OBSERVARE

Universidade Autónoma de Lisboa

e-ISSN: 1647-7251

Vol. 15, N.º 2

November 2024-April 2025

331

GUINEA-BISSAU: AVOIDING THE REPUTATION OF BEING A FAILED

STATE

PAULO GONÇALVES

goncalves.prt@gmail.com

Independent researcher and a retired senior officer (Colonel) of the Portuguese Air Force

(Portugal). He has a large experience in research and advising international organizations, as he

operated in a myriad of functions and tasks, including international engagements in European

Union (EU), North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the United Nations (UN). Throughout

his career, he has operated in 25 different countries across the Americas, Europe, Asia, and

Africa. Paulo worked as a strategic communicator, performed conflict observation and analysis

functions for NATO, the EU, and the UN; operated as an electoral support staff member, and

program implementer for the United Nations Development Program; and was an advisor at the

United Nations political mission for Afghanistan (UNAMA), making analyses and assessments on

Afghan regional and national governance. He is currently an independent researcher on

international relations, with a particular interest in Portuguese-speaking countries. He

collaborates with the University of Macau regularly on academic research.

FRANCISCO JOSÉ LEANDRO

fleandro@um.edu.mo

Ph.D. in political science and international relations from the Catholic University of Portugal

(2010). In 2014, 2017, and 2020, he was awarded the Institute of European Studies in Macau

Academic Research Grant, which is a major component of the Asia-Europe Comparative Studies

Research Project. From 2014 to 2018, he was the program coordinator at the Institute of Social

and Legal Studies, Faculty of Humanities at the University of Saint Joseph in Macau, China. From

2018 to 2023 he was the associate dean of the Institute for Research on Portuguese-Speaking

Countries at the City University of Macau. Since 2023, he is associate professor with habilitation

in international relations at Faculty of Social Sciences and the Deputy Director of the Institute of

Global and Public Affairs – University of Macau (China). Francisco is a member of OBSERVARE

(Observatory of Foreign Relations), which was founded in 1996 as a center for studies in

international relations at the Autonomous University of Lisbon, Portugal. https://orcid.org/0000-

0002-1443-5828.

Abstract

This paper poses and answers the following research question: How may Guinea-Bissau

overcome its permanent governance instability and avoid becoming a “failed state”? This

question is particularly important, not only in the context of circumventing being exposed to

the economic interests of external actors, but also, to understand the state domestic

weaknesses. Guinea-Bissau is a partially archipelagic small state, with an interesting portfolio

of natural resources, investment opportunities, and business prospects. The country has

suffered decades of institutional instability and social fragility, resulting being rated as “failed-

state”. Indeed, O’ Regan &Thompson (2013, p. 3) refer Guinea-Bissau as “(…) the first narco-

state in Africa”. There are a number of perspectives to categorize a state as failed-state, but

we are focused on the institutional approach and in a possible lack of state authority. As such,

we assume that “states fail because they do not possess the political, economic and social

capabilities to survive as states” (Hill, 2005; Gros, 1996, p. 456; Jackson, 2000, p. 296;

Rotberg, 2004, p. 2; Zartman,1995, p. 5). Once the ideological cradle of colonial self-

determination, Guinea-Bissau fought valiantly to gain independence (1963–1974), unilaterally

proclaiming it on 24 September 1973 (Té, 2015, p. 30). Regrettably, after gaining recognition

as a sovereign state, Guinea-Bissau has witnessed four effective coup d’états, 16 different

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e-ISSN: 1647-7251

VOL 15 N.º 2

November 2024-April 2025, pp. 331-370

Guinea-Bissau: Avoiding the Reputation of being a Failed State

Paulo Gonçalves, Francisco José Leandro

332

attempts of coups d’état, one civil war, several parliamentary dissolutions, assassinations of

politicians, interference of the militaries in executive functions and frequent change of political

executives. Several reasons have contributed to this instability: (1) The interests of

neighboring countries as well as an intense international influence; (2) The condition of being

a post-colonial state, which is reflected in a number of factors such as poor literacy, health

care and security (BTI, 2024); (3) The internal ethnic-religious clashes and the 1980 events,

which lead qualified Cabo Verdean personnel to leave the country (Duarte Silva, 2006); (4)

The meagre political control of the armed forces associated to a widespread corruption (BTI,

2024); (5) The short minded political culture within a semi-presidential system; (8) and the

last but certainly not the least, the under-resourced and sloppy surveillance of borders (US

Department of State, 2022, p. 5). All these factors jeopardized its economy, drained its

resources, and exposed society to narco-trafficking. A struggle between the President Umaro

Sissoco Embaló and the parliament regarding the amendment of the Constitution (among

other issues), has further reignited political instability. Apart from the direct competition posed

by Senegal, Guinea-Bissau has potential to become a reference economy in the region, and

an entry door for the market of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS)

and the West African Monetary and Economic Union (WAEMU). However, hardly this will ever

happen, without political stability and an urgent need of reform of the defense and security

sectors. A transformation not only in its structures but, above all, in mentalities, based on the

role of the military in a representative democracy - a semi-presidential political system. This

research does not adopt any explicit theory (Creswell & Creswell, 2018, p. 64). Instead, it

employs a descriptive-inductive qualitative methodology based on selected themes to

evaluate how Guinea-Bissau can avoid becoming a failed state. The critical discussion of these

themes, has been supplemented with interviews with Guinea-Bissau’s opinion leaders and

representatives of its diaspora, as well as former Portuguese colonial agents. The authors wish

to acknowledge that, to mitigate the insufficiency of official and academic qualitative data, we

conducted a number of interviews and we used triangulated media sources. The relevant

interview transcripts, were freely translated into English language. Finally, this research

excludes the last two years (2022-2024) of current political leadership, under the President

Embaló. During this period of time President Embaló dissolved the parliament twice, scheduled

legislative elections for November 2024 and at the time we write, the presidential election has

not been called yet. Therefore, the authors consider important the completion of this sequence

of facts, to analyze his political action.

Keywords

Guinea-Bissau, Failed State, Political Instability, Development, Ethnic-groups, Narco-

trafficking.

Resumo

Este artigo coloca e responde à seguinte questão de investigação: Como poderá a Guiné-

Bissau ultrapassar a sua permanente instabilidade governativa e evitar tornar-se num “Estado

falhado”? Esta questão é particularmente importante, não só no contexto de evitar a exposição

aos interesses económicos de actores externos, mas também, para compreender as fraquezas

internas do Estado. A Guiné-Bissau é um pequeno Estado parcialmente arquipelágico, com

um interessante portefólio de recursos naturais, oportunidades de investimento e perspetivas

de negócio. O país sofreu décadas de instabilidade institucional e fragilidade social, o que o

associa à ideia de “Estado falhado”. Com efeito, O’ Regan & Thompson (2013, p. 3) referem-

se à Guiné-Bissau como “(…) o primeiro narco-Estado em África”. Existem diversas

perspectivas para categorizar um Estado como um Estado falhado. Todavia, neste artigo

adaptámos uma abordagem institucional para avaliar da possível falta de autoridade no

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exercício das funções públicas. Como tal, assumimos que “os Estados falham porque não

possuem as capacidades políticas, económicas e sociais para sobreviver como Estados” (Hill,

2005; Gros, 1996, p. 456; Jackson, 2000, p. 296; Rotberg, 2004, p. 2; Zartman,1995, p. 5).

Outrora berço ideológico da autodeterminação, a Guiné-Bissau lutou corajosamente para

conquistar a independência (1963-1974), proclamando-a unilateralmente a 24 de setembro

de 1973 (Té, 2015, p. 30). Lamentavelmente, depois de obter o reconhecimento como Estado

soberano, a Guiné-Bissau assistiu a quatro golpes de Estado, 16 tentativas de golpe de Estado,

uma guerra civil, diversas dissoluções do parlamento, assassinatos de políticos, interferência

dos militares nas funções executivas e mudanças frequentes de executivos políticos. Várias

razões contribuíram para esta instabilidade: (1) Os interesses dos países vizinhos, bem como

uma intensa influência internacional; (2) A condição de ser um Estado pós-colonial, que se

reflecte numa série de factores como a fraca literacia, débeis cuidados de saúde e insegurança

(BTI, 2024); (3) Os confrontos étnico-religiosos internos e os acontecimentos de 1980, que

levaram cidadãos qualificados de origem cabo-verdiana a abandonar o país (Duarte Silva,

2006); (4) O escasso controlo político das forças armadas associado a uma corrupção

generalizada (BTI, 2024); (5) A cultura política de curto prazo dentro de um sistema

semipresidencialista; (8) e, por último, mas certamente não menos importante, a fraca

vigilância das fronteiras (U.S. Department of State, 2022, p. 5). Todos estes factores

comprometeram a sua economia, esgotaram os seus recursos e expõem a sociedade ao tráfico

de droga. O conflito institucional entre o Presidente Umaro Sissoco Embaló e o parlamento

relativamente à alteração da Constituição (entre outras questões) reacendeu ainda mais a

instabilidade política. Apesar da concorrência directa colocada pelo Senegal, a Guiné-Bissau

tem potencial para se tornar uma economia de referência na região e uma porta de entrada

para o mercado da Comunidade Económica dos Estados da África Ocidental (CEDEAO) e da

União Monetária e Económica da África Ocidental (UEMOA). No entanto, dificilmente tal

acontecerá, sem estabilidade política e sem a reforma dos sectores da defesa e da segurança.

Uma transformação não só nas suas estruturas, mas, sobretudo, nas mentalidades, assente

no papel dos militares numa democracia representativa – um sistema político

semipresidencialista. Esta investigação adopta uma a metodologia qualitativa descritiva-

indutiva (Creswell & Creswell, 2018, p. 64) e baseia-se na análise de um conjunto de temas

seleccionados, para avaliar como a Guiné-Bissau poderá evitar ser um estado falido? Os

autores desejam reconhecer que, para mitigar a insuficiência de dados qualitativos oficiais e

académicos, realizaram uma série de entrevistas e utilizaram fontes mediáticas devidamente

trianguladas. A discussão crítica destes temas foi complementada com entrevistas a líderes

de opinião da Guiné-Bissau e a representantes da sua diáspora, bem como a antigos agentes

coloniais portugueses. As transcrições das entrevistas relevantes foram traduzidas livremente

para a língua inglesa. Por último, esta investigação exclui os últimos dois anos (2022-2024)

da actual liderança política, sob o Presidente Embaló. Durante este período, o Presidente

Embaló dissolveu o parlamento por duas vezes, marcou eleições legislativas para novembro

de 2024 e, à data em que escrevemos, as eleições presidenciais ainda não foram convocadas.

Por isso, os autores consideram importante aguardar pelo desenvolvimento desta sequência

de factos, antes de analisar os últimos dois anos da sua acção política.

