OBSERVARE

Universidade Autónoma de Lisboa

e-ISSN: 1647-7251

Vol. 15, N.º 2

November 2024-April 2025

331

GUINEA-BISSAU: AVOIDING THE REPUTATION OF BEING A FAILED

STATE

PAULO GONÇALVES

goncalves.prt@gmail.com

Independent researcher and a retired senior officer (Colonel) of the Portuguese Air Force

(Portugal). He has a large experience in research and advising international organizations, as he

operated in a myriad of functions and tasks, including international engagements in European

Union (EU), North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the United Nations (UN). Throughout

his career, he has operated in 25 different countries across the Americas, Europe, Asia, and

Africa. Paulo worked as a strategic communicator, performed conflict observation and analysis

functions for NATO, the EU, and the UN; operated as an electoral support staff member, and

program implementer for the United Nations Development Program; and was an advisor at the

United Nations political mission for Afghanistan (UNAMA), making analyses and assessments on

Afghan regional and national governance. He is currently an independent researcher on

international relations, with a particular interest in Portuguese-speaking countries. He

collaborates with the University of Macau regularly on academic research.

FRANCISCO JOSÉ LEANDRO

fleandro@um.edu.mo

Ph.D. in political science and international relations from the Catholic University of Portugal

(2010). In 2014, 2017, and 2020, he was awarded the Institute of European Studies in Macau

Academic Research Grant, which is a major component of the Asia-Europe Comparative Studies

Research Project. From 2014 to 2018, he was the program coordinator at the Institute of Social

and Legal Studies, Faculty of Humanities at the University of Saint Joseph in Macau, China. From

2018 to 2023 he was the associate dean of the Institute for Research on Portuguese-Speaking

Countries at the City University of Macau. Since 2023, he is associate professor with habilitation

in international relations at Faculty of Social Sciences and the Deputy Director of the Institute of

Global and Public Affairs – University of Macau (China). Francisco is a member of OBSERVARE

(Observatory of Foreign Relations), which was founded in 1996 as a center for studies in

international relations at the Autonomous University of Lisbon, Portugal. https://orcid.org/0000-

0002-1443-5828.

Abstract

This paper poses and answers the following research question: How may Guinea-Bissau

overcome its permanent governance instability and avoid becoming a “failed state”? This

question is particularly important, not only in the context of circumventing being exposed to

the economic interests of external actors, but also, to understand the state domestic

weaknesses. Guinea-Bissau is a partially archipelagic small state, with an interesting portfolio

of natural resources, investment opportunities, and business prospects. The country has

suffered decades of institutional instability and social fragility, resulting being rated as “failed-

state”. Indeed, O’ Regan &Thompson (2013, p. 3) refer Guinea-Bissau as “(…) the first narco-

state in Africa”. There are a number of perspectives to categorize a state as failed-state, but

we are focused on the institutional approach and in a possible lack of state authority. As such,

we assume that “states fail because they do not possess the political, economic and social

capabilities to survive as states” (Hill, 2005; Gros, 1996, p. 456; Jackson, 2000, p. 296;

Rotberg, 2004, p. 2; Zartman,1995, p. 5). Once the ideological cradle of colonial self-

determination, Guinea-Bissau fought valiantly to gain independence (1963–1974), unilaterally

proclaiming it on 24 September 1973 (Té, 2015, p. 30). Regrettably, after gaining recognition

as a sovereign state, Guinea-Bissau has witnessed four effective coup d’états, 16 different

JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations

e-ISSN: 1647-7251

VOL 15 N.º 2

November 2024-April 2025, pp. 331-370

Guinea-Bissau: Avoiding the Reputation of being a Failed State

Paulo Gonçalves, Francisco José Leandro

332

attempts of coups d’état, one civil war, several parliamentary dissolutions, assassinations of

politicians, interference of the militaries in executive functions and frequent change of political

executives. Several reasons have contributed to this instability: (1) The interests of

neighboring countries as well as an intense international influence; (2) The condition of being

a post-colonial state, which is reflected in a number of factors such as poor literacy, health

care and security (BTI, 2024); (3) The internal ethnic-religious clashes and the 1980 events,

which lead qualified Cabo Verdean personnel to leave the country (Duarte Silva, 2006); (4)

The meagre political control of the armed forces associated to a widespread corruption (BTI,

2024); (5) The short minded political culture within a semi-presidential system; (8) and the

last but certainly not the least, the under-resourced and sloppy surveillance of borders (US

Department of State, 2022, p. 5). All these factors jeopardized its economy, drained its

resources, and exposed society to narco-trafficking. A struggle between the President Umaro

