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Universidade Autónoma de Lisboa
e-ISSN: 1647-7251
Vol. 15, N.º 2
November 2024-April 2025
108
THE ACCORDS BEFORE ABRAHAM’S
MARTA RAQUEL FERNANDES SIMÕES LIMA PEREIRA
martarpereira@edu.ulisboa.pt
PhD student in International Relations at the Instituto Superior de Ciências Sociais e Políticas of
the Universidade de Lisboa (Portugal). She has her Master’s Degree in Political Science and
International Relations from the Faculdade de Ciências Sociais e Humanas of the Universidade
Nova de Lisboa. For such she specialized in the relationship between Israel, Saudi Arabia and the
United States of America. Therefore, her interests lay in the Middle East, more specifically in
Israel and its relationship with the countries of the Persian Gulf. https://orcid.org/0000-0001-
8603-134X.
Abstract
By September 2020 the world was surprised with the White House's announcement regarding
the normalization treaties between Israel and two Gulf Monarchies, Bahrain and the United
Arab Emirates. It is imperative, nonetheless, to not consider the Abraham Accords as a
normalization moment isolated from the framework of the relations between Israel and the
Arab and Muslim states. It is important to remember the past peace treaties with Israel,
namely the 1979 Peace Treaty with Egypt and the 1994 Peace Treaty with Jordan. Given that
these agreements already existed, the innovation of the Abraham Accords in terms of
international and regional relations is questionable. Therefore, the research question that will
guide this paper is as follows: How is the 2020 Abraham Accords considered innovative as
compared to the Peace Treaties celebrated between Israel and Egypt in 1979 and with Jordan
in 1994? The main goal of this investigative work is to understand the differences between
the Abraham Accords and the cited Peace Treaties at the sociohistorical level and the impact
on International Relations according to the Theory of the Balance of Threat and the Theory of
the Alliance, both by Stephen Walt. The main argument of this paper is that it is understood
that the Abraham Accords are of a different nature from the 1979 Peace Treaty between Egypt
and Israel and from the 1994 Peace Treaty between Israel and Jordan as the sociohistorical,
geopolitical and geostrategic contexts were essentially distinct, as it is perceived by applying
the Theory of the Balance of Threat and the Theory of the Alliance, both by Stephen Walt.
Therefore, the impact on the regional and international relations of each treaty was
distinctively different. To achieve these goals this study will follow this methodology: firstly,
it is considered a positivist study. Also, since there will be a validation of the theoretical
frameworks used, this study is deductive. It will agglomerate in itself two types of
investigations, descriptive and explicative. It is mainly a comparative study, as the 1979 and
1994 Peace Treaties with Israel will be compared with the Abraham Accords. This study will
also use the processual and diachronic historical method to analyze the before and after of
both Peace Treaties and the Accords. All data will be submitted through discourse analysis.
One of the main conclusions of this article is that both the 1979 and the 1994 Peace Treaties
were celebrated after having lost the war against Israel, which brought on the need for peace
with the Jewish state in order to recover financially. Therefore, these Peace Treaties were
seen as an alliance, specifically, a positive balancing with Israel. On the other hand, the
Abraham Accords did not happen in the context of war, as the United Arab Emirates and
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e-ISSN: 1647-7251
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Bahrain never fought Israel, but in the context of perceiving a common threat, Iran.
Consequently, they allied with Israel on a positive both hard and soft balancing alliance.
Keywords
Abraham Accords, Peace Treaties, Middle East, Israel, Jordan, Egypt.
