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e-ISSN: 1647-7251

VOL15, N.º 2, TD1

Thematic Dossier – Brazil-China relations:

The rise of modern International Order

December 2024

SINO-BRAZILIAN COOPERATION IN ANALYSIS: BILATERALISM,

MULTILATERALISM AND MINILATERALISM

ANTÓNIO TAVARES

antonio.tavares@ulusofona.pt

Integrated member of CEAD. Assistant Professor at Lusófona University, Oporto (Portugal).

https://orcid.org/0000-0002-3536-7035.

ASYA GASPARYAN

gasparyanasya9@gmail.com

Research Fellow at the Regional Studies Center, Yerevan (Armenia).

https://orcid.org/0009-0001-7430-6382.

CÁTIA M. COSTA

Catia.Miriam.Costa@iscte-iul.pt

Researcher at CEI-IUL and an invited Assistant Professor at ISCTE-IUL (Portugal).

https://orcid.org/0000-0002-7666-5661.

JOSÉ PALMEIRA

palmeira@eeg.uminho.pt

Integrated member of CICP, and Assistant Professor at University of Minho (Portugal), Portugal.

https://orcid.org/0000-0002-3256-2062.

PAULO AFONSO B. DUARTE

duartebrardo@gmail.com

Integrated member of CEAD. Furthermore, he is an Assistant Professor at Lusófona University,

Oporto (Portugal) and invited Assistant Professor at University of Minho.

https://orcid.org/0000-0003-1675-2840.

SABRINA E. MEDEIROS

sabrina.medeiros@ulusofona.pt

Assistant Professor at Lusófona University , Oporto (Portugal).

https://orcid.org/0000-0003-4954-3623.

Abstract

The current international system is undergoing several structural changes boosted by the so-

called Global South, in an attempt to change the norms and structuring organisations built up

after World War II under US hegemony. Emerging states, who have a great deal of influence

in the international system, often question the westernised nature of global governance and

its main institutions, such as the United Nations, the International Monetary Fund and the

World Bank. In this context it seems pertinent to study the cases of Brazil and China, who

look for changes in the traditional North-South relations that have long failed to reflect the

power dynamics resulting from their emergence. To this end, we will pay special attention not

only to their bilateral and multilateral initiatives, but also to the potential of minilateralism as

a complementary approach in the process, despite often neglected by the literature. Based

on this gap, we argue that the interplay between bilateralism, multilateralism and

minilateralism is crucial in Sino-Brazilian endeavours to reform obsolete structures for the

sake of their own interests and those of the Global South. This being said, the research

JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations

e-ISSN: 1647-7251

VOL 15 N.º 2, TD 1

Thematic Dossier

Brazil-China relations: The rise of modern International Order

December 2024, pp. 38-59

Sino-Brazilian Cooperation in Analysis: Bilateralism, Multilateralism and Minilateralism

António Tavares, Asya Gasparyan, Cátia M. Costa, José Palmeira, Paulo Afonso B. Duarte,

Sabrina E. Mendes

question that will guide our study is the following: Which role play bilateralism, multilateralism

and minilateralism within Sino-Brazilian relations? Focusing on the specific bilateral and mini

cooperation dynamics together with the multilateral forums in which China and Brazil are

integrated - namely the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, the New Development Bank,

the BRICS, BASIC, the G20, among others - one can expect the interplay between

bilateralism, multilateralism and minilateralism to assume an increasing and complementary

role in Sino-Brazilian relations.

Keywords

Bilateralism, Brazil, China, Global South, Minilateralism, Multilateralism.

Resumo

O atual sistema internacional passa por diversas mudanças estruturais impulsionadas pelo

chamado Sul Global, na tentativa de alterar as normas e as organizações estruturantes

construídas após a Segunda Guerra Mundial sob a hegemonia dos EUA. Os Estados

emergentes, que têm uma grande influência no sistema internacional, questionam

frequentemente a natureza ocidentalizada da governação global e das suas principais

instituições, como as Nações Unidas, o Fundo Monetário Internacional e o Banco Mundial.

Neste contexto, parece pertinente estudar os casos do Brasil e da China, que procuram

mudanças nas relações tradicionais Norte-Sul que há muito não conseguem reflectir a

dinâmica de poder resultante da sua emergência. Para tal, prestaremos especial atenção não

só às suas iniciativas bilaterais e multilaterais, mas também ao potencial do minilateralismo

como abordagem complementar no processo, apesar de muitas vezes negligenciado pela

literatura. Com base nesta lacuna, argumentamos que a interação entre bilateralismo,

multilateralismo e minilateralismo é crucial nos esforços sino-brasileiros para reformar

estruturas obsoletas em prol dos seus próprios interesses e dos do Sul Global. Dito isto, a

pergunta de pesquisa que norteará nosso estudo é a seguinte: Qual o papel do bilateralismo,

do multilateralismo e do minilateralismo nas relações sino-brasileiras? Centrando-nos nas

dinâmicas específicas de cooperação bilateral e de minicooperação, juntamente com os fóruns

multilaterais em que a China e o Brasil estão integrados - nomeadamente o Banco Asiático de

Investimento em Infraestruturas, o Novo Banco de Desenvolvimento, os BRICS, o BASIC, o

G20, entre outros - pode-se esperar a interação entre bilateralismo, multilateralismo e

minilateralismo para assumir um papel crescente e complementar nas relações sino-

brasileiras.

Palavras-chave

Bilateralismo, Brasil, China, Sul Global, Minilateralismo, Multilateralismo.

How to cite this article

Tavares, António, Gasparyan, Asya, Costa, Cátia M., Palmeira, José, Duarte, Paulo Afonso B. &

Medeiros, Sabrina E. (2024). Sino-Brazilian Cooperation in Analysis: Bilateralism, Multilateralism

and Minilateralism. Janus.net, e-journal of international relations. VOL 15 N.º 2, TD1 – Temathic

Dossier – “Brazil - China Relations: The Rise Of Modern International Order”. December 2024, pp.

