OBSERVARE
Universidade Autónoma de Lisboa
e-ISSN: 1647-7251
Vol. 15, N.º 2
November 2024-April 2025
108
THE ACCORDS BEFORE ABRAHAM’S
MARTA RAQUEL FERNANDES SIMÕES LIMA PEREIRA
martarpereira@edu.ulisboa.pt
PhD student in International Relations at the Instituto Superior de Ciências Sociais e Políticas of
the Universidade de Lisboa (Portugal). She has her Master’s Degree in Political Science and
International Relations from the Faculdade de Ciências Sociais e Humanas of the Universidade
Nova de Lisboa. For such she specialized in the relationship between Israel, Saudi Arabia and the
United States of America. Therefore, her interests lay in the Middle East, more specifically in
Israel and its relationship with the countries of the Persian Gulf. https://orcid.org/0000-0001-
8603-134X.
Abstract
By September 2020 the world was surprised with the White House's announcement regarding
the normalization treaties between Israel and two Gulf Monarchies, Bahrain and the United
Arab Emirates. It is imperative, nonetheless, to not consider the Abraham Accords as a
normalization moment isolated from the framework of the relations between Israel and the
Arab and Muslim states. It is important to remember the past peace treaties with Israel,
namely the 1979 Peace Treaty with Egypt and the 1994 Peace Treaty with Jordan. Given that
these agreements already existed, the innovation of the Abraham Accords in terms of
international and regional relations is questionable. Therefore, the research question that will
guide this paper is as follows: How is the 2020 Abraham Accords considered innovative as
compared to the Peace Treaties celebrated between Israel and Egypt in 1979 and with Jordan
in 1994? The main goal of this investigative work is to understand the differences between
the Abraham Accords and the cited Peace Treaties at the sociohistorical level and the impact
on International Relations according to the Theory of the Balance of Threat and the Theory of
the Alliance, both by Stephen Walt. The main argument of this paper is that it is understood
that the Abraham Accords are of a different nature from the 1979 Peace Treaty between Egypt
and Israel and from the 1994 Peace Treaty between Israel and Jordan as the sociohistorical,
geopolitical and geostrategic contexts were essentially distinct, as it is perceived by applying
the Theory of the Balance of Threat and the Theory of the Alliance, both by Stephen Walt.
Therefore, the impact on the regional and international relations of each treaty was
distinctively different. To achieve these goals this study will follow this methodology: firstly,
it is considered a positivist study. Also, since there will be a validation of the theoretical
frameworks used, this study is deductive. It will agglomerate in itself two types of
investigations, descriptive and explicative. It is mainly a comparative study, as the 1979 and
1994 Peace Treaties with Israel will be compared with the Abraham Accords. This study will
also use the processual and diachronic historical method to analyze the before and after of
both Peace Treaties and the Accords. All data will be submitted through discourse analysis.
One of the main conclusions of this article is that both the 1979 and the 1994 Peace Treaties
were celebrated after having lost the war against Israel, which brought on the need for peace
with the Jewish state in order to recover financially. Therefore, these Peace Treaties were
seen as an alliance, specifically, a positive balancing with Israel. On the other hand, the
Abraham Accords did not happen in the context of war, as the United Arab Emirates and
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Bahrain never fought Israel, but in the context of perceiving a common threat, Iran.
Consequently, they allied with Israel on a positive both hard and soft balancing alliance.
Keywords
Abraham Accords, Peace Treaties, Middle East, Israel, Jordan, Egypt.
Resumo
Em setembro de 2020 o mundo ficou surpreso ao ser anunciado na Casa Branca um tratado
de normalização de relações entre duas monarquias do Golfo Pérsico, mais especificamente
entre o Bahrain e os Emirados Árabes Unidos, e o Estado de Israel. Ainda mais surpresa ficou
a humanidade ao compreender o silêncio que emanou dos restantes países professantes do
Islamismo. Todavia, não se deve considerar os Acordos de Abraão como um momento de
normalização isolado no panorama das relações entre Israel e os estados árabes e
muçulmanos. É de se relembrar que ocorreram tratados de paz com Israel no passado, sendo
de se nomear o Tratado de Paz com o Egito em 1979 e o Tratado de Paz com a Jordânia em
1994. Tendo em conta que estes acordos já existiam, coloca-se em causa a inovação dos
próprios Acordos de Abraão em termos de Relações Internacionais e regionais. Portanto, a
questão de partida que guiará este artigo é a seguinte: Como é que os Acordos de Abraão de
2020 são considerados inovadores em comparação com os Tratados de Paz celebrados entre
Israel e o Egito em 1979 e com a Jordânia em 1994? O objetivo principal deste artigo científico
será distinguir as diferenças a vários níveis, nomeadamente ao nível socio-histórico e em
termos de impacto nas Relações Internacionais, entre os Acordos de Abraão e os Tratados de
Paz anteriormente celebrados entre Israel e, em primeiro lugar, o Egito, e de seguida, a
Jordânia. O principal argumento deste artigo é que os Acordos de Abraão são de uma natureza
diferente do Tratado de Paz entre o Egito e Israel de 1979 e o Tratado de Paz entre Israel e
a Jordânia de 1994, dado que os contextos sociohistóricos, geopolíticos e geoestratégicos
eram essencialmente distintos, como é percecionado ao se aplicar a Teoria da Balança da
Amaça e a Teoria da Aliança, ambas de Stephen Walt. Assim, o impacto de cada tratado nas
relações regionais e internacionais era distintivamente diferente. Para atingir estes objetivos,
este estudo seguirá esta metodologia: primeiramente, é considerado um estudo positivista.
De igual forma, dado que vai ocorrer validação por quadros teóricos utilizados, é um estudo
dedutivo. Aglomerará em si dois tipos de investigações, descritiva e explicativa. É
maioritariamente um estudo comparativo, dado que os Tratados de Paz de 1979 e 1994 vão
ser comparados com os Acordos de Abraão. Este estudo utilizará o método histórico
processual diacrónico para analisar o antes e depois dos Tratados de Paz e dos Acordos. Todos
os dados vão ser submetidos a análise de discurso. Uma das principais conclusões deste artigo
é que os Tratados de Paz de 1979 e 1994 foram celebrados após terem perdido guerras contra
Israel, o que conduziu a uma necessidade de paz com o estado judaico de forma a haver
recuperação financeira. Consequentemente, estes Tratados de Pa foram vistos como uma
aliança, nomeadamente, um positive balancing com Israel. Por outro lado, os Acordos de
Abraão não sugiram de um contexto de guerra, tendo em vista que os Emirados Árabes Unidos
e o Bahrain nunca lutaram Israel, mas num contexto de perceção de uma ameaça comum, o
Irão. Consequentemente, a aliança com Israel foi tanto um hard e soft balancing.