Resumo
Em setembro de 2020 o mundo ficou surpreso ao ser anunciado na Casa Branca um tratado
de normalização de relações entre duas monarquias do Golfo Pérsico, mais especificamente
entre o Bahrain e os Emirados Árabes Unidos, e o Estado de Israel. Ainda mais surpresa ficou
a humanidade ao compreender o silêncio que emanou dos restantes países professantes do
Islamismo. Todavia, não se deve considerar os Acordos de Abraão como um momento de
normalização isolado no panorama das relações entre Israel e os estados árabes e
muçulmanos. É de se relembrar que ocorreram tratados de paz com Israel no passado, sendo
de se nomear o Tratado de Paz com o Egito em 1979 e o Tratado de Paz com a Jordânia em
1994. Tendo em conta que estes acordos existiam, coloca-se em causa a inovação dos
próprios Acordos de Abraão em termos de Relações Internacionais e regionais. Portanto, a
questão de partida que guiará este artigo é a seguinte: Como é que os Acordos de Abraão de
2020 são considerados inovadores em comparação com os Tratados de Paz celebrados entre
Israel e o Egito em 1979 e com a Jordânia em 1994? O objetivo principal deste artigo científico
será distinguir as diferenças a vários níveis, nomeadamente ao nível socio-histórico e em
termos de impacto nas Relações Internacionais, entre os Acordos de Abraão e os Tratados de
Paz anteriormente celebrados entre Israel e, em primeiro lugar, o Egito, e de seguida, a
Jordânia. O principal argumento deste artigo é que os Acordos de Abraão são de uma natureza
diferente do Tratado de Paz entre o Egito e Israel de 1979 e o Tratado de Paz entre Israel e
a Jordânia de 1994, dado que os contextos sociohistóricos, geopolíticos e geoestratégicos
eram essencialmente distintos, como é percecionado ao se aplicar a Teoria da Balança da
Amaça e a Teoria da Aliança, ambas de Stephen Walt. Assim, o impacto de cada tratado nas
relações regionais e internacionais era distintivamente diferente. Para atingir estes objetivos,
este estudo seguirá esta metodologia: primeiramente, é considerado um estudo positivista.
De igual forma, dado que vai ocorrer validação por quadros teóricos utilizados, é um estudo
dedutivo. Aglomerará em si dois tipos de investigações, descritiva e explicativa. É
maioritariamente um estudo comparativo, dado que os Tratados de Paz de 1979 e 1994 vão
ser comparados com os Acordos de Abraão. Este estudo utilizará o todo histórico
processual diacrónico para analisar o antes e depois dos Tratados de Paz e dos Acordos. Todos
os dados vão ser submetidos a análise de discurso. Uma das principais conclusões deste artigo
é que os Tratados de Paz de 1979 e 1994 foram celebrados após terem perdido guerras contra
Israel, o que conduziu a uma necessidade de paz com o estado judaico de forma a haver
recuperação financeira. Consequentemente, estes Tratados de Pa foram vistos como uma
aliança, nomeadamente, um positive balancing com Israel. Por outro lado, os Acordos de
Abraão não sugiram de um contexto de guerra, tendo em vista que os Emirados Árabes Unidos
e o Bahrain nunca lutaram Israel, mas num contexto de perceção de uma ameaça comum, o
Irão. Consequentemente, a aliança com Israel foi tanto um hard e soft balancing.
Palavras-chave
Acordos de Abraão, Tratados de Paz, Israel, Jordânia, Egito, Médio Oriente.
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e-ISSN: 1647-7251
VOL 15 N.º 2
November 2024-April 2025, pp. 108-135
The accords before Abraham’s
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How to cite this article
Pereira, Marta Raquel Fernandes Simões Lima (2024). The accords before Abraham’s. Janus.net,
e-journal of international relations. VOL 15 N 2, November 2024-April 2025, pp. 108-135.
https://doi.org/10.26619/1647-7251.15.2.5.
Article received on 13 December 2023 and accepted for publication on 7 August 2024.
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THE ACCORDS BEFORE ABRAHAM’S
MARTA RAQUEL FERNANDES SIMÕES LIMA PEREIRA
Introduction
By September 2020 the world was surprised with the White House's announcement of
the normalization treaties between Israel and two Gulf Monarchies, Bahrain and the
United Arab Emirates. There was further surprise considering the silence that came from
the Muslim countries (Perper, 2020).