37-59. https://doi.org/10.26619/1647-7251.DT0324.2.

Article received on 2 February 2024 and accepted for publication on 29 August 2024.

JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations

e-ISSN: 1647-7251

VOL 15 N.º 2, TD 1

Thematic Dossier

Brazil-China relations: The rise of modern International Order

December 2024, pp. 38-59

Sino-Brazilian Cooperation in Analysis: Bilateralism, Multilateralism and Minilateralism

António Tavares, Asya Gasparyan, Cátia M. Costa, José Palmeira, Paulo Afonso B. Duarte,

Sabrina E. Mendes

SINO-BRAZILIAN COOPERATION IN ANALYSIS: BILATERALISM,

MULTILATERALISM AND MINILATERALISM

ANTÓNIO TAVARES

ASYA GASPARYAN

CÁTIA M. COSTA

JOSÉ PALMEIRA

PAULO AFONSO B. DUARTE

SABRINA E. MEDEIROS

1. Introduction

Over the past decades, Brazil and China have built and consolidated a comprehensive

cooperation on a broad range of fields, including social development, environmental

protection, low-carbon economy, digital economy, scientific and technological innovation,

and poverty reduction, as stressed by Zhang and Chen (2021) as well as by de Castro

Neves and Cariello (2022). Besides, the literature offers insightful analyses concerning

the bilateral nature of Sino-Brazilian cooperation (Hase Ueta, Alencastro & Pinheiro-

Machado, 2023; van Tongerlo 2023). At the same time, Sino-Brazil cooperation was

referred to by Maurício Santoro (2022, p.28) as a strategic partnership based on the

“political perspective” of the Global South to push the world order towards multilateralism

(Lessa, 2010). Academic literature further suggests that Sino-Brazilian cooperation is

highly conditioned by multilateralism and a stronger sense of Global South identity

(Vigevani & Cepaluni, 2007; Oliveira, 2010; Guilhon-Albuquerque, 2014). In this regard,

China and Brazil were among the pioneers who founded G20 which affirms their

commitment to South-South cooperation (Alles, 2012). Not only economics are key in

their relation (Lins, 2024; Zumah, 2024) but also a shared sense that world institutions

have become obsolete, thus needing to be reshaped in order to better accommodate the

interests of the developing countries (Bezerra & Lin, 2023; Dams, 2024)

Yet, literature dedicated to the contribution of minilateralism as a complementary

approach vis-à-vis the traditional multilateral and bilateral dimensions of Sino-Brazilian

relations, as well the interplay between the three, remains a gap which the present study

JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations

e-ISSN: 1647-7251

VOL 15 N.º 2, TD 1

Thematic Dossier

Brazil-China relations: The rise of modern International Order

December 2024, pp. 38-59

Sino-Brazilian Cooperation in Analysis: Bilateralism, Multilateralism and Minilateralism

António Tavares, Asya Gasparyan, Cátia M. Costa, José Palmeira, Paulo Afonso B. Duarte,

Sabrina E. Mendes

will help to narrow down. Along these lines, we have adopted the following research

question: Which role play bilateralism, multilateralism and minilateralism within Sino-

Brazilian relations? The analysis spans from 1993, when the Sino-Brazilian Strategic

Partnership was established - a significant milestone in both actors’ bilateral and even

multilateral cooperation - until the most recent developm1ents under current President

Lula da Silva at the time of writing. This time frame enables us to better grasp the

geostrategic and geopolitical dynamics associated with the ongoing war between Russia

and Ukraine, whose impacts reinforce the debate on the effectiveness of the existing

western-led world structures. In fact, the Lula da Silva administration represents one of

the most significant contributions to this debate, unlike other administrations such as

Fernando Henrique Cardoso's or even Jair Bolsonaro. The recent appointment of former

President Dilma Roussef as head of the new Development Bank is one of the signs of

Brazil coming back again to its place in multilateralism with converging interests with

China’s own agenda for the Global South.

All this means that the United States' area of influence is gradually being replaced by

China’s own initiatives in multilateralism, which under Lula’s administration have been

largely supported. On August 15, 2024, Brazil and China marked the 50th anniversary of

their diplomatic relations, a milestone that highlights the evolving nature of their strategic

partnership. The creation of mechanisms like the High-Level Sino-Brazilian Commission

on Consultation and Cooperation (COSBAN) in 2004 underscores efforts to institutionalize

bilateral cooperation, yet the outcomes of such initiatives warrant further examination.

In 2023, bilateral trade reached a record $157 billion, with Brazil achieving a $51 billion

trade surplus, reflecting China's role as a critical market for Brazilian exports.

Additionally, Brazil has become a notable destination for Chinese investments,

particularly in infrastructure, which aligns with domestic initiatives like the Growth

Acceleration Program (China Daily, 2024).

The present study will start by outlining the most relevant milestones in Brazil-China

bilateral relations. It then attempts to understand how multilateralism complements both

actors’ agendas when addressing Global South issues and international policy

perspectives, mainly regarding global governance. The final section aims to investigate

the role and manifestations of minilateralism as an in-between and complementary

approach to both bilateralism and multilateralism. The conclusion summarises the main

findings whilst pointing to future avenues of research.

2. Bilateralism in Sino-Brazilian Relations

This section aims to evaluate the evolution of Sino-Brazilian relations in order to

understand the degree of relationship between the two States and whether this is

determined by cyclical or structural factors.

Brazil and China have never been as close in terms of bilateral relations as they are

today. The dynamic between China and Brazil stands out among Beijing's relations with

other Latin American countries primarily because Brazil is the sole Latin American

JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations

e-ISSN: 1647-7251

VOL 15 N.º 2, TD 1

Thematic Dossier

Brazil-China relations: The rise of modern International Order

December 2024, pp. 38-59

Sino-Brazilian Cooperation in Analysis: Bilateralism, Multilateralism and Minilateralism

António Tavares, Asya Gasparyan, Cátia M. Costa, José Palmeira, Paulo Afonso B. Duarte,

Sabrina E. Mendes

member of BRICS

(Santoro, 2022). Since Lula da Silva's return to the Planalto Palace in

2022, Brasília and Beijing have shown signs of geopolitical alignment regarding major

international issues, which represents a departure from the traditional equidistance of

Brazilian foreign policy in the dispute between the great powers. This approach will not

be strange to Brazil's commitment to cooperation within the BRICS, seen as an attempt

at a greater role in the so-called Global South, resulting in a distance from the United

States of America (US) and the European Union (EU).

