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e-ISSN: 1647-7251

VOL15, N.º 2, TD1

Thematic Dossier – Brazil-China relations:

The rise of modern International Order

December 2024

101

BALANCING CONTINUITY AND ADJUSTMENTS IN BRAZIL’S FOREIGN POLICY

TOWARDS CHINA: A COMPARATIVE APPROACH BETWEEN BOLSONARO

AND LULA’S THIRD TERM

FLORENCIA RUBIOLO

frubiolo@gmail.com

Ph.D. in International Relations, from the National University of Rosario. Currently, she is an

Independent Researcher at the National Scientific and Technical Research Council (CONICET),

CIECS (Argentina) and a Director of Insight 21 at Universidad Siglo 21, Córdoba. She is also a

Professor in the International Relations Doctoral Program at Córdoba Catholic University

(Argentina). https://orcid.org/0000-0002-5669-7332.

GONZALO FIORE

gonzalofioreviani@gmail.com

Ph.D. in International Relations from Catholic University of Córdoba and a postdoctoral fellow at

the National Council for Scientific and Technical Research (CONICET). He currently is a professor

at Blas Pascal University in Córdoba (Argentina), and Anahuac University in Querétaro (Mexico).

He has published two books and numerous articles for both popular and academic audiences.

http://orcid.org/0000-0002-0017-0435.

Abstract

Bolsonaro’s foreign policy, characterized by a staunchly conservative identity aligned with far-

right populist ideologies, emphasized anti-globalism, nationalism, and adversarial narratives.

His administration fostered close ties with the Trump Administration, influencing Brazil’s shift

away from emerging countries and international blocs. This pivot tested Brazil's previously

strong relationship with China, leading to stagnation in diplomatic and political relations,

contrasting sharply with the proactive approaches of Bolsonaro's predecessors. With Lula da

Silva's return to the presidency in 2023, Brazilian foreign policy underwent significant revision

during his first hundred days. Lula aimed to restore key elements of his earlier foreign policy,

emphasizing South-South cooperation, revitalizing the BRICS, and redefining Brazil’s

international agenda amid the ongoing Ukraine conflict. This reorientation notably impacted

Brazil-China relations. This paper provides an in-depth analysis of Jair Bolsonaro’s foreign

policy towards China from 2018 to 2022 and examines the first year of Lula da Silva’s

administration in 2023. It explores the diplomatic and economic dimensions of their respective

approaches towards China, highlighting both changes and continuities. The main argument

posits that during Bolsonaro’s tenure, Brazil’s relations with China underwent political and

diplomatic adjustments in line with the administration’s conservative foreign policy narrative.

Despite this, China retained a crucial role in Brazil’s economic agenda. Following Lula’s return

to power in 2023, diplomatic initiatives towards China were rejuvenated, reflecting a political

rapprochement with Beijing. This shift materialized through high-level official engagements

and continued robust economic ties, illustrating a restored bilateral and multilateral

relationship.

Keywords

Brazil foreign policy, autonomy, China, middle power, economic relations.

JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations

e-ISSN: 1647-7251

VOL 15 N.º 2, TD 1

Thematic Dossier

Brazil-China relations: The rise of modern International Order

December 2024, pp. 101-121

Balancing Continuity and Adjustments in Brazil’s Foreign Policy Towards China:

A Comparative Approach Between Bolsonaro and Lula’s Third Term

Florencia Rubiolo, Gonzalo Fiore

102

Resumo

A política externa de Bolsonaro, caracterizada por uma identidade firmemente conservadora

alinhada com ideologias populistas de extrema direita, enfatizou o antiglobalismo, o

nacionalismo e narrativas adversas. A sua administração promoveu laços estreitos com a

administração Trump, influenciando o afastamento do Brasil dos países emergentes e dos

blocos internacionais. Este pivô testou o relacionamento anteriormente forte do Brasil com a

China, levando à estagnação nas relações diplomáticas e políticas, contrastando fortemente

com as abordagens proativas dos antecessores de Bolsonaro. Com o retorno de Lula da Silva

à presidência em 2023, a política externa brasileira passou por uma revisão significativa

durante seus primeiros cem dias. Lula pretendia restaurar elementos-chave da sua política

externa anterior, enfatizando a cooperação Sul-Sul, revitalizando os BRICS e redefinindo a

agenda internacional do Brasil no meio do conflito em curso na Ucrânia. Esta reorientação

impactou notavelmente as relações Brasil-China. Este artigo fornece uma análise aprofundada

da política externa de Jair Bolsonaro em relação à China de 2018 a 2022 e examina o primeiro

ano da administração de Lula da Silva em 2023. Explora as dimensões diplomáticas e

económicas das suas respectivas abordagens em relação à China, destacando tanto as

mudanças como as continuidades. O principal argumento postula que durante o mandato de

Bolsonaro, as relações do Brasil com a China passaram por ajustes políticos e diplomáticos

em linha com a narrativa conservadora da política externa do governo. Apesar disso, a China

manteve um papel crucial na agenda económica do Brasil. Após o regresso de Lula ao poder

em 2023, as iniciativas diplomáticas em relação à China foram rejuvenescidas, reflectindo

uma aproximação política com Pequim. Esta mudança materializou-se através de

compromissos oficiais de alto nível e da continuação de laços económicos robustos, ilustrando

uma relação bilateral e multilateral restaurada.

Palavras-chave

Política externa brasileira, autonomia, China, potência média, relações econômicas.

How to cite this article

Rubiolo, Florencia & Fiore, Gonzalo (2024). Balancing Continuity and Adjustments in Brazil’s

Foreign Policy Towards China: A Comparative Approach Between Bolsonaro and Lula’s Third Term.

Janus.net, e-journal of international relations. VOL 15 N.º 2, TD1 – Temathic Dossier – “Brazil -

China Relations: The Rise Of Modern International Order”. December 2024, pp. 101-121.

https://doi.org/10.26619/1647-7251.DT0324.5.

