The British Council – like many public sector organizations facing a tight public fisc –
presumably needed to reinvent itself. The 2010 report on Science Diplomacy launched
by the Royal Society and AAAS attracted world-wide attention and has achieved
considerable traction as a policy narrative. The Knowledge Diplomacy report appears to
emulate that earlier process. For the Council, the ‘knowledge diplomacy’ framework
represented a way for the Council to enliven its image, refresh one branch of activities
and re-establish its utility for the UK public sector.
For the UK government, the ‘knowledge diplomacy’ framework becomes a new tool to re-
present itself among international constituencies. In a post-Brexit context, the KD
framework dovetails with the official government narrative of ‘Global Britain’ and UK
aspirations of international leadership, outside the European Union, in areas of
innovation, global services, R&D (research and development) and education.
For HEIs in general, the discourse potentially represents a new way to articulate their
societal and economic relevance to both the public at large and their governments. This
is especially the case for those UK universities that have been at the forefront positing
‘knowledge diplomacy’ as a route towards policy impact and relevance in world affairs
(University of London Institute in Paris, 2020-22). Adding another layer of professional
imagery of the role HEIs as potential diplomats, is perhaps to be expected when HEIs of
many countries need to justify their utility to society and economy. HEIs might even be
said to have an institutional self-interest in knowledge diplomacy. This is witnessed in
the various blog discussions (IIAS-The Blog,2022), seminar series and research
programs (University of London Institute in Paris, 2020-22), or other KD initiatives
undertaken by HEIs or researchers and staff in them. Such initiatives provide intellectual
space for reflection on the role of the university in contemporary world affairs.
From an IR and a policy sciences perspective (with its extensive work on evidence-based
policy), the knowledge diplomacy framework raises some troubling questions. Knowledge
diplomacy is poised as an alternative to ‘soft power’. Following Nye, the latter is
presented as tactics of “attraction and persuasion” by states (instead of hard power
tactics of dominance and control) for the promotion and self-interest of the state (ime,
2023). Rather than the pursuit of state “supremacy”, knowledge diplomacy is
represented as “based on values of reciprocity, mutuality, understanding and
compromise”: that is, KD is not “framed in a ‘power paradigm’ like soft power” (British
Council & Knight, 2019: 6-7).
Many would agree that international scientific endeavours are indeed based on
cooperation while educational processes are based on mutuality and understanding. But
this is where KD starts to ‘float’; the fungibility of the language and lexicon of diplomacy
contributes to the conceptual stretching of its traditional meanings beyond being the
activity of state appointed consuls and diplomats, ambassadors and ‘high
representatives’ of MFAs and international organisations. For instance, the concept of
“policy ambassadors” – developed in public policy studies of the circulation of governance
models and the international diffusion of policy models – is another concept which
emphasizes communication and international exchange that can be undertaken by
government officials as well as non-state actors (Porto D’Oliveira, 2021). Likewise, there
is often use of phrases like ‘student ambassador’ or ‘open science ambassador’ in