OBSERVARE
Universidade Autónoma de Lisboa
e-ISSN: 1647-7251
VOL15, N.º 2, TD1
Thematic Dossier Brazil-China relations:
The rise of modern International Order
December 2024
13
SINO-BRAZILIAN MUTUAL INTERESTS: A COMPREHENSIVE OVERVIEW
RODRIGO FRANKLIN FROGERI
rodrigo.frogeri@professor.unis.edu.br
received a Ph.D in Information Systems and Knowledge Management from FUMEC University
(Brazil) in 2019. He holds a master’s degree in administration (2014) from Centro Universitário
Novos Horizontes (Brazil) and a bachelor’s degree in computer science (2001) from Universidade
José do Rosário Vellano (Brazil). He has specializations in Computer Networks (2003), Higher
Education Teaching (2005), and Information Technology Management (2012). He has been
teaching undergraduate and postgraduate courses in management and technology since 2005.
Currently, he is a permanent professor in the Graduate Program in Management and Regional
Development at Centro Universitário do Sul de Minas - UNIS-MG, Brazil. He is a guest professor
in the master’s program in Data Science at Universidad Científica del Sur (Peru) - 2024. He
serves as a technology mentor in the Innovation Ecosystem of Grupo Integrado (Brazil) and as a
guest researcher at Centro Universitário Integrado, Brazil. He leads the following research groups
accredited by the National Council for Scientific and Technological Development (CNPq): GPGDER
- Research Group in Management and Regional Economic Development and GEADO - Research
Group in Organizational Dynamic Ambidexterity. His most recent books/chapters include: "e-
Government and Green IT: The Intersection Point", published in Recent Advances in Data and
Algorithms for e-Government, Springer Nature (2023); "Restructuring of the Brazilian Private
Higher Education Sector through the Entry of Foreign Investment", published in Advances in
Tourism, Technology, and Systems. Smart Innovation, Systems, and Technologies, Springer
Nature (2022); "Mapping the Brazilian Reality in the Development of Special Economic Zones",
published in Special Economic Zones as Regional Development Enablers, IGI-Global (2022); and
"IT Governance in SMEs: the state-of-the-art", published in Research Anthology on Small
Business Strategies for Success and Survival, IGI-Global (2022). ORCID: 0000-0002-7545-7529.
PEDRO DOS SANTOS PORTUGAL JÚNIOR
pedro.junior@professor.unis.edu.br
received a Ph.D (2016) and Master's (2012) in Economic Development from the Institute of
Economics, Unicamp. Postdoctoral Fellow (2018) through the Postdoctoral Researcher Program
(PPPD) at the Institute of Economics, Unicamp. Bachelor’s degree in economics (2001) and
Specialization in Business Management from Faculdade Cenecista de Varginha (2005). Began his
teaching career at Faculdade Cenecista de Varginha (Department of Economics) and is currently
a professor at Centro Universitário do Sul de Minas (UNIS-MG). Coordinator of the Research
Department at UNIS-MG and a permanent professor in the academic master’s program of the
Graduate Program in Management and Regional Development (PPGDR - UNIS/MG). Guest
professor at Centro Universitário Integrado de Campo Mourão-Paraná (Brazil). Leader of the
Research Group on Management and Regional Economic Development (GPGDER). Member of the
Group of Advanced Studies in Organisational Ambidexterity (GEAMO). Member of the Group of
Studies on Regional Development and Industrial and Construction Waste (GEDRRIC) and also of
the Research Group on Distance and Hybrid Education (GPEDH). Member of the Group of
Economic Studies of Southern Minas Gerais (GEESUL) and of the Business Council of Southern
Minas (CESUL). ORCID: 0000-0003-2590-1959.
FRANCISCO JOSÉ LEANDRO
fleandro@um.edu.mo
received a Ph.D. in political science and international relations from the Catholic University of
Portugal in 2010, and his habilitation from ISCTEUniversity Institute of Lisbon in 2022. From
2016 to 2017, he took part in a post-doctoral research programme on state monopolies in China
One belt, one road studies. In 2014, 2017 and 2020, he was awarded the Institute of
European Studies in Macau (IEEM) Academic Research Grant, which is a major component of the
JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations
e-ISSN: 1647-7251
VOL 15 N 2, TD1
Thematic Dossier
Brazil-China relations: The rise of modern International Order
December 2024, pp. 13-37
Sino-Brazilian Mutual Interests: a Comprehensive Overview
Rodrigo Franklin Frogeri, Pedro dos Santos Portugal Júnior, Francisco José Leandro,
Fabrício Pelloso Piurcosky, Sheldon William Silva
14
Asia-Europe Comparative Studies Research Project. From 2014 to 2018, he was the Programme
Coordinator at the Institute of Social and Legal Studies, Faculty of Humanities at the University of
Saint Joseph in Macau. From 2018 to 2023 he was the Associate-Dean of the Institute for
Research on Portuguese-Speaking Countries at the City University of Macau. He is currently
Associate Professor with Habilitation in International Relations in the Faculty of Social Sciences at
the University of Macau (China). His most recent books are: Steps of Greatness: The Geopolitics
of OBOR (2018), University of Macau; The Challenges, Development and Promise of Timor-Leste
(2019), City University of Macau; The Belt and Road Initiative: An Old Archetype of a New
Development Model (2020), Palgrave Macmillan; Geopolitics of Iran (2021), Palgrave Macmillan;
The Handbook of Special Economic Zones (2021), IGI Global; Disentangled Visions on Higher
Education: Preparing the Generation Next (2023), Peter Lang Publishers; The Palgrave Handbook
of Globalization with Chinese Characteristics (2023), Palgrave Macmillan; Changing the Paradigm
of Energy Geopolitics: Resources and Pathways in the Light of Global Climate Challenges (2023),
Peter Lang Publishers; and Portuguese-speaking Small Island Developing States: The
development Journeys of Cabo Verde, São Tomé and Príncipe, and Timor-Leste (2023), Palgrave
Macmillan, ORCID: 0000-0002-1443-5828.
FABRÍCIO PELLOSO PIURCOSKY
fabricio.pelloso@grupointegrado.br
Post-Doctorate in Social Sciences, Politics and Territory from the University of Aveiro (Portugal),
PhD in Administration from the Federal University of Lavras and Specialist in Innovation and
Business Communication from the Polytechnic Institute of Porto (Portugal). I have a lot of
experience in higher education as a manager, teacher and researcher. I have led teams in
international research projects with India, Russia, Portugal, Bolivia, Paraguay, Argentina and
Mexico and as a visiting professor in Portugal, Russia, Mexico, Peru, Paraguay and Bolivia.
