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ASIA-EUROPE ENGAGEMENTS IN SCIENCE, INNOVATION AND EDUCATION

EXCHANGE: THE LIMITS OF KNOWLEDGE IN DIPLOMACY

DIANE STONE

diane.stone@eui.eu

Chair of Global Policy at the Florence School of Transnational Governance of the European

University Institute (Italy). Previously she was Dean of the School of Public Policy at Central

European University in Hungary, and Centenary Professor of Governance and Policy Analysis at

the University of Canberra.

Abstract

As an interpretative lens for understanding Asia-Europe knowledge exchange in higher

education, science and innovation, this paper contests the ‘knowledge diplomacy’ framework.

First, knowledge diplomacy is a ‘floating signifier’ that homogenises the distinct differences

between science diplomacy, education diplomacy and innovation diplomacy. Second, the term

depoliticizes diplomacy in its attempt subtract politics from knowledge relations in world

affairs. Third, the KD framework is overly normative as it portrays positive and benign

outcomes of exchange to the neglect of the conflict, competition, and confrontations that exist

within and between Higher Education Institutions and scientific communities.

Keywords

Asia-Europe Meeting, Higher Education, Science Diplomacy, Statecraft, Think Tank, Track-

Two Diplomacy.

Resumo

Como lente interpretativa para compreender o intercâmbio de conhecimentos entre a Ásia e

a Europa no domínio do ensino superior, da ciência e da inovação, este artigo contesta o

quadro da “diplomacia do conhecimento”. Em primeiro lugar, a diplomacia do conhecimento

é um “significante flutuante” que homogeneíza as diferenças distintas entre a diplomacia

científica, a diplomacia educativa e a diplomacia da inovação. Em segundo lugar, o termo

despolitiza a diplomacia na sua tentativa de subtrair a política das relações de conhecimento

nos assuntos mundiais. Em terceiro lugar, o quadro de KD é excessivamente normativo, uma

vez que retrata resultados positivos e benignos do intercâmbio, negligenciando o conflito, a

competição e os confrontos que existem dentro e entre as Instituições de Ensino Superior e

as comunidades científicas.

Palavras-chave

Encontro Ásia-Europa, Ensino Superior, diplomacia científica, política de Estado, think tank,

diplomacia “track-two”.

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How to cite this article

Stone, Diane (2024). Asia-Europe Engagements in Science, Innovation and Education Exchange:

The Limits of Knowledge in Diplomacy. Janus.net, e-journal of international relations. VOL 15 N.º

2, November 2024-April 2025, pp. 185-201. https://doi.org/10.26619/1647-7251.15.2.7.

Article received on 29 April 2024 and accepted for publication on 19 September 2024.

JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations

e-ISSN: 1647-7251

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Knowledge in Diplomacy

Diane Stone

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ASIA-EUROPE ENGAGEMENTS IN SCIENCE, INNOVATION AND

EDUCATION EXCHANGE: THE LIMITS OF KNOWLEDGE IN

DIPLOMACY

DIANE STONE

1. Introduction

The notion of ‘knowledge diplomacy’ is the latest addition to millennial reinterpretations

of inter-state relations: ideas of ‘cultural’, ‘diaspora’, ‘education’, ‘museum’, ‘sport’ and

‘university’ diplomacy, amongst other variants. Accordingly, it is worth asking what is

‘new’ about it, who benefits from the use of the term ‘knowledge diplomacy’ and what

purposes this term serves. The first argument of this paper is that ‘knowledge diplomacy’

is a homogenizing term that neutralizes significant differences of style and substance in

its ‘umbrella-like’ inclusion of all things knowledge related. It is a ‘floating signifier’. The

second argument is that the term depoliticizes diplomatic conduct in the realm of

international ‘knowledge’ exchange. Finally, the term is overly normative, presumptive

of positive and peaceful outcomes (Woo, 2023: 692) overlooking the way knowledge

diplomacy – no matter how benign the intentions and motivations of its proponents –

can be instrumentalised and put to work in aid of state interests.

Diplomacy, as a concept in the scholarly field as well as practice of governance, has been

undergoing considerable shifts this century. Public service has been internationalised.

Some civil servants are increasingly being asked to interact with their counterparts

overseas and this activity is no longer monopolised by Ministries of Foreign Affairs

(MFAs). Quasi diplomatic activity is also undertaken by some large international non-

governmental organisations (NGOs. eg. Médecins Sans Frontières), think tanks and

scholars (in security dialogues like the Munich Security Conference), international

foundations (like the Gates Foundation) or diaspora communities as well as via certain

private individuals, for example, ‘good will ambassadors’ for the UN, or networks of

scientists. These actors cannot be classified as ‘diplomats’ in the traditional sense of the

word. Nor do they act with the same power or authority. They have been called ‘new

diplomats’ (Kelley, 2010). But both analytically and in policy terms, there is a trend of

hybridity in how ‘old’ and ‘new’ forms of diplomacy coexist and reinforce one another

(Leira, 2018).