Palavras-chave
Acordos de Abraão, Tratados de Paz, Israel, Jordânia, Egito, Médio Oriente.
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How to cite this article
Pereira, Marta Raquel Fernandes Simões Lima (2024). The accords before Abraham’s. Janus.net,
e-journal of international relations. VOL 15 N.º 2, November 2024-April 2025, pp. 108-135.
https://doi.org/10.26619/1647-7251.15.2.5.
Article received on 13 December 2023 and accepted for publication on 7 August 2024.
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THE ACCORDS BEFORE ABRAHAM’S
MARTA RAQUEL FERNANDES SIMÕES LIMA PEREIRA
Introduction
By September 2020 the world was surprised with the White House's announcement of
the normalization treaties between Israel and two Gulf Monarchies, Bahrain and the
United Arab Emirates. There was further surprise considering the silence that came from
the Muslim countries (Perper, 2020).
Throughout the decades, one considers the following statement as a fact: there is an
eternal tension between Arab and/or Muslim countries and the only Jewish State in the
world, Israel. As a matter of fact, right after the birth of the State of Israel, on May 14th
1948, there was a war waged against it, led by the neighbouring Arab States and financed
by other Muslim countries, such as Saudi Arabia (Labelle, 2011). However, when the
Islamic Republic of Iran was established in 1979, there was a change in the balance of
power in the Middle East. The Sunni Arab States began to perceive it as a threat, not as
a country who professes a different religion, but a country with the same religion, but
from a different sect, the Shi’ite. Moreover, the States from the rich Persian Gulf began
to understand that ancient Persia, who had a new identity, aspired for itself something
they also claimed to be theirs, especially Saudi Arabia, the hegemony in the region
(Miller, 2020).
Other external events happened that prompted changes in the relations in this region.
At the beginning of the second millennium, the Obama administration began to place
more importance on the Asian axis than to the Middle East. Moreover, this administration
delivered the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, most known as the JCPOA or the Iran
Deal. This deal would allow the Islamic Republic to produce more uranium for nuclear
purposes (IRNA, 2015). These two policies would prompt two others from another
administration. Trump’s administration would recognize Jerusalem as Israel’s capital
(U.S. Embassy in Israel, 2020) and would later on mediate the Abraham Accords.
It is imperative, nonetheless, to not consider the Abraham Accords as a normalization
moment, isolated from the framework of the relations between Israel and the Arab and
Muslim states. It is important to remember the past peace treaties with Israel, namely
the 1979 Peace Treaty with Egypt and the 1994 Peace Treaty with Jordan. Given that
these agreements already existed, the innovation of the Abraham Accords in terms of
international and regional relations is questionable.
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Therefore, the research question that will guide this paper is the following: How is the
2020 Abraham Accords innovative as compared to the Peace Treaties celebrated between
Israel and Egypt in 1979 and with Jordan in 1994? The main goal of this investigative
work is to understand the differences between the Abraham Accords and the cited Peace
Treaties at the sociohistorical level and the impact on the International Relations
according to the Theory of the Balance of Threat and the Theory of the Alliance, both by
Stephen Walt. To achieve this goal, firstly we will characterize the historical context of
Egypt in 1979 and of Jordan in 1994. Then, we will compare the Abraham Accords with
the Peace Treaties historically, according to the Theories cited above. Afterwards, we will
make a geostrategic and geopolitical description of Egypt in 1979, of Jordan in 1994, and
of the Middle East in 2020 separately, and then we will make the comparison. Finally, we
will assess the repercussions of each treaty on the international and regional levels
according to Walt’s theories.
The main argument of this paper is that it is understood that the Abraham Accords are
of a different nature than the 1979 Peace Treaty between Egypt and Israel and the 1994
Peace Treaty between Israel and Jordan as their sociohistorical, geopolitical and
geostrategic contexts were essentially distinct, as it is perceived by applying the Theory
of the Balance of Threat and the Theory of the Alliance, both by Stephen Walt. Therefore,
the impact on the regional and international relations of each treaty were distinctively
different.
For the purpose of the organization of this paper, following the introduction, there will be
a chapter dedicated to literature review and another dedicated to the theoretical
framework. Then, there will be a chapter explaining the methodology this paper will
follow. Subsequently, there will be three chapters, each one addressing one of the goals
cited above. Finally, the conclusion will summarize the answer given to the research
question.
Literature review
Since the Abraham Accords are a recent event, the literature about them is untimely and
little elaborated. However, it is possible to recognize three major aspects of this event of
the 21st century.
Firstly, we will explore the ideological aspect, which analyses the role of ideas in the
proceedings of these very distinct countries involved in the Accords. There are two
perspectives related to this aspect. The first sees the Abraham Accords revealing that
the normalization with Israel and the Palestinian issue can be two different issues, both
politically and emotionally (Stephens in Sorkin, 2021). Therefore, the ideological
rejection of Israel as deliberated by 1967 Khartoum Declaration has ended. For Israel,
however, there is no more Palestinian veto for the peace deliberations. However, this
perspective doesn’t consider the fact that the Arab countries who signed the Abraham
Accords have no influence on the Palestinian people. Hence, this perspective doesn’t
consider the cultural geopolitical factor. Still, as far as the ideological aspect, one can
study the Abraham Accords from a Pan-Arabist perspective (Segell, 2021). This
perspective’s major goals are cooperation, unity and solidarity among Arab and African
States, and with Israel. According to this perspective, Bahrain, Sudan and Morocco were
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led by the United Arab Emirates (UAE) to start top-down Accords amongst leaders.
However, as there is no apparent popular support for the ideological movement, there
will be no internal and regional evolution towards a positive change. Nevertheless, the
fact that this perspective sees the Accords as driven by elites, it ignores the historical,
geopolitical and geostrategic context, as the economy and the role of society aren’t taken
into consideration.
A second aspect in the literature can be called liberal, which in itself can be divided in
two perspectives. One literally approaches the Abraham Accords considering the human
factor, by studying it has been driven by the populations (Frish in Sorkin, 2021).