Consultant and facilitator of innovation models and processes for AGROGALAXI, ALICORP, J.
MACEDO, GERDAU. I have won 9 awards for innovation in education. I've created 2 coworking
spaces, mentored 8 startups and 3 business councils. Professor on courses for the Brazilian Air
Force and the Brazilian Army. International assessor of higher education courses for the Higher
Education Assessment and Accreditation Agency (Portugal). Coordinator of the Industry,
Technology and Innovation Chamber of the Campo Mourão Development Council and Director of
the Regional Innovation System. ORCID: 0000-0001-5458-5129.
SHELDON WILLIAM SILVA
sheldon.silva@ifmg.edu.br
received a PhD in Administration in the area of concentration in Global Business Strategy and
Corporate Finance from the Federal University of Lavras in 2022. Master’s in administration from
Fundação Pedro Leopoldo in 2012 and Specialist in Teaching in Professional and Technological
Education; Active Methodologies and Business Management. Bachelor’s in administration with
Qualification in Foreign Trade from the State University of Minas Gerais in 2006. Associate
Professor since 2007 in undergraduate and postgraduate courses in Management, with
experience in coordinating technology, bachelor's and postgraduate courses (Brazil). He is
currently a Professor of Basic, Technical and Technological Education in the Administration area
at the Federal Institute of Education, Science and Technology of Minas Gerais. Topics of interest:
efficiency of public and private organizations, entrepreneurship, foreign trade, international
relations, organizational learning and methodologies innovative teaching styles. ORCID: 0000-
0002-2473-5728.
Abstract
Brazil-China relationship is two-fold, influencing both economic development and geopolitical
strategy in Latin America. On one hand, China views Brazil as an emerging market with
abundant natural resources, making sectors such as agriculture, energy, and infrastructure
attractive for Chinese investment. On the other hand, Chinese investments often come with
infrastructure development projects, such as the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), which can
help Brazil improve its transportation and energy sectors, as seen in the Transoceanic Railway
JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations
e-ISSN: 1647-7251
VOL 15 N 2, TD1
Thematic Dossier
Brazil-China relations: The rise of modern International Order
December 2024, pp. 13-37
Sino-Brazilian Mutual Interests: a Comprehensive Overview
Rodrigo Franklin Frogeri, Pedro dos Santos Portugal Júnior, Francisco José Leandro,
Fabrício Pelloso Piurcosky, Sheldon William Silva
15
project. Furthermore, the countries have mutually cooperated in other areas, such as in the
integration of the BRICS group, the launch of satellites through the China-Brazil Earth
Resources Satellite (CBERS) program telecommunications (e.g., 5G technology), the wind
energy sector, and green technologies, as well as the integration of Brazil into global value
chains. Thus, this study aims to discuss the Sino-Brazilian mutual interests and contribute to
the understanding of this broad subject. Our discussions and analyses suggest that it is
important for Brazil and China to develop initiatives with mutual and sovereign interests aimed
at establishing environmentally sustainable trade with reduced asymmetry. Areas such as the
bioeconomy and global governance are of great interest to Brazil and China. The collaborative
efforts of these nations can enable new initiatives with prospects to balance forces with the
USA. From a macro perspective, the economic and commercial strengthening of BRICS and
its relationship with the Global South could serve as a counterpoint to American influence.
While BRICS may redefine global power relations, member countries of the group may face
influences in managing their regional relations.
Keywords
Brazil, Bioeconomic, BRICS, China, Trade, Innovation, South-South cooperation.
Resumo
A relação Brasil-China é dupla e influencia tanto o desenvolvimento econômico quanto a
estratégia geopolítica na América Latina. Por um lado, a China vê o Brasil como um mercado
emergente com recursos naturais abundantes, o que torna setores como agricultura, energia
e infraestrutura atraentes para o investimento chinês. Por outro lado, os investimentos
chineses geralmente vêm acompanhados de projetos de desenvolvimento de infraestrutura,
como a Iniciativa Cinturão e Rota (BRI), que pode ajudar o Brasil a melhorar seus setores de
transporte e energia, como visto no projeto da Ferrovia Transoceânica. Além disso, os países
têm cooperado mutuamente em outras áreas, como na integração do grupo BRICS, no
lançamento de satélites por meio do programa China-Brasil Earth Resources Satellite
(CBERS), em telecomunicações (por exemplo, tecnologia 5G), no setor de energia eólica e em
tecnologias verdes, bem como na integração do Brasil em cadeias globais de valor. Assim,
este estudo tem como objetivo discutir os interesses mútuos sino-brasileiros e contribuir para
a compreensão desse amplo assunto. Nossas discussões e análises sugerem que é importante
que o Brasil e a China desenvolvam iniciativas com interesses mútuos e soberanos, visando
estabelecer um comércio ambientalmente sustentável com assimetria reduzida. Áreas como
a bioeconomia e a governança global são de grande interesse para o Brasil e a China. Os
esforços de colaboração dessas nações podem viabilizar novas iniciativas com perspectivas
de equilibrar forças com os EUA. De uma perspectiva macro, o fortalecimento econômico e
comercial do BRICS e seu relacionamento com o Sul Global podem servir como um
contraponto à influência americana. Embora o BRICS possa redefinir as relações de poder
globais, os países membros do grupo podem enfrentar influências no gerenciamento de suas
relações regionais.
Palavras-chave
Brasil, Bioeconomia, BRICS, China, Comércio, Inovação, Cooperação Sul-Sul.
JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations
e-ISSN: 1647-7251
VOL 15 N 2, TD1
Thematic Dossier
Brazil-China relations: The rise of modern International Order
December 2024, pp. 13-37
Sino-Brazilian Mutual Interests: a Comprehensive Overview
Rodrigo Franklin Frogeri, Pedro dos Santos Portugal Júnior, Francisco José Leandro,
Fabrício Pelloso Piurcosky, Sheldon William Silva
16
How to cite this article
Frogeri, Rodrigo Franklin, Júnior, Pedro dos Santos Portugal, Leandro, Francisco José, Piurcosky,
Fabrício Pelloso & Silva, Sheldon William (2024). Sino-Brazilian Mutual Interests: a comprehensive
Overview. Janus.net, e-journal of international relations. VOL 15 N 2, TD1 Temathic Dossier
“Brazil - China Relations: The Rise Of Modern International Order”. December 2024, pp. 13-37.
https://doi.org/10.26619/1647-7251.DT0324.1.
