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e-ISSN: 1647-7251

Vol. 15, N.º 2

November 2024-April 2025

453

NOTES AND REFLECTIONS

ONE YEAR AFTER 7 OCTOBER, THE MIDDLE EAST IN THE ABYSS

MARIANO AGUIRRE

maguiernst@hotmail.com

Mariano Aguirre is an independent analyst on international politics and associate fellow of the

international security programme in Chatham House (London). He has been senior

advisor on peacebuilding at the Office of the Resident Coordinator of the United Nations

in Colombia (2017-19); director of the Norwegian Centre for Conflict Resolution (NOREF),

in Oslo (2009-2016), program officer on peace and security with the Ford Foundation

(New York), among other positions. He holds an MPhil in Peace and Conflict Studies from

Trinity College, Dublin. Aguirre is professor of postgraduate studies at the Human Rights

Institute at the Deusto University in Bilbao, University Castilla-La Mancha, and the School

of Culture of Peace-Autonomous University of Barcelona. As a journalist and analyst he

has written on issues ranging from neo-imperialism in fragile states, humanitarian

intervention, exclusion and violence in the Global South, with particular interest on Latin

America and the Middle East. His last book is Guerra Fría 2.0. Claves para Entender la

Nueva Política Internacional (Icaria, Barcelona, 2023) (Portuguese edition published by

Observare. Universidades Autónoma de Lisboa, 2023). In 2014 he received the

Observare Award by the Universidad Autónoma de Lisboa for his professional career

devoted to peace, security and human rights.

Twelve months after Hamas killed 1200 citizens in Israel and kidnapped 240 others,

Israel's offensive in Gaza continues with nearly 42,000 fatalities (not counting those

buried in the rubble). In the name of the right to self-defence, Israel has systematically

violated international humanitarian law by subjecting 2.3 million Palestinians to harsh

attacks, continuous displacement, destruction of all social and economic infrastructure,

restricting access to humanitarian aid, food, water, medical care and medicines. High

numbers of humanitarian workers and journalists have also been victims by the Israeli

army.

In parallel, different war fronts have intensified between Israel and Hezbollah, a Shiite

political party and military organisation in Lebanon; Iran; and a series of armed groups

(the 'axis of resistance') in Yemen, Syria and Iraq that carry out limited attacks against

Israel, US forces in the region and commercial vessels. Washington has sent 43,000

troops to different countries in the region and mobilised two warships to Israel's shores

as a show of support for what prime minister Bejamin Netanyahu calls Israeli “sacred

war”.

Since last October, Yemeni Houthis have attacked several commercial vessels passing

through the Bab al-Mandab Strait that separates Yemen from Djibouti and Eritrea (in

Africa) in the Red Sea. This site is key to the control of almost all shipping between the

Indian Ocean and the Mediterranean Sea through the Suez Canal. The Houthis demand

JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations

e-ISSN: 1647-7251

VOL 15 N.º 2

November 2024-April 2025, pp. 453-459

Notes e Reflections

One year after 7 October, the Middle East in the Abyss

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an end to the offensive in Gaza and the entry of humanitarian aid to stop their attacks.

The US regularly attacks Houthi positions in retaliation for their attacks on Israel and

commercial vessels.

Around 100 Israelis are still being held hostage by Hamas (35 are estimated to have

died). Negotiations to free them, mediated by Qatar, Egypt and the US, have failed.

According to Israel, Hamas is demanding too much by asking for the release of all

Palestinian political prisoners and the full withdrawal of Israeli forces from Gaza.

Relatives and parts of Israeli society accuse prime minister Netanyahu of obstructing

them to continue the war for his own benefit (he has corruption cases pending in court),

even if the hostages die.

Israel has also stepped up its attacks on the United Nations. It is demanding the dismissal

of Secretary-General António Guterres and has declared him persona non grata. It also

wants to close UNRWA, the UN agency for the protection of 5.9 million Palestinian

refugees.

The Israeli government has rejected UN General Assembly demands in December 2023

to immediately implement a humanitarian ceasefire and in September 2024 to "put an

immediate end to the illegal presence in the Occupied Palestinian Territories". It also

denies allegations of systematic violations of international humanitarian law and the

International Court of Justice's recommendations to cease the operation in Gaza as it

could incur the crime of genocide, and the International Criminal Court's arrest warrants

against senior Israeli government officials (and Hamas leaders). Nor has it accepted the

indictment of a UN Commission of Inquiry that holds Israel and Hamas responsible for

committing war crimes.