Sissoco Embaló and the parliament regarding the amendment of the Constitution (among

other issues), has further reignited political instability. Apart from the direct competition posed

by Senegal, Guinea-Bissau has potential to become a reference economy in the region, and

an entry door for the market of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS)

and the West African Monetary and Economic Union (WAEMU). However, hardly this will ever

happen, without political stability and an urgent need of reform of the defense and security

sectors. A transformation not only in its structures but, above all, in mentalities, based on the

role of the military in a representative democracy - a semi-presidential political system. This

research does not adopt any explicit theory (Creswell & Creswell, 2018, p. 64). Instead, it

employs a descriptive-inductive qualitative methodology based on selected themes to

evaluate how Guinea-Bissau can avoid becoming a failed state. The critical discussion of these

themes, has been supplemented with interviews with Guinea-Bissau’s opinion leaders and

representatives of its diaspora, as well as former Portuguese colonial agents. The authors wish

to acknowledge that, to mitigate the insufficiency of official and academic qualitative data, we

conducted a number of interviews and we used triangulated media sources. The relevant

interview transcripts, were freely translated into English language. Finally, this research

excludes the last two years (2022-2024) of current political leadership, under the President

Embaló. During this period of time President Embaló dissolved the parliament twice, scheduled

legislative elections for November 2024 and at the time we write, the presidential election has

not been called yet. Therefore, the authors consider important the completion of this sequence

of facts, to analyze his political action.

Keywords

Guinea-Bissau, Failed State, Political Instability, Development, Ethnic-groups, Narco-

trafficking.

Resumo

Este artigo coloca e responde à seguinte questão de investigação: Como poderá a Guiné-

Bissau ultrapassar a sua permanente instabilidade governativa e evitar tornar-se num “Estado

falhado”? Esta questão é particularmente importante, não só no contexto de evitar a exposição

aos interesses económicos de actores externos, mas também, para compreender as fraquezas

internas do Estado. A Guiné-Bissau é um pequeno Estado parcialmente arquipelágico, com

um interessante portefólio de recursos naturais, oportunidades de investimento e perspetivas

de negócio. O país sofreu décadas de instabilidade institucional e fragilidade social, o que o

associa à ideia de “Estado falhado”. Com efeito, O’ Regan & Thompson (2013, p. 3) referem-

se à Guiné-Bissau como “(…) o primeiro narco-Estado em África”. Existem diversas

perspectivas para categorizar um Estado como um Estado falhado. Todavia, neste artigo

adaptámos uma abordagem institucional para avaliar da possível falta de autoridade no

JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations

e-ISSN: 1647-7251

VOL 15 N.º 2

November 2024-April 2025, pp. 331-370

Guinea-Bissau: Avoiding the Reputation of being a Failed State

Paulo Gonçalves, Francisco José Leandro

333

exercício das funções públicas. Como tal, assumimos que “os Estados falham porque não

possuem as capacidades políticas, económicas e sociais para sobreviver como Estados” (Hill,

2005; Gros, 1996, p. 456; Jackson, 2000, p. 296; Rotberg, 2004, p. 2; Zartman,1995, p. 5).

Outrora berço ideológico da autodeterminação, a Guiné-Bissau lutou corajosamente para

conquistar a independência (1963-1974), proclamando-a unilateralmente a 24 de setembro

de 1973 (Té, 2015, p. 30). Lamentavelmente, depois de obter o reconhecimento como Estado

soberano, a Guiné-Bissau assistiu a quatro golpes de Estado, 16 tentativas de golpe de Estado,

uma guerra civil, diversas dissoluções do parlamento, assassinatos de políticos, interferência

dos militares nas funções executivas e mudanças frequentes de executivos políticos. Várias

razões contribuíram para esta instabilidade: (1) Os interesses dos países vizinhos, bem como

uma intensa influência internacional; (2) A condição de ser um Estado pós-colonial, que se

reflecte numa série de factores como a fraca literacia, débeis cuidados de saúde e insegurança

(BTI, 2024); (3) Os confrontos étnico-religiosos internos e os acontecimentos de 1980, que

levaram cidadãos qualificados de origem cabo-verdiana a abandonar o país (Duarte Silva,