Article received on 2 July 2024 and accepted for publication on 20 September 2024.
JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations
e-ISSN: 1647-7251
VOL 15 N 2, TD1
Thematic Dossier
Brazil-China relations: The rise of modern International Order
December 2024, pp. 13-37
Sino-Brazilian Mutual Interests: a Comprehensive Overview
Rodrigo Franklin Frogeri, Pedro dos Santos Portugal Júnior, Francisco José Leandro,
Fabrício Pelloso Piurcosky, Sheldon William Silva
17
SINO-BRAZILIAN MUTUAL INTERESTS: A COMPREHENSIVE
OVERVIEW
RODRIGO FRANKLIN FROGERI
PEDRO DOS SANTOS PORTUGAL JÚNIOR
FRANCISCO JOSÉ LEANDRO
FABRÍCIO PELLOSO PIURCOSKY
SHELDON WILLIAM SILVA
Introduction
The establishment of official relations between Brazil and China occurred through their
first treaty, the Treaty of Friendship, Trade and Navigation, signed in 1881. Following
this, Brazil opened a consulate in Shanghai in 1883. At the end of the 19th century and
the beginning of the 20th century, Brazil's interactions with Asia were limited to Japanese
workers and unofficial Chinese migration (Oliveira, 2004). During the Cold War period,
Brazil initially recognized Taiwan but later established diplomatic ties with mainland
China. Throughout this era, Brazil engaged in commercial missions (both official and
unofficial) to China and signed the China-Brazil Earth Resources Satellite (CBERS)
agreement. The country developed economic interactions with China while focusing more
on political ties with the Asian nation and maintaining economic relations with Japan
(Oliveira, 2010). In the 1990s, Brazil began to deepen its economic engagement with
China, accompanied by significant political elements. During this period, Brazil and China
signed the Sino-Brazilian strategic partnership, which was the first such partnership
promoted by China globally (Oliveira, 2010). This shift was driven by China's rapid
economic growth and the challenges posed by the proposed Free Trade Area of the
Americas (FTAA) (Oliveira, 2004). The deepening economic ties between Brazil and China
included Chinese Foreign Direct Investment (FDI), Trade relations, and loans to Brazil.
These factors pressured Brazil to adopt a more favorable stance towards China
(Blanchard, 2019).
The commercial rapprochement between Brazil and China developed considerably during
the administrations of President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva (2003-2011) and his successor,
JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations
e-ISSN: 1647-7251
VOL 15 N 2, TD1
Thematic Dossier
Brazil-China relations: The rise of modern International Order
December 2024, pp. 13-37
Sino-Brazilian Mutual Interests: a Comprehensive Overview
Rodrigo Franklin Frogeri, Pedro dos Santos Portugal Júnior, Francisco José Leandro,
Fabrício Pelloso Piurcosky, Sheldon William Silva
18
Dilma Rousseff (2011-2015) (Haibin, 2010). In subsequent years, there were some
fluctuations in imports and exports between the two countries. However, Brazil's exports
to China consistently grew, reaching a peak in 2023 (US$ 49.93 billion) under the new
administration of Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva (2023-2026) (MDIC, 2024). Despite the
commercial ties between Brazil and China being maintained during the administration of
former Brazilian President Jair Messias Bolsonaro (2019-2022), Brazilian foreign policy
during this period was based on the pillars of anti-globalism, anti-communism, and
religious nationalism (Casarões & Farias, 2022; Jesus, 2022). During Bolsonaro's
government, diplomatic relations between Brazil and China experienced the greatest
distancing seen in the last three decades (Jesus, 2022).
Under the current administration of Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva (2023-2026), China remains
Brazil's largest trading partner, with exports to China twice the value of imports. This
trend has been consistent since 2009, including during the Bolsonaro administration
(MDIC, 2024). At the International Conference “50 Years of Brazil-China Relations:
Cooperation for a Sustainable World,” held on April 17, 2024, Brazilian Vice President
Geraldo Alckmin stated: “It is difficult to find an area where there is no partnership
between Brazil and China, a friendship that only consolidates and advances" (Alckmin,
2024).
In the economic field, international relations between Brazil and China are based on the
sale of commodities to China, while Brazil imports manufactured goods. Otherwise, the
countries have mutually cooperated in other areas, such as in the integration of the
BRICS group, the launch of satellites through the CBERS program (Lulla, Duane Nellis, &
Rundquist, 2013), telecommunications (e.g., 5G technology) (Li, 2023), the wind energy
sector (Gandenberger & Strauch, 2018), and green technologies (Miranda, Moletta,
Pedroso, Pilatti, & Picinin, 2021), as well as the integration of Brazil into global value
chains.
Brazil-China relationship is two-fold, influencing both economic development and
geopolitical strategy in Latin America. On one hand, China views Brazil as an emerging
market with abundant natural resources, making sectors such as agriculture, energy, and
infrastructure attractive for Chinese investment (Gallagher, 2010). Furthermore, China's
interest in enhancing its geopolitical standing in Latin America positions Brazil as a
strategic partner (Becard & Lessa, 2021). On the other hand, Chinese investments often
come with infrastructure development projects, such as the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI)
(Almeida Ferreira Abrão & Amineh, 2024), which can help Brazil improve its
transportation and energy sectors, as seen in the Transoceanic Railway project that can
connect Brazil, Peru, and Chile (Almeida, Seleme, & Neto, 2013; Marques, Borges, De
Souza Pires, & Bezerra de Souza, 2023). Thus, this study aims to discuss the Sino-
Brazilian mutual interests and contribute to the understanding of this broad subject.
To address this objective, we conducted searches on the central theme of this research
using generative Artificial Intelligences (generative AI) due to their ability to index and
analyze large volumes of data (Morgan, 2023; The Lancet, 2024). Subsequently, we
analyzed the mutual areas of interest identified in the GAIs consulted and supplemented
these analyses with a Systematic Literature Review considering these areas of interest.
JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations
e-ISSN: 1647-7251
VOL 15 N 2, TD1
Thematic Dossier
Brazil-China relations: The rise of modern International Order
December 2024, pp. 13-37
Sino-Brazilian Mutual Interests: a Comprehensive Overview
Rodrigo Franklin Frogeri, Pedro dos Santos Portugal Júnior, Francisco José Leandro,
Fabrício Pelloso Piurcosky, Sheldon William Silva
19
This approach allowed the study to be divided into four areas: (i) Sino-Brazilian mutual
trade interests; (ii) Sino-Brazilian mutual economic and bioeconomic interests (e.g.,
Environmental Sustainability - Green Technology, Climate Change, Renewable Energy);
(iii) Sino-Brazilian mutual interests in technology, research, development, and
innovation; (iv) South-South Cooperation and the BRICS Alliance.
Methodology
Our study is characterized by a qualitative approach and follows an inductive logic. Due
to the broad scope of the theme 'Brazil-China bilateral relationship,' we chose to use
generative AI (Fonseca, Chimenti, & Suarez, 2023) to identify areas of mutual interest
between the two countries. Generative AI are based on large language models (LLM) that
have the ability to analyze and summarize large amounts of information, though still
without the critical evaluation and original thinking of a human being (The Lancet, 2024).
To identify which LLM would be most suitable for the objectives of this study, we applied
the following criteria: (i) the model must be a popular tool with a recognized capability
to index both historical and current data available on the internet; and (ii) the model
must be capable of searching through large volumes of scientific data. These criteria
ensure that both publications by governments, official agencies, and the general media,
as well as scientific publications, are considered in the searches. No temporal restrictions
were applied to the results presented.
Thus, we identified the following LLM as meeting the first criterion: OpenAI's ChatGPT,
Alphabet/Google's Gemini, and Microsoft's CoPilot (Masinde, 2024; Syriani, David, &
Kumar, 2024). The LLM selected for this study for its ability to conduct specific searches
across large volumes of academic data (e.g., Semantic Scholar) was Perplexity
(https://www.perplexity.ai/). Although there are other tools similar to Perplexity (e.g.,
Scispace, Scite, Elicit, Consensus, etc.), we chose this one for its simplicity and for
presenting results in a manner similar to the aforementioned LLM (Bolanos, Salatino,
Osborne, & Motta, 2024), thereby facilitating the creation of Table 1.
Table 1. Searches in generative AI and its respective results
Generative AI
Prompt
Results
Perplexity (Pro search -
academic)
https://www.perplexity.ai/
What are the mutual
interests in Brazil-China
bilateral relations?
Economic Cooperation (Trade Relations,
Investment)
Technological Cooperation (Science and
Technology, Space Cooperation)
Environmental Sustainability (Green
Technology, Climate Change Initiatives)
Strategic Partnerships (Defense
Cooperation, South-South Cooperation)
ChatGPT 4o (free version)
https://chat.openai.com/
Trade and Investment (Commodities
Trade, Chinese Investment in Brazil,
Brazilian Exports to China)
JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations
e-ISSN: 1647-7251
VOL 15 N 2, TD1
Thematic Dossier
Brazil-China relations: The rise of modern International Order
December 2024, pp. 13-37
Sino-Brazilian Mutual Interests: a Comprehensive Overview
Rodrigo Franklin Frogeri, Pedro dos Santos Portugal Júnior, Francisco José Leandro,
Fabrício Pelloso Piurcosky, Sheldon William Silva
20
Infrastructure Development (Belt and
Road Initiative (BRI), Energy
Cooperation)
Technology and Innovation (5G and
Telecommunications, Research and
Development)
Environmental Cooperation (Sustainable
Agriculture, Climate Change)
Multilateral Cooperation (BRICS Alliance,
Global Governance)
Cultural Exchange (Educational and
Cultural Programs)
Gemini 1.5 (free version)
https://gemini.google.com/
Trade
Investment
Economic cooperation
Climate change
South-South cooperation
Copilot
https://copilot.microsoft.com/
Trade and Investment
Infrastructure and Industry Development
Technological Cooperation
Renewable Energy
Strategic Alignment
Source: Developed by the authors.
Note. We chose to use the term 'Brazil-China' instead of 'Sino-Brazilian' to allow for broader
search results when using AI tools.
After identifying the areas of mutual interest between Brazil and China (Table 1), the
authors of this study grouped the results into four central topics: (i) Sino-Brazilian mutual
trade interests; (ii) Sino-Brazilian mutual economic and bioeconomic interests (e.g.,
Environmental Sustainability - Green Technology, Climate Change, Renewable Energy);
(iii) Sino-Brazilian mutual interests in technology, research, development, and
innovation; (iv) South-South Cooperation and the BRICS Alliance.
Next, after identifying and grouping the areas of mutual interest between Brazil and
China, we conducted a Systematic Literature Review on each of the topics to support the
subsequent discussions. We adopt the standard PRISMA (Preferred Reporting Items for
Systematic Reviews and Meta-Analyses) methodology for conducting and reporting the
systematic review (Page, McKenzie, Bossuyt, Boutron, Hoffmann, Mulrow, Shamseer,
Tetzlaff, & Moher, 2021; Page, McKenzie, Bossuyt, Boutron, Hoffmann, Mulrow,
Shamseer, Tetzlaff, Akl, et al., 2021). According to Webster and Watson (2002), the
most influential articles in the literature are typically found in leading academic journals.
Consequently, the authors conducted searches on the topics identified in the previous
step using SCOPUS, one of the foremost indexing databases for academic journals in
social sciences.
JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations
e-ISSN: 1647-7251
VOL 15 N 2, TD1
Thematic Dossier
Brazil-China relations: The rise of modern International Order
December 2024, pp. 13-37
Sino-Brazilian Mutual Interests: a Comprehensive Overview
Rodrigo Franklin Frogeri, Pedro dos Santos Portugal Júnior, Francisco José Leandro,
Fabrício Pelloso Piurcosky, Sheldon William Silva
21
Table 2. Systematic Literature Review framing
Database
Search string
Results
SCOPUS
(TITLE-ABS-KEY (Sino-brazilian) AND TITLE-
ABS-KEY (trade))
16
(TITLE-ABS-KEY (Sino-brazilian) AND TITLE-
ABS-KEY (economic) OR TITLE-ABS-KEY
(bioeconomic))
11
(TITLE-ABS-KEY (Sino-brazilian) AND TITLE-
ABS-KEY (technology) OR TITLE-ABS-KEY
(research) OR TITLE-ABS-KEY (development)
OR TITLE-ABS-KEY (innovation))
16
(TITLE-ABS-KEY (south-
south AND cooperation) AND TITLE-ABS-KEY
(BRICS))
72
Total:
115
Source: Developed by the authors.