Throughout the decades, one considers the following statement as a fact: there is an
eternal tension between Arab and/or Muslim countries and the only Jewish State in the
world, Israel. As a matter of fact, right after the birth of the State of Israel, on May 14th
1948, there was a war waged against it, led by the neighbouring Arab States and financed
by other Muslim countries, such as Saudi Arabia (Labelle, 2011). However, when the
Islamic Republic of Iran was established in 1979, there was a change in the balance of
power in the Middle East. The Sunni Arab States began to perceive it as a threat, not as
a country who professes a different religion, but a country with the same religion, but
from a different sect, the Shi’ite. Moreover, the States from the rich Persian Gulf began
to understand that ancient Persia, who had a new identity, aspired for itself something
they also claimed to be theirs, especially Saudi Arabia, the hegemony in the region
(Miller, 2020).
Other external events happened that prompted changes in the relations in this region.
At the beginning of the second millennium, the Obama administration began to place
more importance on the Asian axis than to the Middle East. Moreover, this administration
delivered the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, most known as the JCPOA or the Iran
Deal. This deal would allow the Islamic Republic to produce more uranium for nuclear
purposes (IRNA, 2015). These two policies would prompt two others from another
administration. Trump’s administration would recognize Jerusalem as Israel’s capital
(U.S. Embassy in Israel, 2020) and would later on mediate the Abraham Accords.
It is imperative, nonetheless, to not consider the Abraham Accords as a normalization
moment, isolated from the framework of the relations between Israel and the Arab and
Muslim states. It is important to remember the past peace treaties with Israel, namely
the 1979 Peace Treaty with Egypt and the 1994 Peace Treaty with Jordan. Given that
these agreements already existed, the innovation of the Abraham Accords in terms of
international and regional relations is questionable.
JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations
e-ISSN: 1647-7251
VOL 15 N.º 2
November 2024-April 2025, pp. 108-135
The accords before Abraham’s
Marta Raquel Fernandes Simões Lima Pereira
112
Therefore, the research question that will guide this paper is the following: How is the
2020 Abraham Accords innovative as compared to the Peace Treaties celebrated between
Israel and Egypt in 1979 and with Jordan in 1994? The main goal of this investigative
work is to understand the differences between the Abraham Accords and the cited Peace
Treaties at the sociohistorical level and the impact on the International Relations
according to the Theory of the Balance of Threat and the Theory of the Alliance, both by
Stephen Walt. To achieve this goal, firstly we will characterize the historical context of
Egypt in 1979 and of Jordan in 1994. Then, we will compare the Abraham Accords with
the Peace Treaties historically, according to the Theories cited above. Afterwards, we will
make a geostrategic and geopolitical description of Egypt in 1979, of Jordan in 1994, and
of the Middle East in 2020 separately, and then we will make the comparison. Finally, we
will assess the repercussions of each treaty on the international and regional levels
according to Walt’s theories.
The main argument of this paper is that it is understood that the Abraham Accords are
of a different nature than the 1979 Peace Treaty between Egypt and Israel and the 1994
Peace Treaty between Israel and Jordan as their sociohistorical, geopolitical and
geostrategic contexts were essentially distinct, as it is perceived by applying the Theory
of the Balance of Threat and the Theory of the Alliance, both by Stephen Walt. Therefore,
the impact on the regional and international relations of each treaty were distinctively
different.
For the purpose of the organization of this paper, following the introduction, there will be
a chapter dedicated to literature review and another dedicated to the theoretical
framework. Then, there will be a chapter explaining the methodology this paper will
follow. Subsequently, there will be three chapters, each one addressing one of the goals
cited above. Finally, the conclusion will summarize the answer given to the research
question.