One such evolution has been the recent rise of the so-called ‘knowledge diplomacy’

Knight, 2021). However, there are other cognate terms: ‘university diplomacy’ or

‘education diplomacy’ as well as ‘science diplomacy’. For decades, there has been a rich

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and diverse ecology of educational exchange, research collaborations and scientific

partnerships between Asia and Europe. This paper re-examines some of these linkages

through the lens of the so-called ‘new diplomacy’ (Kelley, 2010; Leira, 2018; Higgott &

Terkovich, 2021). The new diplomacy emphasises the often-innovative role of non-state

actors in diplomacy but does not forget or diminish power dynamics. This school of

thinking is more firmly grounded in disciplines like International Relations (IR) and

International Law, as well as Peace, Security or Global Studies. The recent idea of

‘knowledge diplomacy’ – or KD – is derived from Higher Education studies.

This paper is based on a review of the concept of KD which first emerged in its current

format from 2018. Diplomacy conducted through science, technology and innovation, or

via education exchange is extensive. Accordingly, the focus is narrowed a little through

a focus on some illustrative relations in Asia-Europe contexts – an approach which cannot

be comprehensive due to word constraints. The paper is structured as follows: First it

discusses the idea of ‘knowledge diplomacy’ and older cognate terms like ‘new diplomacy’

and ‘science diplomacy’. Second, it addresses some current Asia Europe initiatives in

this field. Third, some limitations of the knowledge diplomacy (KD) framework when cast

against concepts like science and/or Higher Education Institution (HEI) diplomacy are

outlined. Examples of Asia-Europe ‘knowledge engagements’ criss-cross these sections.

2. Knowledge Diplomacy

In the past 30 years, with the advent of the telecommunications revolution and ease of

transportation, the realm of diplomacy has opened to so-called ‘new diplomats’. They

are individuals, organizations and networks based outside traditional diplomatic

institutions such as MFAs or international agencies. Ever since the joint report of the

Royal Society and the American Academy for the Advancement of Science (AAAS) on

science diplomacy (Royal Society, 2010), variations on the theme that these two

institutions advocated have emerged with studies and investigations into think tank

diplomacy (Bayenova, 2023), education diplomacy (Piros & Koops, 2020), academic,

university or higher education informal diplomacy (Perez-Garcia & Nierga, 2021)

alongside more general studies and perspectives that highlight the role of ‘knowledge

actors’ in either public diplomacy or cultural diplomacy.

‘Knowledge diplomacy’ has been defined as: “the role that international higher education,

research, and innovation play in building and strengthening international relations and,

vice versa, the role that international relations play in facilitating and improving IHERI”

(Knight, 2020: 38) in a two-way process. The core characteristics of the knowledge

diplomacy approach are stated as “collaboration, reciprocity, and mutuality” and are

premised on the notion that HEIs can strengthen relations between countries.

This paper argues that ‘knowledge diplomacy’ is an expansive and somewhat state-

centric frame for understanding world affairs that veils earlier analytical work on different

varieties of diplomacy informed by knowledge actors. The KD framework envelopes what

had earlier been identified as science diplomacy and education diplomacy as distinct and

separate processes. Science diplomacy – such as elaborated by the Royal Society (2010)

in the UK and AAAS – was focused on scientific endeavour and research. These two

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scholarly associations (amongst others) considered science diplomacy to be distinct from

educational exchange involved in international teaching and training programs. These

were seen as more akin to ‘public diplomacy’ or ‘cultural diplomacy’. Likewise, the KD

framework subsumes ‘innovation diplomacy’ which has also been treated in earlier

literature (eg. Leijten, 2017) as involving different actors and interests from business or

corporate research and development facilities.

Consequently, a very diverse range of organizational actors are herded under the more

recent label of ‘knowledge diplomacy’ (eg. Hernandez, 2021: 91). Universities and

colleges, scientific laboratories, professional associations, as well as consultancy firms,

think tanks, the analytic units inside government (at city, local and national levels), the

research departments of NGOs and trade unions are all potential knowledge diplomats.

Similarly, certain international organizations – like the Intergovernmental Panel on

Climate Change (IPCC) or the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) – could

also be identified as platforms for, or engaged in, knowledge (for climate or innovation)

diplomacy (Hernadez, 2021).

