,
2023). In 2023, the bilateral trade volume between China and Brazil was US$181.53
billion, a year-on-year increase of 6.1%, of which China's import volume will be
US$122.42 billion, a year-on-year increase of 11.9%. It mainly consists of iron ore and
its concentrate, soybeans, crude oil, paper pulp, and soybean oil, etc. (China, 2024c). It
can be seen that China is the largest buyer of Brazilian products, especially agricultural
products (Brasil, 2024). Based on the trade situation between China and Brazil, Lula has
a positive attitude towards future cooperation and the development of bilateral relations
between Brazil and China. Relations between China and Brazil appear to be getting closer.
Bolsonaro and Lula have exhibited different attitudes towards China. The Chinese
government also responded accordingly to the different attitudes of the Brazilian
government. Considering the results, the relationship between China and Brazil has not
fundamentally changed. There is no doubt that the changing attitude of the Bolsonaro
JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations
e-ISSN: 1647-7251
VOL 15 N.º 2, TD 1
Thematic Dossier
Brazil-China relations: The rise of modern International Order
December 2024, pp. 122-144
Understanding China’s Stance in Sino-Brazilian Relations: The China Mode
Xuheng Wang, Carmen Amado Mendes
125
government imposed certain obstacles on cooperation between the two countries in
important areas (such as technology), and further made the Sino-Brazilian relation tense
for a time. However, after the Lula government took office, faced with this more positive
and friendlier attitude, the Chinese government quickly restored its friendly attitude
towards Brazil.
This paper explores the impact of the changes in the attitudes of the two Brazilian leaders
since Bolsonaro came to power in 2018 and the actual relations between China and Brazil,
and how China responds to the behavioural patterns of the leaders of other countries,
and their different attitudes and strategies towards China. This manuscript uses Guanxi
Theory for this analysis. This research paper suggests that the interaction between the
governments of China and Brazil reflects China’s specific behaviour model—relationship
model in international relations. This relationship model is a dynamic communication
process and changes as the process changes. However, the relationship established
through this model is long-term oriented, i.e. the two parties establish a trusting
relationship and even a cooperative relationship with each other during their long-term
interaction. In the case of China and Brazil, the two countries have a strong basis for
trade relations. Although some tensions may arise due to the government's attitude, the
foundation of the relationship previously established between the two countries has not
been fundamentally shaken.
This paper uses commercial trade data, official visit data, and public speeches to illustrate
Bolsonaro’s propositions for diplomacy, investment and cooperation with regard to China
during his administration (2019-2022), and since Lula took office in 2023. Firstly, this
paper analyses official texts made by each government, in the form of speeches and
interviews, to determine their different attitudes towards developing diplomatic relations
with China. This manuscript also analyses the Chinese government’s responses, and its
attitude towards the Brazilian government. Secondly, this paper analyses the
destinations for, and timing of, diplomatic visits under each administration and their
intended goals, and then examines trends in international trade numbers and
partnerships under each president. It is worth noting that China and Brazil’s trade was
undoubtedly affected by Covid-19 during Bolsonaro’s administration. This manuscript will
also take this into consideration. In addition to the above sources, I also use newspaper
sources, other government publications, and academic research as auxiliary data to
support the views presented in this paper.
Guanxi Theory: Understand Chinese mode
In order to understand China’s attitude and foreign affairs, it is necessary to discuss the
Chinese international relations theories which have been developed in modern China.
Chinese scholars have developed international theories based on the Chinese cultural
background, which inspired various thoughts and debates. For example, Yan Xuetong
who was inspired by ancient Chinese political philosophy, developed the discussion of
modern Chinese international relations (Yan, 2013). Even there was no specific concept
of an “international society” or “international politics” in ancient China, it does not mean
there was no international political thought. Ancient Chinese thoughts based on the idea
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e-ISSN: 1647-7251
VOL 15 N.º 2, TD 1
Thematic Dossier
Brazil-China relations: The rise of modern International Order
December 2024, pp. 122-144
Understanding China’s Stance in Sino-Brazilian Relations: The China Mode
Xuheng Wang, Carmen Amado Mendes
126
of “Tianxia (天下)”, which means the largest world in people's recognition, at that time
was China in pre-Qin dynasty. This “Tianxia” concept is still used in modern world, to
represent the whole earth. Thus, ancient Chinese thoughts could be treated as Chinese
international political thought (Yan, 2013). Because of this, Yan compared the concept
of “hegemony” in ancient Chinese thoughts with Western international theories, which
share the similarity of “the great power” (Mearsheimer, 2001; Keohane & Nye, 1973;
Yan, 2013). He also pointed out that the political power in ancient Chinese thoughts
involves two aspects, namely the ability to govern and the “virtue and self-cultivation”
of important officials (Yan, 2013). Then he developed the concept of Moral Realism (Yan,
2014; Yan, 2023) and the idea of the leadership of the great power (Yan, 2019). Yan’s
thought thus incorporated of human authority into international relations (Paltiels, 2011).
Paltiels claims that Yan’s discussion can be regarded as the contribution of Chinese
scholars to international relations study (Paltiels, 2011). Yan’s ideas concentrate on the
discussion of the connections between power, leadership and norms, and debates on
conflicts. However, there is a lack of discussion on finding a solution to the problem of
cooperation (Paltiels, 2011).