Palavras-chave

Guiné-Bissau, Estado Falhado, Instabilidade Política, Desenvolvimento, Grupos Étnicos,

Narcotráfico.

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How to cite this article

Gonçalves, Paulo & Leandro, Francisco José (2024). Guinea-Bissau: Avoiding the Reputation of

being a Failed State. Janus.net, e-journal of international relations. VOL 15 N.º 2, November 2024-

April 2025, pp. 331-370. https://doi.org/10.26619/1647-7251.15.2.15.

A Article received on 14th May 2024 and accepted for publication on 21st September

2024.

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e-ISSN: 1647-7251

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Guinea-Bissau: Avoiding the Reputation of being a Failed State

Paulo Gonçalves, Francisco José Leandro

335

GUINEA-BISSAU: AVOIDING THE REPUTATION OF BEING A

FAILED STATE

PAULO GONÇALVES

FRANCISCO JOSÉ LEANDRO

1. Introduction

Guinea-Bissau is internationally perceived as a country with high political-military

instability, a “failed-state”, and a “narco-state” (Clarke, 2017). However, there is more to

this African country than meets the eye. Guinea-Bissau is a partially archipelagic small

state, covered by lush vegetation, located in the westernmost part of the African

continent, halfway between the Equator and the Tropic of Cancer. The country is heavily

irrigated by rivers and marshy areas, with more than 80 islands and islets, forming the

“Bijagós Archipelago”.

In 1956, Amílcar Cabral led the founding of the PAIGC (African Party for the

Independence of Guinea and Cabo Verde [Partido Africano para a Independência da Guiné

e Cabo Verde]. He first tried to negotiate a gradual path towards independence, with

obvious negative results (Sanca & Có, 2017). In August 1959, sailors and dockworkers

at the seaport of Bissau went on strike, demanding better wages and better living

conditions (Sanca & Có, 2017). The protestors decided to demonstrate at the harbour,

but the police demobilized it using firearms. Allegedly, 50 demonstrators were killed, and

more than 100 were wounded (Duarte Silva, 2006 and DW, 2014). The so-called Pidjiguiti

massacre, has been perceived as the trigger cause for the PAIGC to abandon their

campaign of nonviolent resistance (Roque, 2018). Not having been successful in the

dialogue with the colonial authorities, Amílcar Cabral led his party to a liberation armed

struggle. In 1963, two years after the beginning of the combats in Angola and the loss

of the Portuguese colonies in India, the PAIGC fighters began their armed struggle,

against the colonial regime. Out of the so-called by the colonial regime “three overseas

theatres of operations” (Angola, Guinea-Bissau, and Mozambique), Guinea-Bissau was

considered the fiercest combat zone, with heavy casualties on both sides. Interviewing

Rodrigues (Interview, 2021b), it became clear that, in the early 1970s, after 11 years of

fighting, the Portuguese military were feeling that the war outcome, would not favour

them. The colonial military only had control of the urban areas, and they lost air

supremacy, due to PAIGC use of soviet made surface-to-air missiles. Meanwhile, Cabral

managed to engage in diplomatic venues, gaining international recognition – He met with

Pope Paulo VI on July 1970, soon after his participation in the international conference

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on solidarity with the Peoples of the Portuguese Colonies (Solidariedade com os Povos

das Colónias Portuguesas), which took place in Rome in June 1970 and gathered 177

organizations from 64 states. PAIGC participated in some United Nations (UN) events, as

a representative of the Guinea-Bissau opposition, and managed to invite a UN envoy, to

territories under PAIGC control, conveying the idea that Portugal, no longer had the right

to represent the people of Guinea-Bissau (GB).

In 1973, Cabral decided to make a smart move: the unilateral declaration of

independence. As a result of his diplomatic efforts, that symbolic act, gained immediate

recognition from several states friendly to the Bissau-Guinean cause. However, months

before making that declaration, Amílcar Cabral was assassinated in Conakry (RTP, 2017)

“tragically killed by his own men, as part of a coup against Cape Verdean leadership of

PAIGC” (Tomás, 2012). Despite his death, the struggle for self-determination continued,

and on 24 September 1973, the new PAIGC leadership, declared unilaterally the

independence. In the following months, the independent GB was recognized by several

countries (Andrade, 1974), most of whom from the African states aligned with Moscow

and by the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA, 1973). Meanwhile, the fight against

Portuguese forces continued, without showing any signs of subsiding. In April 1974, the

Portuguese Army staged a coup d’état in Lisbon, overthrowing the dictatorship regime,

opening the way to democracy. Soon after that, the new regime decided to recognize the

right to self-determination to all so-called “overseas provinces”. Guinea-Bissau was the

first to be recognized as a sovereign state, on 10 September 1974. This recognition of

independence, was followed by most UN member states, and on 17 September 1974, the

United Nations Security Council (UNSC RES 356, August 12, 1974), recognized the UN

membership to Republic of Guinea-Bissau. Relations between Portugal and GB have ever

since become cordial, and there is a significant diaspora of Bissau-Guineans living in

Portugal.

During its first 17 years of independence, GB was run by an autocratic, Soviet-inspired,

single-party regime. As its name suggests, the PAIGC’s political project foresaw that

Guinea-Bissau and Cabo Verde, initially constituted as separate states, would tend

towards unification. Although existing as two sovereign states, they were to be governed

by the same political party (fact that apparently, was not consensual within the PAIGC).

This idealistic concept lasted until 1980. On 14 November 1980, a coup d’état in GB

overthrew the first President Luís Cabral (Teixeira, 2010), suspended the constitution,

instituting the Council of the Revolution, formed by military and civilians. This coup d’état

marked the end of the project of unification of the two countries. Nevertheless, Cabo

Verde and Guinea-Bissau after 1981 (when the PAICV - Partido Africano da

Independência de Cabo Verde - was born), both states have always maintained good

diplomatic relations. After the fall of the Berlin Wall, as most of the states supported by

the Soviet Union, GB entered a deep economic crisis. To overcome this crisis, the

government resorted to soliciting the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund

(IMF) financing. However, this option implied adherence to the neoliberal development

model, which, in turn, resulted in the reform of the political regime and facilitated a multi-

party system.

In 1998–1999 there was another coup d’état (Teixeira, 2010), followed by a bloody civil

war that ousted President Nino Vieira (who had carried out the 1980 coup d’état). In

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2003, a new military coup deposed of President Kumba Ialá, this time without bloodshed.

Nino Vieira again assumed power (in the 2005 presidential election as an independent

candidate), but he was assassinated in 2009. In 2010, there was a military revolt, which

after negotiations, was terminated. In 2011, there was a failed attempt at a coup d’état,

and in 2012, halfway through a presidential election, there was a new coup d’état that

deposed of the incumbent President Raimundo Pereira, after President Bacai Sanhá died

(…) in Paris (Infante, 2016). Since the 1991 presidential election, which opened the

country to a multi-party system, only a single Head of State (HoS) has fulfilled a complete

term, without being assassinated, or deposed of in a military coup.

2. The Notion of National Space

Guinea-Bissau is located on the west coast of Africa, with an area of 36,125 km², of

which 22% are alluvial river areas, with numerous islands along a very jagged coast. The

country has a maximum length of 300 km and its widest width is about 250 km. The

territory is almost flat, with abundant hydrophilic forests, flat swampy regions,

mangroves under the influence of large tides, and the inflow of marine waters can go

beyond 100 km inside mainland. GB borders Senegal (North), Guinea-Conakry (South &

East), and the Atlantic Ocean (West). Administratively speaking, the territory is divided

into two distinct parts: a continental part, and an insular part - the Bijagós, which is

separated from the mainland by the channels of Geba, Pedro Álvares, Bolama, and

Canhabaque. In 1996, UNESCO classified the Bijagós as a World Biosphere Ecological

Reserve (UN Food and Agriculture Organization, 2015). Only 17 out of the 80+ Bijagós

islands are populated. Guinea-Bissau is a unitary state, comprising eight regions (Figure

1): Bafatá, Biombo, Bolama/Bijagós, Tombali, Cacheu, Gabu, Oio, Quinara, and the

autonomous sector of Bissau.

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Guinea-Bissau has 280 km of coastline, with a smooth continental shelf, where the

shallow waters are habitat to large quantities of fish. In total, the GB exclusive economic

zone (EEZ) has 150,000 km², of which 45,000 km² are continental shelf (CCIPGB, 2016).

The climate is tropical, composed mainly of two seasons: The rainy season (May to

October) and the dry season (November to April). Heavy rain falls between July and

September (Hikersbay, 2022), offering nine straight months of potential good weather

for tourism. A national network of several protected areas, covering approximately

470,000 hectares, has already been established (IBAPGB, 2008). Two thirds of the

protected areas are marine and estuarine spaces, containing regulated fishing zones.

These areas play a central role in the reproduction and regeneration of fish, shrimp, and

mollusk stocks, ensuring sustainability to these resources.

3. Population, Ethnicity and Politics

According to United Nations Population Fund (UNPF, 2024) the GB population is close to

2 million inhabitants. The average life male expectancy is 60 years, and female was 64

(UNPF, 2024). The GB population is characterized by having different African ethnicities

(ANEME Report, 2018). Although no ethnic group has the majority, the Balantas

constitute the most representative minority, with 27% of the population. They are

followed by the Fulas (23%), the Mandingas (12%), Manjacos (around 11%), the Papeis

(10%), and the remaining 17% composed of smaller ethnic groups such: Felupes,

Baiotes, Mancanhas or Brames, Biafares, Nalus, and Bijagós.

In recent history, there has been no internal conflicts purely based on ethnic issues.

Ethnic multiplicity has, in fact, been a source of national pride and anti-colonial

sentiment, as the harmonious integration between Bissau-Guinean groups is considered

unusual (Teixeira, 2020). However, with deteriorating economic situation and growing

levels of corruption and nepotism, allegations of ethnic differentiation among the

population have emerged (Baldé, 2021a). The proliferation of political parties, often with

regional implementation, where there is an ethnic hegemony, opens the field to

interpretations of possible ethnic-based partisanships. This relatively new GB ethno-

religious differentiation, is starting to get noticed in, for example, the selection of political

leaders, members of the parliament (MP), and state offices. In GB, religion and ethnicity,

plays an important role in the political arena. In addition, there is a stark contrast

between the legitimacy of state authority and traditional local authorities. Local religious

leaders have higher precedence than secular state officials. To complicate things further,

population is made up of various ethnic groups representing different religious

orientations. The Fulas, Mandingas and Biafares are Muslims, others are animists and

Christians. The Animist religion is practiced by 44.9%, Islamic (Sunni) represents 41.9%,

Christians are 11.9%, and others (including atheists) are around 1.3% of the population

(ANEME Report, 2018). It is the indigenous Animist religious system that has the greatest

influence on the country’s political culture, with practices that allow state officials to

legitimize their authority and overcome the impasse of ethnic heterogeneity,

compensating for loose relations between government and citizens. The manipulation of

religious (animistic) symbolism, by certain leaders with political ambitions, is

characteristic of the so-called “Africanization of Power”, something that operates between

superstition and the transcendental, and empowers authoritarian organizations. The

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official language is Portuguese, but according to Atlas Mundial de Dados (2021), only

about 27.1% is fluent. Nevertheless, Portuguese language is used in legal documents,

public ceremonies, media, and in local schools. Creole is the lingua franca used by 90.4%

of the population (local primary school lectures are taught in Portuguese and Creole,

except in the Portuguese and French schools).