Regarding Hamas and other Palestinian armed groups in Gaza involved in the 7 October

attack on Israel, Human Rights Watch research concludes that they violated international

humanitarian law through deliberate and indiscriminate attacks on civilians and civilian

objects; intentional killing of persons in custody; cruel and other inhumane treatment;

crimes related to sexual and gender-based violence; hostage-taking; mutilation and body

snatching; use of human shields; and looting and pillaging.

No answers for Gaza's future

Since October 2023 the US has assured Netanyahu that it would continue to supply him

with weapons while insisting that he moderate his responses to avoid civil casualties and

a regional war. The US delivers about $3.8 billion annually in arms to Israel. It is followed

by Germany and Italy as leading providers. In February 2024 the US Congress approved

an additional $14 billion in military aid, and in August it added another $20 billion.

For 12 months Washington, and some European governments, urged Israel to avoid

attacks on civilians, not to carry out an offensive in the city of Rafah (where the Israeli

military had earlier indicated it would be a 'safe zone'), and to soften its position in

negotiations in Qatar. But neither the prime minister nor his far-right cabinet ministers

took the advice, convinced that neither Washington, Berlin nor London would cut off arms

deliveries.

JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations

e-ISSN: 1647-7251

VOL 15 N.º 2

November 2024-April 2025, pp. 453-459

Notes e Reflections

One year after 7 October, the Middle East in the Abyss

Mariano Aguirre

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Israel has not defined what it wants to do in Gaza when the war is over. The latest idea,

dubbed the "Generals' plan", is to evacuate all remaining Palestinians in the northern

part of the strip, occupy it militarily, and expel some of the 2.3 million Palestinians to

Egypt or Jordan, or other countries. At the same time, handing over the management of

Gaza to local tribal leaders unaffiliated with Hamas and delivering aid to Israeli-

Palestinian mafias. Indeed, a Financial Times investigation shows that Israel already

promotes and protects aid traffickers who sell food at exorbitant prices in Gaza while

blocking the entry of UN assistance.

The war against Hamas is expected to continue for a long time, as after a year its

militiamen are still holding out. US and EU proposals for the weak Palestinian National

Authority, which runs part of the West Bank under Israeli tutelage, to take over Gaza

have fizzled out. Likewise, Washington and Brussels' proposal to revive a two-state

solution has faded, while not even a ceasefire has been reached. The future perspective

is what is already happening in the present: a single state (Israel) that subjects the

Palestinian population to a regime like Apartheid. That is, a violent binational state.

Israel's strategic objective is to weaken Iran's capacity and its regional network of armed

groups that attack Israel from Gaza, Iraq, Syria and Yemen. In the long term, the aim

would be to provoke a crisis and the fall of Iran's government after a series of military

defeats that would delegitimise its politico-religious power. Netanyahu would also be

using the offensive to push the US to confront Iran in an uncertain war and weaken

candidate Kamala Harris chances against Donald Trump.

The Hezbollah factor

Israel's extrajudicial assassinations of Hamas, Hezbollah, and Iranian military leaders,

such as the seven Iranian Islamic Revolutionary Guards killed in Syria; Hamas leader

Ismail Haniya in Iran; and the recent assassination of Hezbollah's top leader Hassan

Nasrallah and several of his senior commanders, can be expected to continue.

Israel, Iran, Hezbollah and Hamas have been exchanging limited attacks for years,

sometimes leading to longer and more intense wars, such as Israel-Hezbollah in 2006

and Israel-Hamas in 2008-2009. These clashes were also joined by exchanges between

Israel and Houthi armed groups in Yemen and others in Iraq and Syria, supported but

not directed by Iran.

Hezbollah emerged as a militia against the Israeli invasion of Lebanon in 1982. By 2000

it was already a powerful organisation which, due to Lebanon's splintering into sectarian

identities, enabled it to seize some of the state's power. With Iranian assistance, it

developed a powerful conventional arsenal, especially missiles, and strengthened its

capacity to operate in the southern Lebanese strip bordering Israel. Iran has relied on

this military force as a deterrent and eventual offensive against Israel. If Israel were to

launch an all-out war on Iran, Hezbollah would retaliate.

In the past year, 60,000 Israelis living near the Lebanese border have been displaced.