Another Chinese scholar, Ye Zicheng, has introduced the geopolitical discussion of China’s
relations with various countries (Ye, 2010). He claims that “different countries have
different requirements for comprehensive national power” (Ye, 2010, p33). He explains
national strength as a combination of ability to survive, capacity for development and
international influence (Ye, 2010). Thus, a national state may have different
requirements for its national strength in different periods. From a geopolitical view, China
has different strategic choices to its neighbouring countries, both large countries (i.e.
Russia, Japan, India) and small countries (i.e. Singapore, South Korea, Vietnam). Ye
emphasizes the importance of developing the economy, together with the anxiety and
suspicion brought by China’s fast development (Ye, 2010). In general, Ye has provided
a diversity to discussions on Chinese international relations rather than developing any
specific theory.
When it comes to Sino-Brazilian relations, I chose Guanxi theory, which is suitable
because of its relational perspective. The Guanxi theory proposed by Qin Yaqing is now
considered as being able to explain China's contemporary international relations (Nordin,
Smith, Bunskoek, Huang, Hwang, Jackson & Nakamura, 2019; Kavalski, 2022;
Eisenman, 2023). Guanxi Theory is based on the Chinese social and cultural background,
and exhibits Chinese characteristics. Unlike Western society, which takes the
independent individual as the basic unit, the thinking mode of Chinese society is "family,
country and the world." (Qin, 2018) Whether it is family, country or the world, they are
all collections of individuals. In other words, the identity of an individual is closely related
to groups. The identity of an individual changes according to the different groups to which
she or he belongs. Due to this Chinese cultural value, one critique of Guanxi theory is
whether it could be sufficiently universal in the field of international relations. In fact,
Guanxi theory provides a relational aspect, which is also reflected in the “relational turn”
in Western international relations studies (Kavalski, 2017). Guanxi theory explains that
the establishment of a network of relationships is dynamic, and that actors influence each
other in the process of establishing relationships. Individuals also form new groups and
establish new relationships because of interactions between the different groups to which
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e-ISSN: 1647-7251
VOL 15 N.º 2, TD 1
Thematic Dossier
Brazil-China relations: The rise of modern International Order
December 2024, pp. 122-144
Understanding China’s Stance in Sino-Brazilian Relations: The China Mode
Xuheng Wang, Carmen Amado Mendes
127
they belong. Qin describes international relations as a set of intertwined binary
relationships, each of which represents a unique connection in the unique social
connection group of both parties (Eisenman, 2023). Guanxi theory is claimed to provide
a better explanation of the “complex, eclectic, and non-objective blend” in interactions
between cultural universals and culturally specific patterns (Chen, 2011).
Qin argues that from the perspective of relational logic, the influence and power of actors
come from their larger circle of relationships, and other closer and more important actors.
These circles have higher social prestige, and manipulation of circles is an important
source of their influence (Qin, 2016). This means that in Guanxi Theory, actors become
more powerful by sharing resources with other actors through established relationships
rather than by simply using their own resources. Relational logic is not altruism (Xue,
2023), but a strategic move. It is carried out with the expectation of receiving more
loyalty and reciprocity from the recipient. This practice is not just to achieve the short-
term interests of others, but to regard others as part of their long-term self-interest
(Kavalski, 2017; Xue, 2023). States gain power and resources by establishing
relationships. Although there is a lack of discussion of hierarchy in Guanxi Theory,
especially the forced obedience of weak countries to strong countries, for the sake of
maintaining relationships and long-term interests, great powers should obey stricter
international norms while giving marginalized weaker countries room to manoeuvre
(Shih, & Huwang, 2014). In other words, only when weak countries can truly obtain
resources from big countries and transform them into their own interests can they
establish a long-term reciprocal mechanism. The acquisition generated through
relationships is two-way, and both the strong and weak parties in the relationship can
interact and exchange through the establishment of a relationship network. Therefore,
the focus is not on any specific individual, but on the specific nature of the interactive
relationship between individuals.
Guanxi Theory emphasizes social norms and trust building in relationships (Qin, 2018).
Mutual respect and mutual respect are necessary conditions for China to achieve its
relationship management goals and are also the focus of China's normative power. (Qin,
2018; Kavalski, 2017; Xue, 2023; Kavalski, 2013). Xue (2023) points out the difference
between the concept of “respect” under Chinese norms and Western ideas in modern
international politics. He believes that the Treaty of Westphalia emphasizes the principle
of respect for each other's sovereignty and territorial integrity. The United Nations
Charter explicitly advocates and encourages respect for human rights and fundamental
freedoms for all, regardless of race, gender, language or religion. This respect is based
on the premise of "respect for what I say, not what I do." The logic of relations
emphasizes that Beijing's normative power makes other countries participate in the
practice of mutual respect - that is, "they do as China does" (Xue, 2023). Following this
understanding, China emphasizes the practicality of respect rather than following certain
clearly defined values and rules. For long-term considerations, China often adopts a
continuous attitude in establishing and maintaining diplomatic relations. Even if conflicts
arise in the short term, China will tend to take actions to safeguard its long-term
interests. Such actions may manifest themselves in different ways depending on
diplomatic style, but the common point is the emphasis on the long-term development
of relations and interests. However, most of the debate regarding Guanxi theory still
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e-ISSN: 1647-7251
VOL 15 N.º 2, TD 1
Thematic Dossier
Brazil-China relations: The rise of modern International Order
December 2024, pp. 122-144
Understanding China’s Stance in Sino-Brazilian Relations: The China Mode
Xuheng Wang, Carmen Amado Mendes
128
concentrates on the relations that have been built already. There’s a lack of discussion
on the interactions to develop new relations. From this aspect, the development of new
relations relies on a “middleman”, that is a third party that has already built relations
and trust with those two sides.