Literature review
Since the Abraham Accords are a recent event, the literature about them is untimely and
little elaborated. However, it is possible to recognize three major aspects of this event of
the 21st century.
Firstly, we will explore the ideological aspect, which analyses the role of ideas in the
proceedings of these very distinct countries involved in the Accords. There are two
perspectives related to this aspect. The first sees the Abraham Accords revealing that
the normalization with Israel and the Palestinian issue can be two different issues, both
politically and emotionally (Stephens in Sorkin, 2021). Therefore, the ideological
rejection of Israel as deliberated by 1967 Khartoum Declaration has ended. For Israel,
however, there is no more Palestinian veto for the peace deliberations. However, this
perspective doesn’t consider the fact that the Arab countries who signed the Abraham
Accords have no influence on the Palestinian people. Hence, this perspective doesn’t
consider the cultural geopolitical factor. Still, as far as the ideological aspect, one can
study the Abraham Accords from a Pan-Arabist perspective (Segell, 2021). This
perspective’s major goals are cooperation, unity and solidarity among Arab and African
States, and with Israel. According to this perspective, Bahrain, Sudan and Morocco were
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led by the United Arab Emirates (UAE) to start top-down Accords amongst leaders.
However, as there is no apparent popular support for the ideological movement, there
will be no internal and regional evolution towards a positive change. Nevertheless, the
fact that this perspective sees the Accords as driven by elites, it ignores the historical,
geopolitical and geostrategic context, as the economy and the role of society aren’t taken
into consideration.
A second aspect in the literature can be called liberal, which in itself can be divided in
two perspectives. One literally approaches the Abraham Accords considering the human
factor, by studying it has been driven by the populations (Frish in Sorkin, 2021).
According to this approach, the population is tired of asking for pan Arab and pan Islamic
unity and wishes for better economic opportunities, for better welfare, a good education,
innovation, rule of law and equality. However, this aspect ignores the political and
systemic context of the region. On the other hand, there is the approach of the economic
liberalism (Egel, Efron & Robinson, 2021; Kram & Makovsky, 2021; Segell 2021). This
approach sees the economic relation between Israel and the UAE as the powerful
foundation for the Abraham Accords. According to the authors who defend this position,
these Accords will allow for the economies to connect with each other and eventually
reach other Muslim and Arab countries. This expansion will create a more integrated
Middle East, enabling environmental, economic and social challenges to be addressed.
Nevertheless, if one were to truly witness the emergence of a new regional economic
structure, more countries would be willing to sign up for normalization with Israel.
Finally, there are two realistic approaches to this event. The first one relates the
coexistence of a pragmatic side with an ideological one during the creation of the
Abraham Accords. According to the authors (Krieg, 2020; Abdullah, 2021), the pragmatic
side is based on the national interests of the signatory countries, which consist on the
wish for consolidation of power, preservation of economic and military stability, as well
as for scientific and technological developments to preserve safety. The ideological side,
however, desires peace, regional stability and a changing in mentalities. Nonetheless, by
analysing what was revealed, one understands that there is, in fact, just one side, the
pragmatic one, as the ideological derives from it. In reality, when power is consolidated
and developments are made, these will create regional peace and stability, making
changes in mentality possible. The final perspective is characterized as neorealistic, as it
considers the Accords the result of a geopolitical change in the Middle East (Norlen &
Sinai, 2020). It states that, besides each signatory country gaining strategic depth with
the Accords, a resistance axis was also created (Guney & Korkmaz in Kihlberg, 2021).
Consequently, the biggest consequence of the Abraham Accords, according to this
perspective, was the formation of alliances in the Middle East. However, this approach
ends up being a study of the consequences of the Abraham Accords and not the study of
the causes that led up to them.
Main concepts and theoretical framework
There are concepts that, for the purpose of uniformly understanding this paper, will be
conceptually delineated.