With a recent history of coups d’état, attempted coups d'état, assassinations, a civil war

and a haughty attitude of the military towards the political rulers, Guinea-Bissau is not

progressing as it should be, in terms of human development. In addition, Guinea-Bissau

has been characterized as a “failed-state,” with nuances of a narco-trafficking-state

(King, 2022; Chabal & Toby, 2016). These disparage qualifications are substantiated by

international organizations reports. In fact, the United Nations Office of Drugs and Crime

has characterized Guinea-Bissau as a “landfall” of most cocaine entering Africa from

South America, in transit to Europe (UNODC, 2008), and according to the non-

governmental organization Transparency International (2023), Guinea-Bissau is

considered a “highly corrupted” country, ranking 158 out of 180. Considering that a failed

state is defined by the general inability to perform sovereign functions through the three

branches of state, delivering responses to fundamental needs of citizens, including basic

services and public security, we may say that although GB has serious problems regarding

social stability, corruption and poverty, it does not mean that its government has

completely lost the ability to cope with basic citizens demands.

In the 1990s, with the opening to a multi-party system and private initiative, private

schools began to appear. Due to better salaries and the prestige of private institutions,

the best qualified teachers began to abandon the public education system and move to

private education. The ongoing economic crisis, led to major cuts in the state budget,

dedicated to the education sector. Parents had bear more expenses with education, and

school dropouts began to grow significantly (Alves & Rêses, 2021). As a general rule, the

level of computer skills of students is less than basic, because access to computer

equipment is scarce and the internet network works poorly. All of this, has two negative

consequences: on the one hand, in situations of movement restriction or confinement

due to pandemics or natural disasters, teaching stops completely, as there is no

possibility of taking classes online; on the other hand, as the higher technical education

system is deficient and students have to do study abroad, they face extra difficulty

because they start from a much lower level of knowledge comparatively to the students

in the host nation. In interviews conducted with teachers (2021), there were many

criticisms to the current educational system – Salaries, promotions, lack of

infrastructures are among the main criticisms. According to members of the teachers’

body, access to the education sector requires a partisan posture, because both teachers

and support staff, are selected by their political party card, rather than on their merit or

curriculum. Likewise, career movement depends more on party position than on

profession credits.

In 2017, the UN Mission to Guinea-Bissau (UNIOGBIS, 2020 a) reported that GB had

reached a literacy rate of 49.9% among adults, which meant that, if this pace continued,

it had reached a total literacy rate of 70% by 2020. To this end, the United Nations

Children's Fund worked in partnership with the Ministry of Education and other partners

(2016–2020). However, although being a commendable effort, just being able to read

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and write, and approximately 44% of children aged 6 to 11 years were out of the

education system.

4. Geo-economic Perspectives

Due to its geographical location, the waters of Guinea-Bissau are particularly rich in fish

and seafood (shrimp, crab and oysters) in abundance and diversity. The reason for such

a wealth of marine life is essentially due to three interrelated factors. First, continental

shelf provides large tracts of shallow seabed that are permanently irrigated with sediment

brought in by the country’s many freshwater courses. Secondly, the GB oceanic waters

are covered by very specific currents that, in conjunction with the offshore winds, produce

a phenomenon called “upwelling”, which generates rising sea currents that bring nutrients

deposited on deeper seabed to the surface. Thirdly, the GB coastal areas have the second

highest concentration of mangroves in West Africa, and the 12th worldwide (Dias, 2019).

Mangroves are plant formations that develop in transition zones between marine and

terrestrial environments, where there is great biodiversity. About 90% of marine

organisms spend part of their life in this ecosystem, with 80% of the world’s fish catches

dependent on mangroves (IUFCN, 2021). It should also be noted that, according to Nieto

& Mélin (2017), GB has large concentrations of phytoplankton on the continental shelf -

the most extensive in the entire Gulf of Guinea. Given that phytoplankton is the food

base for all marine life, it is not surprising that the GB coastline has very considerable

fishery resources.

Given the high biodiversity of its waters, the extensive area of its continental shelf

favourable to fishing activity, as well as the various international agreements in force,

the EEZ is frequented by a significant number of industrial fishing vessels. Taken into

consideration the type of fishing activity exercised, three fishing zones have been defined

in Guinea-Bissau’s waters (Table 1). However, although geographical and climatological

conditions enhance the replenishment of fish and crustacean stocks, there are serious

problems regarding illegal fishing by both industrials and artisanal fleets (Sanca, 2021).

In 2020, the Undersecretary of State for Fisheries, Jeremias Intchama, told a newspaper

(DN, 2020) that “the annual share of fisheries was 4% of GB GDP and it created direct

employment for 6,134 individuals, and indirect for 26,000 people”. Paradoxically, due to

the predominance of an agricultural tradition in Guinea-Bissau, and because there has

never been an industrial high seas fishing fleet, the population eats mainly fruits, rice

and river fish.

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According to Intchama (2020) “(…) foreign industrial fishing vessels are generally

obliged, either through fishing agreements or the legal chartering regime, to disembark

and sell part of their catch in national markets” (DN, 2020). This option seeks to solve

the food shortage problem. However, post-capture activities are very restricted, and

almost all industrial fishing vessels disembark their catch in Dakar (Senegal), Abidjan

(Cote d’Ivoire), or Las Palmas (Spain). The fish will them travel from those seaports

towards Africa and Europe. The reasons for this situation are related not only to the small

size of the Bissau-Guinean market, but also to the fact that there are poor infrastructure

and services such as: the absence of an internationally recognized quality certification

system, excessive bureaucracy, little port capacity, lack of large refrigerated warehouses

and qualified personnel, and poor road connectivity. In addition to the fishery agreement

with Senegal, GB has fisheries partnership agreements with the European Union and the

People’s Republic of China.

The fishery agreement with the EU (renewed in 2024) has a financial contribution “(…)

estimated at €85 million over the 5 years, consisting of €17 million per year, of which €4.5

million will be dedicated to promoting Guinea-Bissau’s sustainable fisheries

management, control and surveillance capacities, and supporting local fishing

communities” (European Commission, 2024). The agreement with China provides for

several investments, including the construction of a fish processing and conservation

unit. The agreement protocol also includes the construction of a warehouse for the sale

of artisanal fishing materials, the installation of three ice factories and the expansion and

modernization of the artisanal fishing port of Alto Bandim (DN, 2020), which has been

concluded in 2023. The fishery agreement with Senegal, was signed under the ECOWAS

framework, and provides for the sharing of resources between neighbouring countries.

Ship-owners from both countries can carry out activities in the territorial waters of both

states. However, this agreement resulted in an “invasion” of Senegalese artisanal

fishermen into GB waters and ports, but the reverse did not happen. This occurs not only

because GB does not have the same potential as Senegal, but, above all, because the

terms of the agreement were not disclosed to GB fishermen. Once again, the GB

population criticizes their government for protecting their “northern neighbours” (DN,

2020). As regards monitoring the activities of ships at sea, Guinea-Bissau uses a vessel

monitoring system via satellite, bought with the money earmarked for institutional

support under previous fishing agreements (DGNRSMS, 2021). Although it is a very

precise system, it only works on the basis of the “good faith” of the crews of registered

ships, because it requires on-board identification equipment to be switched on (NAFO,

2021). If the crew disconnects it, the ship disappears from the system. With regard to

aquaculture, a potentially interesting area of activity within the mangroves zone and its

nutrient-rich waters, there is only reference to a success story, funded by FAO, not on

the coastline, but in the village of Pitche. A group of young people, managed to carry out

a project, where they extract about 22.5 tons of fish annually (FAO, 2021a). Aquaculture

is an area of profitable activity, which is being untapped by the local riverside population.

Food security depends on subsistence agriculture. However, access to land has not been

a peaceful issue, as only 30% - 40% is farmland, with easy access to abundant water. In

2018, the Director-general of Agriculture (Carlos Amarante) explained that, subsistence

agriculture occupies 33% of the 1,200,000 hectares of arable land and, with the increase

of the production and export of cashew nuts, disputes over the land are more frequent

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(Expresso das Ilhas, 2018). After the independence, all the land was nationalized. This

brought up, land disputes among the rural community. In order to solve the situation, in

1998, a “Land Law” was promulgated, aiming to regulate the use of land, and to provide

access to property to the most vulnerable. However, the 1998 civil war, and all the

instability that followed, prevented its application. In an attempted to apply the “Land

Law”, in 2018, the EU made an investment of three million euros, in a four-year project,

which would be conducted by the FAO, seeking food stability (DN, 2018).

The main agricultural product in Guinea-Bissau is cashew nuts. The country usually

exports around 200,000 tonnes of cashew nuts annually, but due to the COVID 19

pandemic, the production dropped to 160,000 in 2020 (BBC News, 2021). Still, the

cashew nuts represent 90% of exports, mostly to India, Brazil, Germany, China and

Vietnam. Small-scale farmers try to gain their living subsistence not only with the cashew

nuts, but also with the wine and other alcoholic beverages they manage to extract out of

the cashew apples. Mamadou Djamanca (Cashew Exporters Association of Bissau-

Guineans) asserted that, “(…) while cashew products remain popular, Guinea-Bissau’s

export challenges, over the coming times, will be crucial for farmers and distributors”

(BBC News, 2021). As for a population that live along the coastline, it is the mangrove

forests that act as a fundamental resource for their respective subsistence. In addition,

to fish farming, mangroves are also used for agricultural purposes, namely in the

cultivation of mangrove rice, and salt extraction. The country seems to have the

necessary agriculture resources for its population, but, in 2021, FAO made an alert that

GB needed food assistance for almost 10% of the population (FAO, 2021b). Over 45% of

the cereal required is covered by imports. Rice accounts for about 80% of the imports,

followed by wheat (15%). Imports in the 2020-2021, were forecasted to be above-

average level, which normally was 155.000 tons (FAO, 2021b).