According to this approach, the population is tired of asking for pan Arab and pan Islamic
unity and wishes for better economic opportunities, for better welfare, a good education,
innovation, rule of law and equality. However, this aspect ignores the political and
systemic context of the region. On the other hand, there is the approach of the economic
liberalism (Egel, Efron & Robinson, 2021; Kram & Makovsky, 2021; Segell 2021). This
approach sees the economic relation between Israel and the UAE as the powerful
foundation for the Abraham Accords. According to the authors who defend this position,
these Accords will allow for the economies to connect with each other and eventually
reach other Muslim and Arab countries. This expansion will create a more integrated
Middle East, enabling environmental, economic and social challenges to be addressed.
Nevertheless, if one were to truly witness the emergence of a new regional economic
structure, more countries would be willing to sign up for normalization with Israel.
Finally, there are two realistic approaches to this event. The first one relates the
coexistence of a pragmatic side with an ideological one during the creation of the
Abraham Accords. According to the authors (Krieg, 2020; Abdullah, 2021), the pragmatic
side is based on the national interests of the signatory countries, which consist on the
wish for consolidation of power, preservation of economic and military stability, as well
as for scientific and technological developments to preserve safety. The ideological side,
however, desires peace, regional stability and a changing in mentalities. Nonetheless, by
analysing what was revealed, one understands that there is, in fact, just one side, the
pragmatic one, as the ideological derives from it. In reality, when power is consolidated
and developments are made, these will create regional peace and stability, making
changes in mentality possible. The final perspective is characterized as neorealistic, as it
considers the Accords the result of a geopolitical change in the Middle East (Norlen &
Sinai, 2020). It states that, besides each signatory country gaining strategic depth with
the Accords, a resistance axis was also created (Guney & Korkmaz in Kihlberg, 2021).
Consequently, the biggest consequence of the Abraham Accords, according to this
perspective, was the formation of alliances in the Middle East. However, this approach
ends up being a study of the consequences of the Abraham Accords and not the study of
the causes that led up to them.
Main concepts and theoretical framework
There are concepts that, for the purpose of uniformly understanding this paper, will be
conceptually delineated.
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Firstly, it is of extreme importance to say that we will follow the definition of power as
given by Joseph Nye (1990). According to this academic, power consists in the capacity
of affecting the other in order to achieve the desired goals. This author also distinguishes
between two types of power. Hard power, the first distinction the author draws, which
consists in the ability to carry their goals forward through coercive actions or threats.
Historically, hard power is measured by criteria of population and/or territory sizes,
geography, natural resources, military force and economic strength. On the other hand,
there is soft power, which is defined by the ability of shaping others’ preferences through
culture, political values and institutions or moral authority. However, the International
Relations reality reveals the need to use both soft and hard power together. Therefore,
the ability to strategically combine these powers is called smart power. Supporters of
smart power articulate the advantages of hard power, such as the military power,
combining them by investing in alliances and institutions. This way, the key players are
capable of achieving maximum results legitimately.
It is also essential to define the term “geopolitics”. In Flint’s vision, geopolitics isn’t just
a question of countries competing with each other. It is the possibility of competing for
a territory through means other than the states’ practices. Consequently, we will follow
the definition of contemporary geopolitics which is identifying “the sources, practices,
and representations that allow for the control of territory and the extraction of resources”
(Flint, 2006, p.16).
As for the concept of “geostrategy”, to Foucher it means the application of geographical
reason to drive a war and/or create a national defense framework (Foucher, 2000,
p.165). As geopolitics simplifies realities to a circumscribed reality, geostrategy applies
practices to those locations through a military operation lens. It considers the assessment
of external threats and the balance of power according to the interests of the state and
the nation in a spatial, physical and human configuration.
Finally, as for the concept of Middle East, we will follow Tibi’s definition (1989, p.73, in
Ozalp, 2011, pp. 10-11 e 18). The reason for this choice is that the author not only
considers the structural relations and the processes of mutual interaction, but also the
linguistic, ethnic, socioeconomical and cultural frameworks. Tibi, after thinking about
these factors, delineates the Middle East in three subregions: Mashriq, Eastern Arabia,
Maghreb, North Africa, and Khaleej, the Gulf region.
Regarding the theoretical framework, we will consider four key points. Firstly, the region
will be characterized according to International Relations Realism framework which has
the following propositions (Kauppi & Viotti, 2020, pp. 21-24). For the realist, the state is
the key player in studying the anarchic international system. As we can observe in the
Middle East there isn’t a state strong enough to create a central government. It is also
considered that the state is a unitarian player, the government being the agent of foreign
policy. The state is also considered a rational player, which means it drives the foreign
policy by assessing the goals, the alternatives, the benefits and the costs. Finally, for the
realists, the key interest is national and international security, thus examining potential
uses of force and conflicts. As we have understood through the literature review, the
Abraham Accords should be studied considering the calculus of costs and benefits to
protect the national security of the signing states.
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Realism turns into Neorealism or Structural Realism when the main focus is the
international system. Neorealists define the system considering the polarities, which are
caused by the number of international powers and the effects they cause (Kauppi & Viotti,
2020, pp. 34-35). According to those effects, there can be balances or alliances.
Neorealists can be distinguished between defensive or offensive. The latter, led by
Mearsheimer, think that anarchy creates the desire to expand the relative power capacity
as a way of being safe (Kauppi & Viotti, 2020, p.46). On another hand, the former, led
by Waltz, defend that the states desire for survival and safety, are keen on maintaining
the status quo (Kauppi & Viotti, 2020, pp. 45, 46). It is within the Defensive Neorealism
framework that the two Stephen Walt’s theories were created, which will be the main
theoretical framework for this paper (Walt, 1985 & 1989).
Walt’s main premise of his Theory of Balance of Threat is that the states react to an
external threat by creating alliances. A threat, to this author, is not only being a superior
power, but a perceptive one. A state is considered superior and a perceptive threat when
it has more aggregate power (bigger in terms of population size and more innovative
technologically and industrially), is geographically close, has strong military forces and
aggressive intensions. This state becomes the reason to create an alliance between states
who wish to keep the status quo.
There are two kinds of alliances that can be created when a threat is perceived according
to the Theory of the Alliances of Walt. The first one is to create bandwagoning, which is
the alliance of the threatened states to the threatening power who is disrupting the status
quo. The external policy of this kind of alliance is described as belligerent and offensive.