In recent years, China's foreign policy discourse has always tried to emphasize harmony,
reciprocity and respect for differences. In Guanxi Theory, the interaction process of actors
is also a process of mutual tolerance (Qin, 2018). Individuals with different natures can
coexist in the process of interaction, rather than by one party eliminating the other.
Similarly, competition, conflict or struggle may also exist. But actors can achieve the so-
called state of coexistence through bargaining or mutual transformation in the process
of interaction. This enables actors to better practice mutual respect and reciprocity
(Berenskoetter, 2007), that is, the "seeking common ground while reserving differences"
emphasized by Chinese society. Under the constraints of this norm, actors try to
transform the resources of others into part of their own interests by coexisting with other
actors with different characteristics, and at the same time, their own resources will also
be transformed into part of the interests of others. Based on this logic, when
understanding China's diplomatic model, it is inseparable from the discussion of actual
resources and interests. In the Sino-Brazilian relation, this especially refers to trade
exchanges. The following section explores the characteristics of China's behaviour model
in the face of the different attitudes exhibited by the two Brazilian leaders towards China.
The Bolsonaro government and Covid-19: Changing bilateral relations
Former Brazilian President Jair Messias Bolsonaro had some very distinct political
characteristics. During his administration, the diplomatic discourse between China and
Brazil fluctuated between positive and tense. As a right-wing politician, Bolsonaro, as
could be expected, aligned himself with the right-wing US President Donald Trump, who
was in power from 2017 to 2021, interrupting good relations with China (Damacena,
2021). In 2018, during Bolsonaro’s campaign, he was nicknamed Tropical Trump, and as
a presidential candidate he made clear his desire to realign foreign policy, forge closer
ties with the United States, and distance Brazil from its growing ties with China and other
emerging powers (Lapper, 2019). In February 2018, Bolsonaro visited Taiwan. He
became the first Brazilian presidential candidate to visit Taiwan since Brazil recognized
Beijing as the sole Chinese government in 1979 (Agência Lusa, 2018). The visit to the
island was part of a tour of East Asia that includes Japan and South Korea but did not
include China (Santoro, 2018), Brazil's largest trading partner. In Taipei, Bolsonaro
called Taiwan "one country" and said it was the best of the United States and Japan
combined (Santoro, 2022). The move prompted condemnation from China. The Chinese
Embassy in Brazil issued a letter condemning Bolsonaro’s trip to Taiwan as “an insult to
China’s sovereignty and territorial integrity” (Andreoni, 2018). This raised concerns about
whether the presidential candidate would affect Sino-Brazilian relations (Spring, 2018).
Among other comments, Bolsonaro portrayed China as a predatory economic power
during his campaign (Lapper 2019; China Daily, 2018). On the China issue, the Brazilian
leader has often expressed concerns about Chinese purchasing land in Brazil, citing
national security concerns to avoid Chinese state-owned enterprises participating in the
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e-ISSN: 1647-7251
VOL 15 N.º 2, TD 1
Thematic Dossier
Brazil-China relations: The rise of modern International Order
December 2024, pp. 122-144
Understanding China’s Stance in Sino-Brazilian Relations: The China Mode
Xuheng Wang, Carmen Amado Mendes
129
privatization process of government energy companies (Gabriel, Mandelbaum, Campos
& Carvalho, 2019). He claimed during his campaign that Beijing is not only “buying things
from Brazil, but also buying Brazil (Andreoni, 2018).” China's official English-language
newspaper "China Daily" admitted in an editorial that Beijing authorities and Chinese
companies operating in Brazil were questioning the extent to which Brazil's new leader
would affect relations between the two countries (China Daily, 2018). In 2018, Chinese
investment in Brazil fell by more than 60% (Cariello, 2018). This may have been due to
Chinese investors' concerns that Bolsonaro could make changes in Brazil's existing China
policy after taking office (Zheng, 2020). In response to Bolsonaro’s attitude, the China
daily newspaper wrote that “Dumping China […] may serve some specific political
purpose”, but “the economic cost can be backbreaking for the Brazilian economy” (China
Daily, 2018). This view was similar to that of some academics and analysts. Maurício
Santoro, professor of International Relations at the State University of Rio de Janeiro,
said that from a pragmatic perspective, Bolsonaro would continue to maintain friendly
relations with China once he entered the government (Andreoni, 2018), and that Brazil’s
agricultural sector had benefited from China’s feud with Trump, especially in the wake of
the U.S.-China trade war. China sharply reduced its purchases of U.S. soybeans, making
up the difference with Brazilian grain. Brazil’s soybean exports to China increased by
22% in 2018 and currently accounts for approximately 80% of Brazil’s total soybean
exports (Voice of America, 2018). From China's perspective, maintaining trade relations
with Brazil is important. The economies of China and Brazil are considered “truly
complementary” and have “few competitors” (China Daily, 2018). At this stage, though
it was difficult to say that Bolsonaro's political ideology had changed Sino-Brazilian
relations, all sectors of society were generally concerned about the friendly relations
between China and Brazil. Obviously, part of the exchange of interests in the Sino-
Brazilian relation came from trade. From the perspective of maintaining long-term trade
relations with Brazil, China tried to express its hope that friendly relations could continue
by emphasizing the close economic and trade cooperation between the two countries.