The beauty of Guinea-Bissau islands, forests, the exuberant biodiversity, and the cultural

and ethnographic diversity, provide a set of outstanding opportunities in the area of

tourism. Paradoxically to its instability, GB has been investing in the conservation of its

biodiversity and its ecosystems. The creation of a National System of Protected Areas is

proof of this. As a result, the tourism sector has potential for a sustainable economic

growth and employment. Culinary, ethnic-cultural events, hunting and sport fishing, spa

tourism and ecotourism are, among others, factors that contribute to further enrich the

tourist experience. Furthermore, regardless of their internal problems and disputes, the

GB population is traditionally sympathetic to foreign visitors. The Bijagós is the ex-libris

of tourism, being considered one of the most beautiful places on the African continent,

where the weather permits touristic activities approximately 10 months per year.

However, here too, the results of the country’s instability can be seen, because the

tourism sector it is almost unexplored. Bissau and the Bijagós Archipelago have a few

hotel-type accommodations, but they are limited in number, size, and service quality.

The maritime connections, as well as the road network, are insufficient; there’s a lack of

medical care facilities; and the internet connectivity is scarce. In 2019, GB participated

for the first time in an international fair dedicated to tourism, in Paris. In a media

interview the Secretary of State for Tourism (Catarina Taborda) said: “At the moment,

we only have 3,000 tourists annually, but we have the ambition to significantly increase

that number significantly in the next three years: one million, two million tourists

annually. It is very ambitious, but we will work to achieve this goal.” (RFI, 2019a).

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According to Edmundson (2014), there are two main minerals to be explored: Phosphate

and Bauxite. In 1978, the UNDP was the first international organization to investigate

the phosphate deposits. However, there was no exploration, simply because there was

no mining infrastructure. Later in 1997, the Canadian Champion Resources Inc. made

another study and reached the conclusion that GB was rich in phosphate rock - close to

100 million tons of high-quality clay bounded ore, with 30.1% raw phosphate rock

(approximately 40 years’ worth of mining), plus an additional 400 million tons of lower

quality calcium bounded rock (up to 200 years of mining potential). The Canadians stated

to explore the mineral but, in 1998, the civil war stated and everything was put to a stop.

Since then, several other initiatives were taken, but the instability inhibited any solid

enterprise. Although phosphate mining could be very interesting for local employment

and revenues, it can have dare consequences to the environment, if not handled properly.

Phosphate mining and processing requires a substantial amount of water. The resulting

clays and sands cannot be discharged untreated, or risks polluting the local rivers (e.g.,

Cacheu) and the sea, inducing enormous negative impact on the ecosystem and fisheries.

When we think about mineral resources, we cannot ignore that it is estimated that a good

percentage of the world-known resources of bauxite and other rare earth elements.

Bauxite reserves are estimated at 17 million tons (Da Cruz, 2020). In the Boé area, there

are five deposits of bauxite. Bauxite can be refined into aluminium, attracting a much

higher price, but at a much greater cost. The Dutch discovered it in the 1950s, but it was

the Soviets that made a proper study. Beyond the security and stability risks, the problem

in exploring the bauxite in Boé, is that there are no proper roads and to the closest

seaport (Buba) is poorly developed. Despite these set-backs, both Angola and the United

Arab Emirates, have indicated the possibility of investments in the transportation system,

as well as the mining infrastructure. In 2007, a commercial company from Angola had

been licensed for bauxite exploration, but with limited results due to the instability. In

2024, President Umaro Embalo’s visit to Russia might suggest a potential pivot towards

collaborating with Russia for ongoing bauxite exploration.

Agricultural land is by far the greatest source of natural wealth (Edmundson, 2013, p.

1). The second largest component resides in the forests of Guinea-Bissau (…) Fisheries

represent the third largest element of natural wealth (Edmundson, 2013, p. 2). The fourth

largest component of natural wealth are the Protected Areas (PA) and the biodiversity

they contain (…) Finally, minerals could provide Guinea-Bissau with an important revenue

stream (…) (Edmundson, 2013, p. 3). “Although sustained studies have not yet been

carried out on the potential of the seabed in the GB EEZ, it is well known that there are

concentrations of important strategic mineral in the seabed of the Gulf of Guinea”

(Abubakar, 2016). Minerals such as cobalt crusts, the poly-metallic nodules (containing

nickel, cobalt, copper, and manganese), polymetallic sulphides (containing zinc, silver,

copper, and gold), as well as monazite sand (containing significant amounts of uranium),

deposits of diamond, gold and phosphorus have been mentioned in different studies of

different places in the Atlantic Ocean. Should those minerals exist in Guinea-Bissau’s

seabed, its mining could be significantly easier than in other latitudes, because the depths

of the seabed are lower due to the extensive continental shelf.

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The entire Gulf of Guinea is an area of great potential for oil exploration, constituting the

second largest concentration of hydrocarbons in the world (CEIRI News, 2019). The GB

territory marks precisely the northern limit of the Gulf of Guinea, therefore, it is not

surprising that there is interest of large oil companies in exploring the seabed. The

maritime border between GB and Senegal was agreed in April 1960, between the French

and Portuguese governments (Figure 2). This delimitation was established following a

line at azimuth 240 degrees, taken in the coastal zone of the land border between the

two territories. To the South of 240 degrees, it is Guinea-Bissau’s waters, and to the

North of 240 degrees it is Senegalese waters. In 1993, Guinea-Bissau and Senegal signed

an agreement to establish a Joint Exploration Zone (JEZ), with approximately 25,000

km², aiming for a joint exploitation of fishery and offshore hydrocarbon resources. The

JEZ is defined by azimuths 220 degrees (which is inside Guinea-Bissau’s waters) all the

way up to azimuth 268 degrees (which is inside Senegalese waters). For this purpose,

GB has given 46% of its maritime territory and Senegal 54%. The 1993 agreement

provided that fish dividends would be split in equal parts (50%–50%), but for

hydrocarbons the sharing is 15% GB and 85% for Senegal. Although there were reasons

for this disparity, according to several interviews (Baldé, 2021; Senha, 2021; Gomes,

2021 a, c), the GB population never understood, neither did they agreed, why Bissau’s

authorities had signed such an agreement. In recent years, several studies and evaluative

drilling were carried out in the JEZ, made by different international companies. However,

commercial oil exploration has never taken place. In addition, the possibility of having oil

in Guinea-Bissau’s seabed is not restricted to the JEZ.

In that regard, in August 2019, the GB government announced the granting of rights to

carry out prospecting for the China National Offshore Oil Corporation. In statements to

the media, the Minister of Natural Resources Issufo Baldé said that he “expected the

Chinese to extract 30 to 60 thousand barrels of oil per day” (RFI, 2019b). In addition to

Chinese research, there were also oil companies operating in Bissau-Guinean waters from

Angola, Dubai, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, and Norway. In November 2021,

the Secretary-General of Guinea-Bissau Agency for Management and Cooperation with

Senegal (Inussa Baldé) announced that the newly appointed President Embaló, who was

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known to have good relations with the Senegalese Head of State (HoS), would be

renegotiating the agreement, in order to have least 30% for Guinea-Bissau and 70% for

Senegal (CM/Lusa, 27 Nov 2021). However, in December 2021, the mentioned

agreement between the two HoS was severely contested by Prime Minister (HoG) Nuno

Gomes Nabiam. Addressing the media, HoG Nabiam explained that “(…) this type of

agreements is a government’s responsibility, with ratification from the National Assembly

and promulgation from the president - not the other way around as it seems to have

happened (…) the oil to be explored happens to be on the Guinea-Bissau’s part of the

JEZ, hence the difference in revenue, if renegotiated, should also be the other way

around, with the highest bid for GB, not for Senegal” (DW, 2021).

On 14 December 2021, the National Assembly (NA) voted against the oil-sharing

agreement signed between the Presidents, Umaro Embaló (GB), and Macky Sall

(Senegal). In January 2022, the NA speaker (Cipriano Cassamá) sent an official letter to

his Senegalese counterpart, with a copy of the deliberation approved by the majority of

the MP, in which they declared the aforementioned agreement “null and without effect”

(DW, 2022). On 20 January 2022, the HoS stated that “(…) he did not sign any oil

exploration agreement, rather a cooperation agreement with Senegal, and that the

parliament did not have the authority to declare the agreement void” (MSN/Lusa, 2022).

When President Embaló explained the situation to journalists, he referred to the HoG and

parliament with harsh words, denouncing any potential political instability caused

(MSN/Lusa, 2022).

5. Key Infrastructure

Approximately 44% of the population lives in urban areas. Approximately, one-fifth lives

in Bissau and along the Atlantic coast, and the remaining in rural regions distributed

between small and often isolated communities (Index Mundi, 2021). The length of the

national road network is 3,455 km, of which 965 km are paved and 2,490 km are unpaved

roads. Weather conditions, namely the deterioration associated with the rainy season,

require permanent investment in the maintenance. As the territory is mostly crossed by

rivers, the transport of goods out of the main access roads relies on the frequent use of

unsophisticated boats, which makes the entire transport process difficult. The road

infrastructure needs large investments to support the desired development. In this sense,

in 2018, China signed a contract with the government of GB, for the construction of an

important road in the coastal area providing access to Bissau. This project has a non-

reimbursable budget of USD 30 million, and it will be a Chinese donation to Guinea-

Bissau (E-Global, 2018).

In addition, the land connectivity between GB and the neighbouring countries need a

clear improvement, especially considering the international market. Thus, given that

Guinea-Bissau’s privileged trade partner is Senegal, the two countries started a project,

financed by the ADB, to improve the road between Dakar and Bissau. This project is

being carried out within the framework of ECOWAS. This new road between Farim and

Dungal, will have the characteristics of the agrarian development corridors (“agro-

corridors”), in the context of African Spatial development initiatives. In an interview (1

April 2022) to the Guinean-Bissau diaspora online channel, the Minister Fidelis Forbs said

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that when his government took office, 83% of the road system of the country was

destroyed, and he had the vision to invert that data by 2024, having 83% of the countries

road system renewed. Forbs continued saying that in two years (2020–2022), he

managed to rebuild 800 km of roads, and President Embaló, is negotiating with the

international and banking community, to get loans at a very low rate (1%), to a push up

on the public works. The government vision for his legislature, is to initiate the process

to build of a new international airport; renew the construction of the road system; and

to build a circular highway around Bissau (Forbs, 2022). Indeed, the only operational

airport, with the capacity to receive international flights, is the Bissau Osvaldo Vieira

Airport. Its modest terminal and its reduced capacity for handling several commercial

aircraft simultaneously limits operations, and GB does not have a national airliner.

International connections are carried out by airlines operating from Portugal, Morocco,

Cabo Verde, and Senegal.