2006); (4) O escasso controlo político das forças armadas associado a uma corrupção

generalizada (BTI, 2024); (5) A cultura política de curto prazo dentro de um sistema

semipresidencialista; (8) e, por último, mas certamente não menos importante, a fraca

vigilância das fronteiras (U.S. Department of State, 2022, p. 5). Todos estes factores

comprometeram a sua economia, esgotaram os seus recursos e expõem a sociedade ao tráfico

de droga. O conflito institucional entre o Presidente Umaro Sissoco Embaló e o parlamento

relativamente à alteração da Constituição (entre outras questões) reacendeu ainda mais a

instabilidade política. Apesar da concorrência directa colocada pelo Senegal, a Guiné-Bissau

tem potencial para se tornar uma economia de referência na região e uma porta de entrada

para o mercado da Comunidade Económica dos Estados da África Ocidental (CEDEAO) e da

União Monetária e Económica da África Ocidental (UEMOA). No entanto, dificilmente tal

acontecerá, sem estabilidade política e sem a reforma dos sectores da defesa e da segurança.

Uma transformação não só nas suas estruturas, mas, sobretudo, nas mentalidades, assente

no papel dos militares numa democracia representativa – um sistema político

semipresidencialista. Esta investigação adopta uma a metodologia qualitativa descritiva-

indutiva (Creswell & Creswell, 2018, p. 64) e baseia-se na análise de um conjunto de temas

seleccionados, para avaliar como a Guiné-Bissau poderá evitar ser um estado falido? Os

autores desejam reconhecer que, para mitigar a insuficiência de dados qualitativos oficiais e

académicos, realizaram uma série de entrevistas e utilizaram fontes mediáticas devidamente

trianguladas. A discussão crítica destes temas foi complementada com entrevistas a líderes

de opinião da Guiné-Bissau e a representantes da sua diáspora, bem como a antigos agentes

coloniais portugueses. As transcrições das entrevistas relevantes foram traduzidas livremente

para a língua inglesa. Por último, esta investigação exclui os últimos dois anos (2022-2024)

da actual liderança política, sob o Presidente Embaló. Durante este período, o Presidente

Embaló dissolveu o parlamento por duas vezes, marcou eleições legislativas para novembro

de 2024 e, à data em que escrevemos, as eleições presidenciais ainda não foram convocadas.

Por isso, os autores consideram importante aguardar pelo desenvolvimento desta sequência

de factos, antes de analisar os últimos dois anos da sua acção política.

Palavras-chave

Guiné-Bissau, Estado Falhado, Instabilidade Política, Desenvolvimento, Grupos Étnicos,

Narcotráfico.

JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations

e-ISSN: 1647-7251

VOL 15 N.º 2

November 2024-April 2025, pp. 331-370

Guinea-Bissau: Avoiding the Reputation of being a Failed State

Paulo Gonçalves, Francisco José Leandro

334

How to cite this article

Gonçalves, Paulo & Leandro, Francisco José (2024). Guinea-Bissau: Avoiding the Reputation of

being a Failed State. Janus.net, e-journal of international relations. VOL 15 N.º 2, November 2024-

April 2025, pp. 331-370. https://doi.org/10.26619/1647-7251.15.2.15.

A Article received on 14th May 2024 and accepted for publication on 21st September

2024.

JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations

e-ISSN: 1647-7251

VOL 15 N.º 2

November 2024-April 2025, pp. 331-370

Guinea-Bissau: Avoiding the Reputation of being a Failed State

Paulo Gonçalves, Francisco José Leandro

335

GUINEA-BISSAU: AVOIDING THE REPUTATION OF BEING A

FAILED STATE

PAULO GONÇALVES

FRANCISCO JOSÉ LEANDRO

1. Introduction

Guinea-Bissau is internationally perceived as a country with high political-military

instability, a “failed-state”, and a “narco-state” (Clarke, 2017). However, there is more to

this African country than meets the eye. Guinea-Bissau is a partially archipelagic small

state, covered by lush vegetation, located in the westernmost part of the African

continent, halfway between the Equator and the Tropic of Cancer. The country is heavily

irrigated by rivers and marshy areas, with more than 80 islands and islets, forming the

“Bijagós Archipelago”.