Bolsonaro has always regarded China as one of Brazil's most important ideological rivals,
yet portraying China as an enemy has political and economic consequences (Guimarães
& Silva, 2021). China is Brazil's largest trading partner and consumes most of Brazil's
agricultural and mining exports. These goods account for 80% of Brazil’s total exports to
China (Zhang & Jin, 2020). To many Bolsonaro supporters, China is far more important
than the United States. Brazilian farmers' decisive support for Bolsonaro's electoral
victory could be undermined by a tougher stance on China. As Bolsonaro continued to
view China as an adversary, even discussing with U.S. authorities during a visit to
Washington how to reduce Brazil's dependence on China, important supporters began to
complain about the government's anti-China bias (Folha de So Paulo, 2019).
Bolsonaro's criticism of Chinese investment did not last long. After Bolsonaro was elected,
his government made friendly gestures towards Chinese investment. On March 8, 2019,
Bolsonaro announced that he would visit China later that year (Verdélio, 2019). On May
24, 2019, the Brazilian Vice President Mourao paid an official visit to China. Mourao
emphasized that the new Brazilian government led by President Bolsonaro continued to
attach great importance to relations with China (China, 2019b). The leaders of the two
countries expressed their willingness to further expand trade cooperation while opposing
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e-ISSN: 1647-7251
VOL 15 N.º 2, TD 1
Thematic Dossier
Brazil-China relations: The rise of modern International Order
December 2024, pp. 122-144
Understanding China’s Stance in Sino-Brazilian Relations: The China Mode
Xuheng Wang, Carmen Amado Mendes
130
unilateralism and trade protectionism. Mourao's visit was seen as an attempt to create a
friendlier atmosphere between the two countries, following Bolsonaro's visit to Taiwan.
However, at Bolsonaro's personal request, Mourao eventually had to give up his
favourable position towards Beijing (Junqueira, 2019; Guimarães & Silva, 2021). This is
obviously inconsistent with the attitude expressed by Bolsonaro in his official statement.
As mentioned earlier, considering the real situation, Bolsonaro chose to send a friendly
signal to China, but it does not mean that he had really changed his attitude towards
China.
China did not adopt the same view towards Brazil as Bolsonaro did to China. This is
specifically reflected in China’s support for Brazil on the issue of Amazon fires (Guimarães
& Silva, 2021). As fires in the Amazon begin to spiral out of control, Bolsonaro's
government had to contend with growing international criticism from many quarters. The
French President Emmanuel Macron said: "We cannot allow you (Bolsonaro) to destroy
everything." This was considered an indirect challenge to Brazil's sovereignty in the
region (Associated Press, 2019). Asked about the Amazon fires, Minister-Counsellor Qu
Yuhui of the Chinese Embassy in Brasilia said Brazil has one of the most effective
environmental laws in the world (Oliveira, 2019). Although the diplomat stressed that his
views were personal and did not represent Beijing's official position, Brazil sees China’s
stance on the Amazon as a bridge to rebuild relations (Guimarães & Silva, 2021). As a
result, Bolsonaro publicly announced approval of China's support for Brazil's sovereignty
over the Amazon for the first time (Landim, 2019). Bolsonaro's attitude towards China
has also begun to change. Since then, Bolsonaro has publicly expressed interest in
visiting China to improve tense bilateral relations. On July 25, Bolsonaro met with Chinese
Foreign Minister Wang Yi to discuss relations between the two countries and his visit to
China in October (China, 2019a). Bolsonaro said Brazil is very interested in deepening
trade negotiations with China (Estadão Conteúdo, 2019). On October 25, during his visit
to China, Bolsonaro stated that although he was dissatisfied with the unbalanced trade
relationship between Sino-Brazilian during the election, he recognized the importance of
Sino-Brazilian relations to Brazilian society (Zheng, 2020).
Interestingly, judging from the speeches made by the leaders of the two countries during
this meeting, the two sides exhibited completely different attitudes. Bolsonaro's
comments on China seemed to be more focused on economic and trade opportunities
(Fernandes, 2019). He claimed that the only purpose of visiting China was to do business
(Guimarães & Silva, 2021). He also commented that coming to China was "coming to a
capitalist country (Senra, 2019)." In contrast, Chinese leader Xi Jinping's official speech
emphasized the friendly development of bilateral relations since the establishment of
diplomatic relations between the two countries, citing the principles of mutual respect,
equal treatment, mutual benefit and win-win results and the outlook for future bilateral
relations (China, 2019c). Chinese leaders often adopt the same pattern in such speeches,
expressing a friendly attitude towards bilateral or multilateral relations by elaborating on
the historical origins of establishing relations with other countries and looking forward to
long-term cooperation in the future. A new term that began to appear in Brazilian-
Chinese dialogue was "strategic partner". Despite the ideological differences between the
two countries, Brazil was recommended to adopt a pragmatic approach toward China
(Guimarães & Silva, 2021). As far as Bolsonaro's first year in power (2019) was
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concerned, regardless of his attitude towards China, Bolsonaro generally conducted
pragmatic diplomacy with China along the lines of strategic partnership (Santoro, 2022).