Likewise, there is a galaxy of different types of experts and knowledgeable individuals

are subsumed under the ‘knowledge diplomacy’ umbrella. These can range from youthful

groups of students, alumna, faculty on exchange programs through to Nobel prize

winners. Finally, in terms of policy focus, knowledge diplomacy can intersect global

issues that range from climate change, food security, migration, epidemics, refugees and

migration, poverty reduction, and water security. The concept just about covers

everything.

The KD term lacks analytical purchase. It can mean all things to all interests. Too many

different types of individual and organizational actors are lumped in together. The phrase

becomes a ‘floating signifier’ – that is, a concept or symbol that is sufficiently loose and

malleable to mean many things to many people, yet specific enough to galvanize action

in a particular policy context. A signifier absorbs rather than emits meaning.

The content specific knowledge and professional expertise/experience connected to

specific policy sectors is lost under the KD umbrella. By contract, a phrase like ‘water

diplomacy’ or ‘health diplomacy’ at the very least, signals the types of knowledge and

expertise likely to be deployed. Hence, the preferred term of this paper is for the better-

established term science diplomacy (to best accommodate research and scientific

enterprise) or for HEI diplomacy (to accommodate diplomatic affairs related to student

mobility or university exchanges) recognising that there is a significant array of ‘grey

areas’ between the terms.

Nevertheless, it is worthwhile to ask who benefits from the use of the term ‘knowledge

diplomacy’ or to ask what purposes this term serves. The current fashion for the term

can be traced back to the 2019 study commissioned by the British Council that culminated

in the report Knowledge Diplomacy (British Council & Knight, 2019). The KD framework

and the Report were subsequently rolled out at the Council’s Going Global annual

education conferences. Prior to this report, the term was understood in a much more

limited sense as associated to intellectual property (Ryan, 1998).

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The British Council – like many public sector organizations facing a tight public fisc –

presumably needed to reinvent itself. The 2010 report on Science Diplomacy launched

by the Royal Society and AAAS attracted world-wide attention and has achieved

considerable traction as a policy narrative. The Knowledge Diplomacy report appears to

emulate that earlier process. For the Council, the ‘knowledge diplomacy’ framework

represented a way for the Council to enliven its image, refresh one branch of activities

and re-establish its utility for the UK public sector.

For the UK government, the ‘knowledge diplomacy’ framework becomes a new tool to re-

present itself among international constituencies. In a post-Brexit context, the KD

framework dovetails with the official government narrative of ‘Global Britain’ and UK

aspirations of international leadership, outside the European Union, in areas of

innovation, global services, R&D (research and development) and education.

For HEIs in general, the discourse potentially represents a new way to articulate their

societal and economic relevance to both the public at large and their governments. This

is especially the case for those UK universities that have been at the forefront positing

‘knowledge diplomacy’ as a route towards policy impact and relevance in world affairs

(University of London Institute in Paris, 2020-22). Adding another layer of professional

imagery of the role HEIs as potential diplomats, is perhaps to be expected when HEIs of

many countries need to justify their utility to society and economy. HEIs might even be

said to have an institutional self-interest in knowledge diplomacy. This is witnessed in

the various blog discussions (IIAS-The Blog,2022), seminar series and research

programs (University of London Institute in Paris, 2020-22), or other KD initiatives

undertaken by HEIs or researchers and staff in them. Such initiatives provide intellectual

space for reflection on the role of the university in contemporary world affairs.

From an IR and a policy sciences perspective (with its extensive work on evidence-based

policy), the knowledge diplomacy framework raises some troubling questions. Knowledge

diplomacy is poised as an alternative to ‘soft power’. Following Nye, the latter is

presented as tactics of “attraction and persuasion” by states (instead of hard power

tactics of dominance and control) for the promotion and self-interest of the state (ime,

2023). Rather than the pursuit of state “supremacy”, knowledge diplomacy is

represented as “based on values of reciprocity, mutuality, understanding and

compromise”: that is, KD is not “framed in a ‘power paradigm’ like soft power” (British

Council & Knight, 2019: 6-7).

Many would agree that international scientific endeavours are indeed based on

cooperation while educational processes are based on mutuality and understanding. But

this is where KD starts to ‘float’; the fungibility of the language and lexicon of diplomacy

contributes to the conceptual stretching of its traditional meanings beyond being the

activity of state appointed consuls and diplomats, ambassadors and ‘high

representatives’ of MFAs and international organisations. For instance, the concept of

“policy ambassadors” – developed in public policy studies of the circulation of governance

models and the international diffusion of policy models – is another concept which

emphasizes communication and international exchange that can be undertaken by

government officials as well as non-state actors (Porto D’Oliveira, 2021). Likewise, there

is often use of phrases like ‘student ambassador’ or ‘open science ambassador’ in

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exchange programs. The ease of appropriating the language of diplomacy, however, does

not translate into either diplomatic interaction or positive outcomes in world affairs.