Article received on 1 July 2024 and accepted for publication on 20 September 2024.

JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations

e-ISSN: 1647-7251

VOL 15 N.º 2, TD 1

Thematic Dossier

Brazil-China relations: The rise of modern International Order

December 2024, pp. 101-121

Balancing Continuity and Adjustments in Brazil’s Foreign Policy Towards China:

A Comparative Approach Between Bolsonaro and Lula’s Third Term

Florencia Rubiolo, Gonzalo Fiore

103

BALANCING CONTINUITY AND ADJUSTMENTS IN BRAZIL’S

FOREIGN POLICY TOWARDS CHINA: A COMPARATIVE APPROACH

BETWEEN BOLSONARO AND LULA’S THIRD TERM

FLORENCIA RUBIOLO

GONZALO FIORE

1. Introduction

Brazilian foreign policy has historically been characterized by an active and pragmatic

diplomacy, based on principles such as non-intervention, self-determination and the

search for international cooperation. Several works have identified Brazil as a country

with a universal vocation, and with the ambition to become a key actor in international

politics. (Caballero & Crescentino, 2020). Building on a highly qualified and

professionalized diplomatic tradition, Itamaraty became an example of professional and

institutional foreign policy for other Latin American countries and beyond.

Regarding the geographical scope, Brazilian relations with the so-called Global South

countries have been a priority. South-South relations and regional alliances became

fundamental means to diversify partnerships and reduce asymmetries with developed

countries, adopting a reformist and more assertive diplomatic stance (Neto & Malamud,

2015). Diversification became an essential pillar in Brazil’s foreign policy, and China, with

special emphasis on South-South relations. In this context, China has emerged as a

crucial player in Brazil's economic diversification strategy.

During the first decade of the 21st century, China and Brazil witnessed a significant

strengthening of their economic and political ties. This period marked the establishment

of a robust trade partnership, with bilateral trade soaring from just over 3 billion USD in

2001 to surpass 44 billion USD in 2010 and then reaching 100 billion USD by 2019 (Myers

& Gallagher, 2024).

Concurrently, the two nations deepened their political collaboration, notably through

initiatives like the BRICS grouping - comprising Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South

Africa - and the establishment of corresponding multilateral financial institutions like the

New Development Bank. For an extended period, Brazil has consistently ranked as the

primary destination for Chinese direct investment in Latin America and the Caribbean

(LAC), even in the face of initial challenges related to investing in sectors such as green

JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations

e-ISSN: 1647-7251

VOL 15 N.º 2, TD 1

Thematic Dossier

Brazil-China relations: The rise of modern International Order

December 2024, pp. 101-121

Balancing Continuity and Adjustments in Brazil’s Foreign Policy Towards China:

A Comparative Approach Between Bolsonaro and Lula’s Third Term

Florencia Rubiolo, Gonzalo Fiore

104

energy, transportation infrastructure, and agriculture within the country (Studart and

Myers, 2019).

Bolsonaro's foreign policy, characterized by a strong conservative identity, aligned with

far-right populist ideologies, focusing on anti-globalism, nationalism, and anti-foe

narratives (De Sá Guimarães & De Oliveira e Silva, 2021), maintained closed links with

the Trump Administration and its political objectives in South America, driven Brazil’s

focus away from emerging countries and blocs. Brazil’s close relations with China were,

then, tested. Diplomatic and political relations stagnated, with few gestures from the

Brazilian government towards Beijing, in sharp contrast with Bolsonaro’s antecessors (De

Sousa, Abrão & de Souza Porto, 2023; De Sá Guimarães & De Oliveira e Silva, 2021;

Gomes Saraiva and Costa Silva, 2019).

With the return of Lula da Silva to the Planato in 2023, during his first hundred days

there was a review of Brazilian foreign policy (de Oliveira, 2023) that had to do with

returning to some milestones of Lula's first foreign policy and restoring the agenda.

South-South cooperation, rebuild and rethink the role of the BRICS and remake an

international agenda within the framework of the war in Ukraine (Gallego, 2023). This

reorientation had an impact on Brazil-China relations, which will be analyzed in the

following sections.

In this paper, we aim to provide an insightful analysis of Jair Bolsonaro's foreign policy

towards China during his term from 2018 to 2022, as well as examining the initial year

of Lula da Silva's administration in 2023. We will analyze the diplomatic and economic

dimensions, highlighting changes and continuity in their approaches towards China. As a

main argument we suggest that Brazilian relations with China underwent political and

diplomatic adjustments during Bolsonaro’s administration, in line with the government’s

narrative and conservative foreign policy identity. But, in the economic realm, China

maintained a core place in Brazilian global agenda. After Lula’s return to power in 2023,

diplomatic initiatives towards China were restored, - both at the bilateral and multilateral

arena - reflecting the political rapprochement to Beijing, which materialized in high level

official actions, paralleling the ongoing density of economic ties.

The theoretical approach centers on the concept of autonomy, and its interpretations

through different Brazilian administrations, particularly on the political and economic

dimensions. We also focus on the notions of the continuity, changes and adjustments in

foreign policy, to understand the dynamics during both presidential periods under study

in the bilateral relation with China. In doing so, we will examine bilateral investment and

commercial figures for the economic dimension, and systematize foreign policy actions

such as official visits, statements and bilateral documents during the period under study.

This paper is structured as follows: after the introduction, in section two we present the

theoretical debates to frame Brazil’s foreign policy during Bolsonaro’s and Lula’s

governments, with a focus on the concept of autonomy. In section three and four we

discuss the specific features of Brazil's relations with China during each Administration,

delving into the economic and political dimensions, to identify traces of continuity,

adjustment or change between the two periods. Overall, the study aims to offer insights

JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations

e-ISSN: 1647-7251

VOL 15 N.º 2, TD 1

Thematic Dossier

Brazil-China relations: The rise of modern International Order

December 2024, pp. 101-121

Balancing Continuity and Adjustments in Brazil’s Foreign Policy Towards China:

A Comparative Approach Between Bolsonaro and Lula’s Third Term

Florencia Rubiolo, Gonzalo Fiore

105

into the complexities of Brazil-China relations and their significance within the broader

context of international diplomacy.