The participation of Chinese state-owned enterprises in the November 2019 oil auction
was politically significant—without Brazilian government approval, only Petrobras would
have participated in the operation due to operating rules (Rosa, 2019). But at the same
time, although Bolsonaro signed multiple infrastructure development and agricultural
trade agreements with Chinese companies, he did not reach any major agreements with
China in economic and technological cooperation as some optimistic observers had
predicted (Zheng, 2020).
Up to the end of 2019, Sino-Brazilian relations seemed to be improving, but after the
Covid-19 epidemic broke out, the Bolsonaro government's attitude towards China
changed again. 2020 is considered the tensest year for the political relationship between
China and Brazil, and even triggered a diplomatic crisis (Sawicka, 2020). Members of
Bolsonaro's government began openly attacking China on social media. Eduardo
Bolsonaro, a federal police officer who is the son of President Bolsonaro, likened the
Covid-19 outbreak to the Chernobyl disaster, and accused the communist regime of
hiding the truth in the wake of the pandemic and claimed that "freedom is the solution"
(Bolsonaro, 2020). Chinese Ambassador Yang Wanming and the Chinese Embassy in
Brazil responded quickly on social media, accusing Eduardo Bolsonaro’s remarks of being
an “evil insult against China and the Chinese people” (Yang, 2020). Subsequently, the
Chinese Embassy in Brazil issued a severely worded statement expressing strong
condemnation of Eduardo Bolsonaro (Laio, 2020). The statement emphasized that
Eduardo's remarks are likely to have a negative impact on bilateral relations. These
official statements from China attracted the attention of the Brazilian Congress. Rodrigo
Maia, President of the Brazilian House of Commons, apologized to the Chinese
Ambassador for Eduardo Bolsonaro’s remarks on behalf of the House of Commons on
social media (Maia, 2020). Hamilton Mourão and Ernesto Araújo also emphasized in
interviews that the deputy’s personal opinion does not represent the government’s
position (Sawicka, 2020). A similar situation occurred again shortly after the US national
security adviser visited Brazil in November. Eduardo Bolsonaro accused Huawei's 5G
technology on Twitter of bringing espionage and cybersecurity problems to Brazil.
Although the post was deleted, the Chinese Embassy responded in harsher terms, stating
that Eduardo's stance could lead to "negative consequences and bear historical
responsibility for disrupting the normality of the partnership between China and Brazil"
(Embaixada da China, 2020). Instead of taking action to calm the situation, the Brazilian
Ministry of Foreign Affairs preferred to criticize China for its offensive and disrespectful
behaviour when it publicized its outrage on social media (de Sousa, Souza, da Fonseca,
Carneiro, Abrão & dos Santos, 2020). Similarly, on the issue of the COVID-19 virus,
President Bolsonaro himself has made no secret of his suspicion and made accusations
against China. He has repeatedly stated that the coronavirus was deliberately created in
a Chinese laboratory (Murakawa, 2021). He even explicitly hinted that the epidemic was
a Chinese conspiracy in a public speech: "The military knows what chemical warfare,
bacterial warfare and radioactive warfare are. Aren't we facing a new war? Which country
has the highest GDP? I won't tell You. (Bolsonaro, 2021)"
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It can be seen that Chinese diplomats in Brazil reacted to this situation with more
confidence than in the past (Santoro, 2022). They chose to respond to critical remarks
and demonstrate China's attitudes and views directly through the news or social media.
This approach is considered the new “Wolf Warrior” Chinese diplomacy of the Xi Jinping
years (Martin, 2021). It should be pointed out that this approach is not aimed at the
bilateral relations between China and Brazil, but is a change in the overall style of China's
diplomacy. Compared with the low-key diplomatic orientation adopted by China in the
1990s and early 2000s, China's diplomacy during the epidemic period was more robust
(Martin, 2021). This exchange between Chinese diplomats and Brazilian politicians is also
considered as being unprecedented. While China's assertive style of diplomacy spreads
around the world, it also appears to be intensifying in Brazil (Santoro, 2022). This may
be due to the fact that this is possible in the case of Brazil. Brazil's dependence on the
Chinese market gives China more room to manoeuvre. For example, there is no fear that
a national government will declare its diplomatic personnel persona non grata and deport
them (Santoro, 2022). However, some scholars believe that in the face of deliberately
biased remarks, the Chinese authorities are limited to issuing notes denying conspiracy
theories and repudiating Sinophobia in Brazil. The lack of a tougher stance could be a
signal to members of Bolsonaro’s government that demonstrating Sinophobia has no real
consequences (Quinan, Araujo & De Albuquerque, 2021). On the one hand, China does
not want to break off friendly relations with Brazil, as that would have a huge negative
impact on the mutual interests of the two countries. On the other hand, due to the change
in the attitude of Brazilian leaders, which showed a trend of breaking away from the
previous norms of interaction between China and Brazil, the Sino-Brazilian relation has
also fluctuated. China has chosen to adopt a relatively tough attitude to try to maintain
the relationship between the two countries under the original norms.