In 1956, Amílcar Cabral led the founding of the PAIGC (African Party for the

Independence of Guinea and Cabo Verde [Partido Africano para a Independência da Guiné

e Cabo Verde]. He first tried to negotiate a gradual path towards independence, with

obvious negative results (Sanca & Có, 2017). In August 1959, sailors and dockworkers

at the seaport of Bissau went on strike, demanding better wages and better living

conditions (Sanca & Có, 2017). The protestors decided to demonstrate at the harbour,

but the police demobilized it using firearms. Allegedly, 50 demonstrators were killed, and

more than 100 were wounded (Duarte Silva, 2006 and DW, 2014). The so-called Pidjiguiti

massacre, has been perceived as the trigger cause for the PAIGC to abandon their

campaign of nonviolent resistance (Roque, 2018). Not having been successful in the

dialogue with the colonial authorities, Amílcar Cabral led his party to a liberation armed

struggle. In 1963, two years after the beginning of the combats in Angola and the loss

of the Portuguese colonies in India, the PAIGC fighters began their armed struggle,

against the colonial regime. Out of the so-called by the colonial regime “three overseas

theatres of operations” (Angola, Guinea-Bissau, and Mozambique), Guinea-Bissau was

considered the fiercest combat zone, with heavy casualties on both sides. Interviewing

Rodrigues (Interview, 2021b), it became clear that, in the early 1970s, after 11 years of

fighting, the Portuguese military were feeling that the war outcome, would not favour

them. The colonial military only had control of the urban areas, and they lost air

supremacy, due to PAIGC use of soviet made surface-to-air missiles. Meanwhile, Cabral

managed to engage in diplomatic venues, gaining international recognition – He met with

Pope Paulo VI on July 1970, soon after his participation in the international conference

JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations

e-ISSN: 1647-7251

VOL 15 N.º 2

November 2024-April 2025, pp. 331-370

Guinea-Bissau: Avoiding the Reputation of being a Failed State

Paulo Gonçalves, Francisco José Leandro

336

on solidarity with the Peoples of the Portuguese Colonies (Solidariedade com os Povos

das Colónias Portuguesas), which took place in Rome in June 1970 and gathered 177

organizations from 64 states. PAIGC participated in some United Nations (UN) events, as

a representative of the Guinea-Bissau opposition, and managed to invite a UN envoy, to

territories under PAIGC control, conveying the idea that Portugal, no longer had the right

to represent the people of Guinea-Bissau (GB).

In 1973, Cabral decided to make a smart move: the unilateral declaration of

independence. As a result of his diplomatic efforts, that symbolic act, gained immediate

recognition from several states friendly to the Bissau-Guinean cause. However, months

before making that declaration, Amílcar Cabral was assassinated in Conakry (RTP, 2017)

“tragically killed by his own men, as part of a coup against Cape Verdean leadership of

PAIGC” (Tomás, 2012). Despite his death, the struggle for self-determination continued,

and on 24 September 1973, the new PAIGC leadership, declared unilaterally the

independence. In the following months, the independent GB was recognized by several

countries (Andrade, 1974), most of whom from the African states aligned with Moscow

and by the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA, 1973). Meanwhile, the fight against

Portuguese forces continued, without showing any signs of subsiding. In April 1974, the

Portuguese Army staged a coup d’état in Lisbon, overthrowing the dictatorship regime,

opening the way to democracy. Soon after that, the new regime decided to recognize the

right to self-determination to all so-called “overseas provinces”. Guinea-Bissau was the

first to be recognized as a sovereign state, on 10 September 1974. This recognition of

independence, was followed by most UN member states, and on 17 September 1974, the

United Nations Security Council (UNSC RES 356, August 12, 1974), recognized the UN

membership to Republic of Guinea-Bissau. Relations between Portugal and GB have ever

since become cordial, and there is a significant diaspora of Bissau-Guineans living in

Portugal.

During its first 17 years of independence, GB was run by an autocratic, Soviet-inspired,

single-party regime. As its name suggests, the PAIGC’s political project foresaw that

Guinea-Bissau and Cabo Verde, initially constituted as separate states, would tend

towards unification. Although existing as two sovereign states, they were to be governed

by the same political party (fact that apparently, was not consensual within the PAIGC).

This idealistic concept lasted until 1980. On 14 November 1980, a coup d’état in GB

overthrew the first President Luís Cabral (Teixeira, 2010), suspended the constitution,

instituting the Council of the Revolution, formed by military and civilians. This coup d’état

marked the end of the project of unification of the two countries. Nevertheless, Cabo

Verde and Guinea-Bissau after 1981 (when the PAICV - Partido Africano da

Independência de Cabo Verde - was born), both states have always maintained good

diplomatic relations. After the fall of the Berlin Wall, as most of the states supported by

the Soviet Union, GB entered a deep economic crisis. To overcome this crisis, the

government resorted to soliciting the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund

(IMF) financing. However, this option implied adherence to the neoliberal development

model, which, in turn, resulted in the reform of the political regime and facilitated a multi-

party system.

In 1998–1999 there was another coup d’état (Teixeira, 2010), followed by a bloody civil

war that ousted President Nino Vieira (who had carried out the 1980 coup d’état). In