To conclude this section, there is a need to put the politics back in and draw back on the

conceptual over-stretching in the KD framework for understanding the role of HEIs or

scientists in international relations or world affairs. Knowledge diplomacy is both a

homogenising and a depoliticising term. It homogenises the distinct differences contained

in older terms such as science diplomacy. Similarly, sector specific understandings of

diplomacy recognise the different actors in each that lead to different institutional vectors

and policy processes that clearly distinguish sport diplomacy from museum diplomacy or

yet again, from vaccine diplomacy.

‘Knowledge diplomacy’ also papers over the conflict, competition, and confrontations that

exist within and between HEIs and scientific communities. That is, conflicts not only in

the competitive trade in educational services but also in other areas like the ‘talent wars’,

the league tables, and the jockeying for prestige in university rankings. There are also

some hot debates surrounding power structures in scholarship such as raised in the

context of decolonising the curriculum. Finally, it must not be forgotten that HEIs,

individual students and scholars, or exchange programmes can occasionally become

diplomatic problems: the most notable example in recent memory being the case of Lex

CEU in Hungary.

3. ‘Knowledge’ Innovations in Asia-Europe Diplomacies

International educational exchange between Europe and Asia is extensive at both the

level of policy as well as in the unilateral initiatives of HEIs, donors, research-oriented

NGOs, and scientific associations. In other words, the range of ‘diplomacy-related’

interactions should not be viewed in a limited sense of only diplomatic training and

scholarship.

For sure, there are several universities and diplomatic academies in Europe and Asia that

have sought to attract both aspirant and early career diplomats into their degree

programs. In Europe, there are well known bodies, like the Clingendael Institute in the

Netherlands and the Maria Therese Academy in Vienna, that provide diplomatic training.

Likewise, the College of Europe at the regional level. These bodies usually function with

close affiliation to the state even if historically some have private origins. In Asia,

traditionally diplomatic academies are closely connected to the MFA and the training of

young diplomats is closely guarded within the state.

The growth in numbers and types of ‘new diplomat’ alongside the broadening of the

diplomatic agenda to a wider range of contemporary issues with new digital modalities

and relative ease of communications has created a market niche for training programs

that are delivered to an international market (not just a constituency of national

trainees). These services come from not only MFAs and select educational

establishments but also many NGOs and the educational and learning units of

international organizations. These diplomatic institutes and academies occupy “an

interstitial field”– they have one foot in education, and the other in diplomatic practice

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and international relations. That is, these are bodies that transgress the convenient

distinctions between state and non-state actors (Kuus, 2022).

The Asia-Europe Foundation is but one key policy instrument in relations between the

two regions. It acts as the civil society outreach arm, or interface, of the Asia-Europe

Meeting (ASEM – which is an informal “political dialogue forum” between the

governments of the two regions). Over the years ASEF has fostered educational exchange

projects. For example, with the support of the Swiss Government, and the

DiploFoundation (which is a more-or-less independent NGO supported by the Swiss and

Maltese Governments), the ASEF runs an annual training event on ‘public diplomacy’ for

diplomatic officials in the region. Designed and managed by Diplo, but delivered along

with other experts, the ASEF Public Diplomacy Training encourages peer to peer learning

among junior and mid-career diplomats and civil servants. One objective was to increase

foreign and domestic publics’ awareness of the ASEM process and ASEF. There have been

other ‘one-off’ activities like the Cultural Diplomacy Lab in 2023.

Education is one of the core areas of activity of ASEF. A flagship project is the ASEF

Regional Conference on Higher Education (ARC). Another interstitial area concerns the

overlap of education with the Sustainable Development Goals where ARC has produced

a report mapping national policies and university practices for ASEM. In yet another

interstitial manifestation, ASEF is institutionally hinged to ASEM through the ASEF

Regional Conference on Higher Education (ARC). The ARC is the Official Dialogue Partner

of the ASEAN Education Ministers Meeting. This has included proposals for capacity

training, benchmarking reports and reporting on the network of university and student

leaders across 51 Asian and European countries. The Asia-Europe Institute (AEI) at the

University of Malaya was also established under the official auspices of ASEM.