The main purpose is to create effective military establishments and to resort to force in
international disputes. The second type of alliance formation as described by Walt is
balancing. This type of strategy consists in the states allying to the preserver of the
status quo and opposing to the threat. The states create and aggregate power internally
or through external policy. There can be four different types of balancing. Negative
balancing is when the main goal is to balance against the threatening state; positive
balancing is when the main goal of the strategy is to develop the capabilities of the states
involved on the alliance (Morgenthau & Thompson, 1950, in Bock & Henneberg, 2013, p.
8). However, the balancing can also be defined as soft or hard depending on whether the
capabilities developed are military or not (He & Nexon, 2009, in Bock & Henneberg, 2013,
pp. 8-9). The external policy of a balancing alliance is safer and more defensive. Their
main goal is self-preservation, as they wish to survive whereas the strongest state wishes
to expand its influence.
In order to describe the threat and the states in case study, it is considered essential to
make a geopolitical and geostrategic analysis considering Guido Fischer’s factors (Arnaut
Moreira, 2020, p. 4). This academic considers that power must be assessed according to
three types of factors. The first type are the political factors, which include, the position
and the borders of the country, its territorial and populational size, demographics and
culture that influences the state. The next factor is the economical, which takes into
consideration soil fertility, natural resources, industrial organization, technological
innovation, development of trade and financial strength. Lastly, there is the psychological
factor, which considers economical flexibility, capacity to intervene, the preservation and
adaptation of the population.
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Though a geopolitical and geostrategic analysis of the threatening countries, it will be
possible to strengthen the study according to the Theory of Balance of Threat by Stephen
Walt. By characterizing the countries, we will study using these factors, it will be possible
to assess their evolution and distinguish what kind of alliance was created according to
the Theory of Alliances by Walt.
Methodology
As it was revealed in the literature review, many studies about the Abraham Accords
were accomplished by considering either what where their causes or their effects. This
paper has a holistic and systemic approach, as it will study both. Therefore, it is a
positivistic study (Boduszynski & Lamont, 2020, p. 61). Also, as there will be a validation
of the theoretical frameworks that will be used, this study is deductive (Pires, 2022,
p.23).
However, it will contain in itself two types of investigations (Boduszynski & Lamont, 2020,
p.57). Firstly, it will be a descriptive investigation, as there will be an historical,
geopolitical and geostrategic description of the quoted countries and of the region.
Secondly, this will be an explanatory investigation, since it will identify casual
mechanisms through which we can understand the impact of the Abraham Accords on
the regional system of the Middle East.
It is mainly a comparative study, as the 1979 and 1994 Peace Treaties with Israel will be
compared with the Abraham Accords. Therefore, the method of various different systems
will be used, since all the Muslim states have something in common: peace with Israel
(Boduszynski & Lamont, 2020, pp. 91-92).
This study will also use the processual and diachronic historical method to study the
before and after of the Peace Treaties and the Accords. To achieve the historical
description, the process tracing method will be used (Beach, 2020).
As we will try to understand and interpret motivations and behaviours, this is a qualitative
study (Boduszynski & Lamont, 2020, pp. 98-101) where written data will be intensively
studied. All data will be submitted through discourse analysis. Given that the study takes
into account international politics, the segment of discourse analysis that focuses on
politics will be used (Wilson, 2015, p. 779).
Historical context
A treaty and an accord are responses to historical context. This historical context has
characteristics unique to itself and which will influence the appearance of the treaty
and/or the accord and its writing. Therefore, the context itself will differentiate the
treaties and the accords.
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The Israeli-Arab Wars
As it is understandable, to have a Peace Treaty one must have a war. However, as it was
mentioned in the introduction, the Israeli-Arab Wars were extensive. Therefore, for
synthetization purposes, only two conflicts are studied (Encyclopaedia Britannica, 2022).
The first conflict of interest for the present paper is called “Six-Day War”. It was a conflict
between Israeli, Egyptian, Syrian and Jordan forces. Its name is derived from the fact
that it was a war that took place in six days, between June 5th and 10th 1967. At the
beginning of the year, Syria had intensified its bombings on Israeli locations from the
Golan Heights. When the Israeli air force shot down six Syrian jets, Egyptian President
Nasser mobilized his forces to the Sinai Peninsula border. Nasser also signed a mutual
defence pact with Jordan. Israel understood these actions as threats and answered them
with a sudden air strike. In six days, Israel took control of the Golan Heights, the Gaza
Strip, the Sinai Peninsula, the West Bank and all of Jerusalem. The second conflict
understood to be of interest to this paper happened during Yom-Kippur (Encyclopaedia
Britannica, 2023). This is the most holy of the Jewish holidays, as it is a 25-hour fasting
holiday to cleanse the people from their sins. In the 1973 Yom Kippur, which happened
on October 6th, Israel was invaded by Egyptian forces from the Suez Channel and by
Syrian Forces from the Golan Heights. The foreign forces knew it was a fasting holiday
and believed Israel wouldn’t be prepared for such an invasion. However, the Israeli forces
managed to fend off the invaders who retreated to their territories.
Israel and the Gulf Monarchies
As for the Abraham Accords, its context immediately reveals why they aren’t called Peace
Treaties. As a matter of fact, there was never a direct war between Israel and the
signatory Gulf Monarchies. There was also never war between the United Arab Emirates
and Bahrain, the first signatory States. The threatening behaviour of the Gulf Monarchies
we are studying, to Israel was mainly economical, as these states were part of the boycott
movement against the Jewish State (Ahren, 2020). It was because of the Iranian
threat that relations between Israel and the above-mentioned States began. In February
2005, King Hamad bin Isa Al-Khalifa, of Bahrain, stated to the American Ambassador at
Manama that there were contacts between Bahrain and the Mossad (The Guardian,
2011). Just as with the UAE (Traub et al., 2023), the relations developed differently.
Between 2010 and 2018, the Gulf Monarchy tried a soft power foreign policy. That meant
that their emphasis was on foreign investment, human development and climate change.
However, regional events, such as the Arab Spring and the JCPOA, caused the Emirates
to start involving themselves in alliances. Nonetheless, the UAE began to reflect on the
importance of peace existing between the Abrahamic religions and they also increased
Israeli imports in homeland security.