The turning point dates back to 2009, the year in which China overtook the US as Brazil's

largest trading partner, a situation that continues to this day. The global strategic

partnership established between the two countries in 2012, reinforcing the strategic

partnership celebrated in 1993 (Serra, 2016), is the corollary of a rapprochement

initiated since they established diplomatic relations in 1974. Therefrom Brasília would

recognise mainland China as the legitimate representative of the Chinese State to the

detriment of the nationalist regime taking refuge in Taipei, on the island of Formosa.

According to Brazilian scholar Adriana Abdenur (2022), Brazil's prominent role in South-

South cooperation and global environmental agenda had been undermined under

Bolsonaro presidency, which significantly weakened the country's multilateral practice

and ties with the Global South. Yet, the Guardian’s reference to the victory of Luiz Inácio

Lula da Silva in presidential elections as “Brazil is Back” is more than relevant (The

Guardian, 2023; da Silva, 2023). Lula’s new revisionist agenda is set to grant the Global

South a larger voice in world decision-making, reduce hunger and poverty as well as curb

climate change as priorities under Brazil's G20 presidency. In doing so, Lula’s Brazil is

resolute to revitalise close cooperation with China to cope with pressure coming from the

Global North (Berg & Baena, 2023; Vieira, 2023). In this context, Brazil endorsed

Beijing’s efforts to end the dollar dominance of global commerce by calling on developing

nations to replace the US dollar with their own currencies in international trade (Financial

Times, 2023).

The most decisive step taken by Brazil took place during the visit that Lula da Silva made

to Beijing, in 2023, when he signed an agreement with Xi Jinping aiming to replace the

US dollar in international trade. Brasília meets the Chinese aim of weakening the North

American role in the international system, thereby distancing itself from Washington, but

also from its Western partners, especially the Europeans. Although it has not formally

joined the Chinese Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), Brazil has welcomed significant Chinese

investment in infrastructure and increased its cooperation in strategic areas such as

aerospace, involving the respective national agencies.

Traditionally very jealous of its sovereignty over the Amazon rainforest, Brasília did not

shy away from establishing the China-Brazil Earth Resources program with Beijing, which

includes, among other capabilities, the launch of Earth observation satellites, including

the Amazon rainforest. Lula and Xi “signed 15 agreements that foster cooperation

between the two countries in various areas, such as trade and industry, communication,

innovation, research and technology” (Presidency of the Republic of Brazil, 2023),

deepening the Sino-Brazilian strategic partnership that dates back to the 90s. Brazil

BRICS refers to Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa.

JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations

e-ISSN: 1647-7251

VOL 15 N.º 2, TD 1

Thematic Dossier

Brazil-China relations: The rise of modern International Order

December 2024, pp. 38-59

Sino-Brazilian Cooperation in Analysis: Bilateralism, Multilateralism and Minilateralism

António Tavares, Asya Gasparyan, Cátia M. Costa, José Palmeira, Paulo Afonso B. Duarte,

Sabrina E. Mendes

supplies China with raw materials that it lacks and, in return, receives investment in

infrastructure where Beijing has potential.

A study by the BRICS Policy Centre (2019), which analyses the number of Sino-Brazilian

agreements signed over twenty years (1999-2019), reveals that it was during Dilma

Russef's mandate (2011-2016) that the largest number of agreements were signed

(109), more than the double of those signed during Lula's governments (2002-2010),

which were 53. The two presidents assigned by the Workers' Party were much more

proactive in relation to China than their predecessor, Fernando Henrique Cardoso, who

between 1999 and 2002 made six agreements, or his successor, Michel Temer,

responsible for 15 agreements in 2017 and 2018, while Jair Bolsonaro concluded two in

2019.

At the international level, the so-called enlarged West, with the US and the EU at its

head, has expressed caution in its opening to the Chinese market, for reasons of alleged

national security. At stake are mainly strategic sectors, such as communications and

semiconductors, where there is fear that the Chinese authorities, who control investment,

may access information considered strategic for Western countries. To this fear, which

follows years of relocation of Western companies to Asian countries, more favourable to

production, with a cheaper, although qualified, workforce, is added the global geopolitical

context marked by the conflict in Ukraine, in relation to which Beijing has maintained

public neutrality, although it promotes an “unlimited strategic partnership” with Moscow

(Reuters 2022). At the same time, tension in the Taiwan Strait is intensifying, with Beijing

reaffirming its intention to absorb the territory of Taipei, despite the 2024 presidential

elections reaffirming the power of defenders of autonomy for the island of Formosa vis-

à-vis Mainland China. In this geopolitical context, the rapprochement between Brasília

and Beijing continues to be seen in Western chancelleries as a distancing of Brazil from

liberal democracies, which could affect the approval of agreements such as the EU-

Mercosur or mortgage Brazil's ambition for a greater role in the United Nations system,

including accession to a permanent member position on the Security Council.

This feeling is shared by Thiago de Aragão (2023, p.8), who professionally deals with

foreign investment funds, who expresses a fear: “Without choosing sides, Brazil would

continue to enjoy everything that the two superpowers and their allies could offer. By

choosing a side, Brazil must hope that tensions do not worsen, as then the price of

alliances can be placed on the table”.