2. Theoretical perspectives on Brazilian foreign policy and autonomy

In recent decades, Brazil's foreign policy has attracted significant attention from

academics, especially since the country solidified its position as a middle power on the

global stage. Soares de Lima & Hirst (2006, p. 21) underline this trend by suggesting

that “since the early years of the twentieth century, Brazil's major foreign policy

aspiration has been to achieve international recognition”, based on its self-definition of a

big country which should assume a global role. In this same vein, Sotero (2010)

highlights Lula’s role in shifting towards a more assertive and innovative approach in

global affairs, driven by the country's increased international activism and self-

confidence. This aspiration for international recognition, adds Malamud (2011), has

driven Brazil to engage actively in multilateral forums and regional initiatives to enhance

its global standing, aligning with the country's self-perception as a significant player.

A cornerstone of Brazilian foreign policy since, at least, the second half of the twentieth

century has been the pursuit and consolidation of autonomy (Rodriguez, 2012). This

concept played a central role for several South American governments and has been a

guiding concept for analysts from the region as both a goal and an instrument for

explanatory purposes. In the Brazilian case, autonomy, according to Caballero &

Crescentino (2020, p. 2) can be considered as a “compass of Brazil’s foreign policy”.

Autonomy has several interpretations as a foreign policy concept, particularly developed

in Argentina and Brazil’s academic circles. As Briceño Ruiz & Simonoff (2017) underline,

the autonomy approach is an outstanding contribution to Foreign Policy theoretical

debates from a South American perspective, although its impact for IR theory has been

mostly regional. Notwithstanding the diverse definitions the concept adopted throughout

the decades, autonomy is intimately related to the broader objective of foreign policy

which is the promotion of national development. (Caballero & Crescentino, 2020) Under

the light of becoming a vehicle to overcome dependency and to avoid becoming an

“obedient” country (Malamud, 2011), autonomy also had a performative narrative role

in academic circles, with an impact on governmental discourse.

Regarding Brazil’s foreign policy, autonomy can be classified by different periods

reflecting both the country's self-perception and the surrounding international and

regional environments. From the end of the Cold War, and along with a resurgence of

the autonomic debate (Briceño Ruiz & Simonoff, 2017), Brazil’s search for autonomy was

built on participation in international institutions and regimes “in order to leverage the

country’s foreign policy leeway” (Neto & Malamud, 2015: 14), reflecting principles such

as pacifism, multilateralism, and non-intervention. This new orientation became known

as “autonomy through participation” and meant that “foreign policy retained its ‘desire

for autonomy’ but, at the same time, sought to remove the legacy of authoritarianism

and to respond to the international power of global liberalism” (Soares de Lima & Hirst,

2006, p. 24).

JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations

e-ISSN: 1647-7251

VOL 15 N.º 2, TD 1

Thematic Dossier

Brazil-China relations: The rise of modern International Order

December 2024, pp. 101-121

Balancing Continuity and Adjustments in Brazil’s Foreign Policy Towards China:

A Comparative Approach Between Bolsonaro and Lula’s Third Term

Florencia Rubiolo, Gonzalo Fiore

106

In 2003, Lula came to power and a new impetus was given to Brazil’s foreign policy,

particularly in the regional scenario but also in the desire to build the nation as an

unequivocal middle power with a dynamic participation in multilateral institutions and

emerging blocs. In contrast to previous administrations, Lula’s foreign policy centered on

Latin America as a privileged scenario for integration. Vigevani & Cepaluni (2007)

highlight that autonomy remained a central goal for this government’s foreign policy,

with a renewed emphasis on diversification. the authors define this concept as the

“adherence to international norms and principles by means of South - South alliances,

including regional alliances, and through agreements with non-traditional partners

(China, Asia-Pacific, Africa, Eastern Europe, Middle East, etc), trying to reduce

asymmetries in external relations with powerful countries.” (Vigevani & Cepaluni, 2007,

p. 1313) The idea underlying this new orientation is that Brazil’s power asymmetry vis-

a-vis developed countries could only be balanced and, eventually, reduced by

strengthening the political and economic relations with non-traditional partners from the

Global South and adopting a more assertive diplomatic stance towards international

institutions in order to introduce reforms that could also favored the developing world.

Although autonomy through diversification has been widely adopted among academics

to analyze Lula’s period (Neto & Malamud, 2015; Crescentino & Caballero, 2021), Pereyra

Doval (2013) distances herself from this definition and introduces the concept of

“autonomy by coalition”. This notion refers to “the constant search for partners to form

coalitions and thus coordinate policies in common forums” (Pereyra Doval, 2013, p. 120).

Although the concept reflects Brazil’s projection in the period, in this work we use the

previous definition as it better portrays the evolving dynamics of Brazil's relationship with

China, particularly in the economic domain.

China became a central partner within the diversification strategy, with a particular focus

on the economic dimension. But the economic prosperity that resulted from the

commodity prices boom between 2003-2013, which largely benefited Brazil exports, nor

autonomy neither trade diversification was improved, given the absence of a trade and

investment policy. “Far from granting greater autonomy at the international level or a

desirable diversification of the export matrix, this repressing of exports generated a

pendulum, causing China to replace the U.S.A. as Brazil’s preferred trading partner”

(Caballero & Crescentino, 2020, p. 10). Somehow, the result was a diversification of

dependency, since relations with China continued to reproduce a model dependent on

the demand of the third country instead of being the outcome of national long-term policy

or strategy.

In the aftermath of Rousseff’s interrupted second term, China had become a major

economic partner, but political relations were dependent on Beijing’s political interests

and the relevance Brazil could represent in a wider international strategy aimed at

positioning China in a global stage through multilateral fora, such as BRICS. In other

words, diversification as a means to achieve greater autonomy was only partly successful,

mostly in trade terms.