Israel's current offensive has caused 346,000 displacements in Lebanon between 8

JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations

e-ISSN: 1647-7251

VOL 15 N.º 2

November 2024-April 2025, pp. 453-459

Notes e Reflections

One year after 7 October, the Middle East in the Abyss

Mariano Aguirre

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October 2023 and 29 September 2024, according to the International Organisation for

Migration (IOM). Around 2,000 Lebanese have died as a result of the attacks.

The US-Israeli confrontation with Iran

Since the 1979 revolution, Iran has become Israel's main regional strategic enemy. At

the same time, Tehran's theocratic Shiite regime competes for regional hegemony with

the Sunni Arab monarchies of Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE). The

governments of these countries, allies of the US, have moved progressively closer to

Israel. In 2020 the Donald Trump administration launched the Abraham Accords, another

attempt to build 'a new Middle East', to forge an alliance between Israel, Arab states and

the US. The UAE, Bahrain, Sudan and Morocco began normalising relations with Israel.

The Israeli government immediately recognised Morocco's sovereignty over Western

Sahara.

From 1979 Iran became an enemy of the US. The revolution that triumphed in that year

accused Washington of having interfered in the country's policies since the 1950s to

control oil production and of having supported the authoritarian monarchy of the Shah

of Iran (1941-1979). In retaliation, 66 US embassy diplomats and US citizens were held

hostage in Tehran from November 1979 to January 1981.

Diplomatic relations between the two countries were severed, and the anti-Iranian

alliance between the US and Israel was consolidated. Tehran, Washington and successive

Israeli administrations were active in Syria, Lebanon, Palestine and Iraq, supporting or

fighting governments and armed groups.

Washington's relationship with Iran changed under President Barack Obama. He made

it a priority to prevent Iran from having nuclear weapons, and pushed for a complex

negotiation on Iran's nuclear programme that culminated in the Joint Comprehensive

Plan of Action (JCPOA) signed in July 2015 between Iran, the P5+1 (the five permanent

members of the UN Security Council - China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom, the

United States and the United States - and Germany), and the European Union.

Iran's civilian nuclear programme was placed under international control in exchange for

the lifting of Washington and European sanctions on Iran. The deal worked, but in 2018

then-president Donald Trump denounced it and withdrew the US from the deal and

imposed new, tougher sanctions on Iran.

The Biden administration tried to reinstate it, but anti-Israeli and Republican pressures,

an attempt by US negotiators to link a new version of the deal to Iran not supporting

armed anti-Israel groups and demands for guarantees from Iran that in the future

another Trump administration or another president would again abrogate the deal,

scuttled the negotiations.

The escalation ladder

The delicate balance between Israel, Iran and its allies was upset this year. From 7

October onwards, the Israeli government felt it was possible to change the security

JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations

e-ISSN: 1647-7251

VOL 15 N.º 2

November 2024-April 2025, pp. 453-459

Notes e Reflections

One year after 7 October, the Middle East in the Abyss

Mariano Aguirre

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equation, especially towards Iran. As Prime Minister Netanyahu put it in October, one of

the goals is to bring down the regime in Iran. The aim is to weaken Iranian capacity and

destroy the 'axis of resistance' through the 'decapitation' of its leaders , and a series of

military defeats that delegitimise the Teheran´s political and religious power.

Israel has carried out these extra-judicial executions of non-state armed organisations

for decades without any result in bringing them to an end. Even if temporarily weakened,

Hezbollah and Hamas have deep social roots and will continue to exist.

At the same time, Netanyahu is using the offensive to push the US to confront Iran, and

to promote various war fronts in the Middle East. This would create an unfavourable

climate for Joe Biden's administration, especially as oil prices are already rising. This will

have a negative impact on Kamala Harris, the Democratic candidate for president,

against Donald Trump, the Republican candidate and Netanyahu ally.

Israel has three pillars for its plan to change the Middle East. First, the military and

diplomatic support of the US and most of Europe. Second, its nuclear arsenal. Third, the

support of a large section of Israeli society.

Both parties and most US politicians consider the alliance with Israel and the commitment

to defend its existence to be a "ironclad" issue, despite possible disagreements. The so-

called US-Jewish lobby, influential in business, media and political circles since the 1960s,

is key to maintaining economic, military and diplomatic support for Israel.

This situation has changed over the past decade as a new generation of Jewish-Americans

question Israel's policies towards the Palestinians, particularly the occupation of the West

Bank, Gaza and East Jerusalem, and US support for Israel. While failing to change the

Biden administration's support with arms and diplomacy, this generation has a prominent

role to play since October 2023.