If there is a hallmark that Itamaraty (reference for the Brazilian Ministry of Foreign

Relations) has cultivated since the democratisation of the regime, it is Brazil's strategic

autonomy in navigating relations with the great powers. It began with non-alignment,

during the Cold War period, which had as a corollary the creation of the Zone of Peace

and Cooperation in South Atlantic (ZOPACAS)

, under the sponsorship of the United

Nations, and continued with the deepening of South-Atlantic relations, especially during

Established in 1986 by resolution 41/11 of the United Nations General Assembly, the ZOPACAS includes

24 members states: Angola, Argentina, Benin, Brazil, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Congo, Côte d’Ivoire,

Democratic Republic of Congo, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau,

Liberia, Namibia, Nigeria, Sao Tome and Principe, Senegal, Sierra Leone, South Africa, Togo and Uruguay.

JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations

e-ISSN: 1647-7251

VOL 15 N.º 2, TD 1

Thematic Dossier

Brazil-China relations: The rise of modern International Order

December 2024, pp. 38-59

Sino-Brazilian Cooperation in Analysis: Bilateralism, Multilateralism and Minilateralism

António Tavares, Asya Gasparyan, Cátia M. Costa, José Palmeira, Paulo Afonso B. Duarte,

Sabrina E. Mendes

the mandates of Lula da Silva (Fonseca, 2011), the embryo of what is today called the

Global South.

President Lula sought to place Brazil in the leadership of the countries of the South,

bringing his country closer to the most influential African countries and then extending

this cooperation to great powers considered allies in this purpose, such as India, China

and the Russian Federation, within the scope of the BRICS. Former President Dilma

Rousseff was elected, in 2023, president of the New BRICS Development Bank, based in

Shanghai, which is intended to finance infrastructure projects in the five countries, but

also in Bangladesh, Egypt, the United Arab Emirates and Uruguay, admitted as members

of the bank in 2021. The South African summit also approved the expansion of the BRICS

to new countries - Argentina

, Egypt, Iran, Ethiopia, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab

Emirates – a fact that, on the one hand, could expand China's influence in other markets

and, on the other hand, could reduce Brazil's influence (Bingyun, 2024).

Although the relationship between China and Brazil has intensified in the last two decades

due to the BRICS, the participation in their bilateral relations is intense. In 2022, Chinese

companies invested in thirty-two new investment projects across strategic sectors such

as energy, information technology, and agriculture, the highest number annually

recorded in history, distributed among all regions of the country. Chinese investments in

Brazil are not limited only to large projects, but also include bilateral agreements and

joint initiatives that strengthen cooperation from bilateral relations, especially so that in

2021 Brazil reached the mark of the largest recipient of Chinese investments (CEBC,

2023).

In addition to direct investments, bilateral cooperation between Brazil and China is

facilitated by a series of agreements and protocols established between the two

countries. On January 19, 2024, an agreement was signed between the Brazilian and

Chinese governments on long-stay and multiple-entry visas, further facilitating trade and

business relations between the two countries. Other agreements cover areas such as

defence cooperation, outer space science and technology, and strengthening ministerial

relations, as table 1 shows.

The new president of Argentina, Javier Milei, announced on December 10, 2023 that Argentina was

renouncing membership of the BRICS.

JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations

e-ISSN: 1647-7251

VOL 15 N.º 2, TD 1

Thematic Dossier

Brazil-China relations: The rise of modern International Order

December 2024, pp. 38-59

Sino-Brazilian Cooperation in Analysis: Bilateralism, Multilateralism and Minilateralism

António Tavares, Asya Gasparyan, Cátia M. Costa, José Palmeira, Paulo Afonso B. Duarte,

Sabrina E. Mendes

Table 1. Brazil-China Cooperation Agreements

Source: The authors

Although the relations between the ministries of foreign affairs are primarily those that

demarcate bilateral cooperation, initiatives associated with investments in states of the

federation, municipalities or linked to the various ministries take place systematically and

in parallel with macro-agreements also take place in the form of paradiplomacy (Setzer

& Anderton, 2019), an essential component of minilateralism (see section 4) in our

perspective.

In this sense, the Sino-Brazilian High-Level Commission for Consultation and Cooperation

– COSBAN, created in 2004 to promote biannual regions between China and Brazil to

deepen bilateral relations, is one of the drivers of the outstanding numbers of this

bilaterality. Although delayed, the VI COSBAN Meeting states a Strategic Planning

between 2022 and 2031 and an Executive Planning until 2026, so that the first document

registers the World Trade Organization

as the primary forum for multilateralism of trade

relations between the parties, in the promotion of cooperation, including bilateral

regulatory cooperation. The forum includes scientific exchange and renewable energies

as an essential agenda, dividing the commitment between axes of economic, scientific,

energy and mineral cooperation, and digitalisation, with the formulation of specific

working groups. In addition, the Executive Plan reinforces the commitment to institutions

within the framework of the UN and the 2030 Agenda, but also to the World Bank, the

International Monetary Fund and the G20, in addition to the BRICS, which reveals the

non-opposition to the Western international financial system.

Also, within this agenda, a group of agreements touches on the defence system, including

space cooperation, technologies, and communications. In this framework, the

cooperation system highlights the peaceful application of space technology, through the

Complementary Protocol on the Joint Development of CBERS-6 between the Government

of the Federative Republic of Brazil and the Government of China as part of the

Framework on Cooperation in Peaceful Applications of Science and Technology from Outer

Space between the Government of the Federative Republic of Brazil and the Government

It had a Brazilian director general, Roberto Azevêdo (2013-2020).

Agreement Title Area of Cooperation

Date Signed

Status

Earth-Resources Satellite (CBERS) Project - CBERS-6 Space and Technology 14/04/2023 In Progress

Memorandum of Understanding on Trade and Investment Economic and Trade 12/11/2004 Superseded

Cultural and Educational Cooperation Agreement Cultural and Educational 01/11/1985 In Force

Defense Cooperation Agreement Defense and Military 12/04/2011 Special Status

Infrastructure Construction Cooperation Agreement Infrastructure and Energy 05/06/2006 In Force

Energy and Mining Cooperation Protocol Energy and Mining 19/02/2009 In Force

Judicial Assistance Treaty Judicial and Administrative 19/05/2009 In Force

Multiple Entry Visa Agreement Visas and Immigration 19/01/2024 In Promulgation

JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations

e-ISSN: 1647-7251

VOL 15 N.º 2, TD 1

Thematic Dossier

Brazil-China relations: The rise of modern International Order

December 2024, pp. 38-59

Sino-Brazilian Cooperation in Analysis: Bilateralism, Multilateralism and Minilateralism

António Tavares, Asya Gasparyan, Cátia M. Costa, José Palmeira, Paulo Afonso B. Duarte,

Sabrina E. Mendes

of China. Also, within the bilateral cooperation framework, the 2010 Defence Cooperation

Agreement includes joint military exchanges and exercises, disseminated for peaceful

purposes.