By 2019, everything changed. The UAE decreased the number of men in Yemen and lifted
up sanctions against Qatar. Their main goal would be now to turn the Middle East into a
cultural and economic global centre, developing new technology, science, renewable
energies and artificial intelligence. Therefore, their relations with Israel increased and the
Abraham Accords started to be further developed.
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What do these historical contexts reveal about the Abraham Accords?
By applying the Theory of Balance of Threat to the historical contexts above-mentioned
we are able to understand the important distinction between the Peace Treaties and the
Abraham Accords. From what was mentioned regarding the Peace Treaties, we can
understand that the Arab States understood Israel to be a revisionist state. They
recognized the threat to be the fact that Israel was a non-Muslim country who occupied
a Palestinian territory. Also, as Israel won all the four wars against the Arab states, both
Egypt and Jordan understood the Jewish State to be more developed that them (Middle
East Policy Council, n.d.).
On the other hand, neither Bahrain nor the UAE were threatened by Israel. As a matter
of fact, Israel is geographically distant from the Persian Gulf. For them, the main threat
is the revisionist state of Iran. Iran not only is not a Monarchy, but it is Shi’a, a different
sect from UAE and Bahrain (Al-Ketbi, 2018; Vohra, 2022). Iran wants to export its
revolution to the Gulf Monarchies to liberate the Shi’a who are oppressed, from their
oppressors the Sunnis, who cooperate with the “Great Satan”, the United States of
America (USA).
When we understand the historical context of the Theory of Balance of Threat, we are
also able to understand what was the positioning from each context from the Theory of
Alliance. From the Peace Treaties, we can perceive that for Jordan, who felt unprotected
from Israel, Egypt represented the status quo. Therefore, they formed an alliance. They
wanted a balance of power against Israel (negative balancing). As for UAE and Bahrain,
they see Israel as the powerful and innovative state representing the status quo.
Therefore, they made a balance alliance to develop their capabilities against Iran
(positive balancing).
Geopolitical and geostrategic descriptions
As it was said in the Introduction and in the Theoretical Framework, we believe that
through a geopolitical and geostrategic analysis we can better understand the strengths
and the weaknesses of each state that we are studying in this paper. This rational is
explained by the fact that for a state to involve itself in an alliance, it must understand
that the most powerful state could offer some protection or some innovation that it could
not have by itself. Therefore, in this chapter, we are going to analyse through Guido
Fischer’s geopolitical and geostrategic factors, Egypt and Jordan, by the time they signed
each peace treaty, and UAE, Bahrain and Israel, by 2020.
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Egypt, 1979
Map 1, “Egypt”
Source: https://www.nationsonline.org/maps/Egypt-Map-L.jpg
Table 1. “Guido Fischer’s Factors for Geopolitical and Geostrategic Analysis of Egypt,
1979”
Political
Position
Dimension
Population
Organization
Culture
Borders
North Africa
996 603 km2
37 71 milhões
Tribal
Arab, Berbers,
Nubians
Arab Islamic
Tribal
Lybia
Sudan
Israel
Mediterranean
Sea
Red Sea
Economical
Soil Fertility
Natural
Wealth
Industrial
Organization
Tech Level
Commerce
Finances
Nile River
Natural Gas
Oil
Minerals
Oil
Distribution
n.d.
Oil
Transports
Socialist
Psychological
Flexibility
Intervention
Preservation
Adaptation
Islamism Socialism
Oil
Gas
Regional position
Civilizational
Islam
Sources: Baker, Goldschmidt, Holt, Hopwood, Little & Smith, 2022; Bruton, 1983; EI-Sherif,
1997; World Bank, 1974
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The first Arab state that normalized its relations with Israel was Egypt, in 1979. As it is
understood from the historical context, Egypt, as one of the losers from the frequent
Israeli-Arab Wars, was in a fragile position. The ancient land of the Pharaohs is a country
with strong natural wealth, such as natural gas, oil and precious metals. Also, its soil is
fertile, especially near the Nile River. However, by 1979 its economy didn’t reflect any of
these assets. The riches were invested in defence, which had a very high due to the
conflicts against Israel.
Another weakness was its regime. Up to 1970 Egypt was ruled by President Nasser, who
followed a socialist strand applied to the Arab countries. The name of this movement was
Pan-Arabism and it advocated the political, cultural and socioeconomic unity of Arabs
across the different states that emerged after decolonisation. It was also an ideological
movement taking the form principally of a secular and socialist system. It was similarly
inherently anticolonial and anti-imperial. This political movement, however, caused the
Egyptian economy to become stagnant, as there was no income from foreign
investments.
Jordan, 1994
Map 2, “Jordan”.
Source: https://www.worldatlas.com/upload/e8/2f/72/regions-of-jordan-map.png
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Table 2. “Guido Fischer’s Factors for Geopolitical and Geostrategic Analysis of Jordan,
1994”
Political
Position
Dimension
Population
Organization
Culture
Borders
Middle East
89 318 km2
4 41 milhões
Tribal
Arab
Arab
Islamic
Palestinian
Syria
Iraq
Israel
Saudi Arabia
Economical
Soil
Fertility
Natural
Wealth
Industrial
Organization
Tech Level
Commerce
Finances
Arid
Rocky
Natural Gas
Minerals
Textile
Mineral
n.d.
Tourism
Foreign
Investment
Remittances
Psychological
Flexibility
Intervention
Preservation
Adaptation
Westernized
Small
Monarchy
Modernization
Modernization
Sources: Bickerton, Irvine & Jaber, 2022; Ramachandran, 2004
The second country which normalized its relationship with Israel by 1994, was Jordan.
Its geopolitical and geostrategic context was different, as its weaknesses were threefold.
The first relates to the issue of population. Jordan had received Palestinian refugees since
the Independence War against Israel. Therefore, there was a strong populational
pressure from the refugees, as they feared terrorist attacks from radicals.
Another was territorial. As it was understood from the historical context, the wars with
Israel led to the latter occupying Jordanian territories. Therefore, there was a decrease
in the amount of fertile land available for Jordanian cultivation.
These territorial fragilities had an impact on the economy, as there was a loss of fertile
land. On the other hand, the Arab countries were under an oil embargo, which had a
financial impact on their economies. For this reason, foreign investment from the Arab
countries also decreased.
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United Arab Emirates, 2020
Map 3, “United Arab Emirates”.