In a layered governance architecture, the official intergovernmental ASEM Education

Process (AEP) was formed in 2008 and holds meetings biennially where Ministers of

Education convene. They discuss the two pillars of activity in creating an ASEM Education

Area. One is political involving ministerial commitments. The other is broader involving

various education ‘stakeholders’.

In sum, through ASEF a great deal of educational

exchange takes place not only transregionally but interstitially with the Foundation, ASEF,

as a hinge or link between the governmental and non-governmental.

On the innovation side, collaborative inter-regional science and technology activities are

well developed through the ASEAN-EU Dialogue on Science and Technology. The

Enhanced Regional EU-ASEAN Dialogue Instrument (E-READI) programme supports the

implementation of the EU-ASEAN Dialogue on Green Technology (GreenTech) and

Innovation Mapping. Under EREADI, a series of webinars were organised to promote

The most active stakeholder in the AEP is the Asia-Europe Foundation (ASEF), the only permanent

institution of ASEM. Other stakeholders currently involved (2024) in the ASEM Education Process are:

ASEAN University Network (AUN) , ASEM LLL Hub Secretariat (University College Cork), ASEM-DUO

Secretariat, Erasmus Student Network (ESN), European Centre for the Development of Vocational Training

(CEDEFOP), European External Action Service (EEAS), European Students’ Union (ESU), European Training

Foundation (ETF), European University Association (EUA), International Association of Universities (IAU),

Southeast Asian Ministers of Education Organization Regional Centre specialising in higher education and

development (SEAMEO RIHED), UNESCO, and UNESCO Institute for Lifelong Learning (UIL). https://asem-

education.org/about/asem-education-process/

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technology cooperation and transfer, research collaboration and science, technology and

innovation (STI) capacity building between the two regions.

Also significant are programs like Horizon Europe, as well as previous framework

programs where the EU takes a ‘global approach’ to research and innovation. Bilaterally,

there are also numerous ongoing dialogues and other agreements with Asian countries

such as China, Japan, South Korea and India, amongst others.

Whether ASEF can be re-labelled and categorised as a knowledge diplomacy initiative is

debateable. On the one hand, it is difficult to disentangle some of the intricate (financial)

connections between ASEF and ASEM. On the other hand, many of the participants in

the various projects and events, regard themselves foremost as scholars, students, or

scientists, who are engaged primarily in scientific collaboration or educational exchange.

Such positioning has often been predicated upon academic independence, or at least

distance and autonomy, from governmental and private donors. In ASEF (as well as more

generally) scholars and scientists may well exhibit a reluctance to being enrolled in

exercises of diplomacy, even ‘watered down’ ideas of KD.

The EU and governments in both Europe and Asia use “public‐centric” tools – for example,

educational exchanges, collaborative research programs, innovation networks,

scholarships – most of which remain “state‐based”. In other words, this is an

understanding of diplomacy that is a one-way process from governments to publics.

Likewise, the European External Action Service (EEAS) adopted the idea of ‘science

diplomacy’ primarily in the guise of it being a tool of public diplomacy. The reverse – of

publics informing MFAs or diplomats – is rarely the case.

The desire or capacity, of MFAs or international organizations to incorporate advice,

evidence, data, and research cannot be assumed. Public servants and diplomats are not

‘empty cyphers’ into which knowledge is easily poured. Instead, the EU steers or controls

these educational or science activities through their funding mechanisms or by imposing

other conditions. This means that it may strangle (what Bajenova 2023 refers to as)

“true interactivity and representativeness that would allow for wider publics to become

fully active… participants” in public diplomacy.

The science, innovation and education field is rich with examples of the interfaces

between diplomacy and knowledge creation, but diplomacy plays out through other kinds

of knowledge organizations such as think tanks, dialogue processes and international

philanthropic bodies. The Shangri-La Dialogue (SLD) and the Munich Security Conference

are Asian and European examples respectively of regional dialogue processes on defence

and security with a heavy think tank and academic or expert presence. Founded by the

UK’s International Institute for Strategic Studies, SLD is categorised as “track-one-and-

a-half diplomacy” (Longhini & Zimmerman, 2021). And while academic experts on

security and think tankers are fixtures at these events, their influence is substantially

diluted by the primary presence of government and military officials who control the

agenda.

Regional EU-ASEAN Dialogue Instrument; https://euinasean.eu/cooperation/education-research-and-

capacity-building/

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In civil society among certain NGOs, including their associations and networks, are state-

to-non-state as well as non-state to non-state knowledge exchanges. For example, the

EU-India Think Tanks Twinning Initiative (TTTI) was launched in 2015 as a public

diplomacy initiation of the EU (Winand, 2021). Similarly, since 1997, a scholarly body,

the European Alliance for Asian Studies has been a co-operative platform of European

institutions specializing in the study of Asia which aims “to build high-quality border-

transcending research, teaching and public services, including scholarly networks within

Europe and beyond”. But an aspiration to be of ‘public service’ is a far cry from having

diplomacy ambitions.