Bolsonaro's negative comments about China have not stopped. The narrative surrounding
the COVID-19 viral disease has gradually shifted from the concept of “Chinese virus” to
“Chinese vaccine.” (Ramos, Leite & Mendonça, 2024). Health Minister Eduardo Pazuello
announced his intention to purchase 46 million doses of Coronavac, a vaccine against
COVID-19 from the Chinese laboratory Sinovac Biotech, tested in Brazil by the Butantan
Institute. Less than 24 hours after the news, Bolsonaro fired his health minister and said
the Brazilian government "will not buy" Coronavac (Farias & Gullino 2020). Bolsonaro’s
rationale is that “any vaccine must be scientifically proven by the Ministry of Health and
certified by Anvisa before being made available to the public” (UOL, 2020). At the same
time, another COVID vaccine was also in Phase 3 testing, but it not yet proved its efficacy,
and not been authorized for use by Anvisa. That vaccine received a special approval of
1.9 billion reais from the Brazilian government for the purchase, production, and
distribution of 100 million units of the vaccine (de Sousa et al., 2020). The president
made no secret of his fear of China when considering vaccine: "We're not buying from
China. I don't think it gives people a sense of security because of its origins. That's what
we think" (Bolsonaro & Paraguassu, 2020). Bolsonaro’s behaviour during the epidemic is
considered to be a continuous use of social fears to transform false narratives into official
national discourse and public policies. (Kalil I., Silveira, Pinheiro, Kalil A., Pereira, Azarias
& Amparo, 2021)
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Bolsonaro's comments led some key players to begin linking delays in deliveries of active
pharmaceutical ingredients from China to the disastrous conduct of Brazilian diplomacy
under Bolsonaro (Ramos, Leite & Mendonça, 2024). The president of the Butantan
Institute, Dimas Covas said that the Bolsonaro government's attacks on China led to
delays and reductions in the delivery of raw materials needed for vaccine manufacturing,
and that multiple delays in sending immunizers could be understood as diplomatic
retaliation (Oliveira, 2021). Chinese Ambassador to Brazil Yang Wanming denied such
diplomatic retaliation and delayed delivery of the CoronaVac vaccine, saying that the
delay was due to high demand for the vaccine (UOL, 2021). However, after Trump
stepped down, Bolsonaro immediately changed his tone and showed favour to China.
Bolsonaro said during the vaccine negotiations between China and Brazil that Brazil
needed China and China needed Brazil, “I hope China can help Brazil regardless of past
doubts” (Marques & Lázaro, 2021). He reiterated the trade relationship between China
and Brazil and emphasized China's need to purchase agricultural products from Brazil.
Domestically, political groups in Brazil have put pressure on the government to adjust
bilateral relations. For example, telecom companies that do business with Huawei have
pressured the Bolsonaro government not to implement major changes (de Sousa, Gajus,
Porto, Freitas, Abrão, Rodrigues, Silva & Santos, 2022). The defeat of Donald Trump and
the election of Joe Biden as President of the United States prevented Bolsonaro from
establishing a good relationship with Biden, making alliance plans with Washington
unfeasible (Berringer, Soprijo, Almeida, Mitake & Antoniazzo, 2021). Factors at home
and abroad in Brazil caused the Bolsonaro government's change of attitude.
In general, during Bolsonaro's administration, he always regarded China as Brazil's
political and ideological opponent. But when confronted by a real situation, especially
trade and COVID-19, Bolsonaro has shown that his attitude towards China is not always
consistent with his diplomacy. China's diplomatic stance has also become tougher. The
Sino-Brazilian relationship was tense during Bolsonaro's administration and has
continued to fluctuate. The Sino-Brazilian relation went through a period where it was
not considered a priority (Lopes, Carvalho, Thales & Santos, 2022). The bilateral
relationship was ultimately dominated by pragmatism and still maintained a certain
degree of cooperation that was not completely destroyed. From China's perspective, the
persistence of the Sino-Brazilian relation has been emphasized several times in
diplomatic speeches, which shows that China attaches great importance to the long-term
goal of establishing and maintaining a network of relations. In Sino-Brazilian relations,
China and Brazil each obtained what they needed. It is true that the Bolsonaro
government may have had different views on the benefits and power that Brazil could
obtain in this relationship. But the Bolsonaro government does not seem to have been
able to gain greater benefits from the changing relationship. China's attempt to maintain
the original relationship status and resource exchange has also prevented the bilateral
relationship from undergoing major changes due to the Bolsonaro government's
governing philosophy.
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The Lula government: friendly and close cooperation in the new era
Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva maintained good cooperative relations with China during his first
two terms in power (2003-2010). This previously established good relationship laid a
secure foundation for Sino-Brazilian relations after he took office again. For the Lula
government, China is strategic for Brazil from both a political and economic perspective
(Berringer & Belasques, 2020). For China, this means that Brazil and China have
established and followed a set of behavioural norms in their interactions, and both sides
are willing to continue to be bound by such norms and conduct a new round of continuous
exchanges of interests. After the start of the new term, the Lula government believed
that Brazil's foreign relations were negatively affected by the Bolsonaro government
(Brasil, 2022). One of the important foreign policies of the Lula government has been to
try to rebuild the tense relations with China (de Sousa, Abro, & de Souza Porto, 2023).