We adopted the following exclusion criteria for the results of the Systematic Literature
Review (SLR): duplicate records found in multiple searches and lack of relevance to the
theme of "Sino-Brazilian mutual interests." Our SLR identified a total of 115 studies, of
which 16 were excluded based on the aforementioned criteria. The remaining 99 studies
were used to support the discussions in the following sections. However, due to the large
number of documents to be considered and the limited number of pages to write this
paper, the authors chose to cite more recent publications or those that provide adequate
support for the discussions. The snowball technique (searching for studies cited in the
SLR results but not initially identified) was used to further expand and substantiate the
discussions.
Sino-Brazilian mutual trade interests
The crisis of the agro-export model in the 1930s, leads Brazil to import substitution
industrialization and the shift in the 1990s from a "protected industry" model to
competitive global integration (Legler, 2013). The agro-export model crisis, adopting an
import substitution industrialization strategy. This led to rapid industrial growth in the
latter half of the 20th century, with Brazil incorporating exports into its industrial policy
by the 1960s and 1970s. Brazil’s foreign policy played a crucial role, advocating for
preferential treatment for developing nations in global trade, opening new markets, and
fostering cooperation with other Southern hemisphere countries (Rodrigues, Urdinez, &
De Oliveira, 2019).
Brazil's transition to democracy was driven by economic challenges and a severe fiscal
crisis. This period saw the liberalization of Brazil's industrial sector to global competition,
coinciding with the end of the Cold War and the shift from military to democratic rule
(Santarcángelo, Schteingart, & Porta, 2017). The new foreign policy paradigm of
"autonomy through participation" (Amorim Neto & Malamud, 2015; Fonseca Jr, 1998)
marked a departure from the defensive postures of the military regime, advocating for
JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations
e-ISSN: 1647-7251
VOL 15 N 2, TD1
Thematic Dossier
Brazil-China relations: The rise of modern International Order
December 2024, pp. 13-37
Sino-Brazilian Mutual Interests: a Comprehensive Overview
Rodrigo Franklin Frogeri, Pedro dos Santos Portugal Júnior, Francisco José Leandro,
Fabrício Pelloso Piurcosky, Sheldon William Silva
22
active engagement in international regimes. Following this new approach, Brazil
experienced its first significant commercial alignment with China, marked by the signing
of the Sino-Brazilian strategic partnership in the 1990s (Oliveira, 2010). This was the
first of several important engagements that followed (Arbache & Condi, 2022; Cardoso,
2013; Whalley & Medianu, 2013).
Currently (2024), the trade balance between Brazil and China shows that exports (2023
US$ 49.93 billion) are double the value of imports (2023 US$ 25.52 billion). These
data suggest an economic interdependence, particularly in sectors such as soybean
production (2023 37% of Brazilian exports to China), crude petroleum oils (19%), and
iron ore and its concentrates (19%) (MDIC, 2024).
According to Figure 1, Brazil's imports from and exports to China began increasing
throughout the 1990s. In 2009, the value of exports to China surpassed the value of
imports for the first time in history.
Figure 1. Graph of Imports and Exports from Brazil to China
*Values are showed in billions of US dollars per year.
**Data updated in June 6, 2024.
Source: https://comexstat.mdic.gov.br/en/geral
Brazil's export portfolio to China is characterized by a diverse range of products,
predominantly raw materials and agricultural goods (Jenkins, 2012). This composition
underscores the bilateral trade dynamics between the two countries, with Brazil serving
as a fundamental supplier of essential commodities to China's burgeoning economy.
JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations
e-ISSN: 1647-7251
VOL 15 N 2, TD1
Thematic Dossier
Brazil-China relations: The rise of modern International Order
December 2024, pp. 13-37
Sino-Brazilian Mutual Interests: a Comprehensive Overview
Rodrigo Franklin Frogeri, Pedro dos Santos Portugal Júnior, Francisco José Leandro,
Fabrício Pelloso Piurcosky, Sheldon William Silva
23
Soybeans are the most significant export from Brazil to China, accounting for 37% of
the total exports (MDIC, 2024). This high percentage reflects China's demand for
soybeans, driven by its extensive use in animal feed and as a raw material for various
food products. Brazil's vast arable land and favorable climate conditions position it as a
leading global producer and exporter of soybeans (Rocha, Majo, & Silva, 2022).
Crude petroleum oils and bituminous minerals constitute 23% of Brazil's exports to China
(MDIC, 2024). On one hand this category underscores the strategic importance of
energy resources in the trade relationship (Cáceres, 2011; Castro, Peiter, & Góes, 2020).
On the other hand, Brazil seeks technology transfer from China for energy resources in
Brazil (Castro et al., 2020). Iron ore and its concentrates represent 19% of the export
share, highlighting Brazil's role as a key supplier of raw materials for China's steel
industry (Castro et al., 2020). The extensive iron ore reserves in Brazil provide a steady
supply to meet China's infrastructure and construction needs (Cáceres, 2011). The
export of fresh, chilled, or frozen beef accounts for 5% of the total exports and Cellulose
exports make up 3.8% of the trade. Pulp trade between Brazil and China intensified after
the BRICs were formed (Soares, Viana, & Rego, 2020). Finally, raw cotton constitutes
2.5% of exports between Brazil and China, underscoring the agricultural sector's
contribution to the trade mix.
After analyzing Brazil's exports to China, we will now examine the Chinese products
imported by Brazil.
Products imported by Brazil from China highlight a diverse array of goods with varying
degrees of technological complexity and industrial application. Leading the imports are
thermionic valves and tubes, cold cathode or photo-cathode, diodes, and transistors,
which collectively constitute 8.9% of the total (MDIC, 2024), reflecting Brazil's
substantial demand for advanced electronic components vital for both consumer
electronics and industrial applications (Hauser, Zen, Selao, & Garcia, 2007). Following
closely are telecommunications equipment, including parts and accessories, which
account for 5.5% (MDIC, 2024), underscoring the significance of the
telecommunications sector in Brazil's economy and its reliance on Chinese technology.
Other categories include various products from the manufacturing industry (4.9%)
(MDIC, 2024), passenger motor vehicles (4.9%), and a range of organo-inorganic
compounds, heterocyclic compounds, nucleic acids, and their salts, as well as
sulfonamides (3.6%)(MDIC, 2024), which are essential for both pharmaceutical and
chemical industries.