Temer's short period was marked by a strengthening of an economistic and reductionist

foreign policy approach, focused on using diplomacy as a commercial lever, giving priority

JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations

e-ISSN: 1647-7251

VOL 15 N.º 2, TD 1

Thematic Dossier

Brazil-China relations: The rise of modern International Order

December 2024, pp. 101-121

Balancing Continuity and Adjustments in Brazil’s Foreign Policy Towards China:

A Comparative Approach Between Bolsonaro and Lula’s Third Term

Florencia Rubiolo, Gonzalo Fiore

107

to the nexus with the United States. The strategy of its foreign ministers (José Serra and

Aloysio Nunes) consisted of defending internationally the legitimacy of the

administration, while dismantling the foreign policy design woven throughout the PT

government, claiming a supposed de-ideologization of foreign relations. (Crescentino &

Caballero, 2021; Gomes Saraiva, 2020).

According to Gomes Saraiva (2022) Bolsonaro's foreign policy represented a

reorientation in the country's external relations path, breaking with diplomatic traditions.

Unlike institutionalists who supported normative frameworks and autonomists who aimed

to amend them, Bolsonaro's approach was aggressive and reactive, challenging

multilateralism and existing international standards, and viewing the international order

as a threat to Brazilian autonomy. This period’s foreign policy, with a strong emphasis

on economic-commercial interests, escalated a process that began during Dilma's second

term and was consolidated during Temer's interim period. The construction of a critical

narrative about the ideological footprint of Lula's foreign policy is not new in the

Bolsonaro period, although there has been a radicalization of that discourse. As a

consequence, during Bolsonaro’s term, autonomy became a secondary goal,

subordinated to the ideological agenda that granted the US and the West a privileged

status in Brazil’s foreign policy. (Caballero and Crescentino, 2020)

As we will analyze in the following section, relations with China showed increasing

tensions, stemming from the executive's anti-communist rhetoric and alignment with

Trump's foreign policy that deepened rivalry with China since 2017, mainly through the

trade war. But, as months passed by, economic pragmatism reemerged and relations

with Beijing improved, given the relevance the country had for Brazil’s foreign trade and

economic stability. Notwithstanding this, the rapprochement to Beijing did not follow the

autonomous goal it had during previous presidencies. Instead, there was a material-

mercantilist imprint, which resulted in an improvement of economic indicators of the

bilateral relations, coexisting with constant political and diplomatic tensions.

Lula’s return to power in 2023 implied a new turn to foreign policy orientation. Autonomy

regained centrality, as a guiding principle, tool and goal, but with a different

interpretation. As Soares de Lima (2023) underlines, Lula’s foreign policy 3.0, faces

several changes both at the domestic and the international levels. In the external front,

the war in Ukraine; China’s economic slowdown and its consequent global impact; and

the escalating US-China rivalry, are the main features in a rapidly evolving systemic

context. According to Rodrigues (2023), under this new administration, autonomy can

be characterized as pragmatic. This notion, ‘pragmatic autonomy’, combines the

country's leadership aspirations on issues such as climate change and combating hunger

with the desire to maintain a balance between opposing powers in the international

system, mainly China and the United States (Rodrigues, 2023).

As Caballero and Crescentino (2020) suggest, autonomy as a concept, given the multiple

interpretations it had through the decades, has become an indicator of breaks rather

than a measure for continuity. We will utilize this concept as a theoretical framework to

examine Brazil's interactions with China during the two administrations under evaluation.

Additionally, we will uncover discrepancies between the economic and diplomatic aspects,

JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations

e-ISSN: 1647-7251

VOL 15 N.º 2, TD 1

Thematic Dossier

Brazil-China relations: The rise of modern International Order

December 2024, pp. 101-121

Balancing Continuity and Adjustments in Brazil’s Foreign Policy Towards China:

A Comparative Approach Between Bolsonaro and Lula’s Third Term

Florencia Rubiolo, Gonzalo Fiore

108

as they have followed diverging trajectories in each presidency. It is useful to understand

that autonomy has a political pillar, based on a self-identification as a developing country,

seeking to amplify the margin of maneuver in international affairs and to lessen

dependence on external powers; and an economic one, which has been central to seek

developing goals in South American country, and to maintain domestic economic

stability, even through different political ideologies.

Finally, given the notable contrasts in foreign policy between Bolsonaro and Lula's third

term, we resort to the notions of change, adjustment and continuity to grasp the

complexities of Brazil's interactions with China in both political and economic spheres. In

this line, Busso (2019) approaches foreign policy as a dynamic and complex phenomenon

in constant evolution. Change in foreign policy implies a deliberate break with established

practices, whether due to changes in political direction, ideological considerations or new

geopolitical realities (Busso and Barreto, 2020). In their approach, adjustment is

presented as a more nuanced and adaptive process, reflecting responses to external

changes without a complete reconfiguration of foreign policy frameworks. Busso

highlights the importance of identifying elements of continuity, which indicate the

persistence of certain principles, alliances or strategic priorities over time, even in

contexts of political transition. In this line, Hermann (1990, p. 5) suggests that

adjustments refer to “occur in the level of effort (greater or lesser) and/or in the scope

of recipients (such as refinement in the class of targets). What is done, how it is done,

and the purposes for which it is done remain unchanged.” This adjustment can manifest

itself in the review of alliances, the adoption of new diplomatic strategies or the

recalibration of priorities based on emerging circumstances (Rusell and Tokatlian, 2009).

Regarding continuity, it stands out that, despite changes in government, foreign policy

should maintain certain guiding principles and fundamental strategic lines over time. This

continuity is essential to preserve coherence and predictability in the country's

international relations.

As we discuss in the following sections, Bolsonaro’s foreign policy represented a shift

from previous administrations. The alignment to Trump’s policies; a retreat from Latin

American multilateral initiatives; and constant diplomatic tensions with Beijing, driven by

the anti-communist rhetoric; were some of the main features of the new government.