Lula said in a speech that Brazil hopes to establish a relationship with China that goes
beyond economics and trade (Brasil, 2023b). This means that Brazil and China have
again become strategically related in Brazil's global diplomacy. In 2022, Lula announced
that China would be one of his first visit destinations after taking office (Chade, 2022),
and China sent Vice President Wang Qishan to attend the inauguration ceremony of
President Lula (China, 2022). This shows that China attaches great importance to
bilateral relations and has not changed due to the ups and downs during the term of
former President Bolsonaro. This was also considered to be a symbol of renewed political
reconciliation between Brazil and China (de Sousa et al., 2023). After taking office, Lula
quickly moved to repair relations with China. In March 2023, Brazil and China reached
an agreement that they will no longer use the U.S. dollar as the intermediate currency
in the future but will instead use their own currencies for trade settlements (Martello,
2023). Since China is Brazil's largest trading partner, this has a great impact on reducing
trade costs between the two sides. In September, the first fully closed-loop transaction
using the currencies of the two countries for trade settlement was realized (Sá, 2023).
That is to say that, compared with their previous trade relationship, China and Brazil
have expanded their cooperation to the financial field and bypassed the US dollar for
transactions. In their interactions, the two sides have begun to expand the areas of norm-
building and the influence of their relationship.
Although Lula's visit to China was postponed due to illness, it did not affect an eventual
meeting between the leaders of the two countries. Lula visited China from April 12 to 15,
2023. The leaders of the two countries signed a series of cooperation agreements and
issued a joint statement on deepening the comprehensive strategic partnership (China,
2023). Compared with the joint statement issued during Bolsonaro's visit to China,
bilateral relations now showed a clear relaxation. The statement expressed the view that
both parties believe that President Lula’s visit was a complete success and is of great
significance in the history of bilateral relations (China, 2023). Considering the specific
content of the talks, Lula's visit involved more cooperation areas and more detailed plans.
Whether in terms of discourse or specific measures, the relationship between China and
Brazil became more positive during Lula's visit. At the same time, compared with former
President Bolsonaro’s visit to China, the agreement signed by Lula with China emphasized
the field of industrial science and technology, especially communications, satellites and
aerospace cooperation plans (China, 2024c). This is consistent with the Lula
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government’s mission to “reindustrialize Brazil and promote more competitive
international integration” (Brasil, 2022).
This also triggered Brazil's consideration of improving the quality of bilateral relations
when re-establishing close relations with China. As mentioned earlier, Brazil’s exports to
China mainly focus on bulk commodities, and it is necessary to seek diversification in
commodities (Brasil, 2023a). However, considering the low competitiveness and
complexity of the Brazilian economy, the main difficulty in increasing the export of high
value-added products is structural (Rocha, de Oliveira, Porto, Neiva & Pina, 2022). Lula
also attempted to improve the situation during his visit to China. The two sides signed
an agreement on health requirements for animal protein trade, which is beneficial to
Brazil's agricultural exports (Brasil, 2023a). However, it must be admitted that under the
current sales situation of Brazil's national industry, it is difficult to realize the interests
and diversification of Brazil's agricultural export base (de Sousa et al., 2023). In addition
to the commercial aspect, the Lula government focuses on cooperation between China
and Brazil for finding Chinese investment to achieve the country's goals of
reindustrialization, job creation and technological advancement (Brasil, 2023b). In other
words, Brazil hopes to seek more resources owned by China in the interaction and to be
able to transform them into its own interests. This kind of interest acquisition is long-
term oriented. In this model, the Sino-Brazilian relation becomes closer through
continuous reciprocity.
Compared with the Bolsonaro government, the Lula government is more pragmatic and
has a friendlier attitude towards China. In 2023, Brazil's exports to China will increase by
16.6%, reaching US$104.31 billion. This increase significantly exceeded the 1.7%
increase in Brazil's total exports (Exame, 2024). This reflects the strong and diverse
business partnership between Brazil and China that continues to strengthen. In addition
to this, although Brazil has chosen not to join the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), it has
expressed interest in studying the synergies between Brazil’s development policies,
investment plans and South American regional integration initiatives and the BRI. (23-
6). For China, this does not affect the progress of Brazil-China relations. When meeting
with Lula, Foreign Minister Wang Yi stated that the two sides should strengthen the
strategic alignment between the joint construction of the "Belt and Road" and Brazil's
"re-industrialization" and "accelerated growth plan" (China, 2024a). 2024 marks the 50th
anniversary of the establishment of diplomatic relations between China and Brazil. Wang
Yi said in his speech that China and Brazil would work together to create the next "golden
50 years" of bilateral relations (China, 2024d). In addition, Celso Luiz Nunes Amorim,
Chief Special Advisor to the President of Brazil, visited China at the end of May (China,
2024b). This shows that the Sino-Brazilian relation have become closer. Both China and
Brazil have shown a positive attitude towards cooperation and the intention to maintain
the long-term development of relations.
