Moscow’s Supremacy in Bilateral Energy Relations (1999-2008)
About Russia’s relative superiority over China, until the beginning of the 2000s, with the
amount of oil in energy trade, Akçadağ Alagöz (2019: 58) underlines that Russia was
more advantageous than that of the West and China in energy relations for a while, when
Yukos started to sell 500 thousand tons of oil annually by the railroad. However, Russia
became even more advantageous with the signing of a 5-year oil delivery contract
between Rosneft and CNPC in 2004 for 48.4 million tons of oil to be transported by rail
(Shadrina, 2016: 29). So much so that, China, which paid $14 per barrel for around 500
thousand tons of oil annually in the late 1990s, started to import 292 thousand barrels
of oil per day at $72 in 2007. So, this factor put Russia in a more advantageous position
over China which was experiencing external dependence at those years (Lubina, 2017:
289).
In March 2006, the parties signed a series of cooperative agreements covering joint
projects in the fields of energy. Among these the most important were the agreement
signed with Gazprom for the natural gas pipeline, as well as a protocol between Transneft
and CNPC on the construction of the oil pipeline (Jakobson et al., 2011: 29). However,
initiatives for projects, which were formalized with the preliminary protocol and
memorandum of understanding signed at that time, were subject to delays due to several
reasons. The delays were caused by Russian part. Russia attributed the delay of the oil
pipeline project to the concerns that there may be price disputes regarding natural gas
appear as one of the important factors. Considered in the context of Russia’s pricing
policy, the ongoing negotiations between the parties regarding the purchase of natural
gas stalled because in 2007, the CNPC offered Gazprom a figure well below 60 percent
of the unit price of gas sold to Europe. So much so that the figure suggested by the CNPC
for the natural gas that Gazprom sold to Europe at 13-14 dollars per unit in 2007 was
$5.28, and such a demand was undoubtedly not accepted by Moscow (Downs, 2010:
156). It is evident that Russia's dominance during this period granted it significant
bargaining power in the field of energy diplomacy.
Sensitivity and Its Impact on Bilateral Energy Relations (2008-2013)
During this period, Russia's sensitivities increased, and bilateral relations were affected.
In this direction, 2008 was an important turning point in bilateral relations. From this
year Russia started to see the Asian market as an opportunity and included in its energy
strategy to direct 20-25 percent of its total energy exports to this region until 2030. This
was largely due to Russia’s emergence from military conflict and the fact that it had
suffered great losses from the economic crisis. These losses for Russia are as serious as
the lack of capital required for a pipeline project to the east (Røseth, 2017: 36). So much
so that the problem in those years was serious enough to limit Russia's capabilities. The
solution to the problem came with the signing of the oil loan agreement in February 2009,
which was one of the most important tools of China’s energy security policies. With the
signed agreement, Rosneft and Transneft, which received $25 billion loan from the China
Development Bank, committed to exporting 15 million tons of oil to China annually for
20 years, starting in 2011, starting pipeline works, and cooperating with CNPC on the
development of oil fields. This development is extremely important in terms of the