The Bissau seaport is the largest commercial docking, accounting for 85% of exports and

over 90% of imports. Artisanal fishing boats unload their cargoes, in small anchorages,

along the estuaries of the various rivers. In November 2021, President Embaló, following

his “aggressive and proactive diplomacy”, announced the launch of the feasibility study,

for the construction of the commercial and mining seaport, on the Grande Buba River.

According to President Embaló, this will be the biggest project of civil engineering in the

country. The plan envisages a pier 18 meters deep and will allow for the outflow of bauxite

from Boé and the simultaneous docking of three ships weighing up to 70 thousand tons

(DW/LUSA, 2021). In 2019, the African Development Bank (ADB) had already financed

an initial project study, but it never went ahead due to political instability.

The poor coverage of railway is a land transport weakness all over Africa. In terms of

international intervention and donors, China is the main driver of rail networks on the

African continent. Aware of this deficiency and the potential that the railway has, the

African Union (AU) inscribed in its strategic plan (Agenda 2063), that there should be

investment in a high-speed rail network to unite all African capitals by 2063. In addition,

there is an idea to build a short railway between Buba and Boé to explore mining.

However, no steps have been taken in this direction. Currently (2024), Guinea-Bissau

does not have a single railroad.

5.1. Telecommunications and Energy

Guinea-Bissau telecommunication are essentially based on mobile telephone network.

The mobile network is 3G +/4G in urban areas and the service provider “Orange Bissau”

has announced plans to complete the coverage of the rural areas with 2G/3G (APO Group,

2021). Tin addition, the landline works poorly, since the 1987–2012 instability period

(LCA, 2021). Guinea-Bissau possesses a single National TV station, which receives the

TV signal from Portugal. There is also the national radio station and several other private

and local community stations. Less than 4% of the population uses the internet (CIA,

2021), which has a low coverage, a slow speed and is subjected to frequent cuts (fact

that has been verified during our online interviews (2021 c).

A U.S. report mention that Guinea-Bissau is among the 11 countries that have the less

consumption of electricity in the World (CIA, 2021). According to a United Nations’

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Environment Program (UNEP, 2015) report, only 60% of the population have access to

electricity. Fuelwood supplies about 90% of the domestic energy. Guinea-Bissau is heavily

dependent of foreigner electricity, and all of the national production is based in fossil fuel

(coal and oil). The GB relies strongly on fossil fuels, it has plans to shift into renewable

energies, but needs an investment of USD 700 million (UN News, 2018). Wave energy

production seems promising, due to the tidal amplitude of 3.4 meters, recorded on the

banks of some rivers (UNEP, 2015). The Chinese company Sinohydro began the

construction of the first large scale solar plant, with the purpose of selling power to

national utility Electricity of Guinea-Bissau. As a matter of fact, one of the greatest

potentials is on hydroelectric power, since most of the country does not have the

necessary supply of electricity (IEEFA, 2020).

6. Economic Activities

The United Nations Development Program - Human Development Report, ranks Guinea-

Bissau in 179 out of 193 countries (UNDP/HDR 2024). This means that GB is the 15th

last place, belonging to the group considered as having a “low human development.”

Previously, in January 2016, the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and

Development (OECD) assessed investment risks in the most problematic countries, using

a scale from 0 to 7, where 0 equals minimum risk and 7 equals maximum investment

risk. In that OECD assessment, GB was classified with a score of 7. Therefore, the

investment scenario is indeed unattractive from risk viewpoint. Fortunately, this has not

stop investors, especially in the case of a country with “low human development” and

interesting natural resources, where all kinds of investment hold the prospective of a high

profit. Guinea-Bissau’s economy is based on the exploitation of natural resources. In

addition to international aid, there are loans, diaspora remittances, fishing licenses and

the exports of cashew nuts.

Following the majority of African countries, GB informal economy dominates the nation’s

workforce, with more than 90% of informal labour employment (ILO, 2020). Although

GB is considered to be the fourth world producer of cashew nuts, generating 18% of GDP,

90% of revenues exports and 33% of households’ income (Terra Ranka, 2015) and enjoys

a great wealth of marine resources, the country has a small participation in the context

of geo-economics of Sub-Saharan Africa.

In 2015, the United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) agency presented

a document entitled: Guinea-Bissau 2025 - Strategic and Operational Plan 2015–2020

“Terra Ranka”. This document, foresaw a diversified economy based on the four growth

drivers: agriculture and agro-industry, fishing, tourism, and mining. Once again, due to

political instability, most of the steps needed for its success were not taken, but the goals

designed in this strategy were absolutely appropriate (UNEP, 2015a).

One of the programmes inserted in the 2025 strategy, was the creation of Special

Economic Zones (SEZ) (program 38). Guinea-Bissau is a member of the African

Continental Free Trade Agreement (AfCFTA), which attempts to eliminate the border

tariffs between African nations. In order to deal not only with this promising pan-African

trade, but also worldwide, the country’s strategic thinking envisions to implement SEZ,

especially in Bissau, which has a seaport facility and it benefits from the Chinese Belt and

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Road Initiative. These are integrated economic platforms designed to accelerate private

investment, through the incentive of a tax-free zone, offering land, facilities and services

with special protection to entrepreneurs (Terra Ranka, 2015). The SEZ program is slowly

but steadily being implemented, and it also foresees a Special Tourism Zone, to be

established in the Bijagós Archipelago, aiming at projecting this paradisiac tourism

destination worldwide.

Foreigner investments are also being made in innovative sectors responding to a fragile,

but growing stabilization. Guinea-Bissau is a member of the Organization for the

Harmonization of Business Law in Africa, which legal regime reflects in an additional

guarantee for foreign investors. Recently, GB became particularly attractive for those

interested and investing in solar plants and generation of electricity. Although some

investors perceived GB as unsafe, the reality shows that the current political situation,

has a limited negative impact on foreign investment.

In 2022, GB state budget was approximately USD 435 million: USD 320 million were

state-generated income and USD 115 million deficit, which would have to be covered by

loans and/or donations. More than half of the state budget (56.8%) was committed to

payment of salaries to public servants, goods and services, interest and transfers, 29%

to investment expenses and 14.2% to public treasury charges (ANGOP, 2022). In 2021,

GB external debt represented 79% of the GDP, which depicts a considerable amount of

non-returnable international stakeholders’ donations, in order to maintain investments,

without impacting on state liability (DW, 2020a). In December 2023, the IMF released a

report, analyzing the external and overall debt, estimating a debt increase up to 80.4%

of GDP, with both the risk of external debt distress and the overall risk of debt distress

remaining high (IMF/AD, 2023). Among other factors, such as the State-Owned

Enterprises (with a particular focus on the electricity and water supply enterprises), the

report highlights external debt service-to-exports ratios, being impacted by the falling

prices of cashew. Nonetheless, although the dire economic and financial situation, the

report assesses that the country’s public debt is “sustainable, contingent on the

authorities’ commitment to sound policies, in the context of an engagement with the IMF

and other development partners” (IMF/AD, 2023). The authors of the report estimate

that “Guinea-Bissau’s commitment to the fiscal consolidation towards the WAEMU deficit

convergence criteria, and the consistent support provided by regional institutions, will

help managing its debt (…) Should the convergence criteria be followed, the report

estimates a debt of 70% of GDP by 2026 and 65.7% by 2028” (IMF/AD, 2023).

Furthermore, they also assessed that GB debt sustainability, depends on sound

macroeconomic policies, but there will always be risks that authorities cannot control,

such as:

• Disappointing cashew exports due to lower prices or climate events,

• High global food and oil prices,

• The effects of a protracted political security crisis in Europe and the Middle East,

• Climate change-related natural disasters.

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If these risks materialize, social tensions could increase, triggering political instability

that may constrain the fiscal adjustment and increase debt vulnerabilities.

7. Domestic Politics

There is an old saying “If the tongue and the teeth sometimes enter into conflict, imagine

different people discussing the same issue!”. Teeth and tongue belong to the same mouth

and there is no question about living peacefully together, it is the “working together”

that, sometimes, becomes a problem. Likewise, in the multi-ethnic Guinea-Bissau there

is no problem regarding different religions or cultural backgrounds; but when politics

enters the game, things change. After the implementation of the multi-party system

(1991), the new political parties pressured the government to carry out state reforms,

decentralize power, and privatize public companies. Paradoxically, with the instability, the

informal economy proliferated and the state became the country’s main employer.

Guinea-Bissau’s population entered a system of nepotism in the selection of civil

servants, where membership of a political party mattered more than a candidate’s own

credentials. In the last 30 years, Guinea-Bissau has had more than 50 political parties

and civic movements, in the context of a population less than two million (DW, 2021b).

The problem with having such multiplicity of political parties, is that it raises the suspicion

that they do not differentiate between political concepts or doctrines, but rather between

personal objectives of their leaders, turning political struggle into ethnic-tribal

confrontation. The most representative political parties are PAIGC, Madem G15

(Movement for Democratic Alternation Group of 15 [Movimento para Alternância

Democrática, Grupo dos 15] and PRS - Party for Social Renewal [Partido da Renovação

Social]. During this research, a group of young GB university students, was questioned

about their opinion on their national public administration. The words they used were:

“disorganization,” “nepotism,” “slowness,” and “corruption” (Interviews, 2021, c). It

became clear that public sector lacks definition of objectives, strategic management and

progress indicators. The problem is, regarding the good intentions and the planning

processes, the entire structure is partisan and hostage to the ruling party. The frequent

government changes, block the normal functioning of public services.

The GB political system is semi-presidential, and therefore, the President is the Head of

State, but the highest government body, works under the Prime Minister (HoG)

leadership. The President appoints the HoG, after consultation with party leaders

represented at the National Assembly. Therefore, the parliamentarian majority should

present a name to the HoS and that name should appointed HoG. The new HoG would

then form a government according to the parliamentarian majority. However, the

constitutional law has several gaps leaving room for different interpretations of the HoS

powers. That fact has given the way to a stronger presidential role, with the HoS steering

the government, the foreigner policy and promoting frequent changes of the HoG.