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Firstly, it is of extreme importance to say that we will follow the definition of power as
given by Joseph Nye (1990). According to this academic, power consists in the capacity
of affecting the other in order to achieve the desired goals. This author also distinguishes
between two types of power. Hard power, the first distinction the author draws, which
consists in the ability to carry their goals forward through coercive actions or threats.
Historically, hard power is measured by criteria of population and/or territory sizes,
geography, natural resources, military force and economic strength. On the other hand,
there is soft power, which is defined by the ability of shaping others’ preferences through
culture, political values and institutions or moral authority. However, the International
Relations reality reveals the need to use both soft and hard power together. Therefore,
the ability to strategically combine these powers is called smart power. Supporters of
smart power articulate the advantages of hard power, such as the military power,
combining them by investing in alliances and institutions. This way, the key players are
capable of achieving maximum results legitimately.
It is also essential to define the term “geopolitics”. In Flint’s vision, geopolitics isn’t just
a question of countries competing with each other. It is the possibility of competing for
a territory through means other than the states’ practices. Consequently, we will follow
the definition of contemporary geopolitics which is identifying “the sources, practices,
and representations that allow for the control of territory and the extraction of resources”
(Flint, 2006, p.16).
As for the concept of “geostrategy”, to Foucher it means the application of geographical
reason to drive a war and/or create a national defense framework (Foucher, 2000,
p.165). As geopolitics simplifies realities to a circumscribed reality, geostrategy applies
practices to those locations through a military operation lens. It considers the assessment
of external threats and the balance of power according to the interests of the state and
the nation in a spatial, physical and human configuration.
Finally, as for the concept of Middle East, we will follow Tibi’s definition (1989, p.73, in
Ozalp, 2011, pp. 10-11 e 18). The reason for this choice is that the author not only
considers the structural relations and the processes of mutual interaction, but also the
linguistic, ethnic, socioeconomical and cultural frameworks. Tibi, after thinking about
these factors, delineates the Middle East in three subregions: Mashriq, Eastern Arabia,
Maghreb, North Africa, and Khaleej, the Gulf region.
Regarding the theoretical framework, we will consider four key points. Firstly, the region
will be characterized according to International Relations Realism framework which has
the following propositions (Kauppi & Viotti, 2020, pp. 21-24). For the realist, the state is
the key player in studying the anarchic international system. As we can observe in the
Middle East there isn’t a state strong enough to create a central government. It is also
considered that the state is a unitarian player, the government being the agent of foreign
policy. The state is also considered a rational player, which means it drives the foreign
policy by assessing the goals, the alternatives, the benefits and the costs. Finally, for the
realists, the key interest is national and international security, thus examining potential
uses of force and conflicts. As we have understood through the literature review, the
Abraham Accords should be studied considering the calculus of costs and benefits to
protect the national security of the signing states.
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Realism turns into Neorealism or Structural Realism when the main focus is the
international system. Neorealists define the system considering the polarities, which are
caused by the number of international powers and the effects they cause (Kauppi & Viotti,
2020, pp. 34-35). According to those effects, there can be balances or alliances.
Neorealists can be distinguished between defensive or offensive. The latter, led by
Mearsheimer, think that anarchy creates the desire to expand the relative power capacity
as a way of being safe (Kauppi & Viotti, 2020, p.46). On another hand, the former, led
by Waltz, defend that the states desire for survival and safety, are keen on maintaining
the status quo (Kauppi & Viotti, 2020, pp. 45, 46). It is within the Defensive Neorealism
framework that the two Stephen Walt’s theories were created, which will be the main
theoretical framework for this paper (Walt, 1985 & 1989).
Walt’s main premise of his Theory of Balance of Threat is that the states react to an
external threat by creating alliances. A threat, to this author, is not only being a superior
power, but a perceptive one. A state is considered superior and a perceptive threat when
it has more aggregate power (bigger in terms of population size and more innovative
technologically and industrially), is geographically close, has strong military forces and
aggressive intensions. This state becomes the reason to create an alliance between states
who wish to keep the status quo.