Traditionally, large-scale philanthropy has been very important to international

knowledge exchange. For example, German political foundations have been very active

in Asia (Ismail & Abadi, 2017). According to The Economist, there are 896 billionaires in

Asia, more than any other part of the world (America has 746), with a combined $3.4trn

in assets in 2023. Disaggregated information on philanthropic engagements between

Europe and Asia is very difficult to access as the vast amount of giving is directed to

national communities rather than international challenges. Nevertheless, initiatives like

the peer exchanges promoted by the China-Europe Philanthropic Leadership Platform

promote what they call “global leadership” in this sector with the objective to “Enhance

cooperation between Chinese and European foundations”.

Likewise, the EurAsia Foundation (from Asia) is an internationally minded body. Its vision

statement uses similar language to that of the British Council. The Foundation advocates

the “importance of diverse values” and building “awareness through mutual

understanding and exchange with people from around the world” albeit “while

maintaining its neutral stance as a private organization … away from influences by

nations or organizations” (EurAsia Foundation, n.d.). Within the KD framework, the

EurAsia Foundation could conceivably be re-branded as a ‘knowledge diplomat’.

Politically, however, it is not likely to be accepted by the Foundation given the traditional

political and cultural attitudes towards diplomacy being the purview of the state

throughout Asia.

The above examples are merely illustrative of the diversity of connections between

Europe and Asia and in no sense comprehensive. The range of both state-initiated or

guided public diplomacy on STI and education in Asia-Europe engagements is deep and

diverse but is also complemented by the unilateral initiatives of HEIs, their associations

or that of scientific and other bodies. Whether such initiatives deserve the title of

‘knowledge diplomacy’ is disputed in the next section by drawing attention to some

unwarranted assumptions within the KD framework as well as identifying some other

analytical lens through which to view Asian-European knowledge engagements.

https://philea.eu/how-we-can-help/peer-learning/peer-exchange-programmes/philanthropic-leadership-

platform-china-europe-plp/

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4. Educational exchange versus state instrumentalism: two sides of the

same coin?

While the educational features of public and cultural diplomacy in fostering peace and

security have indeed gained recognition and salience in some scholarly and public policy

quarters, its impact is under researched and often over-hyped. This section will raise

just two considerations: (i) Competition and statecraft; (ii) power and influence.

Undoubtedly, there are numerous benefits arising from scientific cooperation, joint

initiatives on innovation or educational exchange but there are also costs to consider and

motives to mention.

Competition and Statecraft

Student mobility has long been seen as a mode of educational and cultural exchange

(Asada, 2019). It is also, for many countries a lucrative trade in services. The personal

pathways of student mobility do not represent knowledge diplomacy. Instead, such

movements need to be strategically networked into specific policy ambitions of more

powerful actors for such mobility to have the potential for diplomacy. That is, the size

and direction of flows of students can be crafted into a tool of soft power.

Erasmus Mundus is one of the most successful educational programs of the European

Union. This program provides scholarships to bring graduate students from outside the

EU to study in a MA or MSc degree co-delivered by a consortium of (mostly) European

universities (Batory & Lindstrom, 2011; Gerards, Schunz, & Damro, 2022). While not

designed as a tool for diplomacy, nevertheless the program has ‘soft power’ outcomes.

That is, in projecting European norms and standards and promoting the European

Education Area as well as leading to a new external engagement initiative with EU alumni

(Ferreira-Pereira & Mourato Pinto, 2021).

A significant avenue of innovation is via university alliance-building through the Belt and

Road Initiative of the People’s Republic of China. Rather than seeing the BRI simply as

a large infrastructure project, it also has cultural and educational exchange ambitions

(Woo, 2023). While there are developmental objectives that promote “connectivity of

Asian, European and African continents” (Chou and Demiroyl, 2023: 4), nevertheless

there are also geopolitical interests of China that are served by BRI. While BRI has led

to several university alliances along the Silk Road, it is also a platform for China to

develop or demonstrate its knowledge leadership and/or proffer and instil its alternative

vision of world affairs. BRI is about “helping China move from the periphery to the center

of the global soft power sphere” and to be “understood as an alternative economic and

political model to Western liberal democracies” (Woo, 2023: 689). Although HEIs may

proclaim their autonomy or scholarly independence of Chinese Government interests,

they cannot subtract themselves, or the KD concept, from their geo-political context, as

even Chinese scholars question (Liu et al, 2024).