President Embaló (Madem G15) was appointed HoS on 27 February 2020, and as such,

he appointed HoG Nuno Nabiam. However, by the end of 2021, the relationship between

the HoS and the HoG soured (NMM/Lusa, 2022). Throughout 2021, the situation

remained volatile, mostly due to the lack of a developed civil society, with a clear

understanding of democratic institutions, and a nationwide consensus on the role of the

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military. Meanwhile, President Embaló reformed the armed forces. Although no details of

this reform plan have been made public, the President seems to be quite engaged in it,

to the point of not authorizing the retirement request of the Joint Chief of General Staff

General Biagué Na Ntan. Addressing the media in a ceremony to the falling heroes, the

President explained that “(…) General Na Ntan could not retire now, because he is a

stabilizing element in the armed forces reform” (Observador & Lusa, 2022a). In the same

media opportunity, President Embaló stated that “(…) there was an ongoing process of

recruitment of new military personnel, and the goal was to modernize the armed forces,

to allow the contribution to international peacekeeping missions” (Observador & Lusa,

2022a). The political control of the armed forces is a paramount condition for a

representative democracy to flourish. President Embaló, himself a General, is aware of it

and the decision to postpone General Ntan’s retirement, seems to be a measure to

achieve that control. General Ntan is respected among the ranks and has expressed his

loyalty to President Embaló. On the 1 February, 2022 there was an attempt of a coup

d’état, which has failed, because the army answered to the political power and not to

insurgents. Speaking to the country, the President Embaló conveyed gratitude to the

army for preventing a coup d’état, which he said to be an “attack on democracy”

(Expresso das Ilhas, 2022).

Guinea-Bissau’s National Assembly is a unicameral parliament. It has 102

parliamentarian seats, 100 are directly elected through party-list proportional

representation, and two are representing citizens living abroad (one for Africa, one for

Europe). All MP serve four-year terms. The elections held in 2019 provided the following

composition (Observador & Lusa, 2022b): PAIGC (35.2% - 47 seats); Madem G-15

(21.1% - 27 seats); PRS (21.1% - 21 seats); others (22.6% - 7 seats) (13% are female

MP). Although PAIGC managed a relative majority, it has lost the absolute majority.

Furthermore, a coalition of parties (Madem G15, PRS and APU-PDGB) obtained the

majority seats (27 + 21 + 5 (APU/PDGB (United People's Assembly/Democratic Party of

Guinea-Bissau)). The two other small parties obtained a single seat each – the PND

(Social Renewal Party) and the UpM (Union for Change). Hence, the coalition formed the

new government by presenting to President José Mário Vaz (the predecessor of President

Embaló), the name of the politician to be appointed as HoG. Later that year, this same

political alliance sponsored the presidential run of President Embaló, which downplayed

even further the traditional hegemony of PAIGC. However, this new alliance seems to

have weaknesses, and there were rumours that PAIGC was negotiating with PRS an

agreement, which could block the government.

Throughout the year 2020, relations between the President and the National Assembly

became less cordial. President Embaló started to have a direct involvement in the

governance, resembling a full presidential style regime. President Embaló, arguing that

Guinea-Bissau has to turn its political paradigm, into a more proactive diplomacy, entered

into international agreements, without the knowledge or participation of the government.

The need to amend the constitution arose in the wake of the Conakry Agreement (2016),

between major GB political forces and mediated by ECOWAS. Bissau’s inactivity in this

constitutional review, has led ECOWAS to put pressure on the authorities. This pressure,

at times, resulted in an internal perception of interference in domestic affairs.

Nevertheless, two different proposals to amend the constitution, were put forward: one

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drafted and discussed by the NA, the other by the President. The proposal debated at the

NA looked for the reinforcement of semi-presidential system, and outlined the powers of

the sovereign bodies, with particular detail the HoS and the HoG. Something that was

not clear in the Constitution as of 1996. The proposal of President Embaló, on the

contrary, reinforced the powers of the HoS, who would preside over the Council of

Ministers, the Superior Council of Defense and the Superior Council of National Security

(Observador & Lusa, 2022c).

8. Geopolitics

Although geographically Guinea-Bissau is located in the Northern Hemisphere, in

geopolitical terms it is considered to be a South Atlantic state, being part of the Zone of

Peace and Cooperation in the South Atlantic (ZOPACAS) proposed by Brazil and

implemented by the UNGA Resolution 41/11 (1986) (Figure 3). Although geopolitically

important, Brazil is the ZOPACAS driving force, without any visible major support from

other regional power. However, with the foreseen withdrawal of Brazil from other

peacekeeping operations around the world, it is feasible to think that ZOPACAS will be

revitalized in the near future.

Guinea-Bissau has extremely porous land borders, with the same tribe on either side of

the political border. Sometimes, the population has difficulty in recognizing where the

international border is. Both sea and land borders are not adequately surveyed due to

lack of assets. Guinea-Bissau does not have a direct foreign military threat. However,

there are known transnational organized groups that conduct illegal activities, crime, and

drug trafficking. The local population has been complaining about animal theft, vandalism

of fishery resources, illegal removal of cashew nuts, illegal cutting of trees, even land

disputes, all having to do with foreigners.

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In this vein, there is a particular situation, involving foreign military forces inside Guinea-

Bissau, with potential to drag the country into a proxy war. Independence guerrillas from

Senegal regularly cross the northern border into Guinea-Bissau, setting military bases

without the consent of Bissau’s authorities. The problem stems from Casamance region

located between the Gambia and Guinea-Bissau. Casamance (Figure 4) was once also a

Portuguese colony, but later became a French possession through an agreement between

those two European colonial powers. During Guinea-Bissau’s war of independence, the

PAIGC guerrillas frequently resorted to Casamance to establish second line bases (RTP,

2018). These PAIGC sites beyond the northern border, were used for logistic support and

refuge against attacks from the Portuguese forces. Nevertheless, the colonial forces

regularly launched military operations across the border into Casamance to eliminate the

PAIGC bases. Several of these cross-border operations had consent from Dakar. In 1974,

with the GB independence, Casamance was pacified, but it maintained a strong

community of Bissau-Guineans. In 1982, Casamance was again, on the local news, due

to the emergence of the separatist Movement of Democratic Forces of Casamance

(MFDC). As tensions increased between the government of Dakar and the MFDC

representatives, a military has be put in place and, in 1990, the armed conflict resumed.

Comparatively to colonial times, the situation reversed, with MFDC guerrillas, seeking

refuge into Guinea-Bissau, after attacking the positions of the Dakar forces. The presence

of the MFDC, as well as the trafficking of drugs, wood, and arms, justified several

incursions by Senegalese forces into Bissau-Guinean territory. Over the decades, the

Casamance conflict has seen periods of ceasefire and resurgence of fighting, but it has

never been resolved and the occasional presence of Senegalese forces in Guinea-Bissau,

has been an additional reason for political instability (E-Global, 2021).

During 2020, the conflict of Casamance was dormant. However, with the election of

President Embaló, a close ally of President Sall of Senegal, a series of cooperation

initiatives began, which included the resolution of the Casamance conflict. In 26 January

2021, a combined operation between the military forces of Senegal and Guinea-Bissau

began, with the aim of putting an end to the MFDC presence in Guinea-Bissau.

Senegalese forces entered Guinea-Bissau from the north, supported by artillery and

aviation, and Guinea-Bissau forces closed the southern flank. The success of this

operation was limited, and although greatly weakened, reportedly there were still MFDC

positions in Guinea-Bissau (McGregor, 2021). Guinea-Bissau opposition parties, accused

President Embaló of authorizing Senegalese forces to enter, without informing the NA

(NMM, 2021). The GB population did not appreciate the presence of foreign military, and

the opposition parties capitalized on the subject, remembering that one of the motives

for the 2012 coup d’état, was the fact of having the Angolan army stationed in Bissau.

Once again, the close relations between the two presidents generated, a feeling of

distrust, due to the alleged abusive and illegal exploitation of the northern neighbour in

relation to Bissau-Guinean resources.

8.1. Deforestation

Guinea-Bissau has a strong stock of highly valuable rosewood, teak, and other

hardwoods, which have become scarce worldwide, resulting in the price escalation. This

has led to the devastation of forests, especially the regions of Bafatá and Oio (2012 -

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2014), to a point that Oio has been left without primary forests. In 2015, the NA passed

legislation that outlawed the felling of trees for 5 years. During that time, deforestation

eased significantly, but felling for domestic consumption and illegal logging continued. In

2018, the Director-General for Forests and Fauna Mamadu Camará, announced that the

government had started to export 1,500 containers of seized illegal wood, which had

been left strewn across the country (Ambiente Magazine, 2018). At the end of that five-

year ban period, the government reauthorized the felling of trees. In October 2020,

Nelvina Barreto (former Minister of Agriculture and Forestry and environmental activist),

suggested that the government is contributing to exacerbating the effects of climate

change, causing the rainfall regime to change over time, temperatures to rise, and the

fresh water levels to drop and become inaccessible. She added that logging decimates

more than 625 m

of forest each year, reducing it by 30% in the Tombali region and

shrinking 57% of the savannah coverage in the Bafatá region, as well as 19% of the

mangrove forests in Oio and Gabú (DW, 2020b). In addition to exploiting forests,

deforestation is also the result of domestic consumption of firewood as an energy source.

The yearly consumption of wood for energy is about 1.29% of the available biomass

resource, which is about 48.3 million m

, translating into a deforestation rate of 30,000

to 60,000 ha/year (UNEP, 2015b).

8.2. Narco-trafficking

“There is a growing risk of some West African States being captured by foreign and local

criminal networks colluding with senior officials, or even collapsing. While the situation is

most acute in Guinea-Bissau today, it could also develop somewhere else in the region

tomorrow unless resolute steps are taken quickly” (UNODC, 2008, p. 5). Due to the

vulnerability of its economic and social structures, GB became open to the actions of

South American drug cartels, and the country started to be used as a launch pad to take

narcotics into Europe. The origins and destinations of narcotics may not be the

responsibility of Guinea-Bissau, but there are consequences of this traffic in local society

that cannot be ignored. The latest incident took place in September 2024, when an

airplane was sized at Bissau airport with 2.6 ton of cocaine on board (Africa Lusófona,

2024). Drug trafficking brings with it, organized crime, such as the trafficking of arms

and people, and, above all, it poisons the society as easy money. Criminal activity is no

longer a “common crime”, but takes on a higher level of complexity and violence. The

highest spheres of decision-making are absorbed in the web of drug traffickers, and often

national decisions are made in accordance with their interests. “The Office has warned

that the illegal drug trade in the region is threatening stability and development. Guinea-

Bissau, one of the hardest hit countries, risks becoming a “narco-State”. In response to

the situation, UNODC is providing technical assistance to strengthen institutions and the

rule of law and is mobilizing additional international support for Guinea Bissau and the

region” (UNODC, 2008, p. 2). For example, in August 2021, the U.S. Department of State

Narcotics Rewards Program, offered five million dollars reward, for the arrest of the

former head of the Armed Forces (General António Indjai), considered “one of the most

destabilizing figures”. General Indjai was Armed Forces Chief of Staff from 2010 to 2014,

being one of the leaders of both the 1 April 2010 military uprising and the 2012 coup

d’état. He is no longer a military leader, but he was operating freely in West Africa

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(Observador & Lusa, 2021a). Even if Bissau-Guineans wanted to fight drug trafficking,

they do not have the means to do it. Indeed, drug trafficking is not a problem unique to

GB, nor should it be fought in isolation by the small African country. After entering the

African continent, the traffickers’ network makes “the product” travel overland towards

North, to the Mediterranean Sea, towards Europe. It is assessed that over 75% of the

“product” manages to reach European shores. On 10 November 2021, the executive

secretary of the Observatory for the Fight Against Drugs and Drug Addiction (Abílio

Aleluia Có Júnior), declared that drug trafficking had increased in Guinea-Bissau, with

the involvement of state agents. In his own words:

“We’ve always drawn attention to the increase in drug trafficking in Guinea-

Bissau, so it doesn’t surprise us at all. In fact, it is a sad and shameful

situation for the country and with each passing day we are seeing the

involvement of politicians, the military, defence and security agents, and

businessmen in drug trafficking (…)” (Voice of America, 2021).