However, based on the data analysis, it is evident that adjustments were made to

bilateral relations with China instead of significant changes, as previously defined.

3. Brazil-China relations under Bolsonaro (2018-2022)

Since the late 1990s, Brazil had pursued an international strategy focused on diversifying

relationships (hedging) and investing in multilateral institutions to navigate the

challenges posed by superpowers and collective action issues. In recent years, the

relationship between Brazil and China “has become increasingly relevant in the context

of Brazilian foreign policy” (Feitosa et al, 2022, p. 2). The growing economic importance

of China worldwide has led to an intensification of commercial ties and cooperation

between both countries. Pragmatic institutionalists, by advocating close cooperation,

JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations

e-ISSN: 1647-7251

VOL 15 N.º 2, TD 1

Thematic Dossier

Brazil-China relations: The rise of modern International Order

December 2024, pp. 101-121

Balancing Continuity and Adjustments in Brazil’s Foreign Policy Towards China:

A Comparative Approach Between Bolsonaro and Lula’s Third Term

Florencia Rubiolo, Gonzalo Fiore

109

seek to capitalize on the economic opportunities offered by the relationship with China

(Shqueitzer, 2021).

In that sense, Jair Bolsonaro's government was an adjustment in Brazil's foreign policy,

giving rise to a decision-making structure divided into two large sectors: one of an

ideological nature, with an inclination towards Washington, and another pragmatic, which

prioritized the defense of national interests and did not frown upon deepening the

relationship with Beijing. In this sense, Bolsonaro’s government introduced “new ideas,

a new road map of the world, and new partnerships, putting at stake the standards that

have guided Brazil’s international presence for an extended period” (Gomes Saraiva,

2022, p. 1).

This dichotomy can be associated, in turn, with the geopolitical competition between the

United States and China. An illustrative example is the case of the Chinese-based

multinational company Huawei and 5G technology services in the Latin American country,

generating indecision in the Brazilian government due to the position (Shqueitzer, 2022).

The Bolsonaro administration seemed to opt for an automatic alignment strategy with

the United States. Such alignment strategies are commonplace, especially among

medium-sized countries like Brazil, aiming to minimize costs or gain incentives by

aligning with superpowers. However, the issue in the Brazilian context lies in the lack of

concrete evidence supporting national gains resulting from this alignment (Hirst & Valls

Pereira, 2020).

In relation to the anti-China rhetoric, it is observed that Jair Bolsonaro has expressed

critical comments toward the Asian nation, especially during the electoral campaign

period (Burton, 2018). However, once in office, a modulation in his tone has been noted,

acknowledging the significance of the relationship with China for the Brazilian economy.

This change in perspective could suggest a pragmatic adaptation by the Bolsonaro

government based on the country's economic interests despite what his main vocal

supporters may have said on social media (Lopez Conte, 2021). The complexity of the

relationship between both countries is thus manifested in the intersection of political,

economic, and environmental factors.

Trade and technological tensions between Brazil and China have arisen in the context of

the development of the 5G network in the South American country. The participation of

the Chinese company Huawei led to conflicts, prompting the Bolsonaro administration to

consider restrictions. However, a complete ban on Huawei's participation was not

implemented. This episode highlights the delicate balance that the Brazilian government

seeks to maintain between its trade and technological relationships with China and its

political alignments (Esteves, 2020). At the beginning of 2019, according to Stuenkel

(2022, p. 5) “relations faced its most difficult moment in history”. Despite these strains,

in January 2019 Chinese authorities invited members of then-presidential party PSL for

a visit to China and between may 23rd and 26th in 2019, Bolsonaro’s Vice-President,

Hamilton Mourāu had an encounter with Xi which served to rebuild the bilateral

relationship after Bolsonaro's campaign statements. His main task was to improve the

tarnished image of Brazil by convincing the Chinese government that pragmatic forces

within the Brazilian administration were in control of the situation, able to restrain

JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations

e-ISSN: 1647-7251

VOL 15 N.º 2, TD 1

Thematic Dossier

Brazil-China relations: The rise of modern International Order

December 2024, pp. 101-121

Balancing Continuity and Adjustments in Brazil’s Foreign Policy Towards China:

A Comparative Approach Between Bolsonaro and Lula’s Third Term

Florencia Rubiolo, Gonzalo Fiore

110

attitudes which could damage bilateral relations. His visit also led to a reactivation of

COSBAN (Sawicka, 2020).

Bolsonaro engaged in two bilateral encounters with Chinese President Xi Jinping in 2019.

The first took place from October 24th to 26th in Beijing, followed by another meeting

from November 14th to 16th in Brasilia during the BRICS Summit (Paulino, 2020). During

that Summit, Economy Minister Paulo Guedes also travelled to Brasilia to meet his

Chinese counterpart (Dryomova & Stolyarova, 2019). Bolsonaro's stance towards China

has been marked by a volatile evolution, oscillating between seeing China as an arch-

enemy, a strategic partner, and an ideological rival within a short span of time. Initially,

he portrayed China as a significant ideological adversary, emphasizing his visits to Taiwan

and positioning Brazil alongside the United States and Israel (Guimarães & De Oliveira E

Silva, 2021). This approach, however, incurred swift responses from Beijing, highlighting

the importance of careful diplomacy in choosing allies. Bolsonaro depicted China as a

predatory force aiming to dominate key sectors of Brazil's economy, fueling tensions

further. Despite China's status as Brazil's top trading partner, Bolsonaro's administration

explored ways to diminish dependence on China, raising concerns among crucial

constituencies, notably farmers.