In general, soybeans, crude oil, and iron ore are the main products exported by Brazil to
China, while China exports to Brazil products with varying degrees of technological
complexity (Giraudo, 2020; MDIC, 2024). This difference in the level of complexity (Gala,
2017) of imported and exported products between the two countries is a source of
criticism (China exports manufactured goods to Brazil, while Brazil exports commodities
to China) (Giraudo, 2020; Rodriguez & Hounie, 2016) and raises questions about the
symmetry of Brazil-China cooperation, which resembles a center-periphery dynamic
(Romano Schutte & Campos, 2022). The two conceptual paradigms of center-periphery
thinking significantly influence the policy formulations and strategic perspectives of the
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Brazil-China relations: The rise of modern International Order
December 2024, pp. 13-37
Sino-Brazilian Mutual Interests: a Comprehensive Overview
Rodrigo Franklin Frogeri, Pedro dos Santos Portugal Júnior, Francisco José Leandro,
Fabrício Pelloso Piurcosky, Sheldon William Silva
24
Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC) (Bonzanini, Menuzzi
Diverio, Zuliani da Silva, & Olesiak, 2018).
ECLAC's efforts primarily focus on shaping the region's development through initiatives
aimed at economic diversification, with the goal of reducing vulnerabilities in the face of
global dynamics (Gala, Camargo, & Freitas, 2018). This focus has been a constant feature
of ECLAC's framework since its 1968 founding document, where Prebisch critiqued David
Ricardo's theory of static comparative advantage (Marca, Bertol, Fernando, & Filho,
2021). Prebisch highlighted the deterioration in terms of trade, which favored
manufactured goods over primary goods (Souza, 1999)
1
.
ECLAC’s structuralist perspective advocated for transforming Latin American economies
through an import substitution program. This approach involved establishing domestic
industries to produce goods that were previously imported (Marca et al., 2021). Countries
such as Brazil, Mexico, and Argentina implemented this policy most directly between the
1950s and 1970s (Souza, 1999).
Sino-Brazilian mutual economic and bioeconomic interests
As noted in the previous section, the Sino-Brazilian commercial dynamic is characterized
by Brazil's export of commodities (e.g., soybeans) and its import of manufactured goods
from China. In this context, Brazilian commodities, particularly grains and meat,
contribute to China's food security policies, as well as its social stability and development
(Romano Schutte & Campos, 2022). While China pursues a broader development
strategy, Brazil relies on its commodities (e.g., soybeans and iron ore) as its primary
export products (Romano Schutte & Campos, 2022).
The process of Brazil's productive reprimarization began in the late 1990s and early
2000s, driven by the robust economic growth of developing countries such as China,
which led to a surge in international demand for agricultural and mineral commodities,
both metallic and non-metallic (Portugal Júnior, Reydon, & Portugal, 2012). During this
period, Brazil-China trade grew at an average rate of 29% per year, making China
Brazil's largest trading partner and primary destination for agricultural exports by 2009
(Lima, 2016). This closer relationship was facilitated by the geopolitical alignment
between the two countries, further reinforced during the Lula and Dilma administrations
(Lima, 2016).
China itself has assisted in the expansion of soybean production in South America,
particularly in Brazil (Giraudo, 2020). Despite Chinese companies investing in soybean
production in Brazil, Chinese investors are not the dominant players in Brazilian
agricultural land acquisitions (Oliveira, 2018). Investors from the Global North (e.g., the
USA and EU countries) surpass China in land acquisitions in Brazil (Oliveira, 2018).
Brazil's trade dependence on China, particularly in exporting resources like soybeans,
oil, and iron ore, imposes structural constraints on Brazil's ability to transition to a low-
1
Prebisch demonstrated that the terms of trade between primary goods and manufactured goods, which
stood at 1:1 at the end of the 19th century, shifted to 0.687:1 by the mid-20th century (Prebisch, 1949).
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Rodrigo Franklin Frogeri, Pedro dos Santos Portugal Júnior, Francisco José Leandro,
Fabrício Pelloso Piurcosky, Sheldon William Silva
25
carbon bioeconomy (Rodríguez, 2021). On one hand, China aims to peak carbon
emissions before 2030 (Liu, Jiang, Tang, & Han, 2022) and achieve carbon neutrality by
2060 (Jia & Lin, 2021). On the other hand, Brazil's heavy reliance on exporting its high-
environmental-impact agricultural commodities faces social, environmental, and
corporate governance challenges to meet Chinese demands (Bulla, Denny, Burnquist, &
Peneluppi Junior, 2022). From a Brazilian internal perspective, large conglomerates in
soy, sugarcane, and meatpacking dominate the bioeconomy agenda (Lima, 2021). The
significant dominance of agribusiness in Brazil negatively influences natural ecosystems
(Rodríguez-Morales, 2018), as the main drivers of deforestation and land-use change
(e.g., soybean plantations, cattle ranching) may gain economic and political incentives,
as well as greater social legitimacy under the bioeconomy framework (Lima, 2021).
Finally, in the quest to replace fossil fuels, Brazil has recently facilitated the construction
of a factory by the Chinese electric vehicle company BYD. This initiative aims to reduce
the costs of such vehicles for the Brazilian market and to begin replacing the national
fleet with electric vehicles. Brazil has a particular interest in transitioning its fleet to
electric vehicles because, despite its significant potential for domestic fossil fuel
production (e.g., pre-salt oil and ethanol), the country's electricity is generated from
renewable sources (Baran & Legey, 2013). The production of the Chinese factory in
Brazil, combined with the country's self-sufficiency in electricity production, could make
electric vehicles an attractive alternative for a low-carbon economy (e.g., Al-Wreikat and
Sodré, 2023; Liu, 2022).
Sino-Brazilian mutual interests in technology, research, development,
and innovation
For decades, China has consistently financed science and technology development,
focusing particularly on so-called cross-cutting technologies with the potential to
permeate and transform various productive sectors (IPEA, 2024). Technological
relations between China and Brazil have evolved over the years, emphasizing
collaboration and mutual benefits. Both countries have strengthened their ties through
various initiatives (Haibin, 2010).