Source: https://www.worldatlas.com/upload/af/06/8b/ae-01.jpg
Table 3. “Guido Fischer’s Factors for Geopolitical and Geostrategic Analysis of the UAE,
2020”
Political
Position
Dimension
Population
Organization
Culture
Borders
Arabian
Peninsula
Middle East
71 024 km2
9 272 000
Tribal
Arab
Federation
Emirates
Arab
Islamic
Persian
Tribal
Persian Gulf
Saudi Arabia
Oman
Economical
Soil
Fertility
Natural
Wealth
Industrial
Organization
Tech Level
Commerce
Finances
Desert
Mountains
Oasis
Oil
Natural Gas
Oil
Construction
Tech Parks
Tourism
Financial hub
Psychological
Flexibility
Intervention
Preservation
Adaptation
Tourism
Diversification
Oil
Commercial and financial hub
Bank institutions
Islamism
Tribal
High
Sources: Crystal. & Peterson, 2022
The United Arab Emirates are located in the Middle East shatterbelt (Cohen, 2015, pp.
375, 376). This region is characterized by having multiple ethnicities, races and religions
within the same state as well as in-between states. Therefore, there is a dynamic
fragmentation process, which facilitates the alteration between alliances.
In the UAE’s case, even though the major ethnicity is Arab, there is a diversity of tribes
inside each emirate. Also, besides the majority of the population being Sunnite, there is
a Shi’a minority (Office of International Religious Freedom, 2018, p.2).
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This region lays in the juxtaposition of three continents and is at the entrance of the
Arabian Peninsula through the Persian Gulf. However, its ports aren’t deep, which eases
commercial trade. Besides, its low topography allows for easy land trade routes from the
Gulf to the Levant. This is way the coastal cities of the UAE have always been defined by
the existence of multiple races and ethnicities, from Persians, to Arabs, to Indians, to
Europeans. Therefore, even though it is a small country, the UAE imports foreign
workforce, the majority being Indian and Pakistani.
Something which is unique to the Middle East is UAE’s political system. The different
emirates decided to preserve their tribal and historical identities and create a federation.
This practical decision reflects the trade-off that exists in the UAE. Even though it has a
strong Islamic identity, it is more westernized than other states in the region. History
helped create the coexistence of a strong ability to adapt while still preserving one's own
identity within the UAE.
However, the shatterbelt is also characterized by the existence of natural wealth and
scarcity of essential natural resources. As a consequence, there is a strong chance of
conflict due to competition between regional and external powers. Therefore, the fact
that the UAE is in an unstable region, its instability could affect its political system. Two
ideologies have appeared to use this instability as a means to achieve their purpose.
Iran has tried to expand and become the Hegemon in the region through its unification
under one Islamic Caliphate. However, for the Caliphate to succeed, Shi’a Islamism must
be predominant. Therefore, the Islamic Republic has encouraged the Shi’a minorities to
revolt against their Sunni governors. The UAE has a Shi’a minority both in Dubai and in
Sharjah, and for this reason it fears Iranian influence will cause instability.
The second movement which uses the Middle Eastern instability in its favour is the Muslim
Brotherhood. This Islamist group is eager for the return to the Koran and to the Hadith.
Therefore, it tries to Islamise society (Laub, 2019). It’s already influencing Qatar, which
is a neighbour of the UAE. Hence, the UAE fears the infiltration of the Muslim Brotherhood
ideals in its territory.
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Bahrain, 2020
Map 4, “Bahrain”
Source: https://www.mapsland.com/asia/bahrain/detailed-political-map-of-bahrain-with-relief
Table 4. “Guido Fischer’s Factors for Geopolitical and Geostrategic Analysis of Bahrain,
2020”
Political
Position
Dimension
Population
Organization
Culture
Borders
Persian Gulf
778 km2
2 059
Tribal
Arab
Arab
Islamic
Persian
Iran
Saudi Arabia
Qatar
Economical
Soil
Fertility
Natural
Wealth
Industrial
Organization
Tech Level
Commerce
Finances
Southern
Western
Oil
Natural Gas
Refinery
Commerce
Tech Parks
Refinery
Commerce
Financial hub
Psychological
Flexibility
Intervention
Preservation
Adaptation
Diversification
Oil
Commercial
Refinery
Islamism
Tribal
High
Sources: Smith. & Crystal, 2023.
Bahrain has been specially studied has being a stage for the Saudi-Iranian rivalry.
However, this rivalry has a reason for existing. As a matter of fact, Bahrain has
geopolitical and geostrategic importance, particularly in three aspects.
Firstly, even though it is a small island with only 778 square kilometres (Crystal & Smith,
2023), Bahrain’s strategic location is of major importance. It is located west of the Persian
Gulf, having Saudi Arabia on both its west and southern border, Qatar on the east and
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Iran in the north. Because of this location, the USA headquarters for the Centre Command
of Naval Forces is located in this island (Myrvold, 2022). In addition, because of its
location and common history, Iran also claims this island as its fourteenth province.
Secondly, Bahrain is located on a rich oil region. Actually, this was the first emirate where
oil was first found in 1932 (Crystal & Smith, 2023). However, even though Bahrain isn’t
a prolific oil producer nor a member of the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting
Countries (OPEC), it has one of the biggest oil refineries in the world, the BAPCO Sitrah
Refinary. This company produces a sixth of the crude in the world (Nuruzzaman, 2013).
Finally, Bahrain is a mostly Shi’a country but ruled by the Sunni minority. As Borges
(2019) cited, by 1717 the Safavid empire had its control seized from Bahrain and, by
1783, the al-Khalifa, a Sunni Arab family from Najd, came into power. Therefore, there
is a strong sectarian divide in Bahrain. This was evident in the events of the 2011 Arab
Spring, when the Shi’a majority wanted political reforms to end discrimination (Peterson,
2022). However, Saudi Arabia doesn’t want change for it fears for its political and
economic interests (Nuruzzaman, 2013).
Israel, 2020
Map 5, “Israel”.