The dynamics shifted during the Amazon fires crisis in 2019 when, amid mounting

international criticism, particularly from figures like French President Macron, who

questioned Brazil's sovereignty over the region, Bolsonaro found an unexpected ally in

China. Beijing supported Brazil, aligning momentarily on issues of sovereignty and

rebuffing international criticism (Marra et al, 2021). The three-day visit of Brazilian

President Jair Bolsonaro to Beijing marked a significant shift in his approach towards

China. In a complete turnaround from his previous criticisms, Bolsonaro adopted a tone

of cooperation and openness, acknowledging the mutual dependency between Brazil and

China. His words emphasized the importance of this bilateral relationship, describing

Brazil as a vast ocean of opportunities willing to share with China. 25 agreements in the

areas of politics, science, technology, education, economy, trade, energy, and agriculture

were signed. The agreements include sanitary protocols for the export of processed meat

and cottonseed flour from Brazil to China, as well as cooperation for the development of

new and renewable energy (Vidal Liy & Gallaraga Gortázar, 2019).

This newfound alignment, though pragmatic, didn't substantially alter Bolsonaro's

underlying views on China. His subsequent apology to Xi Jinping was overshadowed by

domestic accusations of Chinese involvement in the COVID-19 pandemic, perpetuating a

narrative of Chinese threat. Bolsonaro's diplomatic tightrope walk underscores the

complexities of balancing economic interests with ideological differences, epitomizing

Schmitt's notion of the "political enemy" as existentially different, yet necessary for

engagement. During the 2019 BRICS summit, which was chaired by Brazil, Minister of

Economy Paulo Guedes announced that the government of Bolsonaro was in talks with

China to establish a free trade area between the two nations. This move aimed to

strengthen the bilateral economic relationship and diversify Brazil's trade partnerships.

Guedes emphasized the importance of greater integration with China, even if it entailed

a shift in the trade balance, stating that the country could balance itself in the future

through increased exports (Hooijmaaijers, 2021). During the covid-19 pandemic, the

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bilateral relation went through hard times again. The initially harmonious stance towards

Chinese provider Huawei in Brazil's 5G network auction, announced by the government

in April 2020, underwent a stark transformation amid the Coronavirus pandemic. The rift

began with President Bolsonaro's son, Eduardo Bolsonaro, attributing global blame for

the crisis to China, followed by the resignation of the recent Minister of Education, who

insulted the country in a racially charged and childish speech. This deterioration in

relations was further evidenced during a late April cabinet meeting, where Foreign

Minister Ernesto Araújo criticized China as undemocratic and dismissive of human rights,

advocating for Brazil to spearhead a new global order alongside like-minded nation.

However, disrespectful comments towards China were reportedly struck from the record,

with Economy Minister Paulo Guedes highlighting the economic necessity of maintaining

ties despite ideological differences (Ibañez, 2020).

China issued a warning to Brazil, stating that there could be "negative consequences"

following the characterization by Brazilian lawmaker Eduardo Bolsonaro of Chinese

activities regarding 5G technology as "infamous espionage." This stark message,

conveyed through the Chinese embassy in Brasilia, represents a notable shift in tone

toward the South American nation, a declared ally of outgoing U.S. President Donald

Trump and his anti-Beijing rhetoric. Eduardo Bolsonaro, who was also serving as chair of

the Foreign Affairs Committee in the Chamber of Deputies during his father’s presidency,

subsequently deleted the contentious tweet following discussions with the Minister of

Communications and advisors from the National Telecommunications Agency (Meier,

2023). The central focus of these talks was the 5G auction in 2021. The embassy's

statement, urging Brazilian figures to refrain from aligning with U.S. rhetoric and

disinformation against China, underscores the potential repercussions of straying from

the path of Sino-Brazilian friendship, highlighting the historical responsibility to maintain

the stability of the China-Brazil alliance. After this, in May 24th of 2022, there was a

meeting during the COSBAN Summit, where Mourão met with Chinese Vice President

Wang Quishan (Roberto, 2022).

Bolsonaro's administration, marked by a dichotomy between ideological alignment with

the United States and pragmatic engagement with China, underscores the geopolitical

competition between superpowers, reminiscent of the arguments presented by pragmatic

institutionalists like Shqueitzer (2021). The volatility in Bolsonaro's stance towards China,

oscillating between adversarial rhetoric and moments of cooperation, reflects the delicate

balance between economic interests and political alignments, as highlighted by Hirst &

Valls Pereira (2020). Despite initial tensions and criticisms, Bolsonaro's government

ultimately pursued a pragmatic approach, acknowledging the significance of the Brazil-

China relationship for economic stability and technological advancement. However,

challenges persisted, particularly regarding the integration of Huawei into Brazil's 5G

network, revealing the complex interplay between trade, technology, and political

considerations (Esteves, 2020). Amidst challenges and disagreements, efforts to deepen

economic cooperation, such as discussions on establishing a free trade area and

navigating the COVID-19 pandemic, underscored the importance of maintaining stability

and continuity in the China-Brazil alliance, as emphasized by the warnings issued by the

Chinese embassy in Brasilia (Meier, 2023).

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3.1 Strengthening economic ties with China: Growth in trade and

investments despite political tensions

The economic dimension, particularly in trade terms, showed not only continuity, but

also a growing dynamism, in contrast with the prevailing tensions in the diplomatic

front. Trade has been a core pillar in Brazil’s relations with China since the beginning of

the 2000s. In 2009, China became the main destination for Brazil's exports, surpassing

the United States for the first time, and becoming the country's largest global trading

partner.

Figure 1: Total Trade Brazil - China, 2016-2023, in thousands of US dollars.

Source: Authors, based on data retrieved from the International Trade Center (2024).

As a result of this unprecedented trend, China’s growing role as core trade partner for

Brazil had impacts on the overall participation of other partners and on the country's

global commercial basket composition. In both dimensions, partners and compositions,

there was a gradual decline in diversification. As shown in figure 2, Brazil’s total trade

with China in 2023, more than doubled that with the United States, and was 5.4 times

larger than total trade with Argentina. Furthermore, total trade with China grew faster

than with the other two partners, particularly between 2018-2023. As figures show,

Brazilian trade with China concentrated 20.3% of the country’s global trade in 2017 and

27.1% in 2023. (ITC, 2024) So, in contrast to Bolsonaro's rhetoric, especially during his

campaign and first months as president, China not only sustained a privileged position

as Brazil's primary trading partner but also significantly increased its participation

throughout the period.