This diverse group of initiatives and agreements, whether sheltered by large umbrellas

of technical cooperation and long-term investments, moves forward with fewer barriers

and with a repercussion that may not be observed in proportion (Oliveira, 2010). In

addition, the stakeholders representing Chinese interests are also of different natures.

Institutions such as the Brazil-China Business Council (CEBC) have played a crucial role

in promoting dialogue and facilitating investment and business between the two nations,

whose annual conference highlighted the importance of a new bilateral agenda focused

on sustainability and neo-industrialization, as appointed.

3. Multilateralism as a way to deepen the Global South’s agenda

After analysing Sino-Brazilian relations from a bilateral perspective, we will now try to

understand how multilateralism complements both actors’ agendas when addressing

Global South issues and international policy perspectives, mainly regarding global

governance.

In the last decades, China became a global actor, while Brazil maintained its journey as

a regional power. Both countries have turned to a vibrant diplomacy to increase their

international role and notoriety based on dynamic bilateral relations and the building of

innovative multilateral ties. Inclusively, China created several international forums based

on a new multilateral perspective that gathered China with different regions of the world

(e.g. FOCAC, Forum China Middle East, China-CELAC, Macao Forum), or that inaugurated

a new way to deal with issues like defence and security (The Shanghai Cooperation

Organisation). Through these diplomatic forms, China could develop a global discourse

for foreign policy and ensure the recognition of new ways of dealing with multilateralism

(Costa, 2023). Besides engaging in global discourse, China used bilateral and multilateral

relations to export some elements that successfully developed the economy and society

(e.g., the special economic zones) (Costa & Li, 2022).

Brazil also explored multilateralism through diverse regional and global organisations,

participating actively in creating Mercosur. Brazil’s direct contribution to building new

international organisations or multilateral forums is also relevant, mainly through its

association with regional blocks or other emergent economies, like in the case of the

BRICS or the G20. Some authors refer to 2003-2014 as a shifting moment for Brazilian

foreign policy when the country engaged with an unprecedented international agenda

(Chin & Diaz, 2016). Besides evolving in international politics, Brazil also diversified

bilateral and multilateral relations by introducing new countries and geographies as their

primary partners. During this period, Brazilian authorities tried to balance the principles

of the Washington Consensus and a public policy to foster industrialization and

innovation. Brazil also became more ambitious regarding security policies, trying to

implement a strategy for regional security and a permanent presence in the global south.

Somehow, the Brazilian new approach to foreign policy resulted in a commitment to

JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations

e-ISSN: 1647-7251

VOL 15 N.º 2, TD 1

Thematic Dossier

Brazil-China relations: The rise of modern International Order

December 2024, pp. 38-59

Sino-Brazilian Cooperation in Analysis: Bilateralism, Multilateralism and Minilateralism

António Tavares, Asya Gasparyan, Cátia M. Costa, José Palmeira, Paulo Afonso B. Duarte,

Sabrina E. Mendes

innovative international governance, paying more attention to the needs and claims of

peripheral countries, namely the ones in the Global South.

China and Brazil experimented with the momentum to increase and deepen their

relationship but also to engage mutually in a broader process of building alternatives to

an international order that did not allow newcomers to lead or deeply participate in the

decision processes. The non-conformist way of looking at international order and foreign

policy overlaps with the growth of both economies and a common interest in matching

each country’s development processes in a way they could be complimentary. The next

step was to reinforce multilateralism through new patterns and to engage in the creation

of new multilateral organisations (Stephen & Parízek, 2019).

Authors such as Petrone (2021) agree that multilateralism has become convenient for

emerging powers to propose new perspectives on global issues and their governance.

BRICS is one of the most successful international organisations, reflecting a Global South

approach and the demand for a different global order, better reflecting the needs for the

International Order identified by these countries. The role of countries such as Brazil and

China in the shift of the international balance is evident. However, this new context

resulted in the establishment of new organisations, some of them reflecting

multilateralism with a tendency to address solutions through multilateralism and

bilateralism, paying more attention to their national interests. This situation results in a

convergence when these international organisations have to address global issues and

propose a nationalist approach regarding specific development questions (Stephen &

Parízek, 2019).

The lack of success of global organisations such as the World Trade Organisation also

contributed to the peripheral states regarding the decision to experiment with specific

alignments through minilateralism diplomacy. In the particular case of Brazil and China,

the flexible way they use multilateral approaches, in complementarity with other

diplomatic methods such as bilateral relations to minilateral relations BRICS is a relevant

example of a new way to deal with multilateralism, allowing the use of diverse formats

inside the organisation in a multilateralism a “la carte”, encompassing bilteralization and

multilateralization within the member states, but fostering an alignment when

participating in other multilateral organisations such as WTO (Vazquez, 2021). This open

way of engaging member states is very attractive for dynamic regional powers that can

claim deeper participation in global governance and the international order. One of the

main issues at BRICS is the accommodation of diversity, following a coexistence strategy

while contributing to a non-west perspective of global governance (van Noort, 2018).

As for the G20, it was unclear how the pandemic and the Ukrainian war would impact the

organisation in which Brazil and China are also active members. However, the

commitment to some drivers of global governance such as climate change, taxation or

cooperation for development allowed the organisation to maintain its role, not without a

perception of a precedent of western-driven nature that these events contributed to

eroding (Larionova, 2023).