The China-Brazil Earth Resources Satellite (CBERS) program, operational since 1999,
exemplifies technological cooperation between the two countries and has contributed to
the use of remote sensing technologies and geoinformation (Lulla et al., 2013). In the
2010s, Chinese technology firms such as Huawei and ZTE began playing a significant
role in Latin America's telecommunications sector (Ellis, 2013). Huawei established a
strong presence in Brazil, becoming a key player in developing the country's
telecommunications infrastructure, including the deployment of 4G networks and
preparations for 5G networks (D. S. R. Becard & Macedo, 2014). In the subsequent
decade (2020), despite geopolitical pressures favoring American 5G technology adoption
(Li, 2023), Brazil opted for Huawei in developing its 5G telecommunications network
(Zeng, 2024).
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Rodrigo Franklin Frogeri, Pedro dos Santos Portugal Júnior, Francisco José Leandro,
Fabrício Pelloso Piurcosky, Sheldon William Silva
26
In the field of green technologies, China has initiated more programs compared to Brazil,
including sustainable agriculture, water treatment, waste management, green energy,
and carbon reduction (Bulla et al., 2022). While Brazil has potential in these areas, it
has not matched China and India, its BRICS partners, in implementing such practices to
the same extent (Miranda et al., 2021).
In the wind energy sector, Brazil and China have developed significant initiatives.
Despite both countries being latecomers in this sector, their approaches to balancing
national and foreign technology differ (Gandenberger & Strauch, 2018). In China's case,
the balance has gradually shifted from foreign to domestic technology. Brazil has
successfully attracted foreign direct investment and built a domestic supply chain
(Gandenberger & Strauch, 2018). However, Brazil remains highly dependent on foreign
technologies and has a negative trade balance in high-tech goods, indicating reliance on
imported technologically advanced products while specializing in low to medium-low
technology goods (Chiarini & da Silva, 2019).
We observe that Brazil's integration into global value chains (GVC) has been focused on
technological groups where the country holds static comparative advantages. However,
China has moved towards more dynamic technological groups, indicating a more
advanced position in GVC (Araújo & Diegues, 2022). The Chinese economy maintains an
advantage in participating in more dynamic sectors with higher levels of technological
intensity, whereas Brazil concentrates its participation in less technologically intensive
sectors (Araújo & Diegues, 2022).
Nevertheless, due to political and diplomatic alignment between Brazil and China in the
early years of the Lula government, their participation in the BRICS group, bilateral
agreements (e.g., Sixth Meeting of the Sino-Brazilian High-Level Commission for
Consultation and Cooperation - COSBAN) (Brasil, 2024c) and the Belt and Road Initiative
(BRI) may offer opportunities for scientific (Leta, Machado, & Canchumani, 2019) and
technological cooperation between the two countries, despite existing asymmetries
(Oliveira & Myers, 2021).
Even during the period of Brazil's economic re-primarization, policies and efforts were
made to promote local industry (Portugal Jr; Reydon & Portugal, 2012). Examples
include initiatives such as the Industrial, Technological, and Foreign Trade Policy (ITFTP)
from 2004 to 2007, the Growth Acceleration Program (GAP) in 2007, the Productive
Development Policy (PDP) from 2008 to 2010, and the Greater Brazil Plan in 2011
(Portugal Júnior et al., 2012). In more recent years, particularly from 2016 to 2022,
Brazil did not effectively implement an industrial policy. However, with the new
government under Lula, the New Brazil Industry (NBI) was established, focusing on neo-
industrialization and grounded in strategic investment areas with potential impacts on
social and economic development for the period 2023-2033 (Brasil, 2024a). The NIB is
organized into six missions, aiming to integrate economic, social, and environmental
objectives while complementing other public policies (Mazzucato, 2024).
The NBI's Action Plan encompasses the following missions: i) sustainable and digital
agro-industrial chains; ii) the health economic-industrial complex; iii) sustainable
infrastructure, sanitation, housing, and mobility; iv) digital transformation of industry;
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Rodrigo Franklin Frogeri, Pedro dos Santos Portugal Júnior, Francisco José Leandro,
Fabrício Pelloso Piurcosky, Sheldon William Silva
27
v) bioeconomy, decarbonization, energy transition, and security; and vi) technologies of
interest for national sovereignty and defense (Brasil, 2024b). To achieve these missions,
key instruments include local content requirements, government procurement,
technology transfer, public investment, and preferential margins (Brasil, 2024b), which
may influence Brazil's external relations and contribute to the enhancement of Brazilian
products in global value chains.
South-South Cooperation and the BRICS Alliance
Brazil has emerged as a regional power in Latin America, particularly in the southern
region, due to its economic and territorial advantages (Bernal-Meza, 2022). Its
geographic stability allowed Brazil to resolve territorial and border issues earlier than its
neighbors, facilitating regional consolidation post-mid-20th century (Kozlova, 2023). This
aligns with Brazil's ambitions to play a significant role in global affairs, aspiring for parity
with northern hemisphere powers (Berringer & Ferreira, 2022).
Brazil's participation as a belligerent in World War I ensured its representation at the
1919 Paris Peace Conference, where it advocated for minor states' rights and sought to
reform the League of Nations' collective security framework (United Nations, n.d.).
Brazil's founding membership in the United Nations (UN) and the General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade (GATT) exemplifies its active involvement in international affairs. The
presidencies of Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva (20032011) and Dilma Rousseff (20112015)
(Silva & Pérez, 2019), emphasized engagement within the South-South axis amid rising
protectionism and challenges in Northern markets (Rizzi & Antunes, 2017). Furthermore,
Brazil has been pivotal in regional blocs like MERCOSUR (Almeida, 2018) and UNASUR
(Vaz, Fuccille, & Rezende, 2018), promoting regional integration through "autonomy
through participation" (Amorim Neto & Malamud, 2015; Giacalone, 2012; Lima & Hirst,
2006).
Brazil aspires to be recognized as a global player, aiming for a permanent seat on the
UN Security Council (UNSC) (Valença & Carvalho, 2014). However, this ambition faces
resistance from regional players like Argentina and Mexico, which prefer increasing non-
permanent UNSC members (Valença & Carvalho, 2014). Lacking regional support, Brazil
sought backing from sympathetic nations, forming the IBSA (India-Brazil-South Africa)
initiative (Visentini, 2019). This coalition underscores a regionalist argument for
representation from Africa, Southeast Asia, and South America in global decision-making
bodies (Leisering, 2021). Brazil's foreign policy has evolved significantly, marked by
strategic shifts in response to economic challenges and global dynamics. While
maintaining a focus on economic development and regional stability, Brazil has
increasingly sought active participation in international affairs, aspiring to assert itself as
a global player on par with industrialized powers (e.g., China) (Oliveira, 2010).