The narco-trafficking has also contaminated the armed forces, with high-ranking officers

being identified as relevant elements in the drugs’ cartels, and low army ranks facilitating

and providing security to drug shipments (VoA, 2021). President Embaló has called the

fight against drugs cartels one of his administration’s major goals. In fact, he has

expressed that, as a result of his anti-drugs engagement, the failed attempt of the coup

d’état that occurred on 1 February 2022, might have been promoted by the drug cartels,

in order to remove him from power (DN, 2022).

8.3. Global Warming

As a country where a simple high tide can make the sea water penetrate about 100 km

through the inland rivers, it is easy to see that Guinea-Bissau is strongly threatened by

the average rise in sea water, due to global warming. In a number of interviews, it was

clear to draw the conclusion that although the seriousness of global warming is

acknowledged, climate issues are not yet on the agenda. However, without realizing it,

GB has a relevant role to play in the fight against global warming. The extensive

mangroves coastal forests, are one of the most effective ways of capturing and fixing

carbon, which is why the Guinea-Bissau flora, is extremely important for the global

decarbonization. Likewise, the presence of large amounts of phytoplankton in the Atlantic

Ocean that bathes the Guinea-Bissau continental shelf is, another extremely effective

way of capturing carbon. The more carbon the phytoplankton absorbs; the more

phytoplankton reproduces. Since phytoplankton is the essential basis for feeding fish

stocks, the captured carbon enters the food chain in a health way.

8.4. Illegal or Unreported Fishing

In a speech to a Community of Portuguese-speaking Countries (CPLP), group of experts

in fishing matters, stated that “illegal, non-declared, and non-reglementary fishing is one

of the biggest problems facing Guinea-Bissau” (Sanca, 2021). This abusive and unlawful

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activity is not only impoverishing the economy, but above all is extinguishing resources,

destroying the sea bed, and the mangrove forests. The illegal and excessive fishing that

is taking place, inhibits the protection seasons and could deplete irreversibly fish stocks.

It should also be noted that trawl fishing is particularly harmful, as it destroys the seabed,

brings to the surface species that are returned to the sea dead. Likewise, Senegal’s

artisanal fleet, fishes indiscriminately in GB territorial waters, without any license and, to

make matters worse, destroy considerable amounts of mangroves in order to collect

wood to smoke fish. In this way, they contribute to further aggravate the problem by

destroying the refuge of species in their juvenile state.

8.5. International Organizations

The United Nations had a mission in Bissau (UNIOGBIS) for 20 years. By decision of the

UN Security Council, this mission ended in 2020, due to lack of visible results. According

to a report (S/2018/1086), UNIOGBIS faced insurmountable challenges to its mandate

due to the “engines of instability”. The GB fragility breads from structural problems: “a

political class deeply divided; the growing political influence of a shadow economy based

on drug trafficking; the absence of the state, particularly in rural areas, and its

ineffectiveness when present; human rights violations and widespread impunity;

resignation to poverty and lack of access to basic services.” Furthermore, it was

mentioned that GB did not have the institutional and physical infrastructure, nor the

human resources with the necessary training, to absorb the technical and financial

support provided by the international community. It concluded that the long presence of

“(…) UNIOGBIS may have contributed to a lesser sense of ownership of the political

process among the leaders and of their responsibility to advance the country”

(UNIOGBIS, 2020 b).

The post-electoral crisis that broke out in early 2020, confirmed all the points of the

UNIOGBIS report. The crisis in the system was aggravated by the COVID-19 pandemic,

which had a strong impact on the way UNIOGBIS had planned its redeployment, as well

as, on the transfer of mission to other UN funds, agencies and programs, assuring that

the UN support would be continued. Furthermore, before withdrawal, UNIOGBIS

encouraged ECOWAS, the AU, the CPLP and the European Union (the “Group of Five”) to

promote aid to Guinea-Bissau (Global Initiative, 2021).

Guinea-Bissau joined the African Union in 1973 and the ultimate goal of AU, is the

complete economic integration of all African countries into an African Economic

Community. From the 1990s onwards, with the opening to multi-party system, Guinea-

Bissau entered a situation of latent internal conflict, with successive coups d’état, a civil

war and permanent political instability. Thus, AU placed the country under close

surveillance and, when the 2012 coup d’état took place, the Guinea-Bissau’s AU

membership was suspended, and sanctions were applied.

The democratic elections of 2014 came to mark the return to normality, and the AU

reinstated Guinea-Bissau membership. Guinea-Bissau is a founding member of ECOWAS

(1975). Following the 2012 coup d’état in Guinea-Bissau, and the withdrawal of the

Angolan forces, which were in Bissau under a bilateral military cooperation agreement,

ECOWAS deployed a peacekeeping force to GB. The ECOWAS peacekeeping mission was

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named ECOMIB. Initially, this international force had an 800-strong military apparatus,

with the task to ensure the security of the local sovereign bodies. Later on, the force

reduced its contingent to 500 soldiers and police agents. ECOMIB had military personnel

from Nigeria, Côte D’Ivoire, Togo, Senegal, and Burkina Faso as well as the police

contingent from Nigeria. The peacekeeping force had an initial mandate of six months,

agreed with the host nation. However, in 2017 the force was still in Guinea-Bissau, and

not much improvement could be seen regarding the violence and instability. The locals

claimed that the foreigner military had been “contaminated” by the drug dealers, and

were trafficking themselves. Furthermore, the foreigner forces had too much Senegalese

military, bringing bad memories of the neighbouring country’s participation in Guinea-

Bissau’s 1998-1999 civil war, questioning the force’s neutrality. In addition, ECOMIB

compounds were too far away from Bissau, where the violence resided, thus leaving the

population unprotected. In September 2017, ECOMIB redeployed to their sending

nations, and no other international force substituted it (Global Security, 2017).

In October 2016, ECOWAS made yet another important contribution for the pacification

and stability of Guinea-Bissau, by promoting and mediating a reconciliation meeting, in

Conakry, with all Bissau-Guinean stakeholders. The result of this meeting was a written

agreement between all parties, which became known as the Conakry Agreement. The

Agreement provided for the formation of a consensual government comprising all parties

represented in the National Assembly, the appointment of the HoG by consensus and far-

reaching institutional reforms. In terms of institutional reforms, the UN supported the

drafting of a new electoral law, the revision of the constitution law and a law on political

parties. However, in the two years following the agreement, none of the provisions

revised therein were implemented. Therefore, ECOWAS decided to intervene and applied

sanctions on 19 individuals, accused of promoting instability, and political obstructionists.

The Chairperson of the UN Commission and the UNSG fully endorsed the decisions of

ECOWAS. They reiterate their endorsement of the centrality of the Conakry Agreement

as a roadmap for Guinea-Bissau’s future (UNSG, 2018). The UE, the EU and the U.S. had

imposed sanctions imposed over some military personnel, because of their actions in the

2012 coup d’état. In 2021 several of the sanctioned persons saw their bank accounts

frozen by the UN, and the new President Embaló told media representatives he was going

to try negotiate with the UN the lifting of such sanctions (Observador & Lusa, 2021b).

In March 2018, the AU promoted the signing of an international agreement among the

African States for the creation of an African Free Trade Area (AfCTA). A year later, GB

signed the AfCTA Agreement (The instrument of ratification was deposited on 27

September 2022). The main objective of the AfCTA is to create a single market, in which

the free movement of people and goods and a future system of a single currency for all

signatory countries is established. Another relevant international forum in which Guinea-

Bissau has an “equal in-between pairs” seat, is the CPLP. One area of particular emphasis

is the cooperation in the defence sector, where GB can profit from the military and

security capabilities of its CPLP partners. Especially in the surveillance of the waters under

Bissau’s jurisdiction. Guinea-Bissau military personnel has been participating regularly in

CPLP “Felino” exercises since 2000. In September 2021, the GB HoS expressed the wish

to take the (rotate) two years’ presidency of CPLP, after São Tomé and Principe, which

will end in 2025 (Observador & Lusa, 2021c).

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8.6. Bilateral Relations

In 2012, the Groupe de Recherche et de Realization, sponsored by ECOWAS, mapped the

Bissau-Guinean diaspora (RADBG, n.d.). Annually, GB diaspora sends home about USD

47 million, representing 3.1% of national GDP. The results of that research beyond

Guinea-Bissau’s region were not surprising: most Bissau-Guineans living abroad reside

in Europe, with Portugal leading the list. According to the Portuguese Border and

Emigration Service (SEF), in 2019, there were approximately 19,000 Bissau-Guinean

nationals, which represents 1% of Guinea-Bissau’s population (Sangreman et. al., n.d.).

Therefore, the bilateral relationship between Portugal and Guinea-Bissau is particularly

solid. Portugal operates as a bridge to EU funds for African countries, and as a

negotiator/facilitator for EU fishing interests in GB waters.

The Soviet Union had a major role in the independence process of Guinea-Bissau. After

its independence, the Soviet support continued. However, after the dissolution of the

Soviet Union, the Russian support, although effective, became residual. Nowadays,

Russia is still an option for GB students wishing to carry on with their superior studies.

In October 2021, relations between the two countries entered a new chapter. The Russian

Foreign Ministry released a statement announcing the agreement between Russia and

Guinea-Bissau regarding visa waiver for diplomatic and service passports, as well as a

new technical-military agreement. Quoting Minister Sergey Lavrov “The natural next step

must be to intensify trade, economic and investment cooperation in order to bring it to

the level of good and credible political dialogue” (Observador & Lusa, 2021d). Russian-

Guinea Bissau relations continued to develop after 2021.