Combining the cases of BRICS and G20, it is noticeable that both countries used

multilateralism to address global issues and to establish a leading position with the

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António Tavares, Asya Gasparyan, Cátia M. Costa, José Palmeira, Paulo Afonso B. Duarte,

Sabrina E. Mendes

countries of the Global South. Some authors even refer to the combination of strategic

policies in the BRICS and the G20, promoting reform in economic governance (Larionova

& Shelepov, 2022). Other authors also argue that the BRICS region was criticised several

times due to its lack of institutionalisation. Nevertheless, the BRICS maintained the

needed institutional coherence to survive the challenges of proposing an alternative to

the dominant multilateralism (Abdenur, 2014).

Brazil and China share other geopolitical spaces, with variable geometry, such as the

case of the G77. The origin of the Group of 77 (number of founding States) dates back

to 1964 and has its origins in a joint position of those States, taken during a United

Nations conference on trade and development. Another multilateral platform in which

Brazil and China are included is BASIC. The latter is the acronym for Brazil, South Africa,

India and China, industrialised countries that in 2009 defined a joint strategy within the

scope of the United Nations Conference on Climate Change, cooperation that they have

maintained in this area, with the most recent taking place in 2023, at the New York

climate summit (Ministério das Relações Exteriores, 2023).

4. Minilateralism as a complementary approach in Sino-Brazilian

cooperation

This section aims to investigate the role and manifestations of minilateralism as an in-

between and complementary approach to both bilateralism and multilateralism. More

specifically, it claims that a multistakeholder arena has been evolving from various forms

of diplomatic engagement, from bottom-up to top-down institutions.

Sino-Brazilian cooperation extends beyond multilateral platforms like BRICS or G20

encompass minilateralism. This is evident in the establishment of the High-Level Sino-

Brazilian Commission and the creation of the "private arm" of the Sino-Brazilian

relationship, the Brazil-China Business Council in 2004 (Lessa, 2010).

Minilateralism as a diplomatic tool has coexisted with other forms of global governance

since the end of World War II, for example, when considering initiatives such as the

European Coal and Steel Community (1951), the precursor of the European Community.

Minilateralism represents an alternative approach to international cooperation,

characterised by the formation of narrower and more targeted partnerships between a

limited number of countries that share common interests and concerns on specific

agendas. Unlike multilateralism, which involves a greater number of states in

comprehensive agreements and institutions, minilateral agreements seek to bring

together varied stakeholders in discussing limited issues, and on some occasions, in

defined periods. These initiatives often arise in response to the perception that existing

multilateral structures are ineffective or incapable of adequately dealing with urgent

global challenges, a relevant characteristic presented about three decades ago in the

literature (Braga, 1989; Naim, 2009; Becard, 2011).

The G20 brings together the most developed economies that have met since 1999, with the aim of

regulating the financial system and the global economy.

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António Tavares, Asya Gasparyan, Cátia M. Costa, José Palmeira, Paulo Afonso B. Duarte,

Sabrina E. Mendes

Minilateralism offers advantages in terms of agility, flexibility, and focus, allowing

participants to act more quickly and decisively on specific issues, often bypassing the

complexity and time-consuming associated with multilateral processes (Wuthnow, 2019).

The complementarity between multilateral agreements qualified by traditional diplomacy

and minilateral agreements qualified by alternative multi stakeholder diplomatic axes

characterises and encompasses a large part of the systems and subsystems in use. This

phenomenon incorporates actions marked, for example, by paradiplomacy, whether

interministerial, inter-municipal or multisectoral (Ribeiro, 2009), once treated as

convergent paradiplomacy (Zeraoui, 2016).

Some axes of cooperation have emerged from systems guided by themes and qualified

as minilateral, such as the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade of 1947 (GATT),

which began as expanded bilateral negotiations between the major trading powers

(Tirkey, 2021). To some extent, the criticism of minilateral agreements involves the

question of the efficiency and legitimacy of these agreements for the macro-processes in

which they are involved, but also the presence of minilateralism to soften the circuit of

influences carried by the instruments. In addition, some risk seems to be associated with

what have been called "power imbalances" derived from the accentuation of minilateral

relationships (Mladenov, 2023).

There is also a growth proportional to the complexity between the minilateral agreements

and the expansion of the system of international interdependencies. The difficulties

associated with the governance of multilateral organisations have reduced the belief in

global cooperation on crucial issues. Part of the scepticism in the classical multilateral

environment points out that minilateralism may be the new type of efficient

multilateralism (Duygun, 2022). Although it is relevant to note that there has been

progress in multilateral structures in recent decades, the progressive fragmentation of

these structures, the reorientation of agendas, the more specific thematic attribution and

the strengthening of civil society are components that reveal this incidence (Anuar &

Hussain, 2021; McGee, 2011; Tirkey, 2021).

Through trilateral/bilateral agreements and/or minilateral partnerships, challenges such

as climate change, technology, energy, or food security are addressed, highlighting the

greatest possible effectiveness of minilateralism in bringing together relevant

stakeholders, unlocking original barriers between diplomacies, and achieving shared

goals in a more targeted and pragmatic manner (Eckersley, 2012; Falkner, 2015). In this

context, minilateralism is associated with the concept of club governance, since the

conduct of an important part of global governance is translated by third parties into

forums of possible low visibility (Duygun, 2022).

Exacerbated by the COVID-19 pandemic, the environment in which minilateralism and

all associated decentralisation movements thrived highlighted the weaknesses of the

main multilateral forums, so that relationships and partnerships of a different nature

were created following the paralysis of many of these forums (Tirkey, 2021). In this

context, minilateral agreements and subsystems swiftly emerge, benefiting not only

China but also facilitating its planned expansion across various sectors. Minilateralism

encompasses diplomatic initiatives involving multiple layers and stakeholders,

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António Tavares, Asya Gasparyan, Cátia M. Costa, José Palmeira, Paulo Afonso B. Duarte,

Sabrina E. Mendes

underpinned by a robust commitment to investment. In this dynamic context, minilateral

agreements and subsystems rapidly come to the forefront, not only advancing China's

interests but also facilitating its strategic expansion across diverse sectors. Minilateralism

epitomises diplomatic endeavours that engage multiple layers of governance and

stakeholders, bolstered by a steadfast commitment to investment. Notably, this approach

has been emblematic of China's strategy in the Global South, where it positions itself as

a partner adept at navigating the demands and intricacies unique to these regions

(Kobayashi & Sanchez, 2017).