However, over the decades, Brazil and China have developed an asymmetrical strategic
partnership (Romano Schutte & Campos, 2022), but at the same time one of
dependence, especially on the Chinese side with regard to Brazilian commodities. Both
countries exhibit markedly distinct economic, military, and political characteristics. China
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Rodrigo Franklin Frogeri, Pedro dos Santos Portugal Júnior, Francisco José Leandro,
Fabrício Pelloso Piurcosky, Sheldon William Silva
28
holds a seat on the United Nations Security Council (UNSC), is a nuclear power, and
boasts the world's second-largest economy (Cardoso, 2017). Chinese international
engagement strategies focus on infrastructure investments, direct aid programs to
countries, debt forgiveness for poorer nations, and a policy of non-interference to secure
privileged access to markets and resources (Pecequilo, 2014). While China is Brazil's
largest trading partner, the reverse is not true.
Despite significant power asymmetries between the two countries, Brazil has proven to
be a key partner in establishing and expanding BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and
South Africa) and its extension to BRICS+ (including Egypt, Ethiopia, Iran, Saudi Arabia,
and the United Arab Emirates) (Coquidé, Lages, & Shepelyansky, 2023). In 2023, during
a visit to China, Brazilian President Luís Inácio Lula da Silva proposed to President Xi
Jinping the creation of a BRICS-backed commercial currency. BRICS has emerged as a
group capable of influencing global governance (Duggan, Hooijmaaijers, Rewizorski, &
Arapova, 2022), internet governance (Hurel & Rocha, 2018) and international relations
(Sergunin, Konyshev, & Fei, 2020).
However, the unity of BRICS countries may have regional implications for Brazil, given
its historical leadership in similar initiatives in South America such as UNASUR and
MERCOSUR. Brazil's involvement with BRICS countries could weaken relations with other
South American nations and potentially diminish regional defensive regionalism (Vadell
& Giaccaglia, 2020, 2021) characteristic of Latin America (Quiliconi & Espinoza, 2017;
Vivares, 2021).
From the Chinese perspective and its participation in BRICS, Beeson and Zeng (2018)
argue that China's dominance within BRICS could lead to conflicts, as it may seek to
consolidate regional hegemony over other member nations (e.g., Russia and India). An
example of such tensions is India's boycott of China's Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) due
to sovereignty and security concerns, particularly regarding projects like the China-
Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) (Beeson & Zeng, 2018). Moreover, Chinese
environmental policies driven by domestic political pressures may not align with
expectations of global leadership within BRICS (Beeson & Zeng, 2018). Asymmetries are
already apparent among BRICS countries in sustainable development initiatives,
particularly in Green Technologies, where China and India lead compared to Brazil,
Russia, and South Africa (Miranda et al., 2021).
Despite the potential impacts of BRICS on member countries and their regions, there is
a clear motivation among BRICS nations to seek alternatives to the dominance of the
US dollar, which has strengthened their relationships (Kondratov, 2021). In this context,
Coquidé et al. (2023) suggest that if a BRICS currency becomes a reality, there are
favorable prospects for its dominance in international trade.
Final considerations
At this juncture, it is opportune to revisit the objective that guided this study - to discuss
the Sino-Brazilian mutual interests and contribute to the understanding of this broad
subject. Our discussions and analyses suggest that it is important for Brazil and China
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December 2024, pp. 13-37
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Rodrigo Franklin Frogeri, Pedro dos Santos Portugal Júnior, Francisco José Leandro,
Fabrício Pelloso Piurcosky, Sheldon William Silva
29
to develop initiatives with mutual and sovereign interests aimed at establishing
environmentally sustainable trade (e.g., Bulla et al., 2022) with reduced asymmetry.
Areas such as the bioeconomy and global governance are of great interest to Brazil and
China. The collaborative efforts of these nations can enable new initiatives with prospects
to balance forces with the USA.
Brazil and China are nations that exhibit considerable asymmetry in their economic and
hard power characteristics. While Brazil seeks growth opportunities from China, China
views Brazil as a resource base to meet its internal demands, especially regarding
Chinese food security. However, we emphasize that the challenges are not solely on the
Brazilian side. Despite China's increased global influence, its economy still faces
instabilities. Currently (2024), China is confronting new challenges in seeking internal
balance and revising its growth model (World Bank Group, 2024).
From a macro perspective, the economic and commercial strengthening of BRICS and its
relationship with the Global South could serve as a counterpoint to American influence,
reducing the role of the US dollar in the global economy and Federal Reserve System
(FED) monetary policy. However, while BRICS may redefine global power relations,
member countries of the group may face influences in managing their regional relations,
particularly Brazil, which has traditionally based its international relations on defensive
regionalism.
Finally, we consider that the Brazil-China relationship has potential for bidirectional
expansion. Brazil can continue its approach with China in developing Brazilian
infrastructure (e.g., electrical, telecommunications, and railways) and industry.
Technological cooperation between Brazil and China can assist in expanding and
modernizing Brazilian 5G telecommunication networks and facilitating innovations in the
country. In this sense, BRICS can serve as a platform to accelerate this technological
cooperation. In the strategic field, the two countries can strengthen South-South
cooperation and increase the voice and representation of developing countries in
international affairs.
On the Chinese side, besides securing commodity-based resources that fuel the Chinese
economy and enable its growth, the multifaceted relationship with Brazil is characterized
by cooperation in key sectors such as agriculture, energy, and industry. China's
investments in Brazil's renewable energy sector expand its global energy footprint.
Furthermore, strategic coordination in international structures and agreements on the
digital economy, logistics, and environmental cooperation supports China's global
influence and sustainable development goals.
Even though strict methodological criteria were followed in this study, certain limitations
must be considered. The systematic literature review conducted yielded a considerable
number of results, and the selection and interpretation of these results were performed
inductively by the authors. This approach is subject to the authors' own limitations and/or
analytical biases. Furthermore, it was not possible to address all the phenomena
discussed in the studies identified in the systematic review that involve Sino-Brazilian
mutual interests. Therefore, we believe there is room for further studies that aim to
explore in depth one of the themes presented in this study or all of them collectively.
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Rodrigo Franklin Frogeri, Pedro dos Santos Portugal Júnior, Francisco José Leandro,
Fabrício Pelloso Piurcosky, Sheldon William Silva
30
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