Source: http://www.guiageo.com/asia/imagens/mapa-israel.jpg
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Table 5. “Guido Fischer’s Factors for Geopolitical and Geostrategic Analysis of Israel,
2020”
Political
Position
Dimension
Population
Organization
Culture
Borders
Middle East
21 937 Km2
8 424 904
Urban
Jew
Arab
Zionism
Westernized
Egypt
Gaza Strip
Jordan
Lebanon
Syria
Economical
Soil
Fertility
Natural
Wealth
Industrial
Organization
Tech Level
Commerce
Finances
Coastal Plan
Natural Gas
Minerals
Oil
Tech
Chemical
Diamonds
Tech Parks
Natural gas
Diamonds
Tech
Chemicals
High
Psychological
Flexibility
Intervention
Preservation
Adaptation
Tech and Investigation
USA
Zionism
Zionism
Sources: Elath, Ochsenwald, Sicherman. & Stone (2019)
Finally, we will study the country which changed the Middle East. Israel is a surprising
state with four characteristics that are relevant to our analysis. Two of them are related
to its weaknesses, while the other two are considered strengths.
Firstly, Israel is a small state, spanning 470 kilometres. It is surrounded by states that
were hostile when the Jewish State was born: it shares the northern border with Lebanon,
with whom it has fragile relations, the north-eastern borders with Syria, with whom it
has hostile relations, east and southeast with Jordan, with whom it has a peace treaty,
just as with Egypt, on the south (Central Intelligence Agency, n.d.; Elath, Ochsenwald,
Sicherman & Stone, n.d.).
Secondly, its population is over 8 500 000 inhabitants (Central Intelligence Agency, n.d.).
However, the majority of its population are non-Jews: 1.2 million are Muslim, 123
thousand are Christians and 122 thousand are Druze (Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
n.d.). In addition, the country is increasingly westernized, which means that the Jewish
identity is now social, rather than religious. Therefore, the Jewish State doesn’t know
what this identity means (Schweid, 1998).
However, there are two other characteristics which are the main reason for the
normalization treaties. Israel has a strong economy, growing 3 percent a year. The main
strength of Israeli’s economy is its technological sector. Besides producing fertilizers,
pharmaceutical drugs and having a thriving diamond industry, Israel is known for its IT
sector for defence and for medical equipment (Bahar & Eckstein, 2019; Bruno & Chenery,
1962; Central Intelligence Agency, n.d.; Elath, Ochsenwald, Sicherman & Stone, n.d.;
OECD Observer, 2011).
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The final characteristic, which also is a strength, is its dissuasion power. It is important
to say that Israel has an animut policy; this means that Israel doesn’t reveal if it
possesses nuclear power (Ferrero, 2019; Israeli, 2015). However, Israel also has
conventional weaponry power. Its weapons are technologically advanced and military
service is mandatory for both sexes (Wenkert, 2019).
What do these geopolitical and geostrategic descriptions reveal about
the Abraham Accords?
By applying the Theory of Balance of Threat, we understand that, by 1979 and 1994,
Israel was more developed than Jordan and Egypt. Even though Egypt has a larger
territory, more population and is geographically close, its economy wasn’t innovative and
its defence was weak. Jordan was in the same position as Egypt. Therefore, their
intentions, even though aggressive, weren’t as threatening as at the beginning of Israel’s
independence.
At the same time, even though Egypt was seen as a state representing the status quo,
it understood Israel wasn’t revisionist. Although its ideology was different, Israel didn’t
mean to be a threat to the Arab states. In both cases, it was understood that it was more
detrimental to remain in a state of war against Israel or even being hostile, than to
normalize the relations. Therefore, through an alliance with Israel, the status quo was
preserved and Egypt’s and Jordan’s reaped the beneficial consequences. The result of
the alliance was a positive balancing.
As with the UAE and Bahrain, the situation was different than with Egypt and Jordan. The
Gulf monarchies aren’t geographically near Israel. Therefore, even though Bahrain is
smaller and less populated than Israel, it never felt threatened by it. Also, Israel was
never intentionally threatening to these Monarchies. Consequently, it is understood that,
for the UAE and Bahrain to create an alliance, which is both positive and negative (as
their capabilities improved but can also be used against a threat), the threat must come
from another state.
By applying the Theory of Balance of Threat, we perceive Iran as the major threat to
both Gulf Monarchies. Iran not only is bigger and more populated than both Monarchies,
it is also geographically close and has strong military power. Its intentions are clear, since
it claims Bahrain as its 14th province and wants to spread its ideology.
One, then, must understand that, through an alliance with Israel, the UAE and Bahrain
can defend themselves against Iran, benefiting from Israel’s defence and innovative
technology, especially cybersecurity.
The Impact on International Relations
As this is a positivist study that searches for connexions both a priori and a posteriori, as
such it is reasonable to consider the importance of understanding what happened after
the celebration of each accord. Also, we understand innovation by the impact it causes.
Therefore, in the final chapter of this article, we are going to analyse the impact that
each treaty had not only on the relations in the Middle East, but also internationally.
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The Peace Treaties of 1979 and 1994
The main goal of both Peace Treaties was to create peace between the above-mentioned
Arab states and Israel. However, the text of the Peace Treaty commemorated between
Israel and Egypt is different from the Peace Treaty celebrated between the Jewish state
and Jordan. As it is the text that marks the future implications of each treaty, it is
important to analyse it.
Firstly, the element which guides the Peace Treaty between Israel and Egypt is “respect”
(Murphy, 1979). The content of this treaty is filled with concerns about safety.
Subsequently, it seeks to create an international force tasked to monitor the safety
system assigned to the Sinai. It is understandable that this treaty is more safety oriented,
as both countries were engaged in extreme fighting, one trying to annihilate the other.
Peace was being created after years of intense war. Just as with the Peace Treaty
between Jordan and Israel (Satloff, 1995), it emphasizes the terms “partnership” and
“cooperation”. The reason for these concepts being consistent is that the historical
context, as we have studied before, was different. Jordan and Israel didn’t fight each
other for over 28 years. Consequently, both had a better understanding of each other’s
needs and what each understood to be a threat to the creation of lukewarm peace,
without the need for peacekeepers.
Another important aspect about the Peace Treaty with Egypt is that it predicted security
based on reciprocity (Murphy, 1979). This means that each country recognized the
national interest of the other and balanced it with their own national interests. As with
Jordan, cooperation was the main concept of its peace treaty (Satloff, 1995). It is
understandable that the treaty wasn’t only technical, as it established formal diplomatic
relations, but also a road map to develop the political, economic, social, cultural and
human interactions.