Conversely, microlateralism pertains to smaller-scale partnerships, as implied by its

nomenclature, and is not within the scope of this study. A clear distinction arises: bilateral

or trilateral actions qualify as minilateralism when they (1) diverge from conventional

diplomatic approaches, (2) engage multiple stakeholders in their implementation, (3)

operate outside the framework of complex multilateral environments, and (4) span

various layers of representation within national or international spheres (such as local,

federative, or other).

Whether concerning international agreements related to technological development or

climate change, Chinese participation in most economies, especially in developing

economies, has been significantly higher in recent years (Duygun, 2022). In the global

diplomatic landscape, China finds an advantage both in the elaboration of traditional

diplomatic, and thematic agreements or in the expansion of its commercial and cultural

stakeholders.

The emergence of middle and emerging powers and rapid technological advances make

it clear that minilateralism is a viable path for many countries (Anuar & Hussain 2021).

China's presence and influence in Brazil have intensified over the years, reflected through

a variety of investments and cooperation agreements in various sectors. In agribusiness,

for example, China's share as an importer went from less than 3 percent to more than

35 percent between 2000 and 2020. The ties between the two countries extend beyond

the economic realm, also encompassing areas such as technology, diplomacy, and

defence (Medeiros, Feodrippe & Benvenuto, 2018; Medeiros & Benvenuto, 2020).

Following the shift in Brazil's foreign policy focus towards South-South cooperation in the

early 2000s, the expansion of Brazil-China collaboration consistently incorporated a

broad strategic element. This revitalization of the strategic partnership with China

ushered in a new era of relations (Marcondes & Barbosa, 2018). During Lula's initial term,

two significant institutional developments underscored this renewed defence

cooperation: the establishment of the Joint Commission for Exchange and Cooperation

(referred to as JCEC) and the ratification of the Framework Agreement on Defence

Cooperation. Sino-Brazilian strategic cooperation also extends to the satellite sector,

notably through the China-Brazil Earth Resources Satellite (CBERS) project. As a space-

related scientific and technological initiative that began under a cooperation agreement

established in 1988, it currently involves a group of different service providers from Brazil

(China Daily, 2024) and whose cooperation was reaffirmed in June 2024 under a Joint

Declaration for the CBERS 5. In this regard, China's participation in the "Amazon

Protection system" monitoring initiative is nothworty as the latter enables the sharing of

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António Tavares, Asya Gasparyan, Cátia M. Costa, José Palmeira, Paulo Afonso B. Duarte,

Sabrina E. Mendes

Chinese satellite imagery of the Amazon forest to safeguard Brazil’s maritime exclusive

economic zone (Marcondes & Barbosa, 2018; de Stange, 2023). One should note that

while Brazilian satellite institutions involved in cooperation are civilian, Chinese ones are

directly linked to the People’s Liberation Army.

To ensure that minilateral instruments effectively complement the work of multilateral

instruments, for example on climate issues, minilateral agreements play a crucial role in

facilitating cooperation in the research and implementation of renewable energy

technologies. Working to uphold the interests of developing nations in the international

climate change agenda, China and Brazil have pursued climate diplomacy, advocating for

equitable compensation for the past emissions generated by developed countries during

their developmental phases (Hallding et al., 2011; Qi, 2011; Conrad, 2012; Groen,

2020).

These partnerships are structured by subnational and non-governmental actors,

expanding the capacity to generate innovative solutions to contemporary challenges,

whilst China has a programme on its energy security (Foguel, Paiva & Medeiros, 2014).

Ultimately, the operation of minilateral agreements is guided by a perspective that

includes a variety of actors, from developing countries to vulnerable economies,

broadening political dialogue in confidence-building and for international cooperation and

global governance.

In the context of the High-Level Sino-Brazilian Commission (COSBAN), significant

achievements include the successful facilitation of bilateral trade growth. For instance, in

June 2024, Brazil exported $9.74 billion to China and imported $5.84 billion, resulting in

a positive trade balance of $3.9 billion. Over the past year, Brazilian exports to China

increased by $435 million (4.67%), driven primarily by higher exports of Crude

Petroleum, which rose by $623 million (64.1%), and Corn, which saw a substantial

increase of $275 million. Concurrently, imports from China grew by $1.29 billion

(28.3%), largely due to increased imports of Refined Petroleum and Video and Card

Games (The Observatory of Economic Complexity, 2024). As of 2024, the COSBAN has

been representing the China-Brazilian bilateral relations, whilst paving the road for

deepening South-South Relations (Maia, 2024).

The Brazil-China Business Council has played a pivotal role in this expansion by

facilitating over $15 billion in bilateral investments. For instance, the Council's initiatives

have significantly enhanced Brazil's trade dynamics, evidenced by a substantial year-

over-year growth in key export sectors. The increase in exports of products such as Crude

Petroleum and Corn highlights the effectiveness of the Council in boosting Brazil's trade

performance and economic engagement with China. Regarding its participation, although

it is focused on Brazil's bilateral relations with China, the Council reports the important

participation of bilateralism both regarding the states of the federation and sectors of

interest, as well as in the strengthening of other relations such as in Latin America, which

can be evidenced through events and news from the Council's own system (CEBC, 2024).

The relationship between Brazil and China continues to expand, driven by cooperation in

several areas, although the participants of the Brazil-China Meeting still consider the

investments to be lower than expected. The establishment of strategic partnerships and

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Sabrina E. Mendes

the deepening of economic development and trade ties are key elements of this bilateral

relationship and this invisible minilateralism. As a consumer of Brazilian agribusiness,

China has also concentrated its investments in the sector given the significant increase

in demand for food. In 2022, Chinese investments in Brazilian agribusiness reached

almost US$99 million, benefiting agricultural exploration projects in the Midwest of Brazil.