The most relevant of Guinea-Bissau’s bilateral partner laying “beyond the horizon” seems

to be China. Not only do Chinese presence and support to Guinea-Bissau go back to its

days fighting for independence, but they also continue until today, with commerce and

diplomatic engagement. China is the only country that has an embassy in every African

country, which includes Guinea-Bissau. The fishery sector is of particular interest to

China, having entered into fishing agreements with Guinea Bissau. China is also a major

importer of legal timber from Guinea-Bissau. The forests of Guinea-Bissau, if explored

with sustainable methods, can provide good quantities of rosewood, which is coveted for

shipbuilding and used in traditional Chinese hongmu furniture. Beyond the financial

compensation of such commercial exchanges, China has also constructed several facilities

in Guinea-Bissau, aiming to provide wellbeing to the population. However, a recent

development seems to have brought this bilateral relation to a higher level. In 22

November 2021, Guinea-Bissau joined the Chinese Belt and Road Initiative (B&RI). The

MoU was signed by the Chinese Ambassador to Guinea-Bissau, Guo Ce, and the Minister

of Foreign Affairs, Suzi Carla Barbosa. The admission to B&RI will open the Guinea-Bissau

to new Chinese investments, such as a Chinese commitment to build a USD 184 million

bio-mass plant, and has undergone several redevelopment projects, including USD 48

million to renovate the antiquated telecommunications system, highway construction,

deep-water fisheries and fishery land support facilities, potentially oil exploration and,

capitalizing on a future SEZ in Bissau, the installation of more Chinese enterprises

(Devonshire-Ellis, 2021). In 2024, Guinea-Bissau signed a strategic partnership with

China during the FOCAC, which took place in Beijing.

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Casamance became part of Senegal after a border agreement in 1888 transferred control

from Portugal to France. Upon Senegal’s independence in 1960, Casamance was

integrated into the new nation. The Movement of Democratic Forces of Casamance

(MFDC) created in 1982 and its armed wing “Atika” created in 1995, are leading a conflict

that has significantly disrupted tourism in the region, affecting its economic stability.

Despite the 2004 peace agreement with the Senegalese government and the 2014

unilateral ceasefire, some factions have continued to engage in sporadic violence.

Therefore, Senegal is not interested to have a “failed-State” at its doorstep, where drug

and arms dealers’ rule, and where Casamance separatist movements can find refuge.

Furthermore, Guinea-Bissau’s offshore oil and inland resources, are also interesting

businesses for the Senegalese enterprises. Therefore, it is in the best interest of Senegal

to have a stable and developed Guinea-Bissau, and that can be the seen in recent bilateral

partnerships. Angola and South Africa saw their cooperation with Guinea-Bissau

interrupted with the 2012 coup d’état. However, there are signs that they are interested

in returning, which clearly demonstrates the country potential. This is seen a good

indicator of the relevancy that Guinea-Bissau natural resources have in the geo-

economics of sub-Saharan region.

9. General Assessment and SWOT Analysis

Guinea-Bissau is a developing state, with a great wealth in natural resources, where

instability and illegal activities flourish. From 1973 to 2024, Guinea-Bissau has had 30

governments, 20 prime ministers (5 of them appointed more than once), 12 presidents,

and countless government officials. For example, within the duration of the IX legislature

(2014–2018), four HoG were appointed (Teixeira & Tamilton, 2020) and during the X

Legislature (2018–2023), there were three different prime ministers. The genesis of the

country’s instability lies within poor governance, which in turn results in a scarcity of

financial resources, capable of providing the population with an acceptable living

standards. In the absence of immediately available resources in the public sector, and its

authorities defying the rule of law, the population engages in an unrestrained struggle

for resources access, engaging in all types of informal and illegal economy. This situation,

favours nepotism, increasingly based on the differentiation of ethnicities. This contradicts

the successful process of building a unitary state that began with the struggle against

the colonizing power, and persisted until the civil war of 1998–1999. The complex process

of tribalization mixed with political nepotism, is both motivation and consequence of

corruption. Successive coups d’état, that have taken place over the past five decades,

have weakened the process of state building and the implementation of a liberal

democracy based on the rule of law.

At the international level, efforts have been made to support the country and to avoid

the categorization of a “failed state,” with state building and conflict prevention

measures, but these measures appear not to have contributed to the democratization,

with the necessary consequences for the economy, and the gradual disinterest of

international stakeholders. Thus, Guinea-Bissau is at the bottom of the world scale in

terms of human development. In the last report to the UNSC, the UNIOGBIS head wrote:

“There is great fatigue on the part of donors with the cycle of conflict and political

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359

stagnation in Guinea-Bissau” (Global Initiative, 2021). However, the “failed-state” and

“narco-state” labels may be simplistic, not having considering the true potential of the

country. If the authorities, together with the international entities responsible for fighting

narco-trafficking, manage to stop the incoming flow, the involvement in narcotics will

also stop.

Should one make a strength, weaknesses, opportunities, and threats (SWOT) analysis,

it becomes manifest that, although the negative factors occupy more labels (W, T), the

positive aspects (S, O) are far more powerful and sustainable (Table 2). The GB human

capital is low and the level of poverty high. The lack of human resources, jeopardizes the

good governance, opening the society to all kind of “other solutions” such as corruption,

nepotism, and illegal activities. These disrupting actions are significantly increased by

the misunderstanding of democratic values by both military apparatus and the posture

of the ruling authorities. All these homemade damaging effects are exploited and

encouraged by narco-dealers, using GB as a transit platform. In material terms, the GB

needs almost everything, much of which will be obtained externally, in the form of both

donations and investments. Not only investments benefit stakeholders, they also are the

engine for development and for the well-being of the population.

These putative developing projects, may generate a spinning effect of attracting the

diaspora and encouraging the return of highly qualified individuals, as well as their

financial savings, that could boost and create small and medium-sized companies. The

tourism sector must be further explored, as it offers great potential, especially in the

Bijagós, taking advantage of the possibility of establishing a SEZ for tourism.

Furthermore, the setting up of a SEZ in Bissau capable of attracting important

international investments depends on three factors; (1) political stability and fight against

corruption; (2) qualification of human social capital; and (3) ability to attract international

businesses.

Improving the cashew industry, as GB main export, and not only from the quality

viewpoint, but also all derived products. This would require setting up processing plants,

employing more manpower, and augmenting export of that product. If logging is legalized

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360

and sustainability practice can be ensured, there is a significant market awaiting Bissau-

Guinean lumber: China is potentially an important importer of its rosewood. Furthermore,

should proper investments in the road and seaports systems be made, the country could

start exploiting the minerals in its subsoil.

Offshore oil exploration may prove to be an excellent contribution to the economic

balance. However, it should be done with the three permanent concerns: It must not be

a source of oceanic pollution; it must be done taken into consideration that the World will

rely less and less on fossil fuels; and it must avoid absolutely dependency of oil industries.

The privileged conditions for the breeding and capture of fish, mollusks, and shrimp are

very unique, and the immediate answer for the country to prosper. Further, the ocean

floor, is likely to have mineral resources with low exploration costs due to the shallow

depth of its extensive continental shelf. Investments in seaports, borders surveillance,

systems and services to support and provide maintenance to industrial fishing and

merchant operates in the waters under Guinea-Bissau’s jurisdiction, have been wasted

opportunities.

10. Conclusion

Guinea-Bissau is a post-colonial state that fought an armed struggle for its independence,

against Portugal. After independence, Guinea-Bissau was ruled as a single party system

(1973–1991), which might have framed the culture of the senior elites, prompting

adjustment difficulties to a multiparty system. Civil dissatisfaction, due to poor live

conditions, and a military apparatus with a political bearing, lead to frequent cases of

instability. Guinea-Bissau is labeled internationally, as being one of the poorest countries

in the world, with very high levels of corruption and strong drug trafficking involvement.

However, the GB has a considerable amount of natural resources, which, together with

an outstanding bio-diversity, cultural variety, and unexplored paradisiac locations, could

raise the country branding, to the level of a pleasant destination, with good standard of

living. To conclude, we are recalling the main research question: How can Guinea-Bissau

overcome its permanent governance instability, and avoid becoming a “failed state”?

Although the instability’s activities are normally attributed to the defense sector, which

seems to have difficulties in complying with the role of the military in a representative

democracy, and the weak governance that fail to act according to the law, the real reason

for the instability is poverty. The population suffering is best represented by the local

saying: “the greater the famine, the greater the protest in the streets.” Most of the

reasons for Guinea-Bissau’s governmental services’ malfunctioning are common to other

African countries - weak structures and institutions. This happens, because Guinea-

Bissau has adopted a political system, incorporating the Western model of structuring the

state, without taken into consideration their own culture and way of living. This provoked

that the new born country had incompatibilities between different layers of its society,

adding an extra motive of instability. Furthermore, this weak governance has been

surreptitiously aggravated by transnational malicious actors interested in maintaining

instability, in order to use GB as a drug trafficking platform. However, the SWOT analyses

clearly demonstrates that the country’s weaknesses are, in fact the reverse engine for its

opportunities, and it can become a beacon of progress in the region.

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Therefore, Guinea-Bissau might have reached the tipping point of its political evolution.

It is worth noting that GB is a republic with a democratic semi-presidential regime.

However, President Embaló has shown tendency to assume a presidential style of

governance, leading foreigner affairs negotiations, presiding over the council of ministers,

and exercising tight control over the higher echelons of the armed forces. Although

internal criticism of the politically educated people has arisen (VDG, 2021), fearing for

the independence of the state institutions, the fact is that the popular support that elected

President Embaló with 53.55% of the votes does not seem to have decreased (DW,

2020c). Furthermore, interviewing high-ranking officials, it becomes clear that the

presidential initiatives have indeed opened further financial and foreigner diplomat

support. This “presidential style” overtakes the role of the HoG, questioning the type of

regime (semi-Presidential or Presidential) the country needs.

Guinea-Bissau needs firm, transparent, and consistent political leadership that follows

democratic values, exercises fair political tutelage over its armed forces, demands loyalty

from the military ranks, but acts in accordance the law and culture values, while striving

for the well-being of the population. International investments in Guinea-Bissau’s

structures (the so-called State Building) are only relevant if national values (Nation

Building) have previously been enshrined. Apparently, in the case of GB, the order of

factors has been changed. The constitutional amendment due to take place, will have to

clarify the role of the HoS. Only after achieving the political stability, Guinea-Bissau,

manage to establish the conditions to engage in a serious campaign against narco-traffic

and corruption. Any initiative to project Guinea-Bissau’s economy towards an auspicious

future, will require the establishment of partnership agreements, with national and

foreigner entities, such as the ECOWAS, UE, AU, China, and private funds, in order to

develop win-win projects. These projects can have a development spinning factor,

through the planned EEZ, set to be implemented in Bissau and Bijagós.

Only after the stabilization of Guinea-Bissau can the traditional geopolitical question -

What has this country to offer to the world? - be answered; and the country has potential

for the answer to be: sustainable provision of blue economy resources, a stable and

growing economy good for investment connecting Senegal, Guinea and Mali, and a

paradisiac leisure and touristic destination.

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