40 000 000

80 000 000

120 000 000

160 000 000

200 000 000

2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023

Impo desde China Expo a China

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Figure 2: Brazil’s Main trade partners. 2016-2023, in thousands of US dollars.

Source: Authors, based on data retrieved from the International Trade Center (2024).

Brazilian exports represented the main bulk of Brazil-China total trade, and their increase

surpassed that of the country’s imports from this partner. In fact, in the period under

study, Brazil’s exports to China were almost three times greater than those to the United

States and eight times greater than exports to Argentina, the second and third largest

destinations respectively. In terms of participation, Brazil’s exports to China, reached

30.7% of total exports in 2023, with the highest share in 2020 -during Bolsonaro’s

period-, accounting for 32.4%. (ITC, 2024). Analyzing these numbers, there is no doubt

Brazil’s trade relations with China reflected continuity during the whole period under

study. This continuity is further demonstrated by the ongoing asymmetry in trade

composition, which has only strengthened in recent years, emphasizing an interindustrial

trade pattern. Since 2017, the majority of Brazil's main export products to China have

consistently comprised an average of 86% of total items, indicating a highly concentrated

portfolio. (International Trade Center, 2024) Until 2019, the four main products in Brazil’s

export basket were soya beans (42%), petroleum oil (22%), iron ores (18%), and

chemical wood pulp (5%). In 2020, after Beijing granted permission in September 2019

to 25 additional Brazilian beef, pork and poultry plants to ship to the country (Bloomberg,

2019), meat became the fourth exported item, a position that was reinforced in the

following years, accounting for 9% of total exports in average between 2020 and 2023.

Chinese investments have also become increasingly relevant for Brazil since 2009. As

Sawicka (2020) recalls, that year the China Development Bank provided Petrobras with

a loan of 10 billion USD, and in 2010, the State Grid Corporation of China, the largest

power company in the world, acquired seven Brazilian companies in the electric energy

sector. Moreover, in 2016, State Grid purchased a controlling stake in Brazil's largest

power distributor, CPFL. Between 2005 and 2022, this South American country was the

world’s fourth largest recipient of Chinese investment in the world. However, in recent

40 000 000

80 000 000

120 000 000

160 000 000

200 000 000

2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023

Total China Total USA Total Argentina

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years, China has taken a more cautious and selective approach towards outbound

investment for several reasons. The focus on domestic priorities and a more uncertain

global geopolitical landscape have prompted Beijing to adapt its strategies and

concentrate on key partners, such as Brazil. (Cariello, 2023)

During the Bolsonaro administration, the number of investment projects announced and

confirmed showed a fluctuating trend. In 2019, projects announced were 31 and

confirmed 24. But in 2020, as a clear result of the Covid-19 outbreak, confirmed

investment projects plummeted to a total of 8. The years 2021 and 2022 portrayed a

significant recovery, with 28 and 32 confirmed projects respectively. (Cariello, 2023)

Then, despite Bolsonaro’s hostile initial rhetoric towards China, “several cooperation

agreements and sectorial MoUs were signed, resulting in the expansion of Chinese

business operations in Brazil” (García et al, 2023, p. 8). In terms of flows, figures show

that after a peak in 2017 (17.4 billion USD) -that was mainly due to State Grid’s

acquisition of a majority stake in CPFL for a total of 12.5 billion USD (García et al, 2023)-

investments dropped to an average of 3.5 billion USD between 2018 and 2022. The main

sectors receiving Chinese investments include energy, mining, automotive and finance.

Between 2007-2022, measured by value, the electricity sector absorbed 45.5% of total

investments by Chinese companies in Brazil, followed by oil extraction (30.4%),

extraction of metallic minerals (6.2%), manufacturing industry (6.2%), infrastructure

projects (4.4%) and agriculture (3.4%) (Cariello, 2023).

Overall, economic relations between Brazil and China remained stable during the

Bolsonaro period in comparison with previous administrations, and although total figures

are not still available, it is supposed to continue during Lula’s current term. Both trade

and investment flows reacted more to external conditions -such as the pandemic

outbreak, China’s domestic conditions, and international conflicts- than to Brazil’s

political changing orientation. In the aftermath, continuity rather than change or

adjustment, was the result of a pragmatic lecture during Bolsonaro’s years, that

privileged material needs over ideology and political values in its relations with Beijing.

4. Brazil-China relations under Lula’s third term

In the first hundred days of the new foreign policy under Lula's presidency, an attempt

was made to reverse the negative impact of Bolsonaro's previous management on

Brazil's foreign relations. Lula and his team diagnosed a deterioration in the country's

image due to the dismantling of internal policies and an isolationist vision in the

international arena. The objective of Brazilian Foreign Policy under the new government

was to bring Brazil back to the world stage (de Sousa et al, 2023). The first hundred

days of Lula's new foreign policy emphasized the reconstruction of Brazil's international

image, the reorientation of bilateral relations with China and the search for

opportunities for internal development, global projection and cooperation on crucial

issues at the national level. worldwide (De Sousa et al, 2023).

During his first presidency from 2003 to 2010, Lula sought to strengthen ties with China,

recognizing the country's growing economic power. He visited China four times during

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his tenure, and in 2009, China surpassed the US to become Brazil's largest trading

partner, a position it has held since then. This event can be seen in the context of the

commodities boom of the early 2000s, which created a favorable environment not only

for Brazil but also for other Latin American countries, such as Argentina, Ecuador, Bolivia,

and Venezuela, to deepen economic ties with China, then seen as a key market for their

exports and a potential source of investment and technology transfer (Almeida, 2010).