In addition, the Forum for Economic and Trade Cooperation of Portuguese-speaking

Countries (Macao) has promoted multilateral cooperation between China and

Portuguese-speaking countries, strengthening economic and trade ties, where a relevant

part is the cooperation with Brazil. It is notable that Brazil's participation in the Global

South and Portuguese-Language international systems is both boosted and a driver of

minilateral relationships that are dissipated by cooperative sublayers and offer space for

multi-stakeholder relationships with greater flexibility, increasing bilateral synergies.

While triangulation is a key aspect of Brazil's foreign policy strategy in promoting South-

South Cooperation and development, within the context of bilateral agreements, the

formation of minilateral arrangements often arises from shared commitments to broad

regimes, such as climate change, technological development, and energy security. On

the other side, while minilateralism offers notable benefits in terms of agility and focus,

it also poses several challenges. The efficiency of minilateral agreements can sometimes

lead to questions about their legitimacy and broader acceptance, as they often exclude

less influential actors or are part of semi-formal agreements. Additionally, the

proliferation of minilateral agreements contribute to the fragmentation of global

governance structures, potentially undermining the effectiveness of multilateral

institutions designed to address global challenges comprehensively, posing a demand for

bridging the different cooperative layers.

6. Conclusion

Drawing on an existing gap in the literature that has failed to consider other alternative

approaches to the traditional bilateral and multilateral elements in Sino-Brazilian

cooperation, this article has attempted to answer the previously stated research

question: Which role play bilateralism, multilateralism and minilateralism within Sino-

Brazilian relations? In doing so, we have arrived at some important conclusions.

As a first major finding, we conclude that the Sino-Brazilian bilateral relationship is

marked by interests that can be considered cyclical, in the case of economic cooperation,

but also structural, in the case of opposition to the Western model led by the US.

Furthermore, bilateralism has been the privileged approach to advance the Sino-Brazilian

Strategic Partnership. The latter is often recognised as a model of South-South

cooperation and reflects a shared sense that world institutions have become obsolete,

thus needing to be reshaped in order to better accommodate the interests of the

developing countries. The ‘strategic’ essence of Sino-Brazilian ties has been connected

with a broad range of fields encompassing trade, political dialogue, technological

cooperation (such as building satellites), science and climate change (the case of the

Amazon), but also more macro goals such as reforming the international system. This

links to our second finding, which is precisely the complementary boost that Sino-

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Sino-Brazilian Cooperation in Analysis: Bilateralism, Multilateralism and Minilateralism

António Tavares, Asya Gasparyan, Cátia M. Costa, José Palmeira, Paulo Afonso B. Duarte,

Sabrina E. Mendes

Brazilian endeavours in multilateralism provide to their parallel bilateral approach.

Multilateralism seems to be both actors’ preferred foreign policy tool for mutual support

in the BRICS, G20, BASIC, New Development Bank, Asian Infrastructure Investment

Bank, based on non-intervention, solidarity, and mutual respect. Moreover,

multilateralism is the instrument that both favour to build alternatives both for the

obsolete Bretton Woods’ institutions and US-Eurocentric world order. In this regard,

President Lula’s view that countries have the right to go into debt in order to develop,

without the pressure from the International Monetary Fund, together with his questioning

of the dominance of the dollar as the world’s dominant currency, and his attempt to

encourage Chinese strategic projects in Brazil (including 5G), clearly contrast with

Bolsonaro’s Washington first policies. With Lula’s return to Brazilian presidency, the

country is therefore back to the multilateral agenda that it has shared with China in the

defence of the Global South.

As a third last finding, we conclude that minilateralism provides an alternative approach

in the longstanding Sino-Brazilian foreign policy that has been simultaneously driven by

the traditional bilateral and multilateral elements. Nonetheless, minilateralism has

proved advantageous in terms of agility, flexibility, and focus, enabling Brazil and China

to reach faster decisions, often bypassing the complexity and time-consuming associated

with multilateral processes. Besides, Sino-Brazilian engagement in minilateralism arises

in response to the perception that Western-led multilateral structures are too broad,

ineffective or incapable of adequately dealing with urgent global challenges. The session's

scope was chosen to focus on the detection of minilateral efforts as specifically bridging

evidence, without deepening into specific case studies or empirical measurements of

impact. Given the relatively recent and evolving nature of Sino-Brazilian minilateralism

due to the multiplying efforts from different stakeholders, this approach allows for a more

flexible and comprehensive discussion of its potential, which can be tested in future

studies.

Considering the new stage inaugurated by President Lula in the Sino-Brazilian Strategic

Partnership and its impacts for the Global South, future avenues of research would

certainly benefit from paying closer attention to the South Atlantic as a case of bilateral,

multilateral and minilateral governance. In fact, the rekindling of the conflict in the Middle

East and its extension to other actors, namely the Houthi of Yemen, affecting navigation

in the Red Sea between the ocean Indian and Mediterranean Sea, via the Suez Canal,

led to alternative maritime routes, through the South Atlantic, via the Cape (South

Africa), in the transport of goods between Asia-Pacific countries and Europe or the east

coast of the US. Hence future studies should complement the works of Palmeira (2023)

and Ferreira-Pereira & Duarte (2023) on the importance of Brazil’s role in strengthening

ZOPACAS and other bilateral and multilateral agreements, particularly with Portuguese-

speaking African countries, such as Angola, which has intervened in the Gulf of Guinea

Commission, a region in whose security the EU has also been involved, given its strategic

interest for international maritime security. As a global actor, China also seeks to exert

its influence in the South Atlantic, with Brazil emerging as a potential ally in this purpose.

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Sino-Brazilian Cooperation in Analysis: Bilateralism, Multilateralism and Minilateralism 
António Tavares, Asya Gasparyan, Cátia M. Costa, José Palmeira, Paulo Afonso B. Duarte, 
Sabrina E. Mendes 
 
 
 
54 
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