Finally, the notion that educational exchange, knowledge co-production and

internationalisation of research leads to peaceful or at least benign outcomes is

questionable. While a cosmopolitan perspective underpins ‘knowledge diplomacy’,

cosmopolitan outcomes may well be illusory. Indeed, one NGO – the Scholars at Risk

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network – might beg to differ given its mission to protect exiled and politically threatened

scholars and to promote academic freedom. Instead, it is necessary to consider how

discord can be sown through educational exchange when considering the highly

competitive trade of education services, or the race for talent in recruitment of scientists,

the censorship and harassment of foreign scholars in certain countries or other issues of

academic freedom. For instance, Confucius Institutes throughout Europe have attracted

negative attention with accusations from host governments that a few individual

members in institutes are engaged in spying, or that the Institute is pressuring locally

based Chinese international students (European Parliament, 2019, O’Neill, 2021).

Another factor is the way states regulate foreign funding and/or presence of international

foundations and grant programs. This is currently the case in India where amendments

to the Foreign Contribution (Regulation) Act (FRCA) represents a securitized approach to

foreign funding with heavy impact on NGOs and think tanks. For instance, the respected

Delhi -based Centre for Policy Research had its FRCA license revoked because it was

receiving “foreign contributions for ‘undesirable purposes’”.

India is not unique: laws

and regulations regarding ‘foreign agents’ are seen elsewhere around the world.

Knowledge Power and Policy Influence

There is a danger of inflating what are essentially international cultural and educational

exchange initiatives into peace projects. That is, ‘knowledge diplomacy’ is currently a

fashionable phrase in policy making around transnational education. But some caution

is needed in ascribing substantive impact on world affairs. And this also entails

unpacking the distinctive varieties of diplomacy to reveal the very different

potentialities for influence, and with whom, that these diplomacies might exert.

Of more utility is the concept of ‘knowledge power’. In their study of Europe, Young and

Ravinet, 2022: 2) advocated knowledge power as the “capacity to act in global affairs

that allows an actor to affect both relationships and contexts of global governance by

mobilizing knowledge.” This perspective allows us firstly to escape the homogenizing

and de-politicising effect of the ‘knowledge diplomacy’ framework as horizontal

cooperation among equal partners, by reinstating hierarchies of inequities in capacity

and resources between countries or among cross-national research teams. Resistances

emerge – for instance, protests in Budapest against Fudan University campus which is

linked to the BRI (Woo, 2023: 693). It also allows refocusing attention to conflicts over

knowledge production and epistemic authority in a post-factual era (Hernandez 2021:

89). Criticisms of “extractive research” or the perpetuation of western epistemologies in

north-south science collaborations long mounted by scholars of post coloniality (eg.

Nisar, 2023) are now hard to ignore but absent in the KD framework.

Notwithstanding well-established bodies like AEI in Malaysia or the EU Centre at Seoul

University amongst many others, it was evident in the (English language) web-search for

this paper that there is a more diverse ecology of European based institutes and think

tanks of Asian studies than the converse. That is, Asia based institutes of European

India News, January 17th, 2024: https://www.ndtv.com/india-news/think-tank-cpr-got-foreign-funding-for-

undesirable-purposes-sources-4880420

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studies. As the EurAsia Foundation (n.d.) also notes: “it goes without saying that studies

to date have tended to view Asia from a Western perspective”. But this claim needs

further empirical validation.

Secondly, Young and Ravinet put an emphasis on global governance where the word

‘governance’ is much more precise and substantive than KD relations. A key element in

the KD framework is its role “in strengthening positive and productive relations between

and among countries” (my emphasis, Knight, 2020: 39). Internationalised knowledge

relationships are cut off from the governance of other countries or international

organizations or multilateral deliberations and summitry. KD floats in a parallel universe

to global governance and international relations as understood by IR scholars (Kuus,

2023, Leira, 2018; Higgott & Tercovich, 2021).

Another KD “principle” is that of “reciprocity” and “mutuality” in collaborations that lead

to “both collective and context-specific benefits accrued for actors and countries” (Knight,

2020: 39). Such benefits could just as easily be cast as ‘(global) public goods’. Public

goods theory is the traditional theoretical context in which public support and government

funding to science and education is considered (Marginson, 2011). In other words,

transnational educational and international scientific cooperation contribute to the

production or delivery of regional or global public goods more so than diplomacy.