Since President Lula took office again in early 2023, bilateral relations have significantly

improved, with Lula seeking to rekindle the relationship with China and showing

eagerness to develop bilateral trade and investment ties. In late March 2023, China and

Brazil signed an agreement to settle all trade exchanges in their respective currencies

rather than in US dollars. In April 2023, Lula continued the bilateral dialogue by meeting

Xi in Beijing (Giaccaglia, 2024). This agreement, along with President Lula's comments

during his visit to China, shows Brazil's willingness to disrupt the dominance of the US

dollar as the primary trading currency, aligning with Beijing's aspirations to

internationalize the renminbi (Da Rosa, 2024).

During President Lula's trip to China in 2023, over 20 agreements were signed, and high-

level meetings took place, underscoring Brazil's renewed commitment to a robust and

multifaceted relationship with the Asian powerhouse. During these meetings included the

appointment of former Brazilian president Dilma Rousseff as the new head of the BRICS

Bank, underscores Brazil's renewed commitment to a robust and multifaceted

relationship with the Asian powerhouse given that “Lula's decision seeks to give

geopolitical relevance to this scheme” (Giaccaglia & Dussort, 2023, p. 9). Set against the

backdrop of escalating tensions between China and the United States, Lula's visit reflects

Brazil's pursuit of a pragmatic, mutually beneficial approach, consistent with its tradition

of neutrality and negotiation in international affairs. Accompanied by a diverse delegation

including ministers and governors, Lula's journey represents a significant step towards

diversifying Brazil's foreign relations and exploring new avenues of cooperation in

strategic sectors.

According to the Joint Declaration between the People's Republic of China and the

Federative Republic of Brazil on the Deepening of the Comprehensive Strategic

Partnership, released during the visit, the two countries intend to deepen cooperation in

various fields and jointly address a wide range of issues, such as poverty reduction, social

development, technological innovation, environmental protection, climate change, low-

carbon economy, and digital economy (Ministério das Relações Exteriores, 2023). The

bilateral agreements cover many of these fields and more, aiming to boost bilateral trade

and investment across a wide range of industries, including trade facilitation, research

and innovation cooperation, information and communication technology cooperation,

industrial investment promotion, strengthening cooperation in the digital economy,

cooperation between finance ministries, and social and rural development cooperation

aimed at eradicating hunger and poverty. Moreover, the renewal of cooperation in the

aerospace industry was highlighted, with the signing of documents to renew cooperation

in the aerospace sector and restart the China-Brazil Earth Resources Satellite program

(Huld, 2024).

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“Under the new agreements, both sides agree to accelerate the development of CBERS-

6, the sixth satellite built through their partnership, and to implement related projects

within the China-Brazil Space Cooperation Program” (Huld, 2024), reflecting a joint effort

to promote research and development of new technologies and undertake projects

including technology transfer elements (Alcalá et al, 2023). Furthermore, agreements

were made to facilitate trade in agricultural products, with efforts to digitalize customs

procedures and promote cooperation in disease management that could affect bilateral

trade and supply chain stability. Additionally, agreements were reached to resume

Brazilian beef exports to China, although no timeline was provided for lifting the

suspension (Da Rosa Muñoz, 2024). In June 2024, during another COSBAN Summit,

Brazilian Vice President Geraldo Alckim met with Chinese Vice President Han Zheng in

Beijing (Secretaria de Comunicação Social, 2024).

The dynamic evolution of Brazil-China relations under Lula’s third term epitomizes the

interplay of theoretical concepts elucidated within the framework of Brazilian foreign

policy. Lula’s pragmatic approach, characterized by a pursuit of autonomy and strategic

partnerships, resonates with the notion of "pragmatic autonomy" as articulated by

Rodrigues (2023). The reinvigoration of bilateral ties, spanning economic, technological,

and environmental cooperation, underscores Brazil’s pursuit of comprehensive strategic

partnership, echoing Tokatlian’s (1996) emphasis on foreign policy as an expression of

national identity and strategic interests.

Final Remarks

In a developing country like Brazil, despite its GDP level and status as a global middle

power, the material conditions linked to development needs set the pace for foreign policy

decisions. During his campaign, Bolsonaro built an anti-communist, anti-Chinese rhetoric

aligned with the Trump administration, which initially led to a cooling of relations with

Beijing. Since the moment the new government comprehended that the economic ties

with China were truly irreplaceable and that Brazil’s well-being and economic stability

depended on them, the President toned down his criticism and showed gestures of

diplomatic rapprochement, particularly through official visits and the signing of economic

agreements.

Unlike previous governments, the quest for autonomy was not in Bolsonaro’s agenda

towards China, but pragmatism, which is also a traditional feature of Brazilian foreign

policy, gradually became a compass for managing the relationship. In the aftermath,

economic pragmatism prevailed over ideological differences, and relations with China

remained stable through most of Bolsonaro´s administration and strengthened economic

ties. Economic interests, and the unavoidable evidence that the relation with Beijing is a

cornerstone of Brazil’s economic progress, were the essence of continuity besides the

outstanding political differences with previous governments.

Lula’s return to power in 2023 signaled a shift back towards a more autonomous foreign

policy orientation, also characterized by pragmatism. Under Lula's leadership, autonomy

regained centrality as a guiding principle, aiming to balance Brazil's relationships with

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central powers, namely China and the United States, while pursuing leadership

aspirations in global issues like climate change and hunger eradication. This pragmatic

autonomy acknowledges the complexities of the international system and seeks to

maintain a balance between national interests and global realities.

Lula’s government has clearly emphasized the central role China plays for Brazil, both

bilaterally and multilaterally. However, times have changed. Geopolitical rivalry has

intensified, the Global South has lost leverage, and multilateralism is under threat in a

less flexible international environment. Lula now faces the dual challenge of restoring

Brazil’s international standing while addressing increasing domestic social and economic

demands. Global conditions are not as favorable as they were during his previous

administrations. Although the relationship with China remains pivotal, it must be

leveraged in response to the shifting international dynamics and conditions.

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