In general, the Lula government has repositioned the Sino-Brazilian relation after taking
office. Brazil's attitude towards China has undergone significant changes. Faced with the
friendly attitude shown by the Brazilian government, the Chinese government has
responded equally positively. Changes in Brazil's foreign policy have also expanded
cooperation between China and Brazil from agriculture to technology. It can be said that
the Lula government's re-establishment of bilateral relations has achieved results. From
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China's perspective, the bilateral relations between China and Brazil have a long-term
foundation and will not be easily shaken. And out of long-term considerations for future
development, even under the influence of the previous Brazilian president, China tends
to maintain the previously established interaction model and maintain its interests. Lula's
friendly attitude has repaired the previous tension in the Sino-Brazilian relation, making
bilateral relations closer and allowing more exchanges and cooperation in various fields.
Sino-Brazilian relations have entered a period of close cooperation.
Discussion and Conclusion
Since the beginning of 2019, Sino-Brazilian relations have experienced tensions, and
fluctuations, but now they have rebuilt a close and friendly relationship. It’s clear that
the changing attitudes of Brazilian leaders affect the Sino-Brazilian relation. Based on the
Guanxi perspective, the previously built relations and trust between China and Brazil
helped to reanimate current relations. The Bolsonaro government’s view of China as an
ideological rival has affected Brazil’s attitude towards China. Therefore, the Bolsonaro
government tried to reduce its interactions with China, and China was no longer Brazil's
leading priority. This was so much so that during Bolsonaro's term, although China and
Brazil had a number of agreements and cooperation exchanges, they were not as
numerous or important as those of the later Lula government. As long as China's national
sovereignty is not compromised, China's attitude towards Brazil remains friendly and
cooperative, and this is also based on the previous bilateral relations between China and
Brazil. When the Bolsonaro government repeatedly made negative remarks against China
due to COVID-19, China showed a tougher attitude than in the past. Even so, when China
responded to the Bolsonaro government, it emphasized the healthy and friendly
development of Sino-Brazilian relations in the past, and at the same time tried to warn
the Brazilian government to consider the overall situation and maintain a good
environment for the development of bilateral relations.
The historical origins of bilateral relations are a recurring expression in China’s official
narrative. For China, bilateral relations and even multilateral relations are based on long-
term orientation. As the explanation of Guanxi theory, this long-term oriented
relationship builds trust through the interaction between the two parties, and even a
specific model or norm, which provides a certain foundation and guarantee for future
relationships. Under this model, even if bilateral relations fluctuate due to different
diplomatic strategies of leaders, there is still some room for relaxation. When both parties
change due to diplomatic strategies and political goals, the trust and models established
through previous long-term relationships will also have an impact on new cooperation
and negotiations. In the Sino-Brazilian relationship, Lula has reached cooperation and
consensus with China during his previous two terms, establishing a foundation of trust,
so much so that after Lula started his new term, he aimed to repair the Sino-Brazilian
relations. On this basis, China quickly responded with positive feedback and expressed
its willingness to deepen Sino-Brazilian relations.
Apart from official statements, neither China nor Brazil has taken direct actions to
damage relations between the two countries. Whether it was the Bolsonaro government’s
criticism of China or China’s counterattack against similar criticism, most of the steps
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stop at the diplomatic discourse-level on official websites. Perhaps out of pragmatism,
despite various criticisms of China by the Bolsonaro government, China has not taken
any action to sever relations between the two countries. China and Brazil have close
economic and trade ties. Obviously, the political strategies of the Bolsonaro government
and the Lula government towards China were different. The Bolsonaro government
tended to distance itself from China and approach closer to the United States. But such
a strategy meant destroying the interaction model and interest exchange that China and
Brazil had established over a long period. The Lula government chooses to continue to
maintain the reciprocal model with China and tries to seek further development on this
basis to establish a closer bilateral relationship. Whether it is the Bolsonaro government
or the Lula government, when dealing with the Sino-Brazilian relations, they need to
consider the actual impact of weakening or strengthening this relationship. Out of long-
term considerations for bilateral relations, China is relatively cautious about diplomatic
discourse or political measures that may affect bilateral relations. Regardless of whether
China's diplomatic style is tough or not, at this stage, China does not want to damage
Sino-Brazilian relations. Therefore, although the Sino-Brazilian relations were once
strained due to the attitude of the Bolsonaro government, under the friendly attitude of
the Lula government, China can restore its close ties with Brazil based on the trust and
interaction model that has been established.
In general, China pays more attention to long-term interests and maintaining long-term
relationships when establishing and developing diplomatic relations. A mutually beneficial
situation can only be achieved when both sides can achieve resource sharing through
interaction and transform it into their own interests. Only when both sides recognize that
relationships and interactions can bring benefits to themselves and actively abide by the
behavioural norms and profit models established through interaction can this relationship
be sustained and deepened. When one side questions the relationship, as in the actions
taken by the Bolsonaro government, it often causes fluctuations or even stagnation in
the relationship. In the face of the other side's doubts, China may adopt different ways
of diplomatic discourse, either tough or gentle. But no matter what diplomatic style,
China prefers to maintain the existing mutually beneficial model. This also enabled the
Lula government to smoothly ease the legacy of tense Sino-Brazilian relations from the
Bolsonaro government and promote the expansion of China-Brazil interaction to more
and new areas.
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