With these distinctions, we can recognize that these treaties had a twofold impact. The
first was the impact of Arab states beginning to establish peace with Israel. No Arab
and/or Muslim state had established peace with Israel until Egypt. This event even caused
Egypt to be expelled from the Arab League up until 1989 (Masters & Sergie, 2023).
Consequently, this peace treaty was a breakthrough on the relations between Arabs and
Jews.
Secondly, these peace treaties helped understand the type of peace one can have with
another country. Even though the Egypt and Israel Peace Treaty was a victory, they only
agreed on promoting friendly relations and abstaining from creating hostile propaganda.
No mechanism was created to promote cooperation. On the other hand, the Jordan and
Israel Peace Treaty outlined the means to promote cooperation and highlighted the role
of governments to shape the way citizens talk and think about peace. What’s more, a
special joined commission was developed to examine if the mechanisms were established
and if a public forum was created.
The Abraham Accords of 2020
One major impact of the Abraham Accords in the Middle East was the fact that it revealed
that pragmatic issues in the Middle East can be resolved without considering ideology. In
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this case, normalization of relations with Israel were established without considering
ethnicity, religion and other past events that have prevented the pacification in the Middle
East.
Another important topic of these Accords is that they were celebrated without American
intervention. Even though the Abraham Accords were mediated by the USA, the first
initiative came from the states that celebrated them. The Abraham Accords wasn’t forced
upon by the extra-regional order, but were the culmination of several interactions over
the last decades.
It is also important to remember that the Abraham Accords might have been the start of
a new regional order. According to Kram and Makovsky (2021), as with Segell (2021),
this new order will be characterized not only by the deepening of the relations between
the signatory countries, but also by the enlargement of the accords to other Muslim and
Arab countries. Therefore, the Middle East will be more intertwined, even economically.
Such event would allow the rise of a true economic cooperation which could acknowledge
the resolution of environmental and social challenges. As a matter of fact, after the
Accords the Abraham Fund was created, and it exists for investments in infrastructure
and energy programs. The Abraham Accords always predicted a better development of
the region, as it is cited that the signatories “support science, art, medicine, and
commerce to inspire humankind, maximize human potential and bring nations closer
together” (U.S. Department of State, 2020). This is also noticed with the creation of the
“Joint Statement on Women, Peace and Diplomacy” (Berman, 2021), which desires to
show the value of integrating women in the peace process as well as tries to increase
female influence in human rights issues, sustainable development, security and peace
matters.
Finally, according to Norlen and Sinai (2020), the Abraham Accords are changing the
security geopolitics in the Middle East. Israel, with these Accords, was placed in the
Persian Gulf, near Saudi Arabia. The normalization process with Bahrain allows Jerusalem
to be near Riyadh, as there is a relationship of dependency between the Saudi Monarchy
and the al-Khalifa Monarchy.
What do these impacts reveal about the Abraham Accords?
With this exegesis of the 1979 and 1994 Peace Treaties and the 2020 Abraham Accords,
we recognize that the latter aren’t just the celebration of the normalization of the
relations between Israel, the UAE and Bahrain. Also, these accords are not just the
establishment of diplomatic relations. They are something much bigger.
With the above-mentioned treaties, we can understand that the treaties celebrated with
Israel since 1979 have been instrumental in improving the peace established. By applying
the Theory of Alliances by Stephen Walt, we can better understand how the relations
with Israel have been changing. The Peace Treaty celebrated between Israel and Egypt
is a positive balancing, as it aims to develop their relationship, even if relations haven’t
deepened. Just as the Peace Treaty celebrated between the Jewish state and Jordan, it
is a positive soft balancing. The relations have not only improved, but the national
capabilities have also developed with the alliance established.
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However, the Abraham Accords are not a Peace Treaty. Peace was not established
because there was never war between Israel and the Gulf Monarchies. Relations were
established because they didn’t exist in the first place: cooperation was sought. However,
even though military capabilities are improving with the alliance established between the
signatory states, there is no pressure applied against the revisionary state. This means
that the balancing established is not negative, but positive and hard. However, because
cooperation is more than military, this balance is also called soft. As seen above,
cooperation is happening between Israel, UAE and Bahrain on an economic level, with
the Abraham Found, and on the social level, with the “Joint Statement on Women, Peace
and Diplomacy”. Environmental cooperation is also happening, as at least Israel and the
UAE are creating deals to develop renewable energies (Bell, 2021).
Conclusion
At the end of this paper, one turns back to the research question. How is the 2020
Abraham Accords considered innovative as compared with the Peace Treaties celebrated
between Israel and Egypt in 1979 and with Jordan in 1994?
As a matter of fact, the Abraham Accords is of a different nature than of the 1979 Peace
Treaty between Egypt and Israel and of the 1994 Peace Treaty between Israel and Jordan
as the sociohistorical, geopolitical and geostrategic contexts were essentially distinct, as
it is perceived by applying the Theory of the Balance of Threat and the Theory of the
Alliance, both by Stephen Walt. Therefore, the impact on the regional and international
relations of each treaty was very distinct. This argument will now be dissected to better
validate this.
One of the main conclusions of this article is that both the 1979 and the 1994 Peace
Treaties were celebrated after having lost the war against Israel, which brought on the
need for peace with the Jewish state in order to recover financially. Therefore, these
Peace Treaties were seen as an alliance, specifically, a positive balancing with Israel. On
the other hand, the Abraham Accords did not happen in the context of war, as the United
Arab Emirates and Bahrain never fought Israel, but through perceiving a common threat,
Iran, which is a revisionist state. Consequently, they allied positively with Israel, both
soft and hard. As far as its repercussions, the Abraham Accords aren’t peace treaties,
but the establishment of cooperation on military, economic, social and environmental
levels. Therefore, a new Middle East order might be arising.
This paper might be seen as innovative as it uses both the Theory of Balance of Threat
and the Theory of Alliances from Stephen Walt in order to understand an event, together
with geopolitical and geostrategic analysis. Also, the normalization process between
Israel and Arab states was studied aside from ideological terms, being pragmatic and
realistic. Finally, it is a holistic approach to the Abraham Accords and the Peace Treaties
of 1979 and 1994, by studying the historical and the geopolitical and geostrategic
contexts, as their effects.
For further contributions, it would be interesting to compare the Abraham Accords to the
Saudi-Iranian Rapprochement, and the latter to an Israel and Arab state Peace Treaty to
understand if the rapprochement between Saudi Arabia and Iran is innovative and
plausible.
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