There are two kinds of alliances that can be created when a threat is perceived according
to the Theory of the Alliances of Walt. The first one is to create bandwagoning, which is
the alliance of the threatened states to the threatening power who is disrupting the status
quo. The external policy of this kind of alliance is described as belligerent and offensive.
The main purpose is to create effective military establishments and to resort to force in
international disputes. The second type of alliance formation as described by Walt is
balancing. This type of strategy consists in the states allying to the preserver of the
status quo and opposing to the threat. The states create and aggregate power internally
or through external policy. There can be four different types of balancing. Negative
balancing is when the main goal is to balance against the threatening state; positive
balancing is when the main goal of the strategy is to develop the capabilities of the states
involved on the alliance (Morgenthau & Thompson, 1950, in Bock & Henneberg, 2013, p.
8). However, the balancing can also be defined as soft or hard depending on whether the
capabilities developed are military or not (He & Nexon, 2009, in Bock & Henneberg, 2013,
pp. 8-9). The external policy of a balancing alliance is safer and more defensive. Their
main goal is self-preservation, as they wish to survive whereas the strongest state wishes
to expand its influence.
In order to describe the threat and the states in case study, it is considered essential to
make a geopolitical and geostrategic analysis considering Guido Fischer’s factors (Arnaut
Moreira, 2020, p. 4). This academic considers that power must be assessed according to
three types of factors. The first type are the political factors, which include, the position
and the borders of the country, its territorial and populational size, demographics and
culture that influences the state. The next factor is the economical, which takes into
consideration soil fertility, natural resources, industrial organization, technological
innovation, development of trade and financial strength. Lastly, there is the psychological
factor, which considers economical flexibility, capacity to intervene, the preservation and
adaptation of the population.
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Though a geopolitical and geostrategic analysis of the threatening countries, it will be
possible to strengthen the study according to the Theory of Balance of Threat by Stephen
Walt. By characterizing the countries, we will study using these factors, it will be possible
to assess their evolution and distinguish what kind of alliance was created according to
the Theory of Alliances by Walt.
Methodology
As it was revealed in the literature review, many studies about the Abraham Accords
were accomplished by considering either what where their causes or their effects. This
paper has a holistic and systemic approach, as it will study both. Therefore, it is a
positivistic study (Boduszynski & Lamont, 2020, p. 61). Also, as there will be a validation
of the theoretical frameworks that will be used, this study is deductive (Pires, 2022,
p.23).
However, it will contain in itself two types of investigations (Boduszynski & Lamont, 2020,
p.57). Firstly, it will be a descriptive investigation, as there will be an historical,
geopolitical and geostrategic description of the quoted countries and of the region.
Secondly, this will be an explanatory investigation, since it will identify casual
mechanisms through which we can understand the impact of the Abraham Accords on
the regional system of the Middle East.
It is mainly a comparative study, as the 1979 and 1994 Peace Treaties with Israel will be
compared with the Abraham Accords. Therefore, the method of various different systems
will be used, since all the Muslim states have something in common: peace with Israel
(Boduszynski & Lamont, 2020, pp. 91-92).
This study will also use the processual and diachronic historical method to study the
before and after of the Peace Treaties and the Accords. To achieve the historical
description, the process tracing method will be used (Beach, 2020).
As we will try to understand and interpret motivations and behaviours, this is a qualitative
study (Boduszynski & Lamont, 2020, pp. 98-101) where written data will be intensively
studied. All data will be submitted through discourse analysis. Given that the study takes
into account international politics, the segment of discourse analysis that focuses on
politics will be used (Wilson, 2015, p. 779).
Historical context
A treaty and an accord are responses to historical context. This historical context has
characteristics unique to itself and which will influence the appearance of the treaty
and/or the accord and its writing. Therefore, the context itself will differentiate the
treaties and the accords.