The ‘Track 2 diplomacy’ or the ‘informal diplomacy’ of think tanks and HEIs noted above

is clearly a field of policy deliberation where some influence may be found. Yet, there is

now a sizeable literature on Track 2 (T2) diplomacy which notes that this is a relatively

rare or specialised mode of operation (Longhini & Zimmerman, 2021). Very few HEIs

are involved in this type of activity. Moreover, it is generally a process where HEIs, or

experts from universities, are invited into the process by MFAs or some other

authoritative actor like an International Organization. The initiative and the invitation

come from government in more of a top-down process where the process is controlled

by official actors. Accordingly, within the T2 or informal diplomacy theoretical lens of

analysis, knowledge diplomacy would be treated rather more prosaically as Track 3, that

is, simple people-to-people international exchange.

University global engagements like contribution to the SDGs need not be labelled as

diplomacy. Instead, it is feasible to discuss HEI activities with more common-place and

routine phrases like ‘external engagement’, or to describe university initiatives as ‘policy

entrepreneurship’ rather than as diplomacy (Gerards, Schunz, & Damro, 2022: 1242).

The dilemma for diplomacy is that the term become subject to “semantic inflation”.

When the Royal Society (2010) examined cases of ‘science diplomacy’, it was careful to

use precise terms and distinguish between the different modalities of this phenomenon

(EEAS, 2022). Sometimes seen as the ‘progressive front’, the first type, “Diplomacy for

Science” entails diplomatic action to facilitate international scientific collaboration. For

example when the EU and ASEAN negotiate R&D agreements and exchange programmes.

Or when governments establish scholarship schemes for foreign students and scholars.

This is regular and relatively non-controversial form of assistance to cross-national

scientific or educational endeavours.

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The second type – “Science for Diplomacy” – is the use of science as a soft power to

advance diplomatic objectives such as building bridges between nations and creating

good will on which diplomatic relations can be built. This is a modality where states and

IOs tend to be in the driving seat but sometimes HEIs can take the lead. Like the former,

this mode of science diplomacy is oriented towards publics and/or scientific communities.

These two types of science diplomacy are essentially the same as that outlined in the KD

definition on page 2 of this paper (see also Knight, 2022). They align with the ‘motives’

attributed within to KD where KD advocates HEIs and other research and innovation

bodies to pull away from the “power paradigm” (Liu et al, 2024). When power is

subtracted diplomacy becomes a ‘floating signifier’ and what was once understood as

simply ‘international education exchange’ or ‘scientific collaboration’, becomes

diplomacy.

However, the Royal Society’s third modality – “Science in Diplomacy” – occurs when

science (or scientists) provide direct support to diplomatic processes by using their

scientific advice and evidence to support decision- making. This is certainly less public

and less frequent than the other modalities. And this latter form is where political

competition may emerge with the desire of policy makers to keep ‘science on tap’ rather

than ‘science on top’. That is, power is central to understanding diplomacy.

Notwithstanding the “idealistic and normative” nature of education and science, it can be

exploited and replaced with “realist and power competition” notions by some countries

and political actors (Gultekin, 2021).

5. Conclusion

A cautionary perspective on the use of the word ‘diplomacy’ in the context of Asian and

European knowledge relations has been the focus of this paper. This is not to deny the

wealth of practice and partnership that already exists. Yet, the notion of knowledge

diplomacy is not a ‘new route’ for Asia-Europe engagement. It is already a highway of

formal intergovernmental relations with many sets of well-trod institutional pathways of

exchange and mutuality. Notable from Europe are the research collaborations through

Horizon Europe and previous framework programmes as well as the support to science

diplomacy given by EEAS and many European or Asian governments. From Asia, the

Belt and Road Initiative is an economic and political project of the Chinese state to serve

Chinese national interests, But BRI is concurrently, a conduit for information, technology,

and other forms of knowledge exchange.

In sum, the knowledge diplomacy framework functions virtue of being a floating signifier.

Its encompassing definition that covers higher education, research, technology, and

innovation intersects too many domains. The agency and mixed motivations of specific

actors and institutions is de-emphasised. Knowledge is disconnected from interests.

Additionally, the KD approach is normatively naïve in its notion that HEIs and other

knowledge actors play a role in building and strengthening international relations. KD

operates with apolitical assumptions that overlook both the scholarly and political debates

over the instrumentalization of knowledge exchange, the threats to academic freedoms

and the “sharp power of knowledge” (Gultekin, 2021). KD also de-politicises and hollows-

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out the traditional idea of diplomacy which has historically been grounded in the power

of the sovereign state. Power is often seen in interstitial settings (Kuus, 2023).

Consequently, trying to mark clear boundaries between what is ‘knowledge diplomacy’

and what is not, defeats an understanding of the power dynamics in play between

governance and knowledge.

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