Although it has never acknowledged it, Israel possesses at least 80 nuclear weapons. In

2014 the United Nations urged it to renounce them, accede to the Nuclear Non-

Proliferation Treaty, and International Atomic Energy Agency verification. Israel did not

accept these requirements, reserving the option to use nuclear weapons.

In April and a few days ago, Iran launched ballistic missile and drone strikes on military

targets in Israel. Tehran warned the US three days before the attack in April and a few

hours earlier in October. The aim, knowing that Israel has the technology to intercept

the missiles, is to signal that Iran can use more missiles to saturate its shield, and

accelerate plans for nuclear weapons.

For the Iranian government the immediate dilemma is how to respond to Israel. It can

launch more missiles without warning by trying to breach Israel's missile defence shield.

But it runs the risk that the response could be an attack on its nuclear and oil facilities,

as could happen these days. If that were to happen, Iran could destroy oil facilities in the

region, leading to sharp increases in the price of crude oil on the international market.

Israel's attack could also be pre-emptive. If Iran does not respond, trying to maintain

tension without open war, it would lose credibility as a regional power and among the

more radical sectors of the government. But if it does respond and an all-out

JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations

e-ISSN: 1647-7251

VOL 15 N.º 2

November 2024-April 2025, pp. 453-459

Notes e Reflections

One year after 7 October, the Middle East in the Abyss

Mariano Aguirre

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confrontation ensues, Israel has more military means, with the support of the US, Britain

and some Arab countries, and nuclear weapons.

In the long term, the escalation ladder in this volatile regional scenario is very dangerous.

Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates have been pressuring the US for years to

transfer civilian and military nuclear technology to contain Iran. Since the Gaza war,

Saudi Arabia has indicated that it would establish diplomatic relations with Israel if

Washington accepted such a transfer, and if Israel commits to the two-state solution.

Russia and Iran, in parallel, are on the verge of signing a cooperation agreement that

includes security issues. Moscow has good relations with Israel and has to take care of

them because of the Russian-Jewish community that emigrated from the former USSR in

the 1990s. But it also seeks to maintain good relations with Iran, an important regional

and military ally in the broader Moscow-Washington confrontation. All three sides find

advantages in maintaining alliances. China, for its part, will continue to strengthen its

relations with the region and Israel, but without intervening in the security field.

Hamas and Hezbollah's mistake

Hamas considered in 2023 that an October-style strike would be a wake-up call to the

international community's lack of interest in Israel's illegal occupation of the occupied

West Bank, East Jerusalem and Gaza. At the same time, Hezbollah launched limited

attacks against Israel on the Lebanese border to get Netanyahu to agree to a ceasefire

in Gaza.

But the long-standing balance between Israel, Iran and Hezbollah has unravelled.

Hezbollah and Hamas underestimated, as did the US and Iran, the will of Netanyahu's

ultra-right-wing government and the Israeli army in going to a multi-front war for which

they have been preparing for decades, and in which they have the support of various

sectors of their society, from fanatics and settlers to those who reject having a Palestinian

state as a neighbour and fear another 7 October.

Israel has on its side, despite criticism, the US and Europe, and Arab governments that

hate and fear Hamas and Hezbollah, but they feel obliged to condemn Israeli actions

because their societies support the Palestinians.

One year after 7 October and 76 years after the creation of the state of Israel, neither

violence nor restraint have served the Palestinians well in gaining a state in part of what

was the British Mandate of Palestine. Previous Israeli attempts to "change the Middle

East" through assassinations of armed group leaders, invasions of Lebanon, and wars

with neighbours have succeeded in making the Palestinian issue disappear.

The killing of civilians in Gaza in the name of the right to self-defence, the killings by

Hamas also against civilians in the name of resistance to the occupation, and the

escalation towards a regional war will bring security to no one. Resentment over the

killings of civilians and leaders of armed organisations ensures revenge by future

generations on all sides.

JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations

e-ISSN: 1647-7251

VOL 15 N.º 2

November 2024-April 2025, pp. 453-459

Notes e Reflections

One year after 7 October, the Middle East in the Abyss

Mariano Aguirre

459

In the meantime, it has become definitively clear that the US and European political

influence in the Middle East is totally non-existent.

How to cite this note

Aguirre, Mariano (2024). One year after 7 October, the Middle East in the Abyss. Notes and

Refletions, Janus.net, e-journal of international relations. VOL 15, N.º 2, November 2024-April

2025, pp. 455-459. https://doi.org/10.26619/1